PHOTINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00285R000200240028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 30, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: George Allen
Director, Imagery Analysis Service
SUBJECT: PHOTINT
1. Some months have passed since we last met on this draft of
PHOTINT production during an international crisis. As the D/DCI/IC intends
to forward this to the USIB in the near future, we are providing you our
final draft for your informal comment.
2. We would appreciate it if we could receive y later
than 15 September. Please address your responses to] i
Deputy Chief of the Product Review Division, Intelligence Community Staff,
Room 6E08, CIA Headquarters (
Attachment:
D
Copy #3
25X1
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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
DURING AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
This study is one of a series being produced by the IC Staff
on problems related to the production of intelligence during
the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. The other forthcoming
studies are concerned with SIGINT, HUMINT, and Intelligence
Production generally.
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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Because of limitations in collection systems, photographic
intelligence (PHOTINT) has generally produced little information of
immediate value during international crises. Only occasionally has
it made important contributions. It is likely to become a much more
valuable collection resource for crisis coverage with the advent of the
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2. Effective employment of PHOTINT during a crisis has been
complicated by the number and variety of requirements suddenly levied
on the PI-IOTINT managers with little concern for relative priorities.
3. We recommend that the NIO structure play a more direct role
in the identification and prioritization of crisis-related PHOTINT
requirements and that an NPIC liaison officer be assigned to support
the responsible NIO during crises for this purpose.
4. During an international crisis the photographic processing
activities of NPIC, CIA's Imagery Analysis Service (IAS), and DIA's
Di-8 are conducted with some informal coordination but more or less
independently. This results in some redundancy of effort and inefficient
use of resources.
5. We recommend that during a crisis the Director of NPIC be
given the responsibility to integrate and coordinate the crisis-related
activities of NPIC, IAS, and DI-8.
TOP ECHO`
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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
IL. THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES
IL:[. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
IV. PROBLEMS IN EXPLOITATION
Page
V.. PROPOSED INTEGRATION OF PHOTINT EXPLOITATION 7
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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
DURING AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Overhead photography has generally produced little intelligence
of immediate value during international crises like the Arab-Israeli War
of October 1973. The satellite systems, which are designed and program-
med to cover strategic targets over the Sino-Soviet land mass, cannot be
easily or quickly diverted to other parts of the world. Even if they are
diverted, the delay in recovering and processing the film (rarely less
than a week under optimum circumstances) renders it of little use to
the decision-makers.
2. Photographic reconnaissance aircraft, such as the SR-71 or the
U-2, are potentially more flexible and thus more useful systems than the
satellite vehicles for coverage of crisis situations. Their deployment,
however, is often seriously inhibited by political considerations. In
addition to the problem of negotiating staging and overflight rights for
such missions, the decision-maker must weigh the risks of adverse
reactions to the use of (and even hostile action against) such aircraft
in the crisis area.
3. There have been occasions, however, when overhead photography
has produced valuable intelligence on crisis situations, and the opportunity
for such coverage will undoubtedly recur in the future. Moreover, the
advent of thel system is likely to make photography a much more
significant technique for tracking military developments in future crises.
It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the way in which the intelligence
community manages its photographic reconnaissance resources.
4. Our review of the performance of the PHOTINT community
wring the October War suggests two areas of weakness. One was in
jhe establishment and prioritization of requirements; the other was in
a certain lack of coordination among the three photographic processing
ILLEGIB
elements of the community (NPIC, IAS, and DI-8). This paper addresses
these problems and suggests remedies.
Ii:. THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES _, ~,~1Via1C
5. During non-crisis periods, PHOTINT requirements-are identified
as specific targets throw h the COMIREX mechanism. There are, for
example, approximately I frargets identified for 25X1
TAP, SCR
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each satellite mission. These inc ude alarge number of SAM sites,
airfields, etc. , and the OT y provides specific
readouts for each of these targets. This system is a logical
and orderly means of meeting expressed needs, when time is available,
i. e. , during non-crisis periods.
6. During crises, the system of defining requirements is adjusted.
During the October War, for example, the Chairman of the Imagery
Exploitation Subcommittee (EXSUBCOM) of COMIREX issued instructions
setting forth the special requirements of the crisis and informing t
-t1' T e ~~tation-c.o imu ity that these new targets would take
precedence over existing targets. The Chairman of COMIREX
maintained continuous contact with NPIC, and to a lesser degree with
r44.e*.