NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 18 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000200020088-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 88
• Publication Date: April 18, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
18 April 1980
Top Secret
18 April 1980
388
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Situation Report
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briefs and Comments
International: Status of Olympic Boycott . . . . . . . . 4
India-Pakistan: Leaders to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Nigeria: Oil Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Honduras: Assembly Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Lebanon: Continuing Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Ivory Coast: Violence in Abidjan . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Liberia: Continued Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Special Analysis
Greece: The Presidential Election . , . . . . . . . . . . 13
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A senior official of the Islamic Republic Party and Interior
Ministry officials said yesterday that the second round of legis-
lative elections may be postponed until mid-Mayo
Ayatollah Eahonar, a close ally of Ayatollah
Eeheshti, indicated that postponement may be necessary
because the investigation of vote-tampering in the first
round is going slowly. President EanioSadr?s supporters
need more time to organize for the second round, but
there is no evidence that he is focusing his attention
on the elections.
In a speech telecast last night in Iran, Ayatollah
Khomeini told Iranians not to fear sanctions and urged
Western Europe not to support US reprisals against Iran.
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh last night publicly claimed
sanctions would not "bite" Iranians for at least six
months.
to have begun a "detailed study" of the US announcement.
Foreign reaction to President Carter?s announcement
yesterday of new US measures against Iran has so far been
scanty. Moscow radio covered the steps rather matter-
of-factly but did claim that Western Europe had given
him only a "cool response," Japanese officials are said
Iran-Iraq
The Iranian Charge in Lebanon was wounded outside
his Embassy in Beirut last night, apparently by machine-
gun fire from the area of the Iraqi Embassy. The shoot-
ing capped three days of clashes between pro-Iraqi
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Palestinian guerrillas and Shiite elements in the Beirut
area; the wounding of the Char a may have been simply
within that context
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Oil Pricing
Iran has turned down requests from some crude oil
buyers to cancel or reduce the $2050 per barrel price
increase of 1 April. British Petroleum and Japanese
representatives met with the National Iranian Oil Company
this week in hopes of renegotiating prices. National
Iranian Oil Company officials reportedly told a Japanese
company that the price is not subject to negotiation and
suggested that the Japanese firm could reduce its lift-
ings if it does not like the new price. British Petro-
leum has not scheduled tankers to go into Kharg next
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OLYMPIC PARTICIPATION
GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
Probable Boycott
Boycott Supporters [Leaning Toward Loaning Againet [definite Olympic
Supporters By 24 May A Boycott Undecidcsl A Boycott Reuticipanto
EUROPE
UK
West Germany
Belgium
France
Italy
Monaco
Canada
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
Andorra
Denmark
Greece
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
Turkey
Austria
Ireland
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Finland
Hungary
Malta
Poland
Romania
San Marino
USSR
Yugoslavia
EAST ASIA/PACIFIC
Australia
China
Fiji
Hong Kong
Japan
Malaysia
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Mongolia
Laos
Vietnam
NEAR EAST/
SOUTH ASIA
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Egypt
Iran
Israel
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Morocco
Pakistan
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Nepal
Sri Lanka
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
North Yemen
Afghanistan
Algeria
India
Lebanon
Libya
South Yemen
Syria
AFRICA
Central African Rep.
Djibouti
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Malawi
Somalia
Sudan
Zaire
Gabon
Chad
Equatorial Guinea
Liberia
Mauritania
Guinea
Niger
Swaziland
Togo
Upper Volta
Angola
Benin
Cameroon
Ghana
Madagascar
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Botswana
Lesotho
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Nigeria
Senegal
Zambia
LATIN AMERICA
Antigua
Bermuda
Chile
Haiti
Honduras
St. Vincent
Guatemala
Paraguay
Argentina
Barbados
Colombia
Dom. Republic
Brazil
Ecuador
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Guyana
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
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INTERNATIONAL. Status of Olympic Boycott
Support for an Olympic boycott continues to grow.
