UNITED NATIONS, THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, SECOND SESSION, FIRST COMMITTEE, PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00697R000300020003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 16, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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PROVISIONAL
For participants only
THIRD CONFERENCE A/CONF.62/C;1/SR.2
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA ENGLISH
ORIGINAL.. FRENCH
Second Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING
Held at the Parque Central, Caracas,
,on Thursday, 11 July 1974, at 10.40 a.m.
Chairman: Mr. ENGO United,Republic
of Cameroon
CONTENTS
Statements on the international regime and machinery
Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of.the four. working
languages (English, French, Russian or.Spanish), preferably in the same language as
the text to which they refer. Corrections should be sent in quadruplicate within
five working days:to the Chief, Documents Control, Room 9, Nivel Lecuna,, Edif`icio
tinauco, and also incorporated in one copy of the record.
AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 16 JULY 1974, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS
WILL BE.23 JULY 1974.
The co-operation of participants in strictly observing this time-limit would be.-
greatly appreciated.
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2
lc z:~ t t y ill : j , after congratulating the Chairman
on his election, said that the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and 4t7
subsoil should be carried out in accordance with the basic principles of international
law in the interests of all peoples and exclusively for peaceful purposes.
It followed from the basic principles of international law that the regime of
the international sea-bed should not affect the legal regime of the superjacent water
and air space which were a part of the high seas, and that each State had the
sovereign right to share in the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and its
subsoil. The geographical situation of a State should by no means serve as a pretext
for any differences in the treatment of member States of the sea-bed organization.
He hoped that the provisions stating that the sea-bed would be used for the benefit of
mankind as a whole, with special consideration for the needs of the developing countries,
would help to overcome to a certain extent the economic, scientific and technological
differences between countries, which was one of the most regrettable legacies of
-colonialism.
The concept of the common heritage of mankind could be defined only in relation
to the basic principles of international law and the other principles laid down in
General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV), and it implied respect for the following
principles: no State should be allowed to exercise sovereignty over any part of the
international sea-bed or its subsoil; a SStaVe could acquire rights of property only
over mineral raw materials which had been extracted; all States should have the same
rights in the exploration and peaceful utilization of the sea-bed and its subsoil; the
interests of the developing countries, land-locked States and other geographically
disadvantaged States should be duly taken into account; States should be held
responsible for activities not in accordance with the norms of a future convention on
the law of the sea. No State or group of States should be allowed to derive one-sided
advantages from an international legal regulation of the utilization of the resources
of the sea-bed and its subsoil; lastly, the traditional uses of the high seas, such as
free navigation and overflight, the right of each 'State to lay cables and pipelines
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(Mr..Wuensch, German Detocratic Re all aie)
in the high seas, and the option to carry out scientific research, should not be
restricted.
His delegation supported the establishment of an international sea-bed
organization whose main functions would be to co-ordinate the activities of States
in the international area, to make the scientific results of those activities
accessible to all States, to organize at the international level the exchange of
experience and transfer of technology and, in particular, to assist the developing
countries in undertaking research and exploitation activities. The organization
should also be responsible for ensuring the equitable distribution of the mineral
resources, with special regard to the interests of the developing countries. All
States parties to the Convention on the Law of the Sea should, of course, also be
able to become members of the organization. His delegation supported the participation
of national liberation movements recognized by regional organizations. Co-operation
of other intergovernmental organizations with the sea-bed organization should be
regulated in co-ordination agreements concluded in accordance with international public
law.
