NATIVE NATIONALISM IN SPANISH MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R000500030034-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 1, 1944
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch
?
a rz A U00 2095
/NATIVE NATIONALISM IN SPANISH MOROCCO
SECRET
25X1
Description
An analysis of the origins, character,and.
influence,' of the native nationalist move-
ments in Sdanish Morocco.
25 YEAR RE-REVIEW
1 June 1944
25X1
Copy No. 4 5
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?
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This document contains information affect-
ing the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50
U.S.C., 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmis-
sion or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
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SULTINRY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
N?*
iii
I.
INTRODUCTION 1
Geography and Population 1
Early Spanish Encroachment 1
II. NATIONALIST DEVMO1'LENT3 PRIOR TO -.401110 UAR II 3
Riffian Nationalism and Reaction rt4!tinst Spain 3
Pan-Islamic Influence 5
Spanish Civil War Developments 7
Pan-Moroccan Curronto 7
Spanish Policy Toward Native Nationalism 8
III. NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ';ORLD WAR II 10
Native Nationalism in the :oar and The Atlantic
Charter 10
Riffian and Moroccan Nationalism 11
IV. APPENDIX I, CHRONOLOGY 13
APPENDIX II. OUTSTANDING NATIVE NATIONALISTS IN
SPANISH MOROCCO 15
APPENDIX III.NATIVE PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN
SPANISH MOROCCO 17
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Surma
Because of its location, Seseish Morocco is in a position
to dominate the western entrance of the Mediterranean, and at the
same time it for a link between the European and African coneiaents,
For these reaeons the political sentiments and activities of the
native inhabitants are significant,
The native people, most of wham are Arabized Berbers ,have
alwaeee been animated by an indomitable fighting spirit and by an un-
quenchable desire for independence., The Riffiaes, Who inhabit the
eastern area, for centuries awed to the Sultan of Fez nothing more
than a nominal allegiance, and when the Spaniards invaded their
country, they resisted fiercely Soon the Riffiana' hatred for the
Spanish conquerors identified itself with a nationalist movement which
aimed at the creation of a Riffian independent state. The climax
of native opposition to foreign encroachment came with the war that
broke out in 1921 between the Riff and Spain. For five years disaater
threatened Spain; only at the cost of great sacrifices and rith
French aid was Speen finally able to beat the Riff into submission.
After the defeat, new native nationalist movements, in-
feuenced by Pan-Islamism and by French Moroccan movements favoring
unification of the two Protectorate 'Zones, rose to combat Spanish
and French colonial domination. Islamic cultural propaganda and
political pressure were the principal weapons employed The Spanish
civil war gave the Nationalists a unique opeortunity to wring con-
cessions from the new Spanish Government and to expand their
activitiee
The outbreak of World War II found the Nationalists of
Spanish Morocco still striving for their objective: emancipation
from foreign rule, While, however, the basic objective remained
the same, the policy of the Nationalists was affected by a number '
of factors, Among these were: (1) the attempt of the Spaniarle to
deflect native hostility from themselves by trying to intensify anti
-
French sentiment; (2 their effort to weaken the nationalist movemaat
by covertlerfamenting dissension among the parties; and (3) the
intense activities of German subversive propagandists. The Allied
landings in North Africa brought a more favorable attitude toward the
United Nations and stabilized to a oertain extent Nationalist poliey0
An important recent development has eeen the support given by
Spanish Zone Nationalists to the program of the nationalist movement
of French Morocco, and their united determination to achieve the
independence of Morocco under the rule of the Sultan. Both groups
have referred to the Atlantic Charter in stating their claims and
hew) epparent).y pinned their hopes on the promise of freedom which
they believe thip document offers,
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The current situation causes Spain no little apprehension.
Aside fromthe Islamic nationalist parties, whose influence in con-
fined to the educated elements of urban centers, there are the Berber
tribes of the rural areas who have long clung to the idea,of.an
independent Riff, and whose rancor a;ainst Spain han never lessened
Nevertheless, Riffian (Separatist) and Moroccan (unitary) nationalists
are working hand in hand against a corn on enemy. Spain cannot ignore,
therefore, the potential threat that native nationalism represents
to her, and the recent strengthening of military control and the adop-
tion of other precautionary measures in the Protectorate betray her
uneasiness, For only military force can keep in check the Riffians,
animated as they are by a thirst for independence and by a vengeful
spirit. Nor is 3pain unaware of the Riffians, warlike characteristics.,
which she has learned by experience not to underestimate,
G.
