NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 16 AUGUST 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000400020068-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: August 16, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
CO NID 80-19
16 August 1??980
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Top Secret
Top Secret
1 ugust 1
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SITUATION REPORT
25X1
IRAN
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh yesterday told the British charge
in Tehran that in the next day or t~uo he z~ouZd send a "strongly
? worded letter" to the Islamic AssembZ advocating early resolution
of the US hostage issue.
Ghotzbadeh said he was well aware that the Islamic
fundamentalists would oppose him, but that he hoped his
line would, nevertheless, "attract considerable local sup-
port." He said immediate action was necessary because
Iran is "almost at war" with the USSR and noted that he
had "ample evidence" that the USSR "through its local sup-
porters" is involved in "dangerous meddling" in Iran.
25X1
The Foreign Minister, who has consistently been one
of the strongest anti-Soviet critics in Iran, will soon
give up his position in the government. The letter to 25X1
the Assembly and his anti-Soviet statement earlier this
week may be intended to try to convince Iranians that the
foremost threat to the Islamic revolution comes from the
USSR.
25X1
? 25X1
According to press reports, about 3,000 demonstra-
tors marched outside the British Embassy yesterday, but
were ordered to stay away from the gates by their organi-
zers.
25X1
--continued
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The Thatcher government, noting that similar threats
have been made before, decided yesterday not to give in
to Iranian pressure. The case against the militants
will proceed normally through the courts.
London recognizes that the situation is more serious
than in the past, although relations between Britain
and Iran have been poor since the US hostages were taken. 25X1
Tension has mounted since Prime Minister Thatcher
eulogized the Shah, and relations will continue to de-
teriorate. The British Embassy~in Tehran--reduced to a
skeleton crew for several months--will not be open today
and plans to withdraw the remaining staff will be con-
sidered during the next few days.
16 August 1980
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
POLAND: Labor Unrest 25X1
Spreading labor unrest in and around the Baltic coastal city 25X1
of Gdansk may soon confront the regime with its most serious poZiti~
cal challenge since strikes almost paralyzed Lublin in mid-July.
? A strike by 17,000 workers in the Lenin shipyards re-
mains unsettled and apparently has caused sympathy strikes
in two other large shipyards and several smaller facto-
' ries. Local transportation workers in Gdansk and two
neighboring cities also have gone on strike. There are
rumors that there will be a general strike in Gdansk on
Monday.
25X1
Workers in the Lenin shipyards--among the most highly
paid in Poland--have refused to return to work despite
management's willingness to meet most of their demands,
including a 12-percent pay increase. The workers, who
have locked themselves in the shipyard and have been ne-
gotiating with management, reportedly also seek guarantees
against reprisals, a reduction in meat prices, publication
of their grievances, and a meeting with Premier Babiuch to
press demands for a free trade union.
The local militia apparently have been mobilized and
have cordoned off areas around the shipyards, but have 25X1
been held back from direct contact with the strikers.
Given the violent riots that occurred in Gdansk in 1970,
any contact between workers and militia could lead to
serious violence even though the militia probably are not
armed. Violence in Gdansk mi ht lead to protests in other
parts of the country.
The regime has thus far continued the conciliatory
approach that has carried it through six weeks of strikes 25X1
and work slowdowns. Articles and commentary in the cen-
tral media yesterday appealed to patriotism and self-
restraint to get workers in Gdansk back on the job.
Although such appeals have been effective in the past,
they may have lost some of their im act during the pro-
longed period of labor unrest.
If the workers in Gdansk refuse to back down on 25X1
their politically unacceptable demands for a free trade
union, the leadership will be under pressure to take a
--continued 25X1
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tougher stance. During his just ended Crimean vacation,
Gierek may have been counseled by the Soviets to become
more aggressive.
Babiuch, in a speech to the nation yesterday, in-
jected a note of toughness into Warsaw's conciliatory
line. He warned the workers that they must return to
work and that their actions are being exploited by
"enemies" of Communist Poland. Babiuch also said that
the meat-price increases in July will not be rescinded
and that meat supplies will not improve. He promised,
however, that meat prices will remain frozen until the
fall of 1981.
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16 August 19$0
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USSR-US: Reactions to Presidential Directive
ing II missiles."