With regard to the structure of the sea-bed organization, he reeormner.;ied the
establishment of a general assembly, a council and a secretariat. The assembly would
deal with the fundamental questions regarding the exploitation of the resource and
the general rules for the prevention of pollution and with all matters connected
with the implementation of the statute of the sea-bed organization, and it would make
relevant recommendations., Due account should be given, in constituting the council,
to the principle of the sovereign equality of States, equitable geographical
representation and the interests of all States and groups of States. The council
would co-ordinate the activities of States in the exploration and exploitation of
the mineral resources, make available scientific knowledge, prepare draft conventions
on problems of exploration and exploitation, prepare budget estimates and submit
reports to the assembly on its activities. The council should also be entitled to
conclude".. agreements with the United Nations, other. intergovernmental organizations
and States on behalf of the sea-bed organization and following deliberation in the
general assembly. Consideration could also be given to attaching a commission to the
council which would deal with the granting of licences for exploitation and prepare
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(Mr. Wuensch, German Democratic Republic)
the decisions of the council. Licence contracts should be concluded in accordance with
international law between the sea-bed organization and one or more States and should
regulate the following: delimitation of the part of the sea-bed and its subsoil to
be exploited; maximum amount of minerals to be exploited; duration of exploration
and exploitation; modalities and the maximum amount of payments in cash or in kind
by the exploiting State; participation of nationals of developing countries in
research and extraction for the purpose of training, and responsibility for damages
arising in connexion with exploration and exploitation. Legal and natural persons
should be allowed to share in the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources
of the sea-bed and its subsoil only on behalf of and under the responsibility of the
State or group of States which had concluded the contract with the sea-bed organization.
Thus, in a relatively short period of time comprehensive estimates could be made of
mineral resources, States could exercise the right to exploit for only a limited period,
in a limited area, a limited quantity of minerals, the interests of all States,
particularly developing countries, would be taken into account through revenue-sharing
and the training of specialists, the sea-bed organization would be able to regulate
the amounts extracted and the distribution of revenues and, in the case of contracts
concluded with States whose international responsibility would be expressly stated,
national and transnational monopolies would be prevented from using licences to gain
maximum profits.
His delegation was prepared to participate actively and constructively in seeking
solutions agreed to by all participating States. It would present its comments on
various questions under consideration as the work of the Committee proceeded.
Mr. PINTO (Sri Lanka), after recalling the part played by the representative
of the United Republic of Cameroon as Chairman of Sub-Committee I of the Sea-Bed
Committee, expressed his satisfaction at seeing him Chairman of the First Committee
and pledged his full co-operation with the members of the General. Committee.
The principal issues before the Committee related either to the fundamental
principles of the international regime or to the structure and functions of the
international authority. In considering the first of those two problems, the Committee
would have to define the limits of the area of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction.
Three different definitions of those limits were included in the alternatives of
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(Mr. Pinto, Sri Lanka)
article I of the text annexed to the report of Sub-Committee I of the Sea-Bed Committee
(A/9021, volume II, page 51). It was perhaps still too early to try to reconcile the
national jurisdiction claims of coastal States and the objections that had been raised
to those claims, and it would be easier to reach a compromise if the Committee reached
agreement on two related question: (1) to what extent and under what conditions land-
locked States and States which considered themselves geographically disadvantaged
might bd'permitted to explore and exploit the area under the jurisdiction of coastal
States; (2) whether a coastal State whose continental margin extended beyond the
limits of the area under its jurisdiction might be willing to share with the
international community the resources and other benefits of the area between the
outer'limits of its own area and the edge of the continental margin. In considering
the first of those two questions, the Committee would also have to consider activities
regarding exploration and exploitation considered from three different viewpoints in
the alternatives of articles 3, 7, 13, 14 and 15, and it would also have to deal with
scientific research covered in article 11. The same divergence of views was to be
found on'the question of scientific research as on activities regarding exploration and
exploitation. While some States advocated freedom of. scientific research, others felt
that it-should be subject to certain controls. Perhaps those who advocated maximum
freedom for scientific research and those who advocated the minimum of controls might
be able to reach a compromise. He also suggested that the expression "scientific
research" should be defiiied as detailed observation and analytical activity which had
as its sole objective a better understanding of the'nature and characteristics of the
area and its resources and of the physical environmental factors.
