NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 1 NOVEMBER 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000500030003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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_1 Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
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Saturday
1 November 1980
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CO NID 80-257JX
November 1980
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POLAND: Outcome of Negotiations
After 15 hours of bargaining with Premier Pinkow-
ski, union leader Walesa stated early this morning that
the union had won a "victory." Walesa said Pinkowski
agreed to seek a reversal of last week's court de-
cision limiting the union's independence from the Com-
munist Party and restricting its right to strike. The
union also won the right to address the nation in an
uncensored television broadcast. The negotiators failed
to agree on the language of a communique, but Walesa
said the two sides "understood each other quite well."
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USSR-Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Briefs and Comments
Jamaica: Prime Minister Seaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Canada: Opposition to Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Chile: Opposition Leader's Return Denied. . . . . . . . .
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Uganda: Looking for Security Assistance . . . . . . . . .
USSR-Libya: Nuclear Fue Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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UK: Record Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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West Germany - Czechoslovakia: Status of Relations. . . .
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Zimbabwe : The Tekere Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Tanzania: Election Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Lebanon: New Christian Factional Fighting . . . . . . . .
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Special Analysis
Iran-Iraq: Prospects for a Settlement . . . . . . . . . .
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Tentative progress reportedly is being made in the negotia-
tions between Solidarity and the regime, but a union spokesman cau-
tioned against optimism until the talks are concluded.
According to Western news reports, the two sides
held seven hours of "tough" negotiations yesterday in an
atmosphere that was described by a Solidarity spokesman
as "businesslike and friendly." Neither side, however,
was willing to discuss the details of the talks that
apparently will be continued today.
The reports indicate that a compromise on the most
sensitive issue, recognition by Solidarity in its charter
of the leading role of the party, may have been worked
out. A union representative said that the Supreme Court
will make the final decision on this issue by 8 November,
but the court presumably would follow any agreement made
during these talks. The reports also suggest the regime
may be prepared to give the new unions some additional
access to the media.
The speed with which the regime moved to meet at
least some of the workers' concerns indicates that, at a
minimum, party leader Kania did not receive instructions
in Moscow to stand firm on all issues.
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There have been no further raids by Afghan helicopters into
Pakistan since 24 October, but tension is likely to remain high in
the border area because the Pakistanis have decided to react
strongly to attacks.
The latest reporting indicates that a Pakistani
tribal village and an Afghan refugee camp near Miram
Shah were attacked. At least three Pakistani tribesmen
were injured.
Additional incidents could result from the pursuit
by the Soviets and Afghans of insurgents fleeing into
Pakistan. The Soviets are likely to continue operations
this winter against resistance fighters in Afghanistan's
border provinces, although perhaps at a reduced level.
President Zia appears determined to resist border
incursions even though he is aware of the difficulty of
reacting to shallow penetrations of Pakistani airspace
Zia wants to appear resolute in deal-
ing with the incursions so as to preempt any efforts by
his opposition to exploit them. 25X1
Coup Attempt
Recent information indicates that Soviet units in
the Kabul area thwarted a coup attempt by two armored
units in mid-October. The organizers of the coup report-
edly were officers of the Khalq faction of the ruling
party, who have been feuding with President Babrak's
Parchamists.
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The coup attempt was the second by Khalqi officers
since Babrak was installed last December and again under-
lines Moscow's inability to get the warring factions to
work together. The Khalqi move may have been prompted
by the recent purge of a number of senior Khalgi military
officers and their replacement by Parchamists.
Babrak Still in the USSR
The Afghan President remains in the USSR for a rest
and medical examination, according to official statements.
He has had a difficult year and could need a rest, but
the Soviets probably also want to have additional con-
sultations with him. The initial part of his trip was
so taken up with public appearances that there was little
time allotted for serious discussions. Among other things,
the Soviets are likely to press Babrak to take steps to
reduce the political infighting in Kabul.
Afghan Pilgrims Seek Asylum
The pilgrimage to Mecca of 4,000 Muslim Afghans may
develop into an embarrassing situation for Kabul. The
Saudi Charge in Kabul told the US Embassy that only 125
are willing to return home. The Charge added that his
government would try to persuade the others to return
but in the end probably would grant political asylum to
many of them.
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JAMAICA: Prime Minister Seaga
Prime Minister Edward Seaga's overwhelming victory on Thurs-
day is largely a result of his widely respected reputation for eco-
nomic analysis and management, but he also is a strong nationalist
who has moved gradually from earlier leftist views toward a more
pragmatic approach to government.
In recent years, former Prime Minister Manley's
party has exploited Seaga's lack of personal magnetism
and has portrayed him as an unscrupulous rightwinger
whose party would abandon Manley's social objectives and
undercut the country's burgeoning nationalist movement.