Under the familiar rubric of an alleged US drive to
regain military primacy, Soviet commentators are charac-
terizing the directive as a new strategy to achieve a 25X1
nuclear first-strike capability. Lev Semeyko, a veteran
commentator on military affairs, extended this interpre-
tation in the military journal Red Star by claiming that
Washington is working toward a "first-strike potential"
on the "European level" as well. The head of the Central
Committee's International Information Department, speak-
ing with West Germans in Moscow on the 10th anniversary
of the Soviet -West German treaty last Tuesday, said
that the directive "reveals why the US in reality
sought deployment in Europe of cruise missiles and Persh-
depZozUing modernized Zong-range theater nuclear forces.
dentiaZ Directive 59 into existing anti-US themes, striving in
particular to raise doubts in Western Europe about US motives in
Soviet propagandists have moved quickly to integrate Presi-
Some commentators, including Semeyko,
that the strategy embodied in the directive
have noted
is not an
abrupt departure
from previous US doctrine,
citing ante-
25X1
cedents from 1974
recting warnings
and earlier. The Soviets
they issued at that time t
are resur-
o the effect
conjunction with US "forward-based nuclear means."
war in Europe with Soviet proposals to negotiate "as
soon as possible" on medium-range missiles in Europe in
25X1
Pravda's senior political observer, Yuri Zhukov,
reiterated this line on Wednesday and contrasted the
"dangerous" US plan to ride out in safety a local nuclear
confrontation."
that attempts to entertain the "illusory possibility" of
limited nuclear wars "lowers the threshold of nuclear
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Top Secret
PAKISTAN: Dispute Between Islamic Sects
Differences between the two main Islamic sects in Pakistan
continue to fester, despite an agreement Zast month between Presi-
dent Zia, who belongs to the Sunni ma~joritrg, and leaders of the
Shia minoritr~.
Following a Shia demonstration on 5 July against 25X1
imposing religious taxes in accord with Sunni theology
on Shias, Zia promised that the rules of one Islamic sect
would not be imposed on another. Many Sunnis are critical
of Zia for giving in to the Shias and are angered by the
prospect of paying taxes from which Shias will be exempt.
One Sunni extremist organization demands Zia ban Shia
prayers and processions.
The Shias believe that the money, which is to be
used for charity, will go primarily to Sunnis. They fear
that Zia's ultimate goal is to turn Pakistan into a Sunni
state.
Pakistan's most important Muslim allies--Sunni Saudi 25X1
Arabia and Shia Iran--also could become involved in the
dispute. The Saudis so far do not appear to have raised
the dispute with Islamabad, but members of the Saudi royal
family contributed $200 million to start the charitable
funds the taxes are to support.
The recent increase in Iranian support for the
Pakistani Shias reflects the growing political role of
the clerical leadership in Tehran. The Iranian press
has kept up its attacks on Zia, and there was another
demonstration at the Pakistani Embassy on Wednesday.
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25X1
BRAZIL: Right-Wing Violence
A recent surge of right-wing extremist activitz~ aimed at dis-
rupting liberalization could, if sustained, cause political problems
for the government.
The attacks began last month when a prominent human
rights activist was beaten during the visit of Pope John
Paul TI. Since then, sporadic shootings and bombings
have been directed at leftist politicians and labor
leaders, and newsstands selling leftist publications have
been burned.
Several ultraconservative organizations claim re-
sponsibility for most of the violence. They oppose the
government's policy of gradual political liberalization
and the left's increasing visibility. They may hope
either to intimidate the left or to provoke it into more
open agitation which would invite a tougher government
response.
The Justice Minister publicly repudiates the violence
and maintains that the attacks will not affect liberali-
zation. His assertions have been met with skepticism,
however, because no arrests have yet been made and because
local authorities are not pursuing the investigations
vigorously.
Many Brazilians believe the lack of results stems
from the fact that members of Army security forces are
among the culprits.
The government's failure to act is damaging
its already delicate credibility in this case. If the
attacks continue, there would be a greater likelihood
that leftist ctroups may turn to violence themselves.
16 August 1980
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Members .of the Islamic Conference Jerusalem Commit-
tee meet today in Morocco in a special session called to
discuss strategy for countering Israel's recent action
reaffirming its claim to sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.
Moderates led by Saudi Arabia and Morocco will probably
push for approval of the recent Iraqi-Saudi call for sanc-
tions against those countries maintaining embassies in
Jerusalem or endorsing the Israeli move. Saudi Crown
Prince Fahd's highly publicized comments earlier this
week contain an implied warning that Saudi patience with
the US is wearing thin on this issue.
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INTERNATIONAL: Oil Consumption
Oil consumption in the seven major industrialized
countries continued to decline in the second quarter of
this year as higher prices, fuel substitution, and the
economic slowdown cut oil usage roughly 5 percent from
the same period in 1979. .Italy was the only individual
country where continued strong economic activity in the
second quarter helped push oil sales above last year's
level. Light and heavy fuel oil demand dropped sharply
in most countries, but only the US and Japan had large
declines in gasoline usage.