Another problem concerning principles which arose for land-locked States and
geographically disadvantaged States was that of the right of access to and from'the
area. The convention should specify that the exercise of that right would be the
subject of negotiation and agreement between the States concerned, and it should also
define the expression "geographically disadvantaged States". There would seem to be
few States that were not disadvantaged in some way; only an island with a gradually
sloping continental or insular shelf extending in all directions to a distance of
200 nautical miles, with no neighbouring State closer than 400 nautical miles, could
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(Mr. Pinto, Sri Lanka)
claim not to be disadvantaged. Without making light of the difficulties faced by the
States he was referring to, he drew the attention of the Committee to the need to
define that expression. A transit State with access to the sea might have considerably
less resources than a land-locked State and might try to use its geographical advantage
to redress what it might well regard as a "geological" disadvantage. The interests of
different countries should be reconciled by granting to land-locked States the right
of transit and then providing that the modalities of the exercise of that right should
be worked out in direct bilateral negotiation.
Turning to the second problem, the problem of the organization'itself, he said
that the Committee should take account of the fact that the sea-bed and ocean floor
beyond national jurisdiction and the resources thereof constituted the common heritage
of mankind, and that the area and its resources should be explored and exploited in
the interests of mankind as a whole, particular consideration being given to the needs
of developing countries. The Committee should also bear in mind that the technology and
financial resources needed to exploit the area and its resources and to make full use
of the data and raw materials derived from such activities were at the present time
in the possession of very few States and very often in the hands, not of State
enterprises, but of private enterprises. Those enterprises should therefore be given,
in addition to the necessary funds, the chance to develop, for they would be acting as
agents of the international community. The ocean floor might contain limitless wealth,
but at the present time all that was known was the presence of primarily manganese
nodules, and it was the exploitation of those nodules that should be planned at the
present time. The investment required for the commercial exploitation of the nodules
could amount to about $500 million. Consequently, a system should be devised to
encourage or compel those who had the means to exploit the wealth for the good of
mankind as a whole, subject to controls to ensure that all peoples would receive their
legitimate share of the benefits, that the resources were exploited rationally and
without damage to the environment, and that States were secure against any adverse
economic effects of such exploitation.
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(i'dr. Pinto, Sri Lanka)
The Committee had also to take a decision on which system it would adopt; three
systems had been suggested, all providing for the establishment of a new
international organization. Those who supported the first system conceived of the new
organization as an administrative authority empowered to issue licences for
exploitation to States or private entities and to establish general rules providing
for safe and rational exploitation. Proponents of the second system contemplated
an organization with wider pourers, entitled not only to issue licences but also to
explore and exploit resources with its own funds, equipment and personnel. Under the
third system that had been proposed, an enterprise with a monopoly on sea-bed
exploration and exploitation would be established as an arm.of the new. organization. At
first sight, the'propo's,vd systems seemed very different but, on reflection, the
similarities in. essentials were striking., The sea-bed would be explored and exploited
by entities which already possessed the necessary te,,hnology and financial resources
under arrangements in writing to ensure distribution of revenues and other benefits
anong the members na' the .1:.?+': . i.,,.' c: sl communit~, to ensure safe and rational
exploitation, to protect the environment and, perhaps, to minimize the economic effects
caused by the fluctuation of prices of raw materials recovered through sea-bed
exploitation. The main difference between the systems related to the degree to which
the new organization would control. the activities of the entity carrying out
exploration and exploitation. The Committee should concentrate on that point as soon
as possible to try to gain a clear idea of what the different views were and to
reconcile them.
All the proposals- concerning.the structure and functions of the various organs
that had been submitted to the Sea-Bed Committee and were now before the Conference
envisaged that the new organization would. have at least four principal organs:
a plenary organ composed of all States parties to the constituent instrument, an
executive organ with restricted membership, an operational organ, and a secretariat.
There were different views on the powers and functions to be assigned to the plenary
organ or assembly and the executive. organ which could tentatively be called the
council. Those different views were.-eflected in the alternative formulations of
articles 34 and 36 and referred basically to the location of executive power. The
composition of the council was another basic problem that the Committee must consider.
If the council could be constituted in such a way as to reflect accurately the different
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(Mr. Pinto, Sri Lanka)
political alignments and relative numerical strengths within the assembly, there
would be no need to fear that it would be dominated by special interests acting in
the name of technological or administrative efficiency. Account should also be
taken, however, of the fact that those who for the time being controlled the
technology and resources required for sea-bed exploitation could claim to play a
special role in the executive organ. One of the most important tasks facing the
Committee would be to achieve an internal balance among those different considerations in
constituting the council, while keeping a balance between the powers and functions of
the council on the one hand and of the assembly on the other.