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Geography
and
Population
Early
Spaniel
Encroach-
ment
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NATIVE NATIONALISM IN SPANISH MOROCCO
INTRODUCTION
Spanish Nbrocco is a mountainous country with tie() reath
rangesTorming the northern coastal masaif, one west of and eneindiive
Ceuta, called the Jebala, the other between Ceuta and Melina, known
as the Riff. The majority of the inhabitants are Mnsleme of Berber
stock, '-.;ut Arab culture and customs have deeper roots among the
people X the Jebala than among theeRiffians.1 Before rorld riar 1,
the RifC tribes enjoyed complete independence and their territory
was comiclered a ne-man's land to outsiders. The Sultan of Fez? had
never secceeded in eainine full control over the warlike
(Berber tribes) of the Riff, consequently their authcrity eeee hie
region vas limited to a nominal suzeraintY.2
The first Spanish foothold on the coast of Morocco was
acquired. ie 1597, when the Lord Lieutenant of Andalusia seized
Melilla, eubsequently? a number of ports fell into :epanish hands,
and those gem immediately oreanized an "presidios" or penal seta
tlemeni;s. Syain watched with envy French expansion in North
Africa derine the first half of the nineteenth century, and there-
upon decidee to embark on a colonial adventure in Morocco. In 1847.
Spanishewnessions in Africa were unified under a Captain-General-
ship, while the presidios, hitherto neglected, were viewed as
starting-pints for a conquest of the hinterland3 Incessant e.
Riffian eetacks on the presidios gave Spain the pretext to declare
war on Me-occo in 18590 The Makhzen (central Moroccan Govornnent)
at once cfferd certain concessions and security guarantees to the
Spanish aovernment, which were rerused.4 The Spaniards, after
scorine some local military successes of small consequence, accepted
Britiv, mediation proposals and, in 18609 signed a peace treaty vith
the 'elltanQ45 Tribal disturbances near Melilla nearly precipteeed
1, Accordine -be the best estimates, the population of Spanish. Morocco
and the Zone of Tangier is na follows; Europeans, approxieetely
70.000 native' Nesleme, e:einetoly 600,000 of which. 50 eeeeont
are Riffiann,
Greet Britain Foreign 3flic6
Royal institute of Internati,
Affairs, (London, 1925); v-;,a
(London 1927)Q
3, Great Britain 'oreign Office
Ibid
YET6714tion Bulletin 11.14,
, Spanish Morocco, (London. 1.,32n);
)nal AfrifiT-Nurvey of Interrational
, Harris, irancev 'Spain. aria-Ina ;Sr
, op. oitne. pp, 3-11.
July I922Q
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,---.--
another war in 1893, which the Sultan averted through an indemnity
paid to Spain for outrages committed.1 In 1909, the discovery of
minerals attracted Spanish capital and enterprise into the territory
of the Riff. The natives, regarding this as an ill-intentioned
intrusion, came to a bloody conflict with the Spaniards, who had
great difficulties in checking the onslaught.2
The Franco-Spanish agreement of 1912, which granted Spain
a protectorate over northern Morocco, spurred the Spanish program of
military expansion in North Africa that had started in 1911 with the
occupation of Alcazar and Larache.3 Spain aimed at bringing the
Jeibala tribes under her sway before undertaking a campaign against
the warlike natives of the Riff. Nevertheless, the subjugation of
the Jibala, which proved extremely difficult, required several years
owing to naive resistance and Spanish inexperience in dealing with
colonial problems0 bpanish officials employed a variety of methods
to impose their authority over the natives. They fomented tribal
disputes in accordance with the policy of divide and conquer, sub-
sidized local chiefs and noaables, and when these methods proved
unsuccessful, they resorted to military force. The Caid MUlay Hamid-er
Raisuli of the kabila of Beni Aros, a wily tribal chi:f and a
notorious maraUFeTTalas erroneously believed capable of controlling
the tribes of the Jebala ar a, and Spain spent a fortune to sub-
sidize him. Raisuli, however, betrayed the Spaniards whenever he
had the opportunity, and often fought against them.4 In 19210
despite the occupation of Tetuan in 1913 and of Xauen in 1920, Spaings
control over the Jebala was still very unstable. Cajolery and acts
of brutality5 had the effect of increasing rlative resentment aaa4nst
the occupants and paved the way for the general revolt that soon
broke out.
1. Great Britain Foreign Office, op0 cit., pp. 8-110
2. American Legation in Sal Sebastian to State Department,
30 July 1909.
3. Information Bulletin OA, op. cit.
4. LgAfrique Francaise, nay 1925.
5, V.B. Harris, op. cit., pp. 97-99.
