NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 14 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000200020065-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: April 14, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
14 April 1980
Top Secret
Top Secret
CO NID 80-088JX
! April
Copy 3 8 8
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Situation Reports
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Briefs and Comments
Lebanon: Clashes Between Christian and UN Forces . . . . 7
Indonesia: Anti-Chinese Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bolivia: Preserving Stability .
Portugal: ?'residential Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
USSR: Spring Planting Delayed .
11
East Africa: Summit Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Iraq: Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Special Analysis
Israel: The Labor Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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The hostages will be visited today by representatives from the
International Red Cross and its Iranian equivalent, according to an
announcement yesterday by the militants.
A spokesman for the militants said the delegation
would see "all" of the hostages. If all are actually
seen, it would be the first time since the Embassy take-
over that every hostage has been accounted for.
Internal Situation
According to Tehran radio, a spokesman for the
Interior Ministry announced that the next round of
voting for the National Assembly will be held on 2 May.
Although Ayatollah Khomeini has ruled that the Assembly--
when it convenes--will decide the fate of the hostages,
Western diplomats in Tehran are increasingly skeptical
that the issue will be resolved even then.
14 April 1980
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Relations With Iraq
Over the weekend Iran accused Iraq of at least
three attacks on Iranian Gendarmerie posts
European Military Supplies to Iran
Several European firms continue to cooperate with
Iran in either supplying or repairing military equipment.
Romania has offered Iran a wide range of military
equipment for the Army and antiship weapons such as depth
charges and shipborne launchers for small rockets.
Romania's offer of armaments and its recent sale of food and
manufactured goods to Iran have clearly been made with
an eye toward improving relations with Tehran and increas-
ing imports of Iranian oil, which were severely curtailed
last year.
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The new government has not yet consolidated its control foZZow-
ing the coup on Saturday that resulted in the assassination of
President Tolbert. The security situation in Monrovia appears to
be deteriorating.
The coup that toppled the ruling True Whig Party
government, although poorly organized, apparently met
almost no resistance from Army or police forces. Coup
leader Sgt. Samuel Doe reportedly is making all decisions,
but he does not appear to have full control over and
support from military and police forces. He and his
closest advisers seem to be overwhelmed by the task of
restoring order and organizing a functioning government.
Although the chances of a countercoup from forces loyal
to the old regime now appear remote, Doe could face a
challenge from more experienced elements in the military.
Unruly troops continued to roam the city last night,
and several serious incidents of robberies of US citizens
and business facilities have been reported.
Arrests appear to be increasing, as well as reports
of mistreatment of prisoners. Although the new govern-
ment had announced that only those involved in "rampant
corruption" would be arrested and tried, most former
high-level officials as well as their wives have been
arrested. Apparently there is a growing desire among
the indigenous enlisted ranks for revenge on the minority
elite Americo-Liberian population and anyone associated
with the Tolbert family.
This is an ominous development in view of the mili-
tary tribunal scheduled to begin trials today. The
growing emotionalism may create an atmosphere in which
only guilty verdicts will suffice.
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Top Secret
The situation is complicated by reports that the
country's supply of rice--a staple food--will be ex-
hausted within the next 10 days, with the possibility
that a new shipment will not arrive soon. At this stage
it is probable that the new government has not focused
on such matters as food imports. A severe rice shortage
would put tremendous strains on the new regime and the
potential for additional violence may increase.
The new leaders have expressed a desire to maintain
close relations with the US, but held out the prospect
that they may have to turn elsewhere--in an apparent
reference to the Soviets--if expectations of US support
are not met. The new leaders assured US officials that
they would respect all contracts and agreements between
Liberia and the US,
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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military situation.
there have been no significant changes in the
Soviet-Afghan Relations
Afghan military trainees in the USSR reportedly are
meeting resentment from Soviet citizens.
Soviet civilians were upset that the Afghans
were safely in the USSR while Soviets were dying in
Afghanistan.
