LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00156R000300020014-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 10, 1979
• Content Type: LETTER

The Director
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10 MAY 1979
The President
The White House
Washington, D.-C. 20500
responsible for implementation of the Act within CIA. These
three reports will be available for public inspection.
of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, and the designated agency official who is
I am writing to you at this time to request that you
exercise your authority under the Ethics in Government Act
.of 1978 to exempt from public disclosure the financial
reports filed under that Act by CIA personnel and to autho-
rize the filing of additional reports as are necessary to
protect the identities of such personnel. Not included in
this request for an exemption are the reports of the Director
I wish to assure you that in reaching this conclusion I
have not taken my responsibilities lightly, but have con-
sidered several alternatives and balanced the competing
interests. In attempting to determine the extent to which
public availability of the reports of CIA personnel would
compromise the national interest, I have conducted an Agency-
wide review over the past four months.
At the outset I must say that, without'a doubt, the
public disclosure of the reports. of employees who are or in
the future may be utilized in an undercover status would
render cover arrangements ineffectual,.lead to a severance
of. CIA relationships with some organizations that provide
cover, and, quite likely, result in placing many Agency per-
sonnel and their families in immediate personal jeopardy.
The same is true with: respect to certain employees, past or
present, who at one time were under cover. In addition, even
employees never under cover nor likely to be would, with
their families,,be caused to assume an unacceptable degree
of personal jeopardy which. would not occur if they were
employees of an agency engaged in less newsworthy activities.
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I considered as one alternative an'approach that would
leave open to public disclosure the financial reports of CIA
employees who could never be expected to assume'a cover
status and whose identities may not seem to require pro-
tection_ under the law. However, I rejected this option both
because it would diminish the utility and flexibility now
enjoyed in assigning Agency personnel for tours of duty and
because it cannot be determined with any-certainty that an
employee would never-be placed under cover at some later
date. Moreover, since my responsibilities for the security.
of intelligence agencies and personnel and the exemption
afforded under the Act extend beyond undercover individuals
and encompass other sensitive information that would compro-
mise the national interest, an exemption even.for the reports
of overt employees is important. One example of this is
.that official job descriptions of reporting officials must
be released to the public along with the financial disclosure
statements. These descriptions could reveal the internal
organization and workings of the Agency, even if the officials
involved could be identified openly as CIA employees. The
risks inherent in such-disclosures caused Congress, in 1949,
to enact Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act,
in order to implement the more general proviso of the
National Security Act of 1947., "[t]hat the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
Section 6 specifically exempts the Agency from any law which
requires "the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by*the Agency." If the Director is to be
able to carry out his statutory responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,
information of this sort, which is specifically protected
against disclosure by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949, also warrants the protection afforded under the ethics
law.
An additional factor leading me to my conclusion is
the counterintelligence impact of financial disclosures by
intelligence officials for the scrutiny not only of the
American public but also of hostile clandestine services.
While it is true that in some instances the names of Agency
personnel already are being disclosed today, as for example
in the open correspondence with Congress by members of my -
-legal-, legislative and intelligence community staffs, and in
other contexts as well, these effects cannot be equated with
the disclosure of detailed financial information. Disclo-
sure of such personal information could prove a valuable.
asset indeed in assessment, targeting, or exploitation
efforts directed at Agency employees by foreign intelligence
services.
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A further consideration is the undue personal jeopardy
in which employees and their families could be placed with-
out regard to-their cover status or Agency duties. The
constant publicity given to Agency activities and the
controversy which some of this publicity generates make it
likely that publicly available financial disclosure state-
ments of Agency employees will be publicized. Such publicity
will make those employees possible targets not only for
terrorists or ordinary criminals, but particularly for
cranks and mentally unstable individuals who constantly
blame the Agency for their problems, whether real or imagined.
Finally, I considered, and rejected,.the alternative of
permitting the public availability of the reports of a hand-
ful of the most senior, and most visible, Agency officials.
An approach of this nature, I.believe, falls victim to the
same considerations applicable to other-employees and,
indeed, is exacerbated because of the access of these
senior employees to our most vital secrets.
Accordingly, I believe-that the publication of the
names.and financial-statements of senior Agency.officials
would adversely affect the security.. of U. S. intelligence
collection efforts generally and, as a result, compromise
the national interest. In view of these considerations, I
am hopeful you will agree to a total exemption, except as to
the three reports. indicated.. If you do agree, I recommend
that you sign a letter such as that enclosed in draft to the
Director, Office of Government Ethics, Office of Personnel
Management, indicating your decision to exempt from the
public disclosure provisions of the law those reports filed
by present, past, or future employees of the CIA, and of
individuals assigned for duty with CIA from elsewhere in the
Federal Government, and to authorize the filing of additional
reports as may be necessary to protect the identities of
such individuals in accordance with the provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act.
If you approve my recommendation, CIA personnel of
course will remain fully subject to the filing and other
requirements of the Act. They will become exempt only from
the Act's provisions relating to the public availability of
'financial reports.
Yours respectfully,
/_s/., Stansfield Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER
Enclosure
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