Among the powers and functions proposed for the assembly were provisions in
article 32 entitled "Safeguarding the interests and needs of mineral-producing States".
That question should be given detailed consideration en the basis of the excellent
study prepared by the Secretariat (A/CONF.62/25).
With regard to the very important question of a system for settling disputes
between member States, between a State and the organization, between the organization
and an entity engaged in operations on the sea-bed, between one or more such entities
and between a State and any such entity which was not its national, it was clear that
agreement on a system for settling disputes of a technical or legal nature would
greatly facilitate negotiations. Regardless of whether one supported the idea of a
permanent tribunal or some other formula, it would be worthwhile making an effort to
reach agreement on that point.
Mr. LOOMES (Australia) agreed with the President and others who had spoken
at the previous meeting that it was essential that States wishing to do so, and
particularly States that had not been members of the preparatory Committee, should
have the opportunity of explaining their views on the matters before the Committee.
At the same time his delegation hoped that the discussion would be directed in the
main towards identifying the important problems confronting the Committee and setting
forth opinions as to *.heir solution so as to create a basis for transition into a
subsequent phase in which the different views could be narrowed and reconciled.
Accordingly the Australian delegation now proposed to discuss its attitude to the
structure of the international sea-bed authority.
It was a widely shared view that that authority should consist of an assembly,
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(;,,Tr. . Loomes,Australia
a council, an operating arm and a secretariat, together with a mechanism for settling
disputes. The powers and functions of those organs should be set out clearly in
the proposed convention which must also include certain rules and regulations relating
to the exploration and exploitation of the area. Those were the Committee's priority
tasks, and they would remain essential whether operations were undertaken directly
by the authority, on a joint enterprise basis, through service arrangements, by
licensing or by any of the variations which might be agreed upon.
His delegation would prefer a system in which the functions of each of the major
organs were defined and their interrelationship established in a convention. Above
all, the authority must be so constituted and organized as to function effectively
unhampered by unnecessary institutional constraints.
The assembly should be a universal body comprising representatives of all States
parties to the convention, in which each State had one vote. It should have the
right to discuss any matter within the scope of the articles relating to the regime
and to the machinery and organs thereof. It could also have the following specific
functions, which were not necessarily exhaustive, to be exercised on the recommendation
of the council: to appoint a secretary-general; to adopt the financial regulations
and budget; to fix contributions to the administrative budget; to approve major
arrangements in regard to exploration and exploitation; and to adopt rules for the
equitable sharing of benefits.
The council should be responsible for formulating the policies of the authority,
and should recommend them to the assembly. It should also have a duty of supervision
in order to ensure that the provisions set'out in the convention concerning exploration
and exploitation and related matters were followed. The composition of the council
should adequately reflect the preoccupations of all interest groups among parties to
the convention. Although his delegation still had an open mind on that point, it
was attracted to the formula presented the previous year to the effect that the council
should have about 36 members, of whom an agreed number would be elected by the assembly
and the rest would become members on the basis of various criteria, so as to include,
for example, some representatives from technologically advanced States, some from
coastal States and some from land-locked States, with due regard to the principle of
equitable geographical distribution.
The Australian delegation considered that the operating arm would be central and
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(Mr. Loomes, Australia)
critical to the effective functioning of the authority as whole. The challenge was
to gain widespread agreement to the provisions regulating the exploration of the
area and the exploitation of its resources, the conditions un;1er which those provisions
would be applied, and above all the machinery for making and administering the vitally
important decisions under those headings. Basic differences of view had become
apparent during the preparatory work for the conference. If progress were to be made,
those differences had to be discussed and understood and then defined and resolved.
