VIETNAM: WHAT S GOING ON HERE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001300220001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001300220001-2
mid.
ester.
E
S
BALTIMORE, SATURDAY. SEPTEMBER 13.1969
'IETNAM PARLEY-President Nixon meets advisers in White House. From McCain, Gen. Greighton Abrams, Richard Helms, Philip Habib, Ellsworth
eft: Henry Kissinger, John Mitchell, Vice President Agnew,,Adm. John S. Bunker, William Rogers, Mr. Nixon, Melvin Laird and Gen. Earle Wheeler.
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The Weather
)day-Sunny and mild. High in
ie middle 80s. Sunday-Fair and
arm. Probability of rain, 10 per
int today and tonight. Temperature
nge: Today, 58-85. Yesterday,
-78. Details are on Page B4.
2d Year ? ? . ? No. 282
ton
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1969
By Frank Johnston-The Washington Post
President Nixon and advisers review the Vietnam war. Adm. John McCain, Pacific commander; Gen. Creighton to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker; Secretary of State
From left, Henry A. Kissinger, adviser on national secur? Abrams, commander in Vietnam; CIA Director Richard Rogers; the President; Defense Secretary Laird; and Gen.
rity; Attorney General Mitchell; Vice President Agnew; Helms; Philip Habib of Paris talks team; Ambassador Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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 NEWSFFWEEK
Approved For Release 20O&?/ P GVRDP83-00036R001300220001-2
? Vietnam: What's Going On Here?
A fter a month of beachcombing and
golf in the endless summer of South-
ern California, Richard Nixon returned
to autumnal Washington, clearly deter-
mined to do something about his No. 1
foreign headache-the war in Vietnam.
The moment for a U.S. initiative seemed
propitious: He Chi Minh, the legendary
leader of North Vietnam, was dead and
the Communists had declared a three-
day cease-fire in his honor. Yet, by the
time the President convoked a blue-rib-
bon panel of Vietnam experts late last
week, the conflict had resumed with all
its accustomed ferocity-and, somehow,
Mr. Nixon had managed to convert what
might have been an opportunity into an
almost unfathomable display of uncer-
tainty of purpose on the part of the U.S.
True, there was strong reason to think
that the President was about to an-
nounce another sizable U.S. troop with-
drawal from South Vietnam. But this sol-
itary evidence of some consistency of
policy was all but buried in a remarkable;
welter of American faux pas and false
starts. Despite rigorous arm-twisting,
the U.S. was unable last week to per-
suade South Vietnam to join it in observ-
ing the Communist truce-a difference of
? opinion that resulted in the most serious
breach between the two allies since Sai-
gon refused to attend the opening'of the
Paris peace talks last fall. And later in the
week, the White House revealed that,
after suspending B-52 raids against ene-
my targets in South Viet-
nam for 36 hours, it had
suddenly ordered the gi-
ant bombers back into the
air because the Commu-
nists had failed to respond
to the "gesture." (Given
the fact that Viet Cong
communications are noto-
riously poor-and that the
U.S. itself would be hard
put to respond to a peace
signal within 36 hours
-the Administration nev-
er satisfactorily explained
how the B-52 bombing suspension could
have been construed as a serious test of
enemy intentions.)
Judging from this puzzling perform-
ance, the conclusion seemed inescapable
that the machinery of the Nixon Admin-
istration had-temporarily, at. least-shown
itself inadequate to cope with the com-
plexities of the Vietnam war. And in-
deed, it was largely to chart a more co-
herent Vietnam course that the President
decided to convene a meeting of his top
advisers last week. The sober-faced
group of men that assembled around the
Cabinet-room table included the entire
spectrum of the "Vietnam establishment"
-Generals Creighton Abrams and Earle
Wheeler, Adm. John McCain, Secretary
of State William Rogers, Presidential as-
sistant Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Ells-
worth Bunker, CIA Director Richard
Helms, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird and Attorney General John Mitch-
ell. For nearly four hours, while Presi-
dent Nixon listened and occasionally
glanced at a nearby easel bearing mili-
tary maps and graphs, his counselors
ranged over the multifaceted problems
of the Vietnam struggle. Then, after a
brief lunch, Mr.' Nixon flew off to Camp
David, leaving behind the unanswered
question of what, if anything, the meet-
ing had accomplished.