West Germany?s decision to boycott probably means
that few West European teams will go to Moscow. Bonn
will try to arrange a European Community consensus at
next week?s Foreign Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg.
Most West European Olympic committees probably will
abide by their governments' advice on Olympic participa-
tion. Japan?s Olympic committee also is likely to sup-
port its government and boycott the games.
Of the major boycott supporters, the UK, Australia,
and New Zealand face the stiffest opposition from athletes
and sport officials wanting to go to Moscow. Most Third
World governments, which closely control their Olympic
committees, have made or will make their decision inde-
pendently of the vote by the US Olympic Committee
Next week the International Olympic Committee meets
to consider last-ditch action against a boycott. The
Committee could complicate the US effort by permitting
individual athletes, rather than national teams, to at-
tend the games and by abandoning the politically charged
opening and closing ceremonies.
These moves would deprive national committees of
their monopoly over team selection and reduce the politi-
cal prestige of participation in the Olympics. As in
the past, these suggestions probably will fail again to
get the required two-thirds vote.
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The scheduled private meeting today between Indian Prime
Minister Gandhi and Pakistani President Zia in Salisbury, Zimbabwe,
could accelerate efforts to improve relations between the two
The two leaders, who have not met before, probably
will largely sound each other out on the Afghanistan
situation. Although they have divergent perceptions
of Soviet policy and intentions toward the region and
Pakistan's defense requirements, both leaders seem
increasingly interested in overcoming past misunderstand-
ings and building mutual confidence.
Gandhi probably will encourage accommodation with
the USSR. While en route to Salisbury she reiterated her
standard line that prospects for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan would improve if other countries
stopped condemning the Soviets and sought ways to assure
Moscow that its interests were not being threatened. Zia,
however, continues to demand withdrawal as a precondition
for any significant progress in improving relations
between Pakistan and the USSR.
Informal talks in Islamabad last week between a
special emissary of Gandhi and Pakistani officials paved
the way for Zia's top foreign affairs adviser to visit
New Delhi in late May. During his visit to Islamabad,
Gandhi's emissary suggested the creation of some sort of
institutional framework for regular bilateral exchanges.
The proposal was not rejected out of hand, possibly
indicating Pakistani interest in reaching a broad
accommodation with the Indians.
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President Shagari must soon come up with a convincing explana-
tion of what happened to some $5 billion in oil revenues or risk
damaging his political standing.
The alleged shortage, first revealed by the local
press last fall following an audit of the 1977 accounts
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, is at-
tributed by corporation officials to poor bookkeeping.
The affair attracted little interest until late March
when the Senate majority leader claimed he had located
the money in a private London bank account. This charge
led to demands for a legislative investigation, the sus-
pension of several senior Petroleum Corporation officials,
and student demonstrations.
A legislative report is to be issued today. What-
ever its findings, because of the history of corruption
among senior government officials, Shagari will find it
hard to convince the public that some wrongdoing did not
occur.
Shagari?s foes in
the Yoruba tribe will try to use Shagari's handling of
the episode as evidence that his government--for past
favors--is covering up malfeasance by the former military
regime. Yoruba leader Awolowo, Shagarias chief political
rival, has long claimed that Shagaries presidential vic-
tory last year was due to the machinations of former
Head of State General Obasanjo.
The officer corps, sensitive, to any charges that its
former leaders engaged in corruption, will be watching
carefully to see that its image is not tarnished by
Shagari's effort to refute Yoruba allegations of a coverup
and to satisfy public unhappiness.
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HONDURAS. Assembly Elections
The constituent assembly contests scheduled for Sunday are
the first step toward a possible return to civilian rule in Honduras
and likely presage an interim military government followed by a
direct presidential elections
Junta president General Paz on Wednesday announced
military support for a direct presidential election--a
turnabout prompted by public and media interest in the
contest on Sunday and visits by high-level US officials.