That was a priority task for the Committee. The leader of the Australian delegation
had set out his country's approach to that question in his statement to the
25th plenary meeting of the Conference, in which he had said that the agency should not
merely be a regulatory or licensing authority, but should be empowered to enter into
other contractual arrangements with States and-also to undertake exploration and
exploitation on its own behalf when it had accumulated the necessary resources and
experience.
His delegation believed that it was essential to develop a system sufficiently
flexible to permit adaptation in the face of developing technology, so that an
effective sea-bed authority of the 1970s would remain so in the 1980s and beyond, The
approach that Australia had put forward in the plenary would serve the authority, and
the nations of the world, having regard to all the interests involved. Furthermore,
the necessary flexibility could be built into the system by providing the authority,
within the terms of the convention, with the necessary power to adapt its methods of
operation in the light of changing circumstances.
To attain that objective, it would be necessary to discuss the issues and
formulate provisions consistent with the principle of the common heritage of mankind,
which would ensure that the following guidelines were reflected: first, efficiency
of operation, second, security of investment following the negotiation of operating
agreements; third, rational management so as to ensure an appropriate flow to world
markets of commodities from the deep sea-bed, having regard to the need to avoid
global over-supply and also to the need to provide a reasonable return for
operators, including land-based producers; and finally that such supplies should be
made available at reasonable prices to as wide a. range of consumer countries and
peoples as possible.
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(r. 1;oo.ne3, Australia)
His delegation envisaged that the authority would be able to enter into a variety
of contract arrangements, depending on its own advancing level of experience, on the
resources available to it and on the requirements of a particular situation. It
should, for example, have the power to decide whether any particular contract
arrangement was preferable in regard'to a particular area. For example, the authority
might determine that the area in question should be exploited under a licence, and in
its early years, while it was developing its own operating capacity, that might be an
appropriate way to proceed.
In' order to cover adequately the various issues raised by the proposals for the
operating arm, the Committee should discuss in more detail such matters as criteria
for opening areas to exploitation, the size and number of areas, the selection of
operators, the conditions applying to joint ventures and other forms of arrangement
(such as duration, programme of work, financial arrangements, reporting requirements,
transfer of technology, participation of representatives of the authority, the
formulation of safety and environment protection arrangements).
It had been proposed that when the operating body had acquired sufficient earned
income and experience it should be able to exercise a right, subject to the approval
of the council, to explore and exploit on its own behalf. The high cost of the
technology required for deep sea-bed mining would probably rule out direct exploration
and exploitation by the authority at the beginning.
His delegation believed that those questions should be central to the Committee's
discussions and that it was desirable to start debating them as soon as possible in
the interest of reaching agreement.
Mr. de SOTO (Peru) was gratified that 1,1r. Engo would be Chairman of the
Committee and that 2,1Mr. Pinto was to chair the informal meetings. His delegation
entir-y approved the organiz,ati.on,of work suggested by the Chairman and adopted by
the Committee at its previous meeting. The decision to have the'informal meetings
undertake a second reading of the documents of the Working Group of the Sea-bed
Committee.was particularly welcome since it would enable delegations which had not
taken part in the Committee to become familiar with the technique used, and put some
order into overlapping or repetitious texts. Existing divergencies should, if
possible, be narrowed down but the Peruvian delegation did not think that the Committee
should spend too much time on that matter, for it might thus risk repeating the
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(Mr. de Soto. Peru)
previous year's mistake of covering too many questions without getting to the root
of the basic problems.
The Committee should, following a quick third reading of the texts Proposed by the
preparatory committee, concentrate on solving the basic differences concernirj the
regime for the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Those difru,nceg
concerned the regime governing activities in the area and the legal nature of the
r
regime; they related essentially to the question who should exploit the internatical
area, which was the first question that the Committee must try to answer.
In that connexion he stressed that his country was in favour of the creation of
an international authority responsible solely for exploitation of the resources of the
international area. That was the position set forth by 13 Latin American delegations,
including that of Peru, in a working paper submitted to the preparatory committee in
1971 (A/AC.138/49). That pcaition had later been taken up in the preparatory
committee by the African and Asian countries.