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The Indian-Pakistani dialogue on Afghanistan con-
tinued this weekend with the visit to-Islamabad of Indira
Gandhi's personal envoy, former Foreign Minister Swaran
Singh, who met with Zia. The language of the communique
indicated the two sides remain divided on Soviet inter-
vention but have agreed to continue consultations. In
a tacit admission that no progress was made on the issue
of arms aid to Pakistan, Zia's foreign affairs adviser
told a press conference that "concrete proposals" would
be discussed at their next meeting.
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Lebanon
Palestinian "a Con trolle d
, shelling
Aaqurah
Clash between
UN and Christian militia
Svrla
I I-
Golan
Heights
I S UN Outpost
0 Kilometers 10
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Israeli-supported Christian militiamen and UN troops in south-
ern Lebanon, in the worst incident between the two groups to date,
clashed on Saturday as Israeli troops were withdrawing from the UN
sector.
One UN soldier and one militiaman died during the
brief exchange of fire Saturday near At Tiri, a village
in the UN sector where the militia began attempting to
establish a position a week ago. In response to casual-
ties and the loss of an armored vehicle, militiamen fired
tank, artillery, and mortar shells at several other UN
positions. The UN force headquarters at Naqurah sustained
heavy damage.
The situation appeared to have calmed yesterday, but
the growing problems between the militia and the UN have
yet to be resolved. Relations between the militia and the
UN have deteriorated steadily since the UN decided earlier
this year to try to staff five observation outposts deep
within the Christian enclave with new personnel.
Christian leader Saad Haddad has opposed manning
the outposts with the new teams, probably with tacit
Israeli backing. The UN wants to return to staffing all
of the outposts, established in 1972, with observers from
the UN Truce Supervision Organization. The prospect of
experienced UNTSO personnel, including US officers,
manning these outposts apparently has made Haddad and
the Israelis concerned that their movements and actions
in the border area would come under closer scrutiny.
Efforts by the UN to carry out the new staffing over the
last few weeks have met with consistent harassment by
Haddad's forces.
Israeli forces apparently have completed the with-
drawal promised Friday by Defense Minister Weizman from
the positions they established in and near the UN sector
last Wednesday.
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Malaysia
South China Sea
.dae rIrAlAp
,A?ti-Chi se
0 riot
A sn'
n9AOR
VVV ~jS ~ o ~- APOBE
3J
s?>
Makassar
Strait
Indian Ocean
Udjung Pandang
Anti-Chinese
demonstrations
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D C
Celebes
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Security officials fear that anti-Chinese riots in Udjung
Pandang, a major city in eastern Indonesia, will incite ethnic vio-
lence in other cities.
Indonesian mobs sacked Chinese stores on two succes-
sive nights before the government declared a curfew and
restored order. The riots were set off by rumors that a
Chinese shopowner had tortured an Indonesian maidservant
to death.
The Chinese control most urban commerce and much of
the rest of the Indonesian economy. The government will
try to limit reporting of the Udjung Pandang riots in
order to prevent deeply felt anti-Chinese animosity from
erupting into violence.
Local officials in Medan, North Sumatra, are particu-
larly concerned; militant students have staged a series
of demonstrations in recent days against Chinese involve-
ment in local gambling syndicates and alleged corruption
of government officials.
The government's concern about anti-Chinese demon-
strations is broader than the obvious fear of spreading
civil disorder. Most government officials have close
ties to rich Chinese merchants, and the authorities always
worry that anti-Chinese protests will take on antigovern-
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BOLIVIA: Preserving Stability
To try to maintain stability until the June elections, Presi-
dent Gueiler has revamped her cabinet, approved a new electoral
law, and named a new Army commander.
The new cabinet has been created to ensure govern-
ment neutrality in the elections and allay military
apprehensions over leftist influence in the administra-
tion. It will almost certainly not initiate any policy
changes to attack Bolivia's basic weaknesses that have
caused instability since independence. A multiplicity
of parties remain, centered on political personalities,
a corrupt military is still reluctant to relinquish the
spoils of office, and the economy rests on an outmoded,
unproductive tin industry.