This greatly overstates the distance between Jamaica's
two equally populist and historically centrist major
parties.
Despite his conservative image today, the 50-year-
old Seaga was an economic nationalist and an acknowledged
leader of the Jamaica Labor Party's left wing in the
early 1960s. Although he was never a hardcore radical,
he encouraged his conservative colleagues to take a more
sympathetic view of Cuba and toward nationalist economic
policies that were then considered "leftist."
As a government minister, he pushed through measures
to tax the upper income brackets heavily, backed the coun-
try's first program to redistribute unused agricultural
lands, and advocated increased levies on US and Canadian
bauxite companies. For 18 years Seaga has been the rep-
resentative of one of Jamaica's poorest and blackest con-
stituencies, and he has long been an enthusiastic promoter
of the country's African heritage.
Seaga, who is assuming power with more experience
in government than any previous Jamaican Prime Minister,
has become a sharp critic of many of his earlier social-
ist views. He will draw heavily on the private sector
to form his moderate cabinet and will try hard to lure
home technocrats from the Jamaican community abroad.
He nevertheless will remain strongly nationalist while
taking a seasoned and pragmatic approach to government.
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CANADA: Opposition to Reform
Prime Minister Trudeau's constitutional reform plan faces
increased opposition as a result of the federal budget presented
on Tuesday, and it could face a more serious obstacle in the grow-
ing British reluctance to get embroiled in the controversy.
Trudeau is trying to avoid the traditional require-
ment for unanimous provincial approval for constitu-
tional reform by getting a limited reform package
through both houses of Parliament--where opponents are
in the minority--by the end of this year. He would then
send the package to the British Parliament to exercise
for the last time its residual amending power over the
Canadian constitution. At that point, the constitution--
the British North America Act--would come under purely
Canadian control.
The new budget, however, is undermining federal
attempts to reduce hostility in the western provinces.
The main thrust of the budget is to shift the balance
of control over energy decisionmaking and revenues from
the western energy-producing provinces to Ottawa.
Premier Lougheed of Alberta led the counterattack
on Thursday, announcing a gradual cutback in oil produc-
tion. He had already joined forces with five other pre-
miers to,fiaht Trudeau's constitutional plan in the
courts.
The controversy in Canada is having repercussions
in the UK. The British would gladly be rid of this last
vestige of control over Canada, and until recently Brit-
ish parliamentary approval was considered certain. Prime
Minister Thatcher has now indicated, however, that she
might stall Trudeau's package, unless he can demonstrate
Canadian consensus support for his proposals.
To get broad support, Trudeau might have to remove
the more controversial reforms--the amending formula
and the bill of rights--but he would then face the same
impasse over amendments that has plagued Canada for 50
years. It would also prevent him from promoting franco-
phone rights outside Quebec, which is one of his long-
term objectives.
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CHILE: Opposition Leader's Return Denied
The regime's ban on Christian Democratic Party leader ZaZdivar's
return to Chile is typical of President Pinochet's increased aggres-
siveness toward critics since his victor in the constitutional
plebiscite in September.
In October, the regime accused Zaldivar of making
seditious remarks in an interview with a Mexican news-
paper. The paper later retracted the misquotations, but
Chile maintained the ban, claiming that Zaldivar's past
"provocative" statements justified it.
In maintaining the ban on Zaldivar, Pinochet demon-
strates his determination to muffle his domestic critics
even at the risk of damaging Chile's international inter-
If the ban continues, it will further demoralize
the Christian Democrats, who already are deeply discour-
aged by the plebiscite results. Some younger members
believe the party's leaders should protest the ban more
strongly.
8 Ton SPCrPt
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UGANDA: Looking for Security Assistance
Top Secret
The Ugandan Government, unable to deal with internal security
problems and faced with Tanzania's desire to reduce its troop pres-
ence, has been seeking assistance from China, Cuba, and Ethiopia.
Seven Chinese military advisers reportedly arrived
in Kampala last week. The advisers--the first Chinese
military personnel sent to Uganda since at least 1972--
probably will help train Ugandan recruits on small arms
provided by Beijing earlier this month.
China may be attempting to capitalize on Moscow's
reluctance to establish close military ties with Kampala
until after the Ugandan national elections scheduled for
10 December. Beijing also may be trying to gain greater
favor with Tanzanian President Nyerere, whose 11,000
troops in Uganda presently provide what little security
there is.
The head of Uganda's ruling Military Commission,
Paulo Muwanga, evidently expressed interest in establish-
ing closer military ties with Cuba during talks there in 25X1
late September. Havana has been training Ugandan security
personnel and has offered to provide military advisers,
but there is no evidence thus far to confirm recent rumors
that Cuban troops will be sent to Kampala soon.