At the other extreme was the position of various industrialized countries which
with varying shades of difference were in favour of exploitation of the international
c..ea by a system of licences granted without discrimination to national or
transnatione3. firms, or to States. A variation of that method was to grant States
exploitation licences for specific zones.
His delegation realized that the industrialized countries, many of which had
firms capable of carrying out exploration and exploitation in the near future, were
anxious to facilitate access to the area for those firms, but it did not consider that
that would faithfully reflect the 1970 Decla.ttion of Principles in the proposed
convention: i.ndeee his delegation had made it clear that a system of licenc-:s Would
not allow for the joint management which was the essential and perhaps revolutioD+'Y
aspect of the common heritage. Moreover, the work of the Sea-Bed Committee in 1973
had shown that there was no prospect of such a system beir! adopted, since - lArge
majority of States were opposed to it.
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(MMr. de Soto, Peru)
Towards the end of the last session of the preparatory committee, however, a new
trend had emerged on the part of certain industrialized States, in favour of maintaining
a system of licences but accepting in principle that the authority could carry out
direct exploration and exploitation in the area in association or through contracts with
other legal entities. Public or private enterprises 'could thus operate in the area in
two ways: under licence or under contract with the authority. That was merely an
ingenious method of ensuring access to the area for firms, while giving superficial
satisfaction to the developing countries which favoured an operational and
representative authority with the necessary means of control over the area.
His delegation did not believe that such a proposal, which had been submitted as
a compromise, really was a compromise between two extreme positions. The authority
would obviously not survive competition from a?-system of licences. Furthermore, that
solution would be contrary to Peru's position of principle, based on the Declaration
of Principles, and-would also be impracticable.
The industrialized Powers' difficulty in accepting an operational authority
was due to the fact that it would mean an end to the existing international division
of labour between developing and developed countries.. The main overt objection to
an operational authority was that it would need vast funds and technical means which
were beyond its scope. That would be so if those who possessed the funds and
techniques - the industrialized countries failed to place them at the disposal of
the authority. For that vary reason the developing countries would be willing,
without giving up their ideals, to allow bodies possessing capital and techniques to
participate in the sea-bed activities until such time as the authority could,assume
direct, responsibility for such activities. The authority's contribution to such a
co-operative undertaking would be the area's resources which it possessed in the name
of all mankind. The authority should,. however, control operations under appropriate
contracts with the participating bodies. His delegation would accept their
participation only on that condition.
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(-Mr. de Soto, Peru)
There were other questions inextricably linked with the fundamental problem of
the nature of the authority, such as the division of power between the authority's,
organs. His delegation considered that power should derive essentially from the
plenary body, the assembly, in which all members would be represented. The executive
body should be subordinate to the assembly. The authority should include an operating
body, to be called the enterprise, which would be responsible for technical liaison
with the participating bodies and for carrying out activities in the area itself.
Other essential questions were the voting system and the composition of the subsidiary
bodies and the executive body which could be called the council. His delegation would
definitely prefer a purely democratic system. Any method deriving from the Yalta
agreements, which would give preponderance to certain powerful or rich countries, would
simply be i:_compatible with the Declaration of Principles.
His delegation had not touched on the question of the economic implications of
eiploiting the mineral resources of the sea-bed because it was waiting for a
representative of UNCTAD to present the relevant documents prepared by that organization.
Mr. CROSBY (Canada) said that his delegation wished to renew its commitment
to a strong international authority which could ensure that all questions concerning
the resources of the area were resolved in the universal interest, since they were
part of the common heritage of all mankind.
With respect to the type of body within the authority that would undertake
decisions on exploitable mineral resources, despite differences that seemed more
apparent than real one gathered that there was a consensus in favour of a body which
would enter into contracts with competent entities, on behalf of the authority, for the
exploration and development of the resources of the area, especially since the authority
would not be in a position to act on its own at the outset.
Whether the contracts were called permits, licences, agreements or joint ventures,
it was the substantive content that was important, and there would appear to be
various interpretations concerning the definition of such terms.