The electoral law may prove as ineffective as the
cabinet in reducing political instability. Although no
candidate won a majority of the popular vote in last
year's election--and congress could not agree on a winner--
the new law lacks a provision to preclude similar stale-
mates.
Both of the leading civilian presidential contenders
in this year's election, Hernan Siles Zuazo and Victor
Paz Estenssoro, refuse to make a deal thus far to avoid
another impasse. Gueiler admits that she is powerless
to persuade either candidate to adopt a more concilia-
tory attitude.
An electoral deadlock in June probably would give
military hardliners a pretext to seize power again.
Major plotters in the military remain in command posi-
tions, and coup rumors are rampant. In an effort to
appease the military, Gueiler has bowed to armed forces
pressure by appointing the principal coup plotter,
General Garcia Meza, as the new Army commander.
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Army General Soares Carneiro apparently has agreed to be the
ruling Democratic Alliance's candidate in the presidential election
later this year--a move that underscores the Sa Carneiro government's
feud with President Eanes and threatens to divide the military.
Soares Carneiro had set two conditions--support from
the military and freedom to play an active role as presi-
dent. Prime Minister Sa Carneiro apparently accepted
President Eanes, who is also chief of the armed
forces, is a possible contender. He may have tried to
line up support for his candidacy in late March when he
reportedly announced his plans to resign his chief of
staff position. If Eanes does intend to run, it could
lead to bitter infighting in the military.
Soares Carneiro is considered an outstanding troop
commander and generally regarded as the "thinker" in the
armed forces. He would be a strong opponent for Eanes,
though he lacks public exposure so far. Eanes is still
the popular figure in Portugal, but his stock with the
military is at an all-time low.
The Democratic Alliance hopes to announce its candi-
date within the next few days in order to preempt Eanes.
So long as Eanes is not a declared candidate, Sa Carneiro
can avoid criticism that he is splitting the armed forces
by putting forth his own military candidate.
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USSR: Snow Cover as of late March
!Mw
Aral
Sea
z
SPRING GRAINS
Lake Balkhash
0000000 Boundary of area usually covered by snow
~ In 1980 boundary of area usually covered by snow
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USSR: Spring Planting Delayed
Snow and colder-than-normal weather during the past
few weeks have delayed spring planting and threatened to
damage fall-sown grains. Several areas now report at
least two-week delays in fieldwork and spring sowing.
ing to a Soviet forecast, temperatures in parts of the
European USSR are likely to turn colder in the second
half of April with more snow a good possibility. It is
too early, however, to predict the effect of the late
spring on grain crops.
EAST AFRICA: Summit Meeting
Kenyan President Moi will play host to Tanzanian
President Nyerere, Ugandan President Binaisa, and Sudanese
President Numeiri in Mombasa today and tomorrow. They
probably will discuss border security and other concerns,
but the mutual suspicions that prevented much progress
at a meeting between Nyerere, Binaisa, and Moi last Janu-
ary are likely to continue hampering cooperation.
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Syria and Jordan. Baghdad was the first donor to fulfill
its commitment--over $500 million--in 1979 and has already
disbursed the first of three installments this year.
Baghdad last year tripled its aid commitments and
doubled its disbursements of economic aid to developing
countries without major petroleum resources. Iraq's
aid commitment of $1 billion in 1979 places it second
only to Saudi Arabia among Arab OPEC aid donors. Iraq
also is implementing a loan program of roughly $200 mil-
lion to compensate selected developing countries for oil
surcharges levied last year. The Iraqis were primarily
responsible for the decision made at the Arab Summit in
November 1978 to extend over $3 billion in grants to
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ISRAEL: The Labor Alternative
and Gaza leaders last week
Labor thinking on the negotiations, met with West Bank
Labor Party chief Shimon Peres, whose views dominate
Jordan into negotiations for a final peace agreement.
