NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 6 AUG 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000400020023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 6, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

1 ~GV~1
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Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
6 August 1980
m.._ a........~
6 August 1980
Copy
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Situation Report
Iran 1
Briefs and Comments
Israel: Prospects for an Early Election 2
Iraq-Syria: Deteriorating Relations 4
Romania-USSR: Ceausescu-Brezhnev Meeting. 6
Yugoslavia-USSR: Financial Aid Request. 7
Venezuela-Cuba: Status of Relations 8
Somalia: Refugee Situation Critical 9
Special Analysis
International: OiZ Price Outlook. 10
6 August 1980
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The regime apparently intends to arrest retired Admiral Madani,
u~ho was formally expelled yesterday from the Islamic Assembly.
Several legislators have called for Madani's deten-
tion on charges of conspiring with the US and coup plot-
ting. ,Press reports indicate that Madani has crone into
hiding
Madani, who formerly served Khomeini as Defense
Minister and governor of Khuzestan Province, has emerged
as the leading opponent of the regime within Iran. His
appeal is based on his reputation as a strongman and as
the "law and order" candidate in the presidential elec- 25X1
tion in January in which he polled about 15 percent of
the vote. Although he supports the Islamic revolution,
he has criticized clerical interference in the govern-
ment.
If Madani can avoid arrest and establish ties-with
other dissidents, he could provide the leadership the
opposition lacks. His power base is narrow, however,
because he draws most of his backing from the upper
class, the Qashqai, and a few naval officers.
Last month, Madani announced formation of a front
group to unite supporters of "the revolution and Islam"
in an attempt to broaden his appeal. Madani apparently
has avoided contact with opposition leaders in exile,
probably because he believes they have little appeal in
Iran and are infiltrated by Khomeini's supporters.
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1 25X1
ISRAEL: Prospects for an Early Election
Prime Minister Begin and other coalition Zeader~ appear im-
pressed with the advantages of advancing Israel's national eZec-
tion--due no later than mid-November 1981--to next spring.
Begin's control of only 60 out of 120 Knesset seats
exposes him to constant political pressure from oppor-
tunistic coalition deputies and Knesset independents.
Moreover, Begin will run an increasing risk of losing
one of several no-confidence motions the Labor Party is
certain to submit after the Knesset returns from summer
recess in mid-October.
The Prime Minister could avoid these immediate
problems by seeking and almost certainly gaining the
Knesset majority required for dissolving parliament and
calling an early election. The coalition members then
would be legally prohibited from resigning from the
continuinq caretaker government that Begin would head.
Deputy Prime Minister Ehrlich, who is
close to Begin, and Interior Minister Burg, leader of
the National Religious Party--Begin's major coalition
ally--have publicly endorsed advancing the election. 25X1
Ehrlich and Burg do not want to see the government
humiliated and their reelection prospects diminished by
capitulating to the pressure tactics of waivering Knesset
deputies or ultimately by losing a no-confidence vote.
The Israeli leader probably would use the period
between dissolution of the Knesset and an early election--
which by law must last at least 100 days but in recent
practice has taken nearly twice that--to try to put
Labor on the defensive. He also would attempt to divert
voter attention from the government's inability to curb
Israel's spiralling inflation rate, which is likely to
run roughly 200 percent in 1981.
6 August 1980
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Top Secret
IRAQ-SYRIA: Deteriorating Relations
Relations betz~een Iraq and Sz~ria are worsening as each in-
creases its support for subversive activities against the other.
Political relations have been essentially unchanged
since last summer when Iraqi President Saddam Husayn ac-
cused Syrian President Assad of conspiring against him.
Until recently, both sides have kept meddling in each
other's internal affairs to a minimum to avoid divisions
that would weaken Arab opposition to the Camp David
Accords.
Now, however, relations appear to be drifting back
toward the open hostility that existed before the highly
publicized rapprochement between Baghdad and Damascus in
October 1978. Iraqi media criticism of Syria, which has
been building since early last month, has increased
sharply since the assassination on 21 July of former
Syrian Prime Minister Bitar, an opponent of Assad who
had ties to Baghdad. The Syrian press has responded in
Iraq has been aiding a variety of Syrian exile groups
opposed to Assad chiefly for propaganda purposes.
Saddam Husayn, calculating
that Assad may well be overthrown within the year, now
seems likely to step up his support for the Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria.
Saddam Husayn, who has long nursed a grudge against
Assad, probably has decided to act now because of grow-
ing Syrian support for Iran and for Kurdish and Shia
Muslim dissidents in Iraq. Baghdad also is concerned
that Assad's consent to greater Syrian-Soviet political
cooperation is giving Moscow more influence over regional
affairs.
6 August 1980
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1 LJ/~ I
ROMANIA-USSR: Ceausescu-Brezhnev Meeting
The positive characterization of President Ceausescu's meeting
with President Brezhnev on Mondaz~ in the Crimea suggests the tzuo
noz~ are interested in emphasizing the cooperative, rather than the
confrontational, side of their relationship.
The Romanian and Soviet media portrayed the talks as
"friendly" and marked by "mutual understanding." .Although
this description was slightly less positive than those
given Brezhnev's talks with other Warsaw Pact leaders
during the past two weeks, it contrasted sharply with 25X1
the "frank" characterization of the Ceausescu-Brezhnev
meetings in 1978 and 1979.