On that score, White House aides
were of little help. Nonetheless, most
Washington insiders, felt certain that the
President had asked for-and received-
the concurrence of his advisers for a sec-
ond-slice pullout of as many as 25,000 to
40,000 U.S. troops. And some officials be-
lieved that Mr. Nixon might make the
formal announcement of the withdrawal
within a matter of days-perhaps before
he appears at the United Nations this
week to deliver a speech at the opening
session of the General Assembly.
Issues: But in a sense, the timing and
scale of future troop withdrawals were
the least of Mr. Nixon's problems. For as
last week's backing and filling revealed,
the Administration has become increas-
ingly divided over fundamental issues of
war and peace. He Chi Minh's death-
and the question of his successor (page
30)-provided a case in point. Seen from
the :White House, the disappearance of
Ho was'a providential stroke of luck. Mr.
Nixon, *ho had received intelligence re-
ports on Ho's failing health for at least
two weeks before his death, reportedly
interpreted the passing of the North Vi-
etnamese leader as an opportunity to
come to terms with a younger and more
flexible generation of rulers in Hanoi.
Said one U.S. official: "The atmosphere
in the White House since Ho left the
scene is something close to elation." (An-
other possible reason for the Administra-
tion's upbeat mood was suggested by a
foreign diplomat in Washington who told
NEWSWEEK that he was convinced that
the U.S. had received a peace signal
... recalled similar scenes in the Johnson Administration
from Hanoi; if that was
true, however, it was curi-
ous that the Viet Cong
delegation to the Paris
peace talks last week was
even more vituperative
than it usually is.)
Yet it was a dismaying
fact that Mr. Nixon's inter-
pf etation of how Ho's
d"eath might affect the
chances for peace was in
direct conflict with that of
most of the men within
the U.S. Government who
Th., more. things change: Amid a top-level policy review, faux pas, false starts and obfuscation .. Coft5Ilued
 NEWSWEEK
Approved For Release 200 it 8T(T7' : CIA-RDP83-00036ROO1300220001-2
Vietnam: What's Going On Here?
A fter a month of beachcombing and
golf in the endless summer of South-
ern California, Richard Nixon returned
to autumnal Washington, clearly deter-
mined to do something about his No. 1
foreign headache-tlie war in Vietnam.
The moment for a U.S. initiative seemed
propitious: Ho Chi Minh, the legendary
leader, of North Vietnam, was dead and
the Communists had declared a three-
day cease-fire in his honor. Yet, by the
time the President convoked a blue-rib-
bon panel of Vietnam experts late last
week, the conflict had resumed with all
its accustomed ferocity-and, somehow,
Mr. Nixon had managed to convert what
might have been an opportunity into an
almost unfathomable display of uncer-
tainty of purpose on the part of the U.S.
True, there was strong reason to think
that the President was about to an-
nounce another sizable U.S. troop with-
drawal from South Vietnam. But this sol-
itary evidence of some consistency of
policy was all but buried in a remarkable ;
welter of American faux pas and false
starts. Despite rigorous arm-twisting,
the U.S. was unable last week to per-
' suade South Vietnam to join it in observ-
ing the Communist truce-a difference of
S opinion that resulted in the most serious
breach between the two allies since Sai-
gon refused to attend the opening bf the
Paris peace talks last fall. And later in the
week, the White House revealed that,
after suspending B-52 raids against ene-
my targets in South Viet-
nam for 36 hours, it had
suddenly ordered the gi-
ant bombers back into the
air because the Commu-
nists had failed to respond
to the "gesture." (Given
the fact that Viet Cong
communications are noto-
riously poor-and that the
U.S. itself would be hard
put to respond to a peace
signal within 36 hours
-the Administration nev-
er satisfactorily explained
from Hanoi; if that was
true, however, it was curi-
ous that the Viet Cong
delegation to the Paris
peace talks last week was
even more vituperative
than it usually is.)