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Riffian
Nationalism
and
Reaction
Against
Spain
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II
NATIONALIST DELOMENT F, 'RI 911 TO lj ORLI) l'IAR II
Spanish colonial policy had even more disastrous conneeeonces
in the Riff; it turned the early suspicions and misgivings of eta
tribes into a current of anti-Spanish sentiment, which made the eatives
politically conscious and soon identified itself with a Rif:fiwareetion-
alist movement that united the turbulent kabilas in the determieee
tion to preserves, in defiance of Spanish protectorate claime, temir
centuries-old independence. The integration of thesi natine aeeira-
tions into a political movement with a definite purpose and preeram
was achieved through the efforts and intelligent leadership of the
Abd-el-Krim family, which, at the beginning of the century, reled
over the heni Uriaghel, the largeet and most powerful kabila et the
Riff.
Alarmed by Spanish designs in Mbeocco, aeare of the in-
adequacy of Rift Ian meths of warfare as compared with 'ffeetern
mechanical techniques, the Caid Abd-el-Krim el-Khattabi conceived
a plan for wasternizine the Riff, so that it could withstand Seenish
pressure with a better chance of suecess.1 The Caid's relationlhip,
during the second decade of the century, wieh.European mining pros-
pectors and industrialists (the German brothers Manneamann, lieheear-'
rieta de Bilboa) who came to the Riff attracted Ly the mineral
resources of the Beni Uriaghel district, gave considerable impeue
to his plans of westernization2 He sent his two sons Mohammed and
Whammed to Spaniaheschools, where thee became conversant with the
art of modern warfare and the science of technology, and where they
also acquired an excellent knowledee of world affairs. On their
return to the homeland, Mohammed and his brother helped the fetor
in his political work and at the =ran time actively fostered among
the natives the revolutionary doctrine of Riffian nationalism,3
The program of this political. movement, according to
Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim's declarations,4 provided for (1) an ine
dependent national state that included the territories of the Ri2f
Royal Institute of international Affairs, op.,cit,, pp. 10-112;
Roeer-Mathieu, Memoires diebd-el-Krim, (Paris 1927).
2. L,Afrique Francaise, oct66771777---
3. ram, October 1921, October 1923.
4c, Waester Guardian, 12 February 1925; 'e Times, 17 March 16.
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and of the Jebala, since the Nationalists contended that this part
of Moroeco had cultural characteristics of its awn and quite different
from the rest of the Shereefian Empire; (2) a republican form of
government, with the provision that full powers were to be granted
to the Abd-el-Krim family during the first period or transitional
stage, until the citizens of the new state were sufficiently ,educated
to take the government in their awn hands; (6) a program of education
for the people, in which the basic teachings of the Koran woeld be
combined with the best achievements of the V;enet in science and indus-
try; (4) the economic development of the country; and finally, (5)
friendly relations with all neighboring and foreign nations. In teie
program, the implicit repudiation of the Makhzenls authority did not ,
fail to draw the protests of the Sultan against Riffian "dissidence,'
' There was little basis for an understanding or even for a
compromise between the Riffians, irrevocably committed as they were
to a program of total independence and self-government, and Spain,
which regarded the natives of Morocco as an inferior people whose
territory o Tered strategic and economic advantages. In addition*
Morocco was a convenient outlet for WV' Spaniards dissatisfied with
conditions in the mother country. Moreover, Spain could not give
up, as the Nationalists demanded, the protectorate rights she had
acqeired in a treaty with France, without suffering a loss of inter-
national prestige. A crisis broke out in 1919, when the Spanish
military leaders frustrated Abd-el-Krim's negotiations with a Spanish
syndicate for the exploitation of mineral resources, while they
continued to push on the military occupation.2 On the Caidei death
in 1920, his elder son Mohammed assumed the leadership of
resistance, which his father had begun to organize05 In 941,- 19 zi
Spanish advance into the Beni Uriashel district led to a clas which
marked the beginning of a bloody struggle between the Riff and Spain.4
The campaign, weion lasted five years, was characterized at
first by a series of speetacular Riffian successes.5 The colonial
army wavalmost annihilated, and in less than a year the whole of
the Riff, except Melilla, and most of the Jebel& were evacuated06
1. W.B0 Harris? pp o 232-2330
OSS source.
30 Roger-Mathieu, op0 cit., pp. 8384.
40 Royal Institutd-a7International Affairs, o 0 cit., pp.11b.
50 Le Temps, 14 December 1924; The Times, 28 June T24,
60 EnTarstitute of internati3M?XTTUIrs, op. cit., pp. 115418.
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Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim turned out to be a skillful military le der
who knew how to exploit the weak poinlel of the enemy. Ni troops were
taught to use the modern weapons and equipment the Spaniards asandoned
wholesale in the rout. This was apparently the only source of.sUpply
from which the Riffians obtained war materie1.1 With the progress of
the war thus favoring Abd-el-Krim's cause,. the Jebala tribes; whose
reL:entment against Spanish colonialism had grown stronger year by year,
joined the itiffian Nationalists,2 Emboldened by thee achievements,
Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim proclaimed the Republic of the Riff c' A gevern-
ment was set up in Ajdir, the capital of the new state, and various
delegations onre sent to Landon and Paris to ask for lie) reco:nition.
