NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 22 AUGUST 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000400020093-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 93
• Publication Date: August 22, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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~~\ Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
22 August 1 X80
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~Y ~ ~ s
CIA-RDP82T00466R000400020093-6
 25X1
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Situation Reports
Israel-Lebanon: Increasing Israeli Pressure. 4
south xorea: Chun's Takeover .
USSR: Corrvnents on a European Seeuritz~ Conference 6
Ethiopia: Soviet Helicopters in Tigre Province 8
Nicaragua: Private Debt Rescheduling 9
Zambia: Concern Over Possible South African Attacks. to
Special Analysis
Poland: The Prospects for Confrontation. 11
22 August 1980
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U.S.S.R.
Czechoslovakia
Boundary rapreaentatlsn is
not neceasarily eutAsrimhn.
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SITUATION REPORTS
The new head of the government. commission, Deputy 25X1
Prime Minister and party Politburo member Mieczyslaw
Jagielski, probably was selected because of his success-
ful handling of worker grievances in Lublin in mid-July.
The Church has showed that it is willing to take an
active part in easing the situation.. According to a
Western press report, the Bishop of Gdansk met recently
with strike leaders and supported their fight for eco-
nomic gains and human rights but also counseled .them
that lengthy strikes and bloodshed would harm the national
welfare. As with Cardinal Wyszynski's statement that was
publicized on Wednesday, the Bishop's remarks can be read
as encouragement for strikers to go back to work.
Gdansk Situation
Strike leaders are trying hard to prevent defections
and to gain additional support.
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Official Polish contacts of the US Embassy in
Warsaw said that several other enterprises in Nowa Huta
were on strike Thursday .and that, as of Wednesday, three
or four thousand Silesian coal miners had been on strike
to demonstrate support for their colleagues in Gdansk.
The US Embassy in Warsaw reports rumors of an im-
pending nationwide general strike; such rumors have fre-
quently surfaced in times of trouble but have rarely
proved accurate.
Top Secret
22 August 1980
25X
25X1
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Top Secret
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Increasing Israeli Pressure
Prime Minister Begin's public statement on Wednesday that TsraeZ
aims to "strike at terrorists at any time and in any pZaoe" is an open
aekrcowZedgment that his government has reverted to a policy of re
tive attacks against Palestinian positions throughout Lebanon.
The Israelis thus far have concentrated their attacks
against areas in southern Lebanon--including Nabatiyah,
Marj Uyun, Arnun, and the Beaufort Castle--used by the Pal-
estinians for training and for directing artillery and
rocket fire against northern Israeli settlements. Major
Haddad, leader of the Israeli-allied southern. Lebanese.
Christian mil.i.tias, has supported the Israeli actions by
restricting UN patrols in his enclave along the Israeli
border and by shelling Palestinian forces in Tyre.
Israeli forces continue to cross into southern Leb-
anon in support of their attacks; at least 28 Israeli ar-
tillery pieces and six Centurion tanks reportedly crossed
into Lebanon yesterday from the Metulla area.
Begin has long favored an activist policy and is in-
clined to accept the recommendations of hawkish Chief-of-
Staff Eitan, whose influence has grown since former Defense
Minister Weizman resigned last May. E.tan has referred
publicly to Israeli intelligence indicating a Palestinian
buildup in southern Lebanon and probably used it to persuade
Begin to resume Israeli attacks.
Begin probably aims to demonstrate that his govern-
ment will not be deterred by its declining international
image, setbacks in the UN, and eroding support-from Western
states. With an eye to the coming national election, he
also wants to show his determination to defend Israel's
security interests.
The Israeli attacks in the south could heighten ten-
sion and .lead to a wider military conflict in Lebanon.
Palestine Liberation Organization leader Arafat will be
under growing pressure to retaliate with cross-border
attacks if the raids continue. The Israeli operations
also could eventually lead. to new Syrian-Israeli air
clashes. Rightwing Christian Phalange militia, moreover,
might take advantage of the raids to attack Palestinian
and Muslim leftist positions in Beirut or move against
rival Syrian-backed Christian forces in northern Lebanon.
22 August 1980
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To Secret
SOUTH KOREA: Chun's Takeover 25X1
General Chun Doo Hwan's retirement from the Arrm,~ Coda ayes
the mazy for his assumption of formal executive power.
