NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 12 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000200020060-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: April 12, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
12 April 1980
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LIBERIA: Apparent Coup
President Tolbert may have been killed last night
in an apparently successful coup mounted by junior ele-
ments of his presidential guard led by a Sergeant Samuel
Doe. In a radio broadcast, Doe justified his coup in
terms of the previous regime's "rampant corruption."
Forces loyal to Tolbert for the most part appear
to be in disarray.
Doe--apparently a tribal Liberian--
has not clarified whether he intends to form a military
government or hand over power to civilian opponents of
Tolbert. He has announced, however, that he will stay
in charge "until corruption is eliminated."
Several political prisoners reportedly have been
released, including Gabriel Mathews, leader of the
moderately leftist Progressive People's Party, who was
arrested last month on charges of treason. He helped
precipitate rice riots last April which nearly brought
down the Tolbert regime.
Top military commanders and old guard politicians,
such as Minister of Justice Chesson, who control police
and paramilitary elements, reportedly are in hiding.
Liberian-US relations traditionally have been
characterized by a "special relationship." We have no
reports that US citizens or important US civil and mili-
tary communications facilities in Liberia have been at-
tacked. If leftist civilian opposition elements come
to power or gain influential positions, however, Liberia
may well end its close relationship with the US or at
the least impose a monetary price tag on US facilities
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Situation Reports
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Iran o a o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o e a o o e o 0 0 0 0 0 0 o e 1
Afghanistan-USSR o 0 0 0 o v o o e o o v o o< e e o o a e 3
Briefs and Comments
China'-,USSRRUS: Relations. o 0 0 0 0 0 0 o e o 0 0 0 o a o 4
west Germany: Olympic Boycott Decision. o 0 0 0 0 0 0 o e 5
Nigeria'-Libya. Involvement in Chad. o 0 0 0 0 0? a o o e 6
Cuba ?? Andean Pact. Deteriorating Relations ? o e o e e e 7
USSR: Grain Rumors o o e o 0 0 0 0 0. e e. o. o= o e e 8
Canada: Energy Pricing.
e o? e o e 10
Arab States: Radicals Meet. 0 0 0 0 0 o e e o e o 0 o e a 11
El Salvador: Archbishop Romero's Successor. ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
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Since Late March there reportedly have been several scuffles
in the US Embassy compound between the hostages and their guards.
Iran-'Iraq
Bani-Sadres tough rhetoric on Iraq yesterday prob-
ably does not indicate that Iran is ready for a full-
scale military conflict. He claimed that the Iranian
military is ready for war, but he is well aware of
the deficiencies of the Iranian armed forces. Tehran
does not believe war with Iraq is necessary. Khomein
and other Iranians believe the Iraqi regime will collapse
from within and that Iran can help spur such a collapse
best with propaganda and limited support to Shia dissi-
The Soviets appear increasingly concerned about the
deteriorating relations between Iran and Iraq. Moscow
has cast Iraq in the role as the aggressor, citing Iran-
ian reports that armed groups from Iraq had intruded
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into Iranian territory with the aim of overthrowing the
government in Tehran, The Soviets, however, also have
said that Iraq is reacting to Iranian attempts to ex-
port its revolution into neighboring countries,""
Soviet media have also voiced concern that the US
is intent on setting Iran and Iraq against each other
and suggested that Washington might use such a conflict as
a pretext for military intervention in the Persian Gulf
area.
Oil Imports
The reluctance of Japan and some West European
nations to commit themselves on sanctions against Iran
reflects in part their dependence on Iranian oil.
Japan's oil purchases from Iran have been running well
ahead of the 620,000 barrels per day limit set by Tokyo
late last year. In January, Japan imported 17 percent
of its crude from Iran.
While most West European countries have reduced
their dependence on Iranian oil, West Germany is now
importing 15 percent of its oil from Iran, compared
with 11 percent in 1979? French dependence has been
running at around 5 percent since the Iranian revolu-
tion, while Italy imported only about 2 percent of its
oil from Iran last year.