Yet it was a dismaying
fact that Mr. Nixon's inter-
prietation of how Ho's
death might affect the
chances for peace was in
direct conflict with that of
most of the men within
the U.S. Government who
A-RDP8 .Ql i 6b 1"42
how the B-52 bombing suspension could
have been construed as a serious test of
enemy intentions.)
Judging from this puzzling perform-
ance, the conclusion seemed inescapable
that the machinery of the Nixon Admin-
istration had-temporarily, at least-shown
itself inadequate to cope with the com-
plexities of the Vietnam war. And in-
deed, it was largely to chart a more co-
herent Vietnam course that the President
decided to convene a meeting of his top
advisers last week. The sober-faced
group of men that assembled around the
Cabinet-room table included the entire
spectrum of the "Vietnam establishment"
-Generals Creighton Abrams and Earle
Wheeler, Adm. John McCain, Secretary
of State William Rogers, Presidential as-
sistant Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Ells-
worth Bunker, CIA Director Richard
Helms, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird and Attorney General John Mitch-
ell. For nearly four hours, while Presi-
dent Nixon listened and occasionally
glanced at a nearby easel bearing mili-
tary maps and graphs, his counselors
ranged over the multifaceted problems
of the Vietnam struggle. Then, after a
brief lunch, Mr. Nixon flew off to Camp
David, leaving behind the unanswered
question of what, if anything, the meet-
ing had accomplished.
On that score, White House aides
were of little help. Nonetheless, most
Washington insiders felt certain that the
President had asked for-and received-
the concurrence of his advisers for a sec-
ond-slice pullout of as many as 25,000 to
40,000 U.S. troops. And some officials be-
lieved that Mr. Nixon might make the
formal announcement of the withdrawal
within a matter of days-perhaps before
he appears at the United Nations this
week to deliver a speech at the opening
session of the General Assembly.
Issues: But in a sense, the timing and
scale of future troop withdrawals were
the least of Mr. Nixon's problems. For as
last week's backing and filling revealed,
the Administration has become increas-
ingly divided over fundamental issues of
war and peace. Ho Chi Minh's death-
and.the question of his successor (page
30)-provided a case in point. Seen from
the White House, the disappearance of
Ho was a providential stroke of luck. Mr.
Nixon, who had received intelligence re-
ports on Ho's failing health for at least
two weeks before his death, reportedly
interpreted the passing of the North Vi-
etnamese leader as an opportunity to
come to terms with a younger and more
flexible generation of rulers in Hanoi.
Said one U.S. official: "The atmosphere
in the White House since Ho left the
scene is something close to elation." (An-
other possible reason for the Administra-
tion's upbeat mood was suggested by a
foreign diplomat in Washington who told
NEWSWEEK that he was convinced that
the U.S. had received a peace signal
... recalled similar scenes in the Johnson Administration
The more things chanae: Amid a top-level policy review, faux pas, false starts and obfuscation .. COntinUed
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001300220001-2
EVENING STAR
C., Friday, September 72, 1969
President Nixon meets with advisers on Viet-
nam in the White House. From left are: Henry
Kissinger, presidential assistant; Atty. Gen.