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(Mr. Crosby, Canada)
The general expectation would seem to be that at an early stage, some benefits
should flow to the authority from whatever activities might be undertaken. The cash
flow would probably be relatively limited at first, but would eventually constitute
an appreciable source of revenue for the development of the area. On the other hand,
operators also would need assurance of a reasonable return on their investments, without
which it would be difficult to envisage ventures being undertaken under the auspices
of the authority.
One of the primary problems in that respect was the nature of the legal contracts
between the authority and the operators. However, seeing that it would be difficult
at the present stage to foresee all possibilities concerning contractual arrangements,
the important point for the present was an assurance that contracts would in fact be
arranged.
There was one field, however, in which regulatory requirements could be tackled
straight away, and that was the supervision and control of the actual exploration and
development activities. All bodies carrying out activities in the area should be
subject to the same regulations designed to ensure the safety of personnel, the
prevention of pollution and the optimum recovery of resources. That kind of control
would require a highly effective body with a limited number of skilled personnel, but
able to call on the services of consultants, thus avoiding the need for a large
bureaucratic structure.
Regarding the fundamental problem of access to the international area for the
purpose of carrying out exploration and development, without claiming to have all the
answers, he thought it would be desirable from the point of view of resource mar-.gement
for the authority to reserve portions of the area, including a proportion of the areas
made available to developers udder contractual arrangements, part of which would be
returned to the authority when the production stage was reached. The authority could
then. hold that part in reserve or use it. It would thus be possible to prevent
monopolization of the richest sectors and ensure that later participants had an
opportunity for access to those sectors. It would also be possible to envisage
working or financing requirements which would help to exclude parties interested only
in speculation.
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(Mr. Crosby, Canada)
A further primary problem involved the production of minerals. Canada, which was
first in world nickel production and third in world copper production, felt that it was
difficult to envisage completely unregulated production: ever- if world-wide effects
were minimal, it would be of small comfort for those countries most affected.
11r. ILLANES (Chile) noted that the world had come a long way since the
discovery, only recently, that an immense area of the glcte was as yet unexploited.
The work undertaken had led to the preparation of the Declaration of Principles
(General Assembly resolution 2'(49 (xx7)), which designated the sea-bed and ocean floor
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as the commrln heritage of mankind, and
referred to the need to establish an international regime, including an international
machinery or authority, which it was now the task of the Conference to establish by
means of a convention.
The concept of a `common he,'itage'7 would serve as the corner-stone of the
international regime and machinery, The importance of the Declaration of Principles
was both political and legal: it was political because the Declaration constituted a
decision adopted by consensus by the international community, and legal because it would
have major consequences for international law. The main implications of those
principles ,were therefore apparent, and the time had come to elaborate them and
translate them into an international regime and rachr,erv.
One consequence was that any exploitation of the area must be prohibited until
the international regime had been estallished. Another was that the exploitation of
the mineral resources must not harm the interests of the developing countries, which
were then:;;elves mineral producers and exporters.
In the Sea-Bed Committee, Chile's delegation had frequently stated its views
on the form which the Declaration of Principles gave to the nature of the future
international regime and of the body that would have the responsibility of applying it:
firstly, the Convention must be universal; it must be based on the Declaration of
Principles, and must reflect the concept whereby the area and its resources were part
of the common heritage of mankind; it must establish an international regime that was
in keeping with the Declaration of Principles and an international machinery with
powers adequate to ensure the application of the regime; secondly, the regime must be
applied to the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national
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(Mr. Illanes, Chile)
jurisdiction, and to the subsoil and resources thereof, whether mineral or living
resources, or minerals existing in solution in the water column; thirdly, the regime
and the machinery - which would represent the interests of mankind, as the proprietor
should exercise not sovereignty but jurisdiction over the area and its resources., the
machinery should therefore control all economic and related activities in the area and
regulate the process of exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and its resources.,
the process of separation and concentration, and even the marketing of the minerals;
it should also combat pollution and regulate scientific research. The essential aim
was to ensure that the resources of the sea benefited equitably the whole of riankind;
fourthly, Chile. took the view that, in.order -to achieve that airn, the international
authority entrusted with administering the.regime should have flexibility and very wide
powers, in order to be able to take action, to manage, to exercise control and to adapt
itself to circumstances.
