LIBYA: ELIMINATING THE QUESTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 100
• Publication Date: May 30, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4
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LIBYA: Eliminating the Opposition
3 ~ f~:~Y 19$0
With his continuing purges at home and kiZZings of dissidents
abroad, Libz~an Zeader Qadhafi has deepened discontent with his
10-year-oZd regime to dangerous ZeveZs. As his opponents grow
increasingZz~ desperate and the attempts against him muZtipZy, the
odds against him increase.
Qadhafi apparently launched his latest moves against
domestic opponents to force Libya into his revolutionary
molds although he may have been reacting to conspiracies
uncovered at Home or abroad. He has been chafing for
some time at the failure of the Libyan people to adopt
the nebulous social and political theories enunciated
in his "Green Book."
In January i977a Qadhafi proclaimed Libya a
''Jamahiriya"--a coined word roughly translatable as
?'state of the masses." In March 1979, he divested him-
self of all official positions except command of the
armed forces--a move that in no way altered his power.
Economic changes accompanying the political moves
worked increasingly toward the elimination of private
capital and completed the alienation of the middle class.
In April 1979, death was prescribed as the punishment
This February widespread arrests began--mainly
bureaucrats at first, then senior military officers and
members of the "people's committees,?' which ostensibly
supervise all aspects of public life. Perhaps 2,000
have been arrested, and many have been publicly humil-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4
Those arrested have been singled out for their
alleged lack of revolutionary fervor and for so-called
economic crimes. The purges have resulted in a major
upheaval of Libyan life. An atmosphere of fear and
suspicion has come close to paralyzing the normal opera-
tion of Libyan institutions.
As a result, there have been scattered reports of
local riots and perhaps four assassination attempts
against Qadhafi--the latest just last week. Qadhafi
reportedly wears a bullet-proof vest and lives in a
mobile "command van" enabling him to change his location
unpredictably.
Killings Abroad
Qadhafi?s opponents in exile have for years been
organized loosely into perhaps three groups, some with
overlapping membership, and they have received financial
assistance from Egypt and Iraq. Although some of the
exiles may retain some following in Libya, they probably
are incapable of posing a significant threat to Oadhafi.
Qadhafi believes that Libya?s revolutionary image
cannot tolerate any organized opposition.. This March
the regime published a declaration calling for the
physical liquidation of enemies_of the revolution abroad.
Within a few weeks a Libyan student was kidnaped in
London by members of the Libyan "people?s bureau"--
Libya?s version of an embassy.
Murders apparently committed by Qadhafi?s special
"hit squads" now total nine--two in London, four in Rome,
one in Beirut, one in Bonn, and the latest, on 21 May,
Exiled groups probably are more determined than ever
to move against Qadhafi, if only in self-defense. Con-
sequently, they are likely to accept a greater degree of
risk than in the past.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4
Threat at Home
An organized coup attempt is most likely to come
from within the military, elements of which are known to
have been disenchanted with Qadhafi for years. His
recent inauguration of "revolutionary committees" inside
military units have undercut discipline and eroded
Qadhafi has always been careful to guard against
moves from the military by transferring officers fre-
quently and by installing trusted followers--usually
tribesmen--in sensitive positions. The purges and assas-
sinations, however, almost certainly have broadened sup-
port within the military for action against Qadhafi. 25X1
least in terms of domestic policy.
A military coup presumably would replace all of
Qadhafi?s men with some kind of military council, and
a period of protracted instability might follow. Any
military group probably would be more conservative, at
al-Salam Jallud, considered his de facto deputy,
Should Qadhafi be assassinated, a struggle for
power could be touched off. Since Qadhafi?s only remain-
ing office at present is commander in chief of the armed
forces, there would be no immediate need to name a suc-
cessor; Abd al-Ati al-Ubaydi, the General Secretary of
the General People?s Congress, is technically chief of
state. Key candidates to wield actual power also would
include Qadhafi?s closest associates, particularly Abd
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010100-4