Labor Party leaders, buoyed by polls showing that the elector-
ate clearly prefers them to Prime Minister Begin's Likud-dominated
government, have been discussing how the party should proceed with
the peace negotiation process if it is returned to power. There
appears to be a broad consensus within Labor favoring a strategy
using the transitional framework of the Camp David accords to attract
Labor is committed to the Camp David process and
would carry out any agreement on transitional arrange-
ments reached in the current negotiations. If Labor
were to come to power with negotiations for the proposed
self-governing authority still going on, the party would
continue with them--despite some misgivings about the
framework. It would probably be willing to offer con-
cessions, however, on important areas like land, water,
and Jewish settlements, in the hope of attracting Jordan
and Palestinian representatives to the talks. Labor
would probably use the five-year transition period to
test its ideas for arranging a final peace agreement with
sions to Jordan.
The major difference between the Likud and Labor
lies in their approaches to the ultimate disposition of
the West Bank and Gaza territories occupied in 1967. The
Likud favors permanent Israeli control--perhaps through
annexation--while Labor leans towards territorial conces-
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Gaza Strip/
(Israeli
occupieed)
Boundary representation is
fiat necessaaly:autAoritative.
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Labor's policy toward the West Bank and Gaza has
traditionally rested on the "demographic argument."
Pointing to the slow growth of Israeli Jewish population
due to low birth rates and declining immigration, Labor's
leaders have argued that the extremely high birth rate
among West Bank and Gaza Arabs would mean an Arab majority
in Israel as early as 2000 if those areas were permanently
annexed. Israel could therefore maintain its Jewish
character only by denying electoral freedoms to the Arab
population, leaving a disenfranchised, hostile Arab ma-
jority and eroding the democratic character of the state.
Labor's Partition Plan
If Labor could entice Hussein into negotiations for
a final agreement, the party probably would agree to a
territorial partition along the following lines:
-- Return of most of the populated areas
to Jordanian control.
-- Transfer of the Gaza Strip to Jordan.,
-- Retention by Israel of Greater Jerusalem,
the Latrun Salient, and the Etzion
Settlement Bloc. Other, generally
minor, territorial demands might also
be made.
-- An Israeli security presence--perhaps
based on some of the existing Israeli
settlements--in the Jordan River Valley
and the foothills of the eastern Sama-
rian Mountains. Other security require-
ments such as demilitarization, monitoring
devices, and international guarantees
would also be sought.
Peres has hinted that he would be willing to negotiate
the future of existing Israeli settlements in the
areas to be returned to Jordan and might be prepared to
work out a deal whereby Jordanian sovereignty would be
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be created.
accepted over some settlements. Labor would prefer that
the areas returned to Jordan form a Palestinian entity
under Jordanian sovereignty. Most of the party is as
adamant as the Begin government that no Palestinian state
longer a viable negotiation approach.
Critics Within the Party
Some Labor Party members question the wisdom of
pursuing an agreement with Jordan. They note that the
proposal for negotiations with Amman originated several
years ago when Hussein was more moderate than he now ap-
pears to be and before his rapprochement with the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization. These critics note that
Hussein has flatly ruled out negotiations with Israel
on terms other than complete withdrawal to the pre-1967
lines and that he has given no hint that he would be in-
terested in a process that involves yielding territory
to Israel. Thus, they argue, territorial partition is no
Begin's position.
The extreme left of the party advocates total with-
drawal to the 1967 borders--except for Jerusalem--and
would accept the creation of a Palestinian state. More
moderate members, like former Foreign Minister Abba Eban,
have advocated a confederation of Jordan, Israel, and
the West Bank along the lines of the Benelux federation.
A few right wingers in the party more or less support
Coalition Problems
Despite its impressive showing in recent polls,
Labor
is
unlikely to win a parliamentary majority if elec-
tions
are
held in the near future. The party would prob-
ably
have
to form a coalition to govern, most likely
with
the
hawkish National Religious Party. Coalition
politics--particularly if the Religious Party is a member--
might well force Labor to modify its preferred negotiat-
ing position and follow a harder line.
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