The draft submitted by the Latin American countries (A/AC.138/'9 ), which in
general corresponded to the African texts and to the definition submitted by the
Group of 77 and read out in. plenary meeting by the representative of Kenya, provided for
an authority of that kind, entrusted with controlling exploration and exploitation, and
empowered to undertake direct exploration to control both the whole process of
marketing and the arrangements for the distribution of profits, to combat pollution and
to control scientific research within the area. The authority would also be entrusted
with distributing the profits, preserving the marine environment, promoting the
development of the area., and undertaking planning and the transfer of science and
technologypr. The Latin American text also provided for an Enterprise" that would itself
be empowered to exploit the area or to call on other enterprises.or establish joint
companies to exploit the resources.
His country considered that such a system would enable the States concerned to
participate in the various activities and would at the same time ensure effective
control over the whole economic process. Under the licensing system recommended by
certain delegations, there would be a risk of departin? from the objectives of the
Declaration by making it possible for the best part. of the. area and its resources
to fall very quickly under the control of large consortia which would not represent the
interests of the developing countries.
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(Mr. Illanes, Chile)
It was important that the future authority should be democratic and represent
the international community equitably. To that end, the Latin American text provided
for an assembly and a council without privileged members.
His delegation felt, f??rthermore, that it was very important that the Convention
provisions should be clear; otherwise the exploitation of the minerals of the area would
be prejudicial to the developing countries which extracted those same raw materials
from the earth and depended upon the export revenue which they yielded. The General
Assembly and UNCTAD had already stated their views on that point, and it was essential
to establish guidelines to ensure that such cases did not occur. The criterion of
'complementarity' to which the Secretary-General referred in his report could be
useful in tackling that question.
His delegation reserved its right to state its views in greater detail on that
point at the appropriate-stage, and wished only to add that the draft convention which
had been considered and revised in second reading by the `orkint' Group clearly
reflected the main problems to be solved. The first concerned the powers of ;,e
authority, which the developing countries - as well as scientists, intellectuals and
various bodies that had studied the question - felt should be broad, under a strop;
regime.
In connexion with those powers, the question arose as to who would exploit the
area and how it would be exploited: the developing countries had replied that they
wished the authority itself to assume responsibility for exploitation, either dire_tly
or by some other means to be determined by the authority itself, but still under its
control; and they had declared themselves to be in favour of the "Enterprise" to which
he had referred. At the some time., the question had arisen as to who would control
the authority. Finally, certain delegations had sought to resolve in advance the
problem of rules governing the relations between the authority and those who would
undertake the exploitation of the resources of the area - a question which should not
be tackled until the fundamental problems had been settled.
He considered that the Conference should concentrate on approving the princip:~l
articles of each question defined by the chapter headings, for those articles provided
the outline of a plan for an international political solution or 'package deal'7.
Except for the problem of limits, which should be settled when the reconwiendations
of the Second Committee were ~.vailable, the part of the Convention dealiru with the
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(Mr. Illanes,Chile)
sea-bed could be the subject of independent negotiations without the need to wait
until other questions had been settled.
In conclusion, he recalled that the problem of the resources of the area had arisen
when those possessing the economic and technical means for exploring and exploiting
them had sought to protect their activities by means of a legal framework that would
guarantee the security of their investments and enable them to obtain loans and
insurance. They were powerful companies which had spent hundreds of millions of dollars
in studies and research and were ready to undertake: exploitation as soon as an
international regime permitted them to do so. They were not only ready but impatient:,
the Conference had been given to understand that any undue delay in establishing a
regime, or the establishment of a regime regarded as contrary to those interests, might
lead to the illegal exploitation of the area. Nevertheless, the international
community had had the wisdom to refrain from taking hasty measures detrimental to
coming generations, and had worked with an eye to the.future and to international
solidarity, so well expressed in the concept of the common heritage of mankind. Within
that framework - which was provided by the Declaration of Principles -- it should be
possible to fashion an instrument that would be acceptable to all; if it was not, there
could be no valid solution for the developing countries.
The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.
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