The 2,500-member electoral college will meet on
27 August to elect Chun as President, probably unanimously.
? Following his inauguration on l Septemb~.r, Chun probably
will name a conservative and promilitary cabinet and 25X1
announce an accelerated schedule to revise the constitu-
? tion and hold general elections.
The public appears to have acquiesced in the resig-
nation of the ineffectual President Choi Kyu Hah and in
Chun's ascendance. Chun's "purification".campaign and 25X1
social reforms have been popular among the general public
and have gained him the grudging admiration of many in-
tellectuals. Widespread public apathy, deep-seated fear
of North Korea, and the public's desire to end the un-
certainties of political transition and to concentrate
on solvin the nation's economic problems have also aided
him.
25X1
Much of the politically informed minority opposes
Chun's takeover, however, and radical college students
are almost certain to attempt to organize protest demon-
strations after schools reopen next week. Nevertheless,
no serici ~ opposition to Chun's presidency or to the re-
vised constitution--details of which were announced es-
terday in the press..--is likely to surface soon. 25X1
Although many Koreans will have misgivings about
the new constitution, which rejects political liberaliza-
tion, it is likely to be approved when a national refer-
endum is helc; possibly in early October. Chun seems
determined to hold presidential and national assembly
elections under the revised constitution within the next
? six months. 25X1
25X1
To Secret
5
22 August 1980
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Top Secret
USSR: Comments on a European Security Conference 25X1
Pravda on Wednesday outlined Moscow's position on a post-
Madrid European security conference, exhorting signatories of the
Helsinki Final Act to display maximum flexibility in planning the
conference but siynaZing ZittZe readiness to move beyond earlier
proposals for limited military confidence-building measures.
The article is intended to shape the agenda of a
European security conference and lobbies for its convoca-
tion in Warsaw. Its timing reflects the Soviet desire
to have .security issues, especially the idea of a "con-
ference on military detente and disarmament," be the
centerpiece of next month's preparatory conference and
the review conference in Madrid in November of Helsinki:
Act signatories.
Moscow sees a security conference as the best way
to inject vitality into its European detente policy. 25X1
The Soviets are acutely aware, however, of the potential
for disagreements in planning for such a meeting, espe-
cially since France and a number of other West European
countries are advancing security proposals unacceptable 25X1
to the USSR. The article moved decisively to spike
anticipated support for a French proposal to expand
to the Urals the zone of applicability of European
confidence-building measures, noting that their present
scope was the result of a "carefully adjusted balance of
interests" of the participating states.
The article also reiterates President Brezhnev's
proposals of last October to strengthen existing
confidence-building measures modestly by extending them
to include notification of major air and naval exercises
and by limiting the size of military maneuvers. It
concludes with familiar proposals for an exchange of
assurances, including nonfirst use of nuclear and con- 25X1
ventional weapons, guarantees to nonnuclear European
states, nonexpansion of alliances, and a freeze on
armed forces within the region defined by the Helsinki
22 August 1980
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ETHIOPIA: Soviet Helicopters in Tigre Province
- ack helicopters were observed
of an airfield at Mekele in
Tigre Province.
Although insurgents in Eritrea have claimed
t at t e government is preparing to use toxic. gas dis-
persed by helicopters, no chemical warfare or decontamina-
tion equipment was detected The So-
viets reportedly delivered a small number of chemical
decontamination vehicles to the Ethiopians several years
ago.
22 August 1980
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1 25X1
NICARAGUA: Private Debt Rescheduling
After eight months of negotiations, foreign banks
are likely to reschedule about $500 million of Maxiagua's
guaranteed private debt in a meeting in Panama City
today. For at least cosmetic purposes, Managua is also
talking about the need for an International Monetary
Fund .program, a move that would be favorably received
by the bankers. An early agreement probably would
enhance Nicaragua's credit standing enough to secure
short-term credit for critical imports. If agreement
is not reached at the meeting, the banks could declare
the Nicaraguan debt in default, attempt to seize
Nicaraguan assets abroad, and shut off any new lines of
commercial credit. Such actions would set back
Nicaragua's recovery efforts and inhibit any efforts to
reschedule a $300 million debt to official bilateral
lenders or to renegotiate another $380 million in private
unguaranteed debt.