John Mitchell; Vice President Spiro Agnew;
the ing another 35,O0O ~y the end of Jone plan which would have
am. the year. 200,000 American forces out of
the Officials admit the President Vietnam by the mid-term elec-
om- is under heavy political pressure tions in November 1970. The re-
on at home, mounting since he de-; mainder of the 300,000 in the
lore ( layed the promised August deci 500,000 forces still there now
am. sion on further troop reduction, J would be recruited from a volun-
to confirm that he really intends; teer army.
to "Vietnamize" the war. { Official sources have indicated
ther The argument goes that even' all this week that today's confer-
usti- though the peace negotiations' ence-which they insist was not
rces are stuck in Paris, the enemy; caused by the death of Ho or by
Cady has reduced infiltration to the any dramatic change in the Viet-
end south and the South Vietnamese; r=am situation-.was called to
army is improving its combat; focus on the promised president-
U.S. capability to the point where ; ial decision on withdrawing more
s re- I fewer and fewer American! American forces from Vietnam
con-; forces are needed. But the suspensiAl*
_--~.........,-..;x,. .,n..,.,ffn ",.,f.mnnnr-ar
Pacific commander-in-chief Adm. John S.
McCain; U.S. commander in Vietnam Gen.
Creighton Abrams; CIA Director Richard
I elms; Philip Habib of the Paris negotiating
team; Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth
Bunker; Secretary of State William Rogers;
President Nixon; Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird, and Gen. Earle Wheeler.
dramatized that this ap- sources in Washington were say- not meant that any new Ameri- suspension of the B52 raids a
parent gesture toward de- ing that tomorrow's meeting can peace initiative would be just such a gesture.
escalating the war shows the was not'likely to yield anything premature. At the last meeting of th
close link between military and spectacular. . But critics outside the admin- Paris peace negotiations Aug. 2
diplomatic tactics for reaching a The weekly meeting, usually istration, and a minority of offi- President N ixon's negotiator
compromise settlement in the held on Thursday, was canceled vials inside, had counter d that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lod,,(
[war. last week at North Vietnam's the United States should make noted to the Communist sic
And Ziegler said earlier that request after Ho's death. just such an initiative, showing that the United States had cw
all aspects of the Vietnam situa- The consensus among the gov- conciliation, so as to strengthen hailed the 1352s raids in Jui:
tion would be under review. (ernment experts here has been any proponents of flexibility in l While the Lodge statement w
The obvious forum for trans- 'that the first meeting after the the new Hanoi leadership. aimed at proving Nixon's sir
lating the B52 raid suspension postponement would come too Another major question mark verity in wishing to negotiate
into a diplomatic initiative would, soon to see any departure in was how such a step would af- officials said the B52 curtailmei
have been the Paris peace talks ?policy by the continuing collec- feet U.S. relations with Saigon. then was part of the 10 pe
-which are scheduled to re-ltive leadership in Hanoi. . The former head of the cent cut from 1,500 average 1
sume their weekly sessions toJMA*GpgTWg3M004&A0Q20M1s2 The policy advisers of the Nix- American team in the peace monthly raids which the Pent
orr .1ga%2001/08~7 for the Johnson gon had announced for bud;
t i arvhmaintaunngat e likelihood administration, W. Averell Har- etare reasons in April.
vnn,,A in gn7ith Via!nam official Iof a Deriod of uncertainty * in Ha- ! r
iman, has repeatedly cited The White House gave this li
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001300220001-2
EVENING STAR
C., Friday, September 12, 1969
'as
the ing another 35,000 by the end of one plan which would have
gym. the year. 200,000 American forces out of
the Officials admit the President Vietnam by the mid-term elec-
Im- is under heavy political pressure, tions in November 1970. The re-
on at home, mounting since he de- mainder of the 300,000 in the
ore layed the promised August deci- 500,000 forces still there now
M. sion on further troop reduction, would be recruited from a volun-
to confirm that he really intends teer army.
to "Vietnameze" the war. Official sources have indicated
her The argument goes that even all this week that today's confer-
sti- though the peace negotiations ; ence-which they insist was not
ces are stuck in Paris, the enemy caused by the death of Ho or by
idy has reduced infiltration to the any dramatic change in the Viet-
end south and the South Vietnamese nam situation-was called to
army is improving its combat focus on the prom "W- 69eet
President Nixon meets with advisers on Viet-
nam in the White House. From left are: Henry
Kissinger, presidential assistant; Atty. Gen.