This was denied, however, on account of previous Franco-British
declarations that had recognized Spain's protectorate rights in northern
Morocco. Having failed to obtain bel igerent rights from the 1;estern
Powers, Abd-el-Krim remained, from a viewpoint oC international law,
a "rebel" against the lawful authority of Spain.'
In 1924, a frontier incident between French Morocco and the
Riff involved the French, dlspite the reluctance of the political and
military leaders of Rabat, in the conflict.4 The imervention in
1925 of France on the side of Spain reversed the course of :the ware and
in 1926, all the hopes of the Rift Ian Nationalists were sheeel;ore& Abd=p
el-Krim, finding further resistance impossible, surrendered to t.ls
French, who exiled him to Reunion Island.
Pan- The Riffian cmapaign proved a bitter anl costly experienCe
Islamic to Spain, both in men and men:.?'roAfter the defeat of Abd-el-Krim, it
4iirluence
needed if further bloodshed and humiliation were to be avoided* The
was urged in Madrid that a revision of colonial policy was urgently
whole of northern Morocco was now, in 1926, under Spanish oontrol.
The practice of regarding the Zone of Protectorate as a.aierea:kepese*
session, or the policy of "reconquista", as tne S,aniards called it,
was abandoned, and the authorities displayed more good-will than
1. Ibid., pp. 135-156.
2, Information Bulletin 71114, July 1923.
3. The Times, 5 August 1922.
4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 134;
W.B. Harris, op. cit., pp. 194-207; for details concerning evontS
in the French Zone see R & A. No, 1963, Nativn Nationalism in
French North Africa.
ra37-ridiTc-3377E-Itorical Sketch," p. 6.
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previously in their attitude toward the natives. The army wts net
permitted to mistreat Lho population. The customs of the country
were respected. The influence of the clergy--who had supported the
Moroccan campaign in the hope of fulfilling Queen Isabel's testament
(the pursuit and subjugation of the Moslem infidels in Africa)' was
eliminated from colonial affairs.2 Snain was attemetin;.; to conciliate
the tribes with the Protectorate regime and make them forget past
grievances.
Nevertheless, defeat did not entirely Obliterate the
nationalist sentiment that the Abdel-Krim faMtly had instilled among
the masses of the Riff and &bale. The failure of armed resistance
had been, indeed, a hard blow to native independence aspirations.
Dependency and a temporary disorientation succeeded the grim resoXu-
tion that had animated the resistance. Yet, in the midst of the
general dejection, the intellectuals looked for moral support and
guidance outside the Moroccan frontiers, in order to revive the strug-
gle for independence at an opportune moment. This support and
guidance they found in the centers of Pan-Islamism. Egypt and the
Near East.
Originally, the Pan-Islamic movement had possessed a religious
character, and had tricyd to unite politically all Moslems under
Islam's banner. Since the downfall of the Sublimeyorte, however; the
movement as such lost its appeal. There was no longer a Malifat-el-
Islam (Caliph of Islam) and the Pal-Islamic slogan 'there is no
nationality in Islam" aroused no groat enthusiasm anywhere. After the
first World War, the movement survived in the Eastern part of the
Arab World among old-fashioned and conservative Moslem circles, with
which North Africans have been traditionally most closely identified.
Al-Gzhar University in Cairo, and various relieious colleges in ?
Damascus and Nablus, which have always attracted a large number of
students from North Africa, continued to be the focal 2oints of the
Pan-Ielamic anti-Christian movement.
Abd-el-Khaliq Torres, native of Tetuan and son of a Pasha,
speetmenyyears in Eastern schools of Pan-Islamic tendency. On his
return to Spanish Morocco inl 9309 he organized a cae,aign of nation-
alist propa,Anda, which was confined, nowever, to intellectual circles
in Tetuan. In a few years he obtained a large following among the
cultured elements of the Zone9 and in 1936 this group became known
as the party of National Reform.3
1. Roger-Mathieu, op0 cit., p. 85; Rodrigo Soriano, 0-terra, guerrs.,
infiel Marro ui. 1922.
