JUSTIFICATION FOR PPC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001100130010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

C qty?y Oau Y1YIlQfi:g95 qq@
4'^. ~,r i61.4 4 ~'91,M k~' MAT U?i?! (.
Approved For Release 2000/09/01 CIA-RDP83-00036RO01100130010-4
JUSTIFICATION FOR PPC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
1. There are three principal elements in the PPC Staff -- the
Office of the Chief, the Strategy and Policy Group, and the Program
Coordination Group. This breakdown is actually more theoretical than
real, but it meets the administrative requirements incident to the
processing of T/0's. In actuality, there is a great deal of inter-
changeability and mutuality of interest between all three elements and
there is a continual effort to utilize the background and ingenuity of
any individual in the shop who has something to contribute to the
solution of a problem.
office of the Chief
2. Unless there is some argument about'the functional statements
as presented, the duties of the Chief seem to be fairly clear and those
of the Deputy equally so. Between the Chief and the Deputy, arrangements
are made for coverage of external as well as internal meetings and
conferences both in and out of Washington. In addition, the Deputy
spends as much of his time as necessary with the Strategy and Policy
Group or the Program Coordination Group and blends the efforts of
these two elements on joint problems. The Administrative Officer and
the Secretary in the Office of the Chief are required not only for
secretarial work, but to conduct the routine administrative tasks, in
which connection the Administrative Officer is in effect an executive
assistant to PPC so that the Deputy is free to concern himself with
substantive rather than administrative matters.
Strategy and Policy Group
3. The principal reason for the existence of this element is to
harness the efforts of the various staff elements of the covert offices
to the same framework of strategy and policy so that the different staffs
and areas are not running off in diverse directions. There is much risk
in a situation where there is inadequate time for thorough coordination
where security considerations tend to reduce the amount of staff coor-
dination carried out and where the absence of a broad national strategy
leaves excessive leeway in the selection of methods, techniques, interim
objectives, programs, and projects. It has become increasingly clear
that this staff element must develop the strategic planning assumptions
which will serve as a basis for both cold and hot war planning of all
elements within the DD/P Staff. In addition, it must give guidance as
to whether certain contemplated actions are within policy. It maintains
the NSC files within the DD/P Staff and from these and the results of the
consultants' meetings and other high level conferences and liaison conducted
in Washington, maintains on a continuing and current basis the DD/P
Policy Book which is a compendium of all existing policy guidance broken
down both by function and by area.
4. As to staffing requirements, three key individuals and two
secretaries will be needed. of the three people, the Chief will be
f'w;ti Gt i
Approved For Release 2000/09/01 : CIA-RDP83-00036RO01100130010-4
 Approved For Releas,X2000/0911 !i LDP83-00036` 01100130010-4
SECURITY UffURIMS~11
25X1A
25X1A
responsible for reading and appraising all documents which have or may
have strategic or policy implications. This will include NSC papers,
staff studies, intelligence reports, minutes of important conferences
such as the consultants' meetings, and cable material. He will deal
with such members of the DD/P Staff as necessary on any important
implications of this nature. He will also insure that where modifi-
cations in strategy and policy are indicated, action be taken by the
necessary authorities to achieve such modification. As required by
DD/P, he will engage in the review of certain 10/2 activities to insure
consonance with policy and proper strategic orientation. This respon-
sibility requires an individual of the broadest possible background
and with a thorough knowledge of all matters in the government affecting
the covert missions of CIA. He will be supported by two individuals --
one an individual with considerable staff and operating experience who
is constantly striving to find new strategical techniques for the better
achievement of the covert mission and for conducting the necessary
liaison in the government toward the development of new or improved
strategy. The other individual will be in charge of the NBC files
and the DD/P Policy Book and it will be his continuing responsibility
to maintain this Policy Book up-to-date in the light of day-to-day
developments and as directed by the Chief of the Strategy and Policy
Group. Two secretaries will be required for this part of the organization
since the task of maintaining the NBC files and keeping the Policy Book
current is one which requires considerable clerical support and is
sufficient to warrant the use of one full-time clerk stenographer.
Program Coordination Group
5, The establishment of the Program Coordination Group activates
what is perhaps the most essential and important item in the entire
15 July 1952 reorganization -- that of a staff element whereby DD/P
can coordinate and balance the planning efforts of the covert staff
elements and one whereby the logistical and support preparations of
the overt staff elements of CIA can be tied together therewith. The
basis for this requirement is discussed in the following paragraphs.
6. Because of the relative youth of the 10/2 organizations
within CIA, including the 10/2 work of the area divisions, the covert
operations under 10/2 have developed more or less like topsy; i.e.,
each area division has done what seemed to be best looking at the
picture from the standpoint of that area alone. In this way, toward
the end of FY 1952, there were over Mope active projects -- yet the
sum total of these Mprojects was by no means a coordinated effort nor
was the impact of these operations simultaneous or even necessarily
mutually supporting. In many cases, serious conflicts were found to
exist. In others, conflicts were found between the requirements of
the 10/2 mission and the NSCID 5 mission. The reason for all this
was a simple one; i.e., that there was no staff element which could
devote itself to the careful fitting of the diverse requirements of
these activities into a logical pattern and no procedure whereby this
could be done.
