THE BERLIN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R004300240001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

WituAliAX 3
Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83-00415R004300240001-6
CLASSIFICATION s7,0_2/3;;;Aul, 11,J. CFFICIALOIMY 25X1A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION 1:E'PORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Germany
SUBJECT The Berlin Situation
PLACE 25X1C
ACQUIREi
DATE OF
INFO.
ILLEGIB
Riturt CA L
ILLEGI
DATE DISTR. 14 Feb. 1950
NO. OF PAGES 2
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
25X1X
1. Present indications from intelligeneesources suggest the planned Deutschland
Treffen of the FDJ has as maximum an the occupation of the Western Sectors
of Berlin with an extensive disruption of the city life by such means as
localized riots, traffic interruptions, the temporary occupation of public
buildings, etc., to prove that the Oeatern Powers are in no position to
guarantee safety and peace in the areas they occupy and that they are no
longer supported by a majority of the -Berlin population. The FDJ jamboree
should be viewed in the light of a rajor move in the cold Oar directed by
the UGSR against the United States, using German elements to cover up Russian
sponsorship, leaving the possibility of a withdrawal and speculating on the
known American reluctance to apply force.
2. A vicious, well planned propaeanda campaigniof unprecedented intensity was
started on 6 January by the statement of Fr,? Dahlem at a conference of SED
functionaries of the Greater Berlin Landes erband saying "it is apparent that
the enemies of the German people in Berli are in the same position as rats in
a trap. This tension will not pass until Berlin is rid of them which one day
will be the case. It is our desire that fthe American, Englideand French
troops leave our Fatherland as soon as n ssible and cease their criminal attempt
to misuse our youth for war purpose, tus plunging our people and country into
new troubles. The time is past when f tern Germany was involved only in its
on problems contingent on the building of a Democratic order. The DDR has the
task of protecting the interests of the entire German People and directing the
fight for peace, national unity and independence to a victorious conclusion*
The fight for Berlin is a decisive -art of the battle for all of Germany.
American imperialism will do all it can to maintain a bridgehead in the heart
of the DDR with the intention of di:aeting propaganda and sabotage from there."
Statements made by Hans Jendretzky? Gerhart Eisler, Albert Norden, Erich
Honneckerp and ;ealdemar Schmidt sines 6 Janunryiall along the same lines, are
intensifying the campaign.
3. A further deterioration of the emplcement situation reflected by the January
increase of 23,000 unemployed bring- the total figure as of 1 Feburary to
300,000. Western German lack of trist in the economic stability of Berlin -
there is no guarantee of goods being delivered on schedule-is artificially
stimulated by Soviet measures like -poradio interference withthe westaard flow
of Berlin land-bound traffic. For this insecurity no amount of LOA and
Bundesrepublik credits can possibly compensate. The Reichsbahn building
CLASS I FlovrioN SIZRET/GUi4T1
- U.S. nFFICIALS ONLY
STATE RT
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FilApproved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83-00415 3 .4_
SECRETADINTBarea U.A. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release UU1/11/016 : CiA-RDP83-00415R0043002400 - 25X1A
CENTRAL INTaLLIGENCE AGENCY
eecident is viewed by pro-Western el:merle of the Berlin population as
betraying the waning American confid nee in the Berlin position. Recent
ea'ficial American statemeats bearing on the Berlin situation are regarded
these elements as empty threats t iea are not followed up by action
thereby demonstrating a completely di-In:Ave mentality. A classical example
was a recent headline announcing the peeeibility of a reimposition of the
Berlin airlift as aeAmerican threat. els? noted is the American silence ill
the face of the blatant Soviet violeaioa of demilitarization agreements as
evidenced by the Soviet Zone police -,eveIopments. The Berlin and the Eastem
Zone population believe that the Potedam Agreement squarely makes Eastern
Zone affairs also a U.S. responsibi/7-ty
4. The deterioration of the Berlin siteetion is but a facet of developments in
the Soviet Zone where bourgeois parties are facing total extinction or are
being