2. . Harris, op. cit., pp. 49.?506
3. CID it1.35178??8.
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The Party's aim was to obtain from the Spanish Goe!ernment,
0:deny by propaganda and similar methods: df political. pressure,
an extensive reform of the Protectorate regime. Torres Claimed that
Spainos rule in Morocco was not a true protectorate. To him? a
protectorate was only a mandate, and therefore, a foreign administra-
tion of limited duration. During that temporary stage it was the ob..
ligation of the "protecting" power, Torres maintained, to prepare the
natives, by means of a sound educative program and intensive training
in administration, for self-government and independence within the
Shortest possible time01
Spanish The political program of Torres had only a nuisance value,
War
olopments until an opportunity was found to press forward its demands upon the
outbreak of the Spanish civil war. .At that time, Franco opened a
recruiting campaign thong the natives of the Protectorate to meet
urgentimanpouer needs of the Insurgent army. Fearing that the Nation-
al Reform Party might constitute a serious obstacle in the recruiting
for a war entirely alien to Moroccan intereets, Franco entered into
negotiations with Torres. As a reTealt? the Nationalists won from the
Spanish Insurgents a promise of reforms to be introduced into the
Zone at the 00 of the conflict and to be followed shortly by total
independence.'
Pan-Moroccan
Currents
The National Reform Party grew stronger with this unexpected
Spanish support, and its propaeanda among the natives increased in
range and volume. At the some time, the Franco-Torres agreement brought
this Nationalist group so close to the new Spanish regime that it could
not escape the pressure of its political ideology. Torres and his
followers began to revolve in the Axis orbit. Franco's promises,
while they stimulated nationalist activities, opened the gates of
bpanish Morecco wide to German propaganda and intrigue, whichbectune
a critical menace to Allied interests in this area when the second
'World War broke out.
The splitting of the Shereefian Empire into two "spheres of
influence" had always been deprecated in native political circles of
the French Zone as an encouragement to native disunity, which Was to
the exclusive advantage of the colons and the colonial powers. For
the same roaeon the powerful Nationalist groups of Fez com?mned all
native schismatic movements. This Pan-Nbroccan sentiment gained ground
in the Spanish Zone during 1936-58, when some Fez Nationalists sought
refuge there to escape French persecution. Among these refugees were
two outstanding leaders, !kaki en-Nasiri of the Nationalist Bloc and
Brahla eieWaszani of the Popular Movement, who immediately set in
motion a propaganda campaign among the natives of northern Ubrocco
1. See the Reformist program in F.H. Mellor, Morucco Aunkes,
(London, 1939).
2. CID #35178-S; L'Afrique Francaise, October 1936o
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directed net only against S,an'sh domination but also and barticUlarly
against the greater power oe France,
The agreement Torres reaOhedvith Franco was, among other
thin;s, an implicit acknowledgment of the Spanish Protectorate, to
which Reformist action was confined, A conflict of poliCY SOO4
developed between the Reformist group and the Pan-Moroodan:Natienaliets
rallied around Nasirio The latter held a meeting at Tetuan on 11
Deeember 1937, in which they disavowed Reformist policies and declared
themselves a nea party called Moroccan Unity (Unidad Marroqui)0 whose
adopted program contained the following main points: (1) freedom of
native cultural activities; (2) an educationexclusive3.y Moslem for
the Moroccan people; (3) end of economic discrimination in favor of
the European colon to the detriment of the native.; and (4) increased
native participation in the Administration, with a view to terminating
foreign supremacy at the earliest opportunity. The program was a
facsimile of the Plan:of Moroccan :Reform anbodied in the Resolution
of the Rabat NatiZEZliel-MBUFessoT------17-Octobet 1937,1 In additioh,
the Moroccan Unity party proclaimed its solidarity with French Zone
Nationalists,
' ? "
Brahim el-lazzani, who came to the Spanish Zone in 193S,
belonged to a nationalist groupmhich, although of Pan-.Moroccan
sentiment, was less religious and less conservative in outlook than
Moroccan Unity and its French counterpart, the Nationalist Bloc.
He formed an organization known as the Bureau of National Defense,
which closely cooperated with Moroccan Unity, lthough Wazzani often
had a tendency toward radicalism and vio1ettee04
410"ani8h Policy After the fall of the Republican regime in Spain, the at.
Toward Native titude of the new government toward native nationalism in the Protectorate
Nationalism was increasingly subordinated to foreign policy considerationio In
a 1940, the collapse of the French armies in Flanders stimulated Spanish
expansionistic ambitions in North Africa, while it enhanced Axis
prestige and influence in the Iberian peninsula as well as in Morocco03
Those political trends induced Spain to support and encourage the anti-
French propaganda carried on by Pan-Moroccan groups, The fostering
of native hatred for France, which had its foundation in the Berblr
tribes grudge against tne French for their intervention in the
Riffian war, not only helped Madrid's expansienisAc designs, but also
served to distract native relentment for Spanish rule in Morocgo'.