Approved For Release 2000/09/01:11 3-00036R001100130010-4
 Approved For Release J*9&k RDP83-00036 R084'100130010-4
7. In addition, the lack of a programming machinery for the
overall covert effort created a situation whereby the central support
offices of CIA did not receive estimated requirements sufficiently in
advance to provide the resources necessary to conduct operations, nor
were they equipped to evaluate and assess priorities to the various
requests that were submitted. Yet, it is incontrovertible that when
there are not enough resources to go around, some machinery must exist
for the fixing of priorities. Finally, because there was no overall
program but simply a miscellany of projects, it was not clear to the
central support officers what load would be imposed upon them as a
result of the contemplated 10/2 operations. For this reason, at various
times during the past two years, the recruiting machinery, the security
clearance machinery, the training machinery, the procurement machinery,
the transportation machinery, and the audit machinery has been completely
swamped because these elements of CIA had not been in a position to
assess the demands that were to be made upon them.
8. These deficiencies have by no means been corrected and all
continue to exist in one form or another. on the other hand, no question
has been raised in any of the discussions leading up to the resent
reorganization that what was needed was a system whereby 107 as well as
NSCID 5 operations could be planned against the framework of a coordinated
world-wide plan; whereby the planning that was done could be reviewed for
consistency and timing; whereby the support requirements of all types which
were generated by these plans could be reviewed and checked to insure
that they were not exorbitant or excessive (and, as a result of this
check, plans readjusted well in advance so that the requirements would
be realistic); whereby the resulting requirements could be delivered to
the procurement elements of CIA and in turn to the Department of Defense
sufficiently in advance for orderly development of budgets to insure that
adequate funds would be available when needed; and whereby final revision
and cutback of plans could be made as budgetary developments tended
to reduce available resources. These, in short, are the missing items
which can only be supplied by a program coordination group. It will
be noted that a group of this type can furnish as important a service
to DD/A and the central administrative offices as to DD/P since it
involves not only the balancing of the operational programs, but the
balancing of the support requirements generated by these programs.
9. In addition to the above basis for such machinery, consideration
must be given to the question of decentralization to the field. It is
clearly the intent of the Director that this decentralization should
proceed as rapidly as the administrative capability is developed to
manage such an organization from Washington. Quite obviously, there
can be no decentralization without a comprehensive, consistent, realistic,
and balanced program. Once the machinery is established for the develop-
ment of this program, decentralization can take place with relative ease.
Approved For Release 2000/09/0SE ~ifDP83OOO36ROOl 100130010-4
 Approved For Release 1400/09/01 : c8300036R0e41 00130010-4
3ECURITT INFORMATION
10. As to staffing requirements, a minimum of three individuals
will be necessary to develop this system to coordinate the development
of the necessary directives, formats, etc. to review the key planning,
programming, requirements estimation, and budget documents which are
generated as a result of this system and to insure realism, consistency,
and balance. To date, there has never existed in CIA a staff element
for conducting this review. As an example of the magnitude of the task
involved, all drafts of procedural directives require coordination at
35 different points within the Agency -- long and detailed discussion
and negotiation being required in all cases. The Chief of the Program
Coordination Group must be an individual of considerable background
and experience in procedural analysis, with particular reference to
governmental procedures as well as those in the civilian organizations
with which the government must deal. He must have a good general
background in strategic planning and the general situation as to the
national cold war strategy. He must be well versed in logistical
support requirements development in its broadest sense so as to assess
correctly the mutual interaction of strategy and logistics. He must
have the maturity and patience necessary to conduct long and detailed
negotiations with many different staff elements both in the overt and
covert offices. He must be supported by at least two individuals, of
which at least one must have considerable military background and
experience in military and operational planning and programming as
well as intelligence matters in general. His other assistant should
have considerable background in facilities planning. Among the three
key personnel in this element, there must be considerable knowledge
of governmental budget programming procedures. Since the development
and coordination of the procedures necessary to effect sound and
adequate programming will require a very large amount of drafting and
redrafting of directives and negotiation on these directives as well
as formats and drafts of plans, two secretaries will be required to
support the efforts of the key staff officers in this group.
Approved For Release 2000/09/01 : CIAIRDP83-00036 R001100130010-4
SECRET
 (When F,!led ln)
AREA OR AC pproved For I "elea 2 O /V I SECRET IT,,
ERCIP931OtYO'3 R 0110013001
Staffing
HQ PPC DDP T 0
Personnel
Funntion
Memo from C/PPC to DDP. Subject: PPC Staffing Requirements
Memo from COPS to C/ADMIN, same subject.
Detailed discussion of the, staffing requirements for PPC and
C/OPS approval.
(also see: HS/CSG-743, 750,1578, and 1668)
DOC DAT,
CLASS !
3 0 tj52_
4 Oct 52
HS/CSG-1669
ease 12000/09/01 CIA-RDP83-000368001100130010-4
o?as 2523 SOURCE DOCUMENT INDEX SECRET 13- t5)