John Mitchell; Vice President Spiro Agnew;
Pacific commander-in=chief Adm. John. S.
McCain; U.S. commander in Vietnam Gen.
Creighton Abrams; CIA Director Richard
Berms; Philip Habib of the Paris negotiating
team; Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth
Bunker; Secretary of State William Rogers;
President Nixon; Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird, and Gen. Earle Wheeler.
suspension of the B52 raids a
just such a gesture.
At the last meeting of tii
Paris peace negotiations Aug. 2:
President Nixon's negotiator
:A,n,bassador Henry Cabot Lode
noted to the Communist side
that the United States had cur
re- fewer and fewer American; American forces from vietnam.
,on forces are needed. But the suspension of the B52
- dramatized that this ap- sources in Washingtpn were say-
parent gesture toward de- ing that tomorrow's meeting
escalating the war shows the was not likely to yield anything
close link between military and spectacular. V
diplomatic tactics for reaching a The weekly meeting, usually
compromise settlement in the held on Thursday, was canceled
war. last week at North Vietnam's
And Ziegler said earlier that request after Ho's death.
all aspects of the Vietnam situa- The consensus among the gov-
tion would be under review. ernment experts here has been
The obvious forum for trans- that the first meeting after the
lating the B52 raid suspension postponement would come too
into a diplomatic initiative would soon to see any departure in
have been the Paris peace talks policy by the continuing collec-
to-
rr .., on administration had been
Avero
likeli
anon
t
i
that
_
i
l
t
_
ll _ .._ _ _.
, ...
......... .........v
4.,.,
ain
ng
i
ary lma
n
Prior to the new mi
., e,,.-4s; v;n1n~,,, 1 ?f ~ nnrir i ofnrortninty in Ha- riman has reneatedl cited! The White House gave this lie
not meant that any new Ameri-
can peace initiative would be
premature.
But critics outside the admin-
istration, and a minority of offi-
cials inside, had countergd that
the United States should make
just such an initiative, showing
conciliation, so as to strengthen' tailed the B52s raids in Juiy
any proponents of flexibility in While the Lodge statement wa
the new Hanoi leadership. aimed at proving Nikon's sin
Another major question mark cerity in wishing to negotiate
was how such a step would af-lfficials said the B52 curtailmen
{ then was part of the 10 per
relations with Saigon
f
t U
S
.
ee
.
.
i jner head of the cent cut from 1,800 average c
AIQ in the peace I monthly raids which the Penta
T
negotiations for the Johnson1gon bad announced for budg
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Attending yesterday's meeting with President Johnson
were (clockwise around table, starting from left) Carl T.
Rowan, retiring USIA director; McGeorge Bundy, special
presidential assistant; Chester Cooper, assistant to Mc-
George Bundy; Henry Cabot Lodge; Adm. William Raborn,
director of the CIA; Richard Helms, deputy CIA director;
Jack Valenti, presidential assistant; Horace Busby, presi-
25X1A
united Press International
dential assistant; Press Secretary Bill Moyers; Leonard
Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; William
Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State; George Ball, Under
Secretary of State; Dean Rusk; the President; Robert S.
McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Cyrus Vance, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and Gen. Earle Wheeler, chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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DP" July 26, 1965
W. OF P$Q OG A ISt 1
SOURCE: United Press
YOUR HEM IMP-MR1,
White House Conference (McNamara report) July 21
for your retention
C 3 IAL
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`lA`? August 2, 1965
b7Fddl1 CE:
x OM 1 JE i?
President Johnson at cabinet meeting, requested
retention
COWIUMM
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