Top Secret
22 August 1980
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Top Secret
ZAMBIA: Concern over Possible South African Attacks
President Kaunda advised Western ambassadors in
Lusaka on Wednesday that he believes South Afriea is
about to launch a major attack against bases of the
South-West African People's Organization in. Zambia.
South African raids against SWAPO bases in Zambia and
Angola in the past few months have increased concern in
Zambia over the possibility of such an attack. Zambia
has repeatedly emphasized to the West the need to keep
pressure on Pretoria to end such attacks and to achieve
a Namibian settlement. Although Pretoria could easily
use forces already on the Zambian-Namibian border against
suspected SWAPO positions, there are no signs
of the "massive buildup" o w is
Kaunda warned. Kaunda is about to embark on a month-long
trip to Eastern Europe and Asia and may be exaggerating
the nature of South African activities in hopes of avert-
ing trouble while he is away.
25X1 1
25X1
25X1 ~
22 August 1980
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POLAND: The Prospects for Confrontation
The struggle in Poland has now reached a point where clashes
between workers and securitz~ forces are a distinct possibiZitz~, 25X1
especially in the port cities along the BaZtie coast. Power uZ
forces of restraint, however, are still in evidence.
The influence of young militants, assisted by dis- 25X1
sidents, on the joint strike committee appears to have
increased. This leadership is now making economic and
political demands that go well beyond redress of the
initial grievances of the current industrial unrest.
The regime has no intention of accommodating the
militants' political demands. It has made economic con- 25X1
cessions, but as it has done so, the demands have
escalated.
This process has maimed the austerity program, al-
though the government .insists that there is ultimately
no alternative to it. The regime also has sought to
isolate the militants by refusing to negotiate with the
joint strike committee,. disrupting telecommunications,
and arresting dissidents who have been serving as infor-
mation channels.
A Volatile Situation
The regime has made at least contingency preparations
for any violence. Police units have been moved from War-
saw to Gdansk, and the Politburo member in charge of se-
curity forces is also there. Use of the security forces,
however, and especially the military, runs the disks that
these forces might not perform reliably .and that any 25X1
violence might spread beyond the regime's ability to
control it.
Top Secret
Top Secret
22 August 1980
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possible has been accomplished.
Top Secret
At the same time, the regime is attempting to wear
down the workers. with both threats and promises. Tt hopes
that the militants' popular support will. gradually evap-
orate from fear, fatigue, and a sense that as much as
thought to be his most serious rival.
The staying power of the strikers will be impor-
tantly affected by the degree to which the Gierek regime
can present a united front to the public, denying the
militants' hope of exploiting leadership differences.
Gierek starts from a strong point, having just earlier
this year retired Poland's unpopular Premier and having 25X1
exiled. to East Germany the one Politburo member who was
leadership are wavering.
No ready alternative to Gierek's leadership appears
to exist. Both Gierek and Premier Babiuch have publicly
committed their prestige to the regime's current stand,
and there has been no suggestion that others in the
on Sunday.
The Role of the Church
The attitude of the workers and the regime will also
be importantly affected by the Church's posture. Polish
television played up Cardinal Wyszinski's appeal for calm
aspirations of non-Communist Poles.
The Church, however, can hardly be considered a
trusted ally.. It probably does not want matters to get
so out of hand that Gierek falls or the Soviets step in,
but it also does not want to be viewed as opposing the 25X1
Moscow's Position
end the unrest.
The USSR and Poland's Warsaw Pact allies also will
have an impact on the outcome. Three Soviet officials
commented separately this week. that they were confident
Gierek had taken the correct stance and would be able to
Top Secret
22 August 1980
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Top Secret
Moscow's continued confidence in Gierek, its pre-
occupation with its southern borders, and its continued
pursuit of detente in Europe are powerful factors en-
couraging a restrained position. If the Soviets want to
do more, they could increase exports of consumer goods
and extend large hard currency loans. Moscow's hesitation
reflects its own difficult consumer supply situation and
the implicit message for other East European states that
industrial unrest has its rewards.
The concern in Moscow about the Polish situation
is reflected most directly in the jamming of Western
broadcasts. The Soviet leadership expects Gierek to
employ whatever force is necessary to crush the unrest,
and it would attempt to install some other Polish leader
to do the job if Gierek proved unwilling. Poles of all
political persuasions appreciate this reality, and, even
without Gierek's reminder earlier this week, it remains
the major underpinning of stability.
Top Secret
22 August 1980
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