In order to appease the Nationalists for her own political purpose,
Spain grated them a relative freedom of press, permitted them to
expand Moslem culture activities in the Zone, subsidized annual pil-
grimages to Mecca, organized various expeditions of students to
Egypt, and even allowed the merchant marine of the Protectorate to fly
1. CID y128474-R.,
2, Ibid. 1 CID r28925-a0
3. WirTimes, 1-7 June 1940; Ibid., 22 June 1940; Ibid., 21 Seitember
1b4b.
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the Moroccan flagel To forestall 4irda for the fulfillment of early
promises o r independence showover, the Protectorate authorities endeavored
to undermine the Nationalist movement by exploiting and fomenting
dissensions within and between the various partio.s.' This polioy
of overt appeasement and covert obstruction accounted, in part, for
the devious course of Spanish Zone Nationalist activities pri.)r to the
Allied landing, in North Africa*
1. Tomas Garcia Figueras, Marrueeos, (Barcelona, 1939) p. 291.
2,, CID i351784; ue?f7=noarrieo "LIAfrique et WEspagnen,
January.Decerker 1b390
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III
NATIONALIST DEV LOr"1.4NTS SINCE WORLD ?:AR II
Native The ideological differences that for a long time had kept
Nationalism apart t;ho tlo major Nationalist groups in the Spanish Zone, the
in the War Nationalist Reform Party headed by TorrJs (Pan-Islamic) and Moroccan
and The Unity headed by Nasiri (Pan-Moroccan), began to lose importance with
Atlantic the progress of .iorld War II. For, although at variance on questions
Charter of principle and method, the two Parties had a common basic objective,
to rid their country of foreign (17estern ) rule. Moreover, the
IIIrepercussions in North Af,ica of the international tension created by
the war pointed up the need for Nationalist concerted action. Spanish
diplomacy, 1..owever, attepted to prevent the unification of these
nationalist movements, and it was not until 1943 that the two Parties
were able to form a united front.
Until that time, German propaganda, which was extremely
active in Morocco prior to the collapse of the Axis armies in North
Africa, exerted strong pressure on the natives of the Spanish Zone.
The reaction of the Nationalists to this proFaganda varied according
to the group and its political background, although these groups
were all deeply impressed by the initial military successes of the
Axis in Europe and were prone to sympathize with Germany, from wham
they hoped to obtain eventual support for their cause. The Reformists,
owing to their early relations with the Fraaquist movement, were
larticularly receptive to Nazi suggestions and "lore inclined than
Moroccan Unity to side with the Axis. The latter group, while actual-
ly not opposed to the enlistment of foreign support for its awn pur.-
poses, manifested unwillingness to collaborate actively with the Axis
lost it become a tool of foreign interests, and for this reason often
used its influence to moderate pro-Axis currents in the Reformist
ruction?
'After the German defeat in North Africa, however, and the
strengthening of the Allied position in that area, the Axis lost its
prestige among Spanish Zone Nationalists, whose political sympathies
veered toward the Anglo-Americans. Meanwhile, the three most
influential Nationalists leaders of spanish %recce, Torres, Nasiri,
10 CID 0011G; 0,3 Tangier, 13 February 1943.
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and Wassani, held a meeting at Tetuan early in 1943. The result of
this meeting was the fusion of the Nationalist Reform Party and
Mor000an Unity into a single bloc, with Nasiri seemingly taking the
lead in political affairs.1 The newly-formed movement, which ac-
quired a definite Pan-Moroccan character,?aligned itself politically'
with the Nationalists of the French ZoneG with wham it is known to
have collaborated ever since.
The German defeat and consequent loss of prestige was not
the only factor responsible for this change of attitude. The Atlantic
Charter and itsprasise of f reedai for all nations had deep repercus-
sions in both Protectorate Lones.3 Moreover, the release from Jail
of several Nationalists in the French Zone after the Allied landing
greatly enhanced the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of
tho Nationalists of northern Morocco.4
The petition presented by Istiqlal (French Moroccan National-
ist Party) to French and Allied authorities in January 1944, asking
for unification of the two Zones, Moroccan in-lependence under the
Sultan's government, democratic institutions, adherence to the Atlantic
Charter, and a voice in the Peace Conference, found prompt and favor-
able response among Spanish Moroccan Nationalists05 Thus,. the ad-
herence of the latter to the French Zone Nationalist program created
a unity of purpose which save new sigaificanoo to the $tr sngth of
Moroccan nationalism, no longer local in action and character, but
embracing the whole of the Shereefian pire. The concern that Spanish
Protectorate authorities have shown over these recent developments
reflects their apprehension of possible future complications. ildasures
of ban and censorship apRlied to the Nationalist press, and the adoption
of military precautions are positive indications of mounting tension
between Spaniards and native Nationalists, although thus far no out-
breaks or disturbances h-A.:e been reported fran Spanish Morocco.