16 August 1980
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USSR: Status of the Economy
The Soviet economy has made a poor showing during the first
half of the year. Although prospects are good for a better-than-
average grain crop, a beZozv-average harvest of most other major
crops and declining meat output will prevent any rebound in agri-
culture this year. With continued slow growth also anticipated in
industrial output, the energy situation deteriorating, and bottle-
necks in transportation and construction continuing, GNP tviZZ ZikeZy
grow Zess than 3 percent in 1980.
As of early this month, we estimate a Soviet grain
crop in 1980 of about 210 million tons--a marked recovery
from the 179 million-ton crop of last year. Despite the
favorable prospects for grain, Soviet farm production
probably will decline somewhat this year.
Production of meat and dairy products is being held
back by inadequate quantity and quality of livestock
feed, the legacy of poor harvests last year. The out-
look for meat production is particularly gloomy. Based
on our estimate of a 1980 grain harvest, total meat
output for 1980 will drop about 2 to 3 percent from 1979
production to 15-15.2 million tons, the same level as in
1975.
Even with an above-average grain harvest, the Soviet
need for grain imports will remain high. The US embargo
has stretched domestic feed supplies to the limit, and
the late spring reduced access to early pastures and
slowed development of forage crops. If the USSR makes no
more than marginal cuts in current livestock herds and
postpones rebuilding depleted grain stocks, about 240 mil-
lion tons of grain will be needed to meet total domestic
requirements.
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Top Secret
year.
Industry Still Lagging
Industrial production was nearly 4 percent higher 25X1
in the first half of 1980 than in the first half last
year. Gains this year in a number of industrial sectors,
however, barely recouped actual drops in output last
post-war low of 1.8 percent recorded last year.
In addition, lower than expected output of steel,
coal, and cement will limit growth in the months ahead.
For the year, we expect civilian industrial output to
increase only about 3 percent--slightly better than the
tons--20 million tons short of the current target.
year, coal production is unlikely to exceed 725 million
Coal. output for the first half of 1980 was down
1 percent from the corresponding period of 1979. For the
than a 1 percent increase over second half 1979.
During the first half of this year, Soviet oil pro-
duction averaged about 11.9 million barrels per day.
This was 3.5 percent more than first half 1979, but less
ages continue to be reported.
Energy Problems
The Soviet energy situation continues to deteriorate.
Energy production during the first six months of 1980
rose 3 percent above that in the corresponding period in
1979--far short of the planned 4.4 percent increase for
1980. Fuel allocations to a number of industrial enter-
prises have been reduced in recent months, and spot short-
Gas remains the one bright spot in the energy pic-
ture. Even though gas production in the first six months
of this year was slightly behind plans, the target of
15.4 trillion cubic feet probably will be met as gas
demand and production pick up in the fourth quarter.
The failure of the energy sector to meet its goals
apparently has caused Moscow to increase conservation
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efforts". In the annual resolution by the Council of
Ministers on stockpiling supplies of winter fuel, spe-
cific targets for energy conservation were included for
the first time. The specific goals for conservation this
year may be an indirect effort to ration the available
energy supplies.
Consumer Blues .
butter and milk.
Soviet consumers
25X1
25X1
The outlook for the Soviet consumer in 1980 is par-
ticularly gloomy. The 2 to 3 percent drop in Soviet
meat production this year will depress per capita meat
production to the level of the early 1970s. Shortages
of livestock feed have led to reductions in supplies of
in fresh food and other supplies.
are obsessed with the food situation. The recent strikes
at the Togliatti and Gorkiy motor vehicle plants involved
longstanding discontent over work-related issues, but
apparently were touched off by food shortages. The pro-
tests were settled quickly when the authorities brought
Moscow's Reactions
Recent Soviet press reports have stated that the
comparatively low rate of industrial growth achieved was
to be expected given the mature state of the economy.
The leadership is aware, however, that the economy will
have trouble recovering in the second half of the year.
short term.
Moreover, speeches by Soviet leaders in recent
months--while containing traditional exhortations for
increased production--have placed much greater emphasis
on the need for conservation. Besides the recent reso-
lution on energy conservation, the Council of Ministers
decreed in May that less metal should be used in indus-
try. Although couched in terms of efficiency, the em-
phasis on conservation reflects Moscow's failed hopes for
large gains in enerav and raw materials production in the
16 August 1980
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