The conservative military establishment has had diffi-
culty settling on a strategy and had begun to hedge its
plans for a political opening earlier this year. Having
vetoed inscription of the left-leaning Christian Demo-
crats, it began more serious consideration of indirect
elections and the possibility of a full presidential
term for Paz.
The vote will influence the military?s final deci-
sions. The final shape of a new government and the armed
forces' subsequent role also will depend on how the of=
Barring a major surprise on Sunday, Paz probably
will become interim President. Both the Liberals and
the Nationals, who are expected to split the lion's
share of the 71 seats at stake, privately have been
amenable to Paz serving in that capacity. The recent
shifts in military sentiment mean, however, that pros-
pects for an eventual full-term civilian president have
improved.
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LEBANON: Continuing Tension
There have been no new clashes in southern Lebanon
since the fighting between UN troops and Christian mili-
tia last weekend, but the situation remains tense. UN
efforts to recover from the substantial damage its head-
quarters suffered last weekend have been hampered by
the militia's continued control of the roads into the UN
zone. A plan to put a Lebanese Army detachment into a
disputed village between UN units and the militia appears
to be foundering. Militia leader Haddad is attempting to
wring concessions from Beirut in return for approving
the move.
The renewal of serious fighting in the Beirut area
may divert the government. Clashes between the Shia-
dominated Amal movement and the pro-Baghdad Arab Libera-
tion Front continued yesterday, despite attempts by the
Palestine Liberation Organization to arrange a cease-
fire. Clashes also broke out yesterday between the two
major Christian parties in the Beirut area, with militia-
men from the Phalange Party storming the home of the
military chief of the National Liberation Party.
-CIA, DIA, NSA-
By publicly calling for an early national election,
Defense Minister Weizman aims to step up pressure on
Prime Minister Begin to demonstrate greater flexibility
on Palestinian autonomy. Weizman may offer his resigna-
tion at the regular cabinet meeting this Sunday to force
the issue and to enhance his own credibility. Begin,
who is scheduled to return to Israel today, probably will
concentrate initially on determining whether Weizman en-
joys significant support among likeminded moderates in
Likud's Liberal Party faction and in the Democratic Move-
ment. If he finds that Weizman is isolated, Begin may
be inclined to accept the Defense Minister's resignation.
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Morocco
Western
Sahara
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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IVORY COAST: Violence in Abidjan
The government is taking security precautions after
a minor incident precipitated two nights of violence in
Abidjan between local citizens and Mauritanian emigres.
President Houphouet convened an emergency cabinet meeting
yesterday, placed the Ivorian military on alert, and
ordered the 10,000 Mauritanians living in Abidjan out
of the city for their own protection. The government
appears in control, but more violence could easily erupt,
in view of the rising resentment toward the economic
role of the large foreign population-65.000 Frenchmen
and 2.5 million non-Ivorian Africans.
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LIBERIA: Continued Improvement
Top Secret
The security situation in Monrovia continues to im-
prove, but a dusk-to-dawn curfew remains in effect.
Businesses, transportation facilities, and government
ministries are returning to normal; the airport has
opened to commercial traffic. The military tribunal is
apparently holding pretrial hearings--open only to the
press--of former government officials to determine who
will be prosecuted further. Unconfirmed reports indicate
that about 90 people are scheduled to appear. Minister
of State for Presidential Affairs Boley, a civilian, has
indicated jhowever, that the ultimate
fate of prisoners rests primarily with the military
leaders. Boley has attempted to moderate military pres-
sures for retribution, and his remarks reveal that some
executions are likely.
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Prime Minister Karamanlis is likely to make a bid for the
presidency when parliament next week commences voting for a succes-
sor to President Tsatsos. As president, Karamanlis would be in a
better position to safeguard the Longer term interests of Greek
conservatism against inroads by Leftist opposition Leader Andreas
Papandreou. Karamanlis keeps his own counsel, however, and may yet
decide to remain prime minister to retain the more comprehensive
control of government inherent in that position.