Pan-Moroccan nationalism has scarcely affected the Berber
tribes of norther:.. Morocco. The propaganda and cultural activi des
of the movement, which is \guided by hrabized intellectuals interested
in political freedom and the preservation of the Moroccan Sultanate's
Islamic traditions, reaches only the educated nuclei that exist in the
few cities of tho Zone.7 The old dissident Riffian currents, which
1. CID #28925-3; OSS source 3, 15 March 1943.
2. CID #28587-S.
3* CID 01586-S.
4. CID Ti20587-8.
5. OSS i29913, 7 March 1944*
6. Ibid.
7. CID w 63563?Co
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had beon stimulated during the sezond and third decade of this r;oAtury
by Abd-el-Krim's militant nationalism, are reportedly still pre-
ponderant among the kabilas that inhabit the rural areas and tqe hill
country, particularly in the hill' where Islamic culture has not .
penetrated deeply ? Rift Ian Nationalist activities have been trAdo
difficult, however, by Spaniah vigiliAkte and the enforcement of a
strict military control ,1 although a 'minor party, known as the P.beral
Party, was formed in the Beni Uriaghel district a few years a6.o arid is
still active02 Many Riffians are k_:own to have joined the Pau-
Moroccan Nationalists in the struggle against foreign domination,
while actually not sharing the political convictims of Moroccan Uait:-
and the Reformists? Riffian resentment a4ainst Spain--and to a lesser
extent against France?for the defeat suffered in 1 926 has persisted
ever since A.d-el-Krim went into exile. The kabilas have retained
their traditi)nal warlike characteristics, anraivanimated by a spirit
of revenge that only military force can koep in check.
1. CID 1/62756-C.
2? CID ii63563?C
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Appendix
CHRONOLOGY oe EVENT3
1597 Spanish seizure of Aelilla
1847 Unification of Spanish possessions in Africa under
a Captain-Generaliship
1859-.60 War between Spain and Voroeco
1893 Disturbances in Melilla area
1909 Discovery of minerals near Melilla ,
Clashes betwoen Spaniards and natives
1911 Occupation or Alcazar and Laroche
1912 France-Spanish Protocterate Convention and diviaiop
of the Shereefian Umpire into t%.o "spheres of
influence"
1913
1919
192n
Occupation of Tetuan
Crisis in Spanish-Riffian relations
Occupation of Xauen
Death of Abd-el-Krim
1 June 1921 Clash at Mt. Abaran.
Be4nning of Spanish Riffian war
21 June 1921 AnnihilAtion of Spanish post at Mt. Igueribea
22 July 1921 Spanish disaster of Annual
9 August 1921 Spanish capitulation at Mt. Arruit foliowed by
proclamation of Riff Ropublio
12 Sept. 1921 Beginning of Spanish counter-offensive
192 Spanish defeat at Tizzi-Assa. Ritfiaa political
sion visits London and Paris
1924 Spanish evacuation of Xauen.
First Franco-Riffian incidents
13 April 1925 Riffian offensive aainst Fez launched
Beginning of Franco-Riffian hostilities
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Appendix I (eontod)
24 May 1926 Surrender of Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim
End of Riffian war
1930 Torres returns to Tetuan from the Near East
1936 Party of National Reform founded
Agreement botween Franco and Torres at out4
break of Spanish civil mar
11 Deco 1937 Founding of Moroccan Unity
111
April 1939
1 Septo 1939 Beginnin; of World War II
1938
End of Spanish Civil War
Arrival of Wazzani in the Spanish Zone
13 June 1940 Collapse of French armies in Europe.
Spanish declaration of non-belligerency
14 June 1940 Occupation of Tangier
8 Novo 1942 Allied landing in North Africa
May 1943
January 1944 Adherence of Spanish Zone Nationalists to
Collapse of Axis armies in Africa
IstiiXalls p3titiono
February 1943 Coalition of Moroccan Nationalist groups in the
Spanish Zone
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Appendix II
OUTSTANDING NATIVE NATI:INALIST,3 IN SPANISH MOROCCO
ARMED AZERKAN
MCRET
Mohammed ben-Abd-el-Krim's Prime Minister during the
Riffian campaign.
His conduct during the last phases of the campaign in
1926 won him the enmity of the Riffian tribes who forced
him to seek refuge in the French Zone.
Lires now in exile betwe Mazagan and Settat (French
)korocco).