Top oa} ac z-Ot
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Moscow is apparently making no headway in its
efforts to get government officials from the opposing
Parchamist and Khalqi factions in Babrak's regime
to work together on behalf of the "revolution." The
split between the Parchamists and Khalqi officials is
reportedly widening and impeding the government's
ability to function. The Parchamist Minister of Plan-
ning, for example, will not return to Kabul from Moscow
until a Khalqi rival is removed, and the Khalqi Minister
of interior refuses to work because he cannot get along
with his Parchamist chief of police.
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Deng Xiaoping yesterday denounced Soviet foreign policy and
expressed satisfaction with US-China relations while taking note
of "our differences."
In an interview with a US newsman on the day the
Sino-Soviet treaty expired, Deng?s criticism focused
on Afghanistan. His comments appear intended in part
to turn aside the vague offer made on Monday by the
Soviets to reopen political or border negotiations. Al-
though Deng did not rule out resuming political nego-
tiations "when it is necessary," he enumerated the same
demands that stalled the round of talks last fall in
Moscow. Chinese media have not yet commented directly
on the Soviet offer.
The chances of an early resumption of Sino-Soviet
negotiations seem remote. Moscow's offer to reopen talks
came in the context of a sharply negative assessment of
Chinese policy trends. Moreover, the Soviets began a
major military exercise in the Far East on the day they
made their offer, further worsening the atmosphere al-
ready poisoned by the invasion of Afghanistan.
Deng said he was satisfied with China?s relations
with the US, but he also said that the US military aid of-
fering to Pakistan was too small, and he implicitly
cautioned against US measures regarding Iran that could
benefit the USSR and draw attention away from the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Echoing a line conveyed in the
past by other senior Chinese spokesmen, Deng stressed
that the relationship is based on strategic onsiderations,
chiefly common anxiety over Soviet expansion. In an in-
terview with Japanese journalists in late March, Deng
had said that the failure of Western politicians to take
a strategic viewpoint has led to divisiveness. He also
said that it was responsible for the failure to recognize
that Soviet efforts in Southwest Asia ultimately are aimed
at undermining European security.
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WEST GERMANY: Olympic Boycott Decision
The president
of the West German Olympic committee, one of three
International Olympic Committee vice presidents, has
stated that West German Olympic officials probably would
accept government direction on the matter.
A decision before 15 May would leave ample time for
other countries to fall into line with US Olympic policy.
Most West European countries have indicated that they will
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Nigeria's determination to reduce French influence in Chad
could also facilitate Libyan involvement there.
Nigeria considers French influence in western and
central Africa as a threat to its own aspirations for
regional leadership. Lagos has opted out of the latest
mediation efforts in Chad by the Organization of African
Unity, partly because it sees them as French-inspired.
Lagos will resist substituting a Libyan role for
French influence in Chad. The Shagari government is
afraid that Qadhafi would use Chad as a base for culti-
vating Muslim radicals in predominantly Muslim northern
Nigeria.
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CUBA - ANDEAN PACT: Deteriorating Relations
The refugee situation at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana re-
mains stalemated and is complicating Cuban relations with key
members of the Andean Pact.
Havana has refused to permit international organi-
zations to intercede on behalf of the refugees, main-
taining that the problem is a bilateral one. The Pact
did issue a declaration affirming its support of the
right of political asylum and asserting Cuba's responsi-
bility for resolving the crisis. Only Spain, Costa
Rica, and Peru have offered to admit a combined total
of 1,800 refugees.
In a propaganda counteroffensive, Havana continues
to blame Peru and Venezuela--both Pact members--for
precipitating the crisis. Cuba has charged the two
with distorting the right of asylum to protect criminals
and of coordinating their actions with the US to pro-
voke the situation. The Castro regime is trying to
portray its actions in a humanitarian light while seek-
ing international support--despite indications that the
refugees are being harassed by thugs, apparently with
official approval.
Meanwhile, the asylum issue is hardening anti-Cuba
sentiment in Venezuela. Government officials there are
incensed at Cuba's handling of the issue and at Castro's
sharp criticism of President Herrera's recent trip to
Nicaragua. Venezuelan Ambassador Rondon will not be
returning to Cuba, and Caracas will wait to assess
Havana's intentions before making a decision on main-
taining relations.