Bucharest has worked over the past several months
to reduce tension with Moscow arising in part from its
opposition earlier in the year to the invasion of
Afghanistan. The Romanians have been particularly
interested in improving economic relations in order 25X1
to gain greater access to Soviet technology and raw
materials.
Even before the meeting, Bucharest had agreed to
closer economic cooperation with Moscow and had deempha-
sized its traditional opposition to economic integra-
tion within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
During the session in the Crimea, Ceausescu and Brezhnev 25X1
agreed to "strive for the deepening of integration and
cooperation" in bilateral relations and within the frame-
work of CEMA.
As in past years, Brezhnev and Ceausescu apparently
dealt with international issues only in general terms.
They endorsed detente, disarmament, and the forthcoming
meeting in Madrid of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. They evidently did not discuss
their fundamental differences on such issues as Afghani-
stan, China, and Southeast Asia.
Top Secret
6 August 1980
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Financial Aid Request
According to the West German Ambassador to Belgrade,
Yugoslavia has asked the USSR for $900 million in balance-
of-payments support. Belgrade may be trying to head off
Soviet criticism of its requests for large Western loans
and at the same time trying to pressure Western nations
by playing on fears of a post-Tito turn to Moscow. The
USSR would see such a request as an opportunity both to
expand ties with Yugoslavia and to reduce the impact of
possible major Western assistance to Belgrade. Although
the Soviets might offer some assistance, they probably
would not provide the full amount.
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SOMALIA: Refugee Situation Critical
refugee children
in Somalia may be in worse
con i ion an children examine in ampuc can refugee
camps in Thailand and children caught in the famine in the
Sahel in 1973-74. Malnourishment among the children is
exceptionally bad and it appears likely that many children
among the 750,000 refugees in the camps will die of starva-
tion and disease unless they receive more effective relief.
Less than one-third of the malnourished children,
primarily the most severe cases, are receiving attention
in the understaffed camps. At present levels the emer-
gency feeding program cannot prevent many of the children
from becoming severely malnourished. Food deliveries
to the camps are irregular because of truck and fuel
shortages and bad scheduling, and distribution within
the camps occasionally breaks down entirely. New ar-
rivals fleeing from the Ogaden and from the drought in
other parts of Ethiopia will make the situation even
worse.
6 August 1980
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The Venezuelan Government may soon withdraw charges
against jailed Cuban exile leader Orlando Bosch, who is
awaiting trial for sabotaging a Cubana Airlines flight
in October 1976. Venezuelan officials believe that the
case against Bosch is weak, and that his release would
help President Herrera win support from the influential
Cuban exile community in Caracas. Relations between
Venezuela and Cuba are at their lowest point since they
were reestablished in 1975, and Caracas may have decided
it has nothing to lose by taking a step it probably would
have to take eventually.
Cuba warned Venezuela last year that it would break 25X1
relations if Bosch were acquitted without trial. The
Castro regime, however, has severed relations with only
one other state--Israel--and may instead increase its
propaganda attacks and reduce its official presence in
Caracas. Moreover, if Bosch is released, Cuba is likely 25X1
to attempt to arrange for his capture or assassination.
6 August 1980
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INTERNATIONAL: Oil Price Outlook
Declining demand and high inventory ZeveZs ~aiZZ cause the in-
ternational oil market to soften further over the next several months,
perhaps enough to force some Zozvering of official oil prices.
Oil inventories remain near record level in most of
the major consuming countries. Preliminary data indicate
US stocks were at a record 1.4 billion barrels at the end
of May, about 25 percent over levels of May 1979. Stocks
in Japan and Western Europe also remain very high.
Only Iran has reduced
Several other OPEC members
quarter rather than reduce
its official prices thus far.
cut output during the second
prices.
Spot market prices, meanwhile, have fallen sharply.
Prices for high-quality African crudes have dropped $2.75
per barrel since early July and $6.50 per barrel since
late 1979. Middle East light crudes are trading at about
$5 per barrel below 1979 peaks and about $1 per barrel
below prices in June.
The course of crude prices over the next several
months will depend heavily on Saudi actions. As long as
Riyadh maintains production at 9.5 million barrels per
day, the present oil glut will continue and the resulting
downward pressure on prices probably will force the elim-
ination or reduction of some of the premiums and sur-
charges imposed by several OPEC members.
Small reductions in official prices are also
possible, although some producers may make further
cuts in production rather than reduce prices.
Top Secret
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crude.
What the Saudis intend to do on prices is not clear.
After the OPEC ministerial meeting in June, Oil Minister
Yamani indicated that Saudi prices would not be raised
unless Riyadh was convinced the oil companies were
profiting excessively from access to low-priced Saudi
fits as an excuse for such an increase.
move at least part way from $28 for Arabian light
toward the $32 benchmark price before the next OPEC
ministerial meeting in September. Riyadh could use
the recent release of second-quarter oil company pro-
roost OPEC nations, however, expect the Saudis to
tion level of last year.
Fourth Quarter Outlook
Seasonal factors will boost oil consumption during
the fourth quarter of this year, even though the economic
slowdown and the impact of higher oil prices will con-
tinue to .hold oil use below the fourth quarter consump-
the growth in consumption.
In short, the demand for OPEC oil is likely to rise
during the fourth quarter, causing increased upward
price pressures, unless oil companies are willing to
allow a drawdown in inventories sufficient to satisfy
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Top Secret
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