MOHAMED BUDRA.
Riffian Nationalist and a relative of Abd-el4rim0
Leader of the Liberal Party?
MOHATVIED CHENIAJ
Leader of the Moroccan Youth Party
His political symp4thies are for the Franco Government.
GHALI ELF-DAUD
Torres' principal lieutenant and lea Jer of the Reformist
Party branch in Alcazar.
MULAY ELHASSAN BEN EL.LEHDI HEW-ISMAEL BEN-MOHAMMED
Khalifa of the Spanish Zone, or the Sultancs Viceroy.
He owes his position to the Spaniards and is, tLerefore,
inclined to sympathize with them.
AIMED BRN-MOHAISMD BEN-:3E 1)01K EL-HASAII
Sheik of the Brotherhood of the Derkawa.
At present in Tangier.
2.40HAMMED BETI-ABD-EL-KRIM EL-KHATTABI
Son of Abd-El-Krim el-Khattabi, Geld of the kabila of Beni
Uriaghel.
Leader of the Riffian resistance, now in exile at Reunion.
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Appendix II (cont'd)
WHAMMED BIN-ABD-ILAMIU ELANATIABI
Mohammedes younger brother. Vas Commander-in-Chief of the
Riffian army and its enginefJrin..; expert.
Headed the Riffian mission that visited London and Paris
in 1922, demanding racoGnition of the Riff Republic.
Presumably in exile with his brother at Reunion.
1U3cKI EN-NA:URI
Refugee from tho French Zone
A conservative Moslem intellectual and a former mmmber
of the Nationalist Bloc (French Moroccan Nationalist Party)
Leader of Moroccan Unity and the most influential Nationalist
in the Spanish hone at the present time.
ADD.FS-SALLAM ET -TEMBAMANI
A Riffian Nationalist collaborating with Nasiri.
Has been described as enjoying Groat orestige amen_
the Riffian tribes.
ABD-EL0-1(HALIQ TORRES
An intelleotual of Tetuan and son of a Pasha.
Studied in Pan-Islamic schools in Egypt and the Near
East.
Since 1936 the leader (and founder) of the National
Reform Party.
In the past was stron_ly under Pranquist and Axis influence.
BRAHIM EL-WAZZANI
Formerly a member of the Popular Movement, a French Zone
Nationalist party led by a cousin of his no.. in exile.
Came to the Spanish Gone in 1 938.
Head and founder of the Bureau of National Defense.
Collaborated with Nasiri, Eat-lough of radical tendencies.
Described as extrImely opportunistio.
Has powerful connections amo;;G the Nationalists of Fez.
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Appendix III
NATIVE PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIO
SPANISH MOROCCO
----------a.
EL-AHDA EL-MACBRIBIYYA (MOROCCAN UNITY)
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The strongelt organized nativ9, nationalist
movement in the
Spanish Zone, and is headed by Mekki eti-Nasiri. It has for its
program unification of the two Zones and iriependence under the Sultan.
Its headquarters are Tetuan?sillit publishes a paper (El-Wahda el-
Maghribiyya) in Spanish and Arabic. It has branches ca=5175,77-
Xauen9 and Tangier.
HIZB EL-ABRAR (LIBERAL PARTY)
A party headed byMohammed Budra and operating in the Beni
Uriaghol district. Its aim is the creation of a Riffian sopa-aA
state. The character, strength, and activities of this party are
obscure.
HIZB EL-ISLAH EL-UATANI (PARTY OF NATIONAL REFORM)
This party Was founded in 1936 by 'Torres who is its leader.
It was influenced by Pan-Islamic currents, and had strong sympathies
for Franco and the Axis. Since 1943, however, it joined Moroccan
Unity and adhered to. its program. It headquarters are also at Tetuan,
and has a branch at. Alcazar. It publishes a paper known as El-Islah
(Freedom).
MOROCCAN YOUTH PARTY
The party was created in 1943 to counteract the influence of
MOroccan Unity and the Reformists? It is sdonsored by the Spaniards.
Its leader is Mohammed Cheniaj. The Party has seemingly little
influence.
BORTHERHOOD OF THE DERKAWA
A religious-political sect, with affiliations throughout
North Africa, includin., Tripolitania. It has a strong following in
Spanish Morocco. Its attitude is xenophebic rather than nationalistic,
and has no connection with the Nationalist parties. Its headquarters
are in the alargaa Valley, south of the Riff, and is led by the Sheik
El-Hasani.
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PROVISIONAL EDITION
FREE
7? 60
SPAIN
Strait of Gibraltar
TANGIER
6'.
Rehun ?'90
to
Ah I Serif 4)4 ?V