Muwanga also visited Ethiopia recently to ask for
arms and military training.
With Tanzania hoping to start withdrawing its troops
from Uganda after the elections there, Muwanga is anxious
to line up new sources of help as soon as possible.
Kampala is unable to cope on its own with the threat of
further armed incursions by exiled dissidents, continu-
ing tribal unrest and chronic urban violence.
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Soviet plans to reduce the enrichment level of
nuclear fuel destined for Libya should prevent the Lib-
yans from stockpiling significant quantities of weapons-
usable uranium in the form of spent fuel elements. While
reaffirming their intent to let Libya keep the spent
fuel, the Soviets recently indicated that the enrichment
level planned for the fresh fuel has been reduced from
80 percent to between 40 and 50 percent. The even lower
enrichment of the spent fuel--probably between 29 and 37
percent--will constitute an effective technical barrier
to any Libyan efforts to use the material in an explosive
device. The Soviets have informed US officials that addi-
tional reductions in the enrichment level of the fresh
fuel are likely in the future.
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UK: Record Unemployment
The record jump this month in unemployment in the
UK to 7.8 percent has put increased pressure on the
Thatcher government's austerity program just as inflation
appears to be moderating. Unemployment is particularly
high in the auto, textile, and steel sectors where 142,000
jobs have been lost this year. The government will stand
firm against demands to abandon its anti-inflation program
and increase trade protectionism because of wage negotia-
tions now under way and because of disarray within union
and political opposition circles.
The announcement of West German Foreign minister
Genscher's official visit to Czechoslovakia on 18 and
19 December indicates that both countries are interested
in continuing normal relations. The visit had been post-
poned twice in the past year due to disagreement over
Czechoslovak treatment of dissidents and the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan. Moscow also may see an advantage
in having the Czechoslovaks host Genscher. Despite set-
backs in East German - West German relations and recent
Czechoslovak charges of Western interference in Poland,
Prague and Moscow both wish to demonstrate interest in
detente.
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The murder trial beginning on Monday of Minister of
Manpower Tekere, who also is Secretary General of the
ruling Zimbabwe African National Union, poses a serious
political problem for Prime Minister Mugabe. Tekere and
seven of his bodyguards have been indicted for murder
because of their role in an armed raid on a farm in
August in which a white farm manager was killed. Although
the legal case against them seems overwhelming, Mugabe
cannot simply write off Tekere, who has many sympathizers
within ZANU. Mugabe probably is concerned that his own
political position would become tenuous if he lost the
backing of Tekere and his followers.
If Tekere is convicted and sentenced to death,
Mugabe will almost certainly seek to have his sentence
commuted. Tekere is likely to be convicted of at least
manslaughter and be stripped of his party and govern-
ment offices. In the unlikely event Tekere is cleared,
Mugabe would face the difficult task of reassuring both
whites and blacks that the case had created no license
for future acts of violence.
Tanzania announced yesterday that President Nyerere
and Vice President Jumbe won last Sunday's elections
with about 93 percent of the popular vote. Over half
of the incumbent members of parliament were ousted, a
reflection of popular discontent over the government's
handling of the economy. Dissatisfaction with Nyerere
will probably increase in the near future in both civil-
ian and military circles, if--as is likely--Nyerere fails
to halt the country's economic decline.
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LEBANON: New Christian Factional Fighting
The Phalange Party earlier this week strengthened
its position as Lebanon's dominant Christian faction in
sharp fighting in a suburb of Beirut with the rival Na-
tional Liberal Party. The Phalange victory also is a
setback for the new Lebanese Government of Prime Minister
Shafiq Wazzan, whose authority was ignored, and further
erodes the credibility of the Lebanese armed forces.
Government forces made no attempt to intervene to stop
the fighting, although they clashed yesterday with
Phalange militiamen in another suburb of the capital.
The new gains by the Phalange over the National Liberal
Party will increase.the confidence of Phalange militia
leader Bashir Jumayyil. They also strengthen the likeli-
hood that he will move against the last two strongholds
of the National Liberal Party in the Beirut area and
perhaps against the militia of the Beirut Armenian
community.
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IRAN-IRAQ: Prospects for a Settlement
After six weeks of war, the outline of a mutually acceptable
basis for a settlement has yet to emerge. With the war proving more
difficult than expected, Baghdad already appears to be redefining
victory in more modest terms to demonstrate flexibility and stimu-
late a settlement that could still plausibly be termed an Iraqi suc-
cess. At this point, however, there is no sign of Iraqi give on the 25X1
basic objective of control over the Shatt aZ Arab. From Baghdad's
perspective, this will determine victory or defeat.
For Ayatollah Khomeini, a dialogue with Iraq is im-
possible as long as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and
the Baath Party rule in Baghdad. During his 14 years in
Iraq, Khomeini developed a deep-seated animosity for the
Baathists, whom he sees both as Sunni Arab oppressors of
the country's majority Shias and as secular modernists 25X1
with the same weaknesses as the Shah.
Iranian intransigence also is directly linked to the
domestic political struggle for control of the revolution.
The clerics have seized on the war--just as they have used
the US hostages--to radicalize the revolution further and
direct it against their opponents. Under the circumstances,
President Bani-Sadr and others more inclined to look for
compromise will be reluctant to assume the "dove" role.
The long-term prospects for a settlement thus are
likely to hinge on the continued ability of Khomeini and
the clerics to capitalize on the strong national and re-
ligious sentiment aroused by the Iraqi invasion. Offset-
ting this will be the deprivations that the Iranian people
will face if Iraq continues to disrupt most of the oil
supplies to domestic refineries and a sizable percentage
of Iran's normal port operations. We believe the Iranian
capacity to endure hardship is considerable, however, and
thus far there is little indication that Khomeini is being
blamed for the war and its effects.
Saddam's Weakening Position
Iraq's failure to wrap up a quick military victory
seriously threatens Saddam's hopes for regional leadership.
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He has not won solid Arab backing and has instead deepened
the split among the Arab countries arrayed against Egypt
and the Camp David accords. = :: 25X1
Arabs in both camps see "Saddam's war" as hurting the
Palestinian cause. Many of Iraq's conservative supporters
do not want an Iraqi victory as much as simply an end to
the fighting.
The war, meanwhile, has stimulated greater US pres-
ence in the Gulf and greater willingness of Gulf monarchies
to accept a US security role. that prewar Iraqi
policy sought to combat. 25X1
The domestic implications of a prolonged war are just
as grim. The economy will suffer, and Sunni-Shia tension
will mount. Plotting against Saddam is likely and, at a
minimum, would bring about a more repressive period.
Saddam has two tactical approaches by which he can
try to bring Iran around to renegotiating the Iran-Iraq
border, especially the Shatt al Arab. He could soften
his terms for settlement, or he could intensify the war
in an effort to ensure maximum economic cost to Iran. A
softening appears already under way. Intensification of
the military effort is not now evident, but it is possible
for Iraq to pursue both options simultaneously
The war was intended to correct, at Iran's expense,
Iraq's fundamental strategic deficiency--the lack of reli-
able and defensible maritime access to the Gulf. Iraq is
not likely to negotiate seriously until it takes control of
Khorramshahr and Abadan and, thereby, of the Shatt al Arab.
When this occurs, a diplomatic peace offensive stressing an
offer to trade Iraq's withdrawal-for acknowledgment of its
control of the Shatt is likely.
We cannot be certain if "control" in Iraq's eyes re-
quires continued occupation of a border strip along the
Shatt that includes Khorramshahr and Abadan. Virtually all
the remaining territory seized by Iraq probably could be
used as bargaining chips. 25X1
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Saddam might consider withdrawal from the area along
the Shatt if the international situation were to turn 25X1
against him, and if Iran were to agree to return the border
in the Shatt to the low watermark on the Iranian side. He
also could ask for UN supervision of a buffer zone.
Such a compromise would not solve Iraq's strategic
problem because it would not significantly enlarge Iraq's
land access to the Gulf and the Shatt would remain highly
The Search for Iranian Flexibility
At this point, Iran probably would reject even the
minimum Iraqi terms. Tehran has refused to discuss the
Shatt dispute and demands a full Iraqi withdrawal from
Khuzestan before there can be any talk of a cease-fire or
possible mediation.
The Iraqi invasion nevertheless has had a sobering
effect on Tehran. The clerics have accepted the return to
duty of previously purged Army and Air Force officers and
generally appear to have a better appreciation of the
dangers of Iran's international isolation.
On the other hand, the war has not ended the infight-
ing between the clerics and the more moderate secularists.
In fact, Bani-Sadr probably further increased his political
vulnerability by recently raising the possibility of Iranian
territorial concessions. The creation of a Supreme Defense
Council, although nominally headed by Bani-Sadr, was almost
certainly an effort to circumscribe both his and the mili- 25X1
tary's role in war policy.
Further military setbacks in Khuzestan, however, could
cause problems for the clerics. Bani-Sadr already has
charged that their purges of the military and the insertion
of clerical committees in all units of the armed forces have
weakened Iran's ability to resist. 25X1
The outlook is for continued Iranian intransigence and
a protracted "people's war." The dire economic consequences
of this policy could eventually induce Tehran to reconsider.
For the time being, however, Khomeini and the clerics appear
determined and able to continue the war in order to destroy
Saddam and consolidate the revolution.
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Top aecrei
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