These developments may strengthen pressure from
hardline elements in the Venezuelan Government and the
ruling party for stronger measures against Havana.
Venezuela may consider canceling oil shipments to Cuba
under a swap arrangement with the USSR and limiting
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The Soviets appear to be circulating rumors in trade circles
to create pressure on the US Government to relax the grain em-
bargo.
The US has continued to supply
the 6-8 million tons permitted annually under the agree-
ment; the embargo pertains to much larger additional
shipments. the Soviets would
not need even the grain shipped under the long-term agree-
ment because "the winter wheat grain crop looked ex-
cellent and the USSR had been so successful in obtaining
The Soviets probably expect such information to be
passed on to US officials and grain producers. The USSR
hopes to change US policy by persuading producers that
continuation of the embargo would mean the additional
loss of the Soviet market for long-term agreement grain.
We believe that the Soviets will continue to need
US grain and will not renounce the agreement. It is too
early to predict the outcome of the Soviet 1980 grain har-
vest. Even if it is above-average, Moscow would still
need to import large quantities of Western grain--especially
corn of which the US is a major supplier--to maintain its
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CANADA: Energy Pricing
A confrontation is developing between Alberta and Ottawa
over oil and gas prices.
With domestic oil prices currently at 45 percent
of world levels and reserves declining, officials in
the oil-producing province of Alberta are demanding
rapid increases in Canadian energy prices. They argue
that present 'prices result in a $10 billion annual sub-
sidy from the province to the rest of Canada.
Prime Minister Trudeau is concerned, however, over
the impact that higher oil prices would have in the east-
ern provinces that elected him to office. In Ontario,
both consumers and the province's industrial economy
would be hard hit. For Quebec, cheap energy from west-
ern Canada is the most visible benefit of confederation.
In a show of determination, Alberta has taken over
distribution of 80 percent of the province's crude
production and threatens to delay construction on two
proposed synthetic oil plants. It has also terminated
salmi 100,000 barrels per day to an Ontario refinery.
Federal Energy Minister LaLonde has responded by
threatening to distribute all domestically produced oil,
and has revoked an agreement granting world prices
for output from Alberta's two existing synthetic crude
Ottawa might be willing to meet Alberta halfway
if Alberta were to agree to hold down natural gas prices
and encourage the substitution of gas for imported oil--
low gas prices would help industries in the east. Gas
prices are linked to oil prices, but Alberta probably
would be more flexible on gas pricing because reserves
are plentiful and prospects are good that they will in-
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policy on Afghanistan.
She has publicly criticized the US buildup in the Indian
Ocean, but since returning to power in January has con-
fined her sharpest attacks against the US to private
conversations.
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The leaders of Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen,
and the Palestine Liberation Organization--the radical
Arabs? "Steadfastness Front"--are scheduled to meet
today in Tripoli, Libya. Foreign Ministers of the group
convened yesterday to draft an agenda that probably will
focus on renewed condemnation of Egypt, Israel, and the
US. The radicals seek to marshal Arab opposition to the
ongoing Egyptian-Israeli-US negotiations and to imple-
ment more effective sanctions against Egypt. They may
also work privately to arrange a rapprochement between
feuding Libyan leader Qadhafi and PLO chief Arafat.
EL SALVADOR: Archbishop Romero's Successor
The Vatican?s appointment of a moderate liberal
as provisional successor to the assassinated Archbishop
Romero suggests that the Church may play a greater role
as political mediator. Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas--
an intellectual leader of the Church?s progressive
wing--is known for his objectivity and evenhanded manner.
He could encourage a dialogue between the government
and the left, particularly if his appointment is made
permanent--as seems likely. Most Salvadorans, recalling
that Romero shifted from cautious moderate to outspoken
liberal after his appointment as Archbishop, likely
will withhold judgment on Rivera. He will, however,
be subject to considerable pressure from both the
conservative and radical wings of the Church.
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Government officials and senior military officers,
who convened in Bamako last Tuesday, apparently are still
discussing whether Malian President Traore should be
removed for his inept handling of economic and student
problems. Traore's shaky position probably will be
undermined further by France's decision to reduce its
budgetary support to its former colony; France is Mali's
principal financial benefactor.
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