GENERAL REVIEW OF US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160102-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 102
• Publication Date: February 28, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
COPIES TO:
Memorandum of Conversation
Pebruary 28, 1957
General Review of US-Tegvelav nastiest and Other Issues.
Leo Mates, Ambassador of Yugoslavia
Prams Primate, Minister-Oonaselor, Yugoslav dabasey
Robert Merphr,
David Mark, MB
BUR - Mr. Bose
NZ - Xr.-Lsverish
BB- Mr. Manama
BR- Kr. ?rivers
DRS - Mr. Walker
MB - Kr. Borges
o - Mr. Murphy
O - Mr. Kendrick
Annetassy, Belgrade
Ameabasey, Warsaw
CPO ?O$$04
Ambassador Mates revaested the neeting with Mr. Murphy se that
Hr. Priaosie? elm is returning to Belgrade for 3 or 4 weeks of oon?
saltation with the Yugoslav ?crisis: Offiee, night have the benefit
of current US thinking en a amber of problem.
Mr. Marphy opemed the dissuasion by repeating his regrets voioed
on precious eseasives that the plan for bigoolav President Tito to
visit the US had net worked out. Me stated thab he held to his view -
though Metes miabi hold to a contrary one theta publis VS state-
ment em the visit two asnithe alp would net have helped meek, mad
that tine was needed to limes, 'dais ?Amiss, Is facto mar
newspapers mad letter utters be the Department were already taking
a sere reseemable view, mad natters might take ? favorable turn later.
kabassedreillOWssid that the lissmbewer4itio someereatiolie
would have taken lbw at a vow eppertuse tine. Pereenal gamiest
was mash sere estiefastery than diplemetie eleseels in disquiets(
Bastorm Berofe, SoViet developments, and the Middle Rest,- It was
a pity that the meeting mould net essur sema.
After metier, in response to Mr. Marphyle query, that the text
of rereige Minister Perraisle resent fordo peliey epee& eritialsimg
the USOR had net yet arrived, sad that samment se it was the* pre-
eluded, Mates said that the Middle &stern situation looked brighter.
Mr. ilerphy
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OONFIPIRTiAL 1110
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Mr. Murphy agreed and added that it appeared that Israel would with-
draw from BelAiangterritory and the Gum strip and that UN troops
would enter Oise avd work out oivilian administration for the area.
He stated that Mp. Fewsi seemed to accept this stop and that this
was lOgioal since Gas& was only a liability and expense to lgypt.
WHOA was already established to oars for the Palestinian refugees,
and the UMBF could prevent a renewal of ft'sdayeen* raids.
Mates noted that the Sues issue still remained to be solved,
and Mr. Murphy replied that once the acute issue of Israeli troop
withdrawals had been overcome, it nit be possible to make progress
on Sues even though no answer was yet in sight. Nasser had slowed
down clearance of the canal and sought to use the canal as a political
'bargaining tool, but he might taw have to take **count of his
deteriorating domestic economic situation. Perhaps if the canal
were reopened, tolls might be paid to the rem or UM on an interim
basis. Kates observed, and Kr. Murphy concurred, that the six
principles on the canal adopted by the Security Cowin still
seemed valid, but their translation into practise was now the big
test.
Mates went on to ask whether the departure of Minister Wailes
from Budapest implied a move to break US relations with Hungary.
Or. Murphy denied this and pointed out that it would have been
awkward for the 03 to have seemed to endorse the fader regime by
having Wailes present his credentials to it. Wailes would now
return to the US for consultation pending developments, but
Kr. Murphy was not hopeful that Wailes would go back to Budapest.
Mates also thougtt it unlikely that conditions in Hungary would
improve in the near future.
The Ambassador then brought up the question of Hungarian refdgees
in Yugoslavia, and Mr. Murphy indicated that the US was interested in
the problem. Mr. Mark explained that the US hoped to help the Yugoslav
authorities with agricultural commodities and perhaps some release of US-
held local currency funds. Moreover, although it would not be possible
to bring Hungarian refugee; from Yugoslavia into the US on parole pend-
ing enactment by Congress of the Adainistration-sponsored immigration
legislation, the US was hoping to find several million dollars to help
other countries in hrope and elsewhere resettle the refugees. How-
ever, this was not yet to be taken as a Wit ccomitment since the US pro.
ject was in the exploratory stage. Ambassador Mates declared that he
fully understood, but was still happy to hear that the US was actively
trying to aid Yugoslavia. He believed that the Foreign Office would
be happy
WitMEM&
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to happy to hear of this from Primed., especially sines the pro.
blue was a continuing ono for IUgoolavia, and would pee worse
until the Soviets and Bungarises eampletely sealed the frontier,
which they had began to do.
In reply to Br. Murphy's inquiry about reeemt sweets in Poland,
including sips that the Stalinists there night be asking seas come-
back with Samalka's aegnieseense, Bates said that the situation
remained very delicate. The Russians were Inhappy over the basis
orientatimet the Ocmalka regime, and the Mist had to upset a
long period at gradual attempts by the USSR to reeomp its position
in ?eland by ever increasing the pressure an the Pales. As a re-
sult, there would be oscillations bask and forth within the Oemalka
regime. if matters went no farther than this, they *sold probably
be kept under eentrel, prelidod 531 Mos eftrollmid tboUtiost
caution. Ihe kir test would ceps in the 0040011.0 field *ere con-
ditions were bad and where the Russians goad easearbate than. If
the Poles failed to solve these problems, Soviet agents woad stir
things up. Mir. liorpkgr commented that it was interesting, to see how
the Soviets continued to operate in Poland maybe' their bendbmen
at the top in Warsaw had been Gaited, and Metes noted that the
%edam had manypro.Soviet Poles scattered about the country
who could be activated.
Mr. Murphy asked about Oseehosievakia, and Mates answered that
it was different because the *economic situationwas better and the
populace more docile, but that it could not eventually escape from
the 'historical trend towards national indepomileeee which was affecting
all of the Soviet orbit. As far Bulgaria and, Albania, about which
Mr. Murphy had also inqeired, Mates said that the Albanian regime
was the most sabservient to the Russians of all the satellites,
while the Bulgarians were clefs behind. Albania had never norm..
liaed its relatioes with fugoolavia. Rauh& was little more than
a figurehead, and Sheba was the Soviet sgaeleitee who took orders
from the very manyrdeviet "advisers" stationed there. Xs. Murphy
commented that the Soviets wanted to rum thins* in this faehion
everywhere, including Belgrade, sad Mates agreed. Be added that
Soviet assurances of friendship meet nothing.
Kr. Murphy concluded the meeting by stating that if the toreign
Office asked Primosio whether there was anything new an the legoslav
request for a multi-year PL 4$0 agreement with the BB, the answer
was negatifti nothing had *hanged SLIM the Usk Illarpapillatas oan.
venation as the *Nast a few woks earner.
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