Karamanlis will announce his intentions today or
tomorrow and will seek the concurrence of his New
Democracy Party next Tuesday. The constitution of 1975,
which was largely Karamanlis` creation, established a
strong presidency to give the country the stability the
deposed monarchy was supposed to have provided. The
President can select a prime minister if there is no
obvious candidate, dismiss the government and suspend
parliament, and initiate legislation and call for ref-
erenda on key issues.
Presidential powers, however, have never been tested.
President Tsatsos is a Karamanlis confidant who refrained
from exercising his executive powers, thereby enabling
the Prime Minister to use the greater day-to-day preroga-
tives of that office.
Karamanlis' middle-of-the-road policies have gone
far toward diminishing the deep split between the politi-
cal left and right, and his adroit fiscal and monetary
policies have led to prosperity and a sound growth rate.
His successful summit diplomacy, capped by the approval
of Greek membership in the European Community, has done
much to repair Greece's relations with its Western allies.
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Karamanlis is currently considering how best to
preserve and build upon these accomplishments at a time
when the fortunes of his party are declining. The party
has been hurt by its prolonged incumbency, the govern-
ment's unpopular economic austerity measures, and the
opposition's successful demagoguery. It cannot be as-
sured of winning a parliamentary majority or even a
plurality in the parliamentary election that must take
place by November 1981.
Pros and Cons of the Presidency
As president, the 73-year-old Karamanlis would have
enough prerogatives to remain the dominant force in
Greek politics for another five years, even if his party
were to be eclipsed in the election by Papandreou's
Panhellenic Socialist Movement. In that event, a
Karamanlis presidency would also help safeguard Greek
democracy, since the prospect of a government led or
dominated by Papandreou might impell the military to
intervene, as it did in 1967.
The presidency would also permit Karamanlis to ful-
fill his longstanding desire to end his political career
as leader of all Greeks. That desire probably has been
fortified by a recent public opinion poll in which a ma-
jority favored Karamanlis for president.
On the other hand, the presidency would deprive
Karamanlis of much of his direct control of the economy,
the talks on full Greek reintegration into NATO, the
disputes with the Turks, and the looming negotiations
with the US on a new defense cooperation agreement.
Karamanlis' failure to groom a successor to lead his
party and take over the prime ministership has left his
followers ill-equipped to contest the next election with-
out Karamanlis' vote-getting power.
If Papandreou becomes prime minister, he and
Karamanlis are likely to lock horns as each tries to
limit the other's prerogatives. This could provoke a
constitutional crisis in which Papandreou's youthful
followers might attempt to organize a popular protest
to drive Karamanlis out of office.
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Top Secret
Karamanlis does not have the two-thirds majority
to win in the first two rounds of balloting, but he prob-
ably could enlist the support of at least five opposition
deputies or independents to secure the three-fifths ma-
jority required to win in the third round. Failure to
elect a successor after three rounds would result in a
new parliamentary election contested on the issue of a
Karamanlis presidency.
Beyond the Presidential Election
If Karamanlis moves up to the presidency on 20 June,
the first order of business would be the election of a
new prime minister. He would prefer that his New
Democracy colleagues select party Foreign Minister Elder
and Deputy Prime Minister Papakonstantinou as interim
prime minister, and that the two principal contenders,
Rallis and Defense Minister Averoff, agree on which of
them would become the permanent replacement.
Averoff would have the inside track because of his
popularity within the party's dominant right wing. Co-
ordination Minister Mitsotakis, a former centrist, would
be a long shot because most party members view him as an
interloper.
All of these prospective candidates would continue
Karamanlis' moderately conservative and pro-Western
policies with only minor changes and with an eye on the
contest with Papandreou in 1981. That election would
provide a powerful incentive for the party to hold to-
gether despite the disruptive effect of Karamanlis' de-
parture.
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