SECURITY CONDITIONS IN CARACAS AND BOGOTA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R000400030020-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 7, 1961
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 8G-61
7 December 19b...
Limited Dis tri :s,a i oe
Final Copy
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
S P E C I A L
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E E S T I M A T E
NUMB E.R 80-61
The following intelligence organizations participated in the prepara-
.tion of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
C1A INTERNAL USE ONLY
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on 7 December. 'Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army; the Assistant Chief of.Naval Operations (Intelligence),
Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director
of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of
their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
7 December 1961
SUBJECT: SNIE 80-61: SECURITY CONDITIONS IN CARACAS AND BOGOTA
To estimate the likelihood of incidents which would endanger or embar-
rass the President during his forthcoming visits to Caracas and Bogota.
THE ESTIMATE
1. The governments of Venezuela and Colombia are vitally interested.
in the success of the President's visit, they will be alert to protect him
from danger or embarrassment, and they have forces at their disposal adequate
to maintain general control of the situation. Nevertheless, there are ele-
ments in both countries eager to create the appearance of popular antagonism
toward the US and popular rejection of the Alliance for Progress, and at the
same time to discredit their own governments.. These elements will almost
certainly take advantage of the occasion to stage some sort of hostile
demonstration. The nature and effect of these efforts will depend in large
measure on the immediate circumstances and the manner in which the security
forces deal with tie aceleases 12/23: CI P83-00
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2. The object of most hostile efforts would almost certainly be to
subject the President'and his party to personal indignity rather than to
physical injury, but some risk of the latter is inherent in the circum-
stances. There is, of course, a possibility of an assassination attempt by
some fanatic individual or small group.
Caracas
3. The circumstances of the President's visit to Caracas are radically
different from those which prevailed at the time of the Nixon incident. Then
most Venezuelans strongly resented the favor which the US had shown toward
the recently deposed Perez Jimenez dictatorship, and those elements which
undertook to demonstrate this resentment enjoyed the favor and encouragement
of the interim government. There is good reason to believe that the govern-
ment deliberately exposed Mr. Nixon to indignity, though it probably did not
expect the situation to get so far out of hand.
4. In contrast, the success of the President's visit is of vital
importance to the Betancourt government, which is alert to the danger of
hostile demonstrations and is taking extraordinary security precautions to
prevent or control them. Elite National Guard and regular military units
will be employed for this purpose. The government, however, is not popular
in Caracas, where the Communists and other extreme leftist elements have
control of student organizations and the capability of organizing large
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popular demonstrations, as well as considerable capabilities for terroristic
action. Furthermore, there is always the possibility that rightist extremists
will attempt to create an incident which would discredit the Betancourt govern-
ment in US eyes. On past occasions the government has demonstrated its will
and ability to curb disorder and control the general situation, but it has not
been able to prevent occasional violent disturbances.
5. The situation in Caracas could be adversely affected by develop-
ments in the Dominican, Republic, particularly if it could be made to appear
that the US was supporting the restoration of'military dictatorship there.
6. Local US capabilities to provide warning. of planned hostile actions
are good. We have evidence to indicate that Communist plans are designed
primarily to tie up traffic and discourage the attendance of favorably dis-
posed Venezuelans and that instructions have been given not to make any at-
tempt on the President's life. The probability is that the security forces
deployed for the occasion will be able to protect the President and control
.the general situation. Even so, some disturbance is almost certain to occur..
In any event, the amount of force deployed to protect the President could
itself become the source of some embarrassment.
Bogota
7. The circumstances in Bogota also are radically different from
those that prevailed at the time of the Bogotazo in 1948. Then the country,
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under the arbitrary rule of an unpopular government, was in a state of in-
cipient civil war, The Bogotazo was primarily sparked by local passions
which had no relation to the coincident meeting of the OAS.
8. In contrast, President Lleras Camargo is generally popular and
the threat is limited to the capabilities of the Communists and other ex-
tremist splinter groups to foment disorder in hope of creating the appear-
ance of a popular repudiation of the President and the Alliance for Progress.
This theme will not have much popular appeal in Bogota, but the Communists
do have a controlling influence in student organizations and some labor
unions. Local US capabilities to provide warning of the specific hostile
plans of those groups likely to cause trouble are fair to good.
9. As in Caracas, the government is vitally interested in the success
of the President's visit, is alert to the danger of hostile demonstrations,
and will take extraordinary security precautions to prevent or control them.
The forces at its disposal should be sufficient to protect the President and
control the general situation. There can be no guarantee, however, against
the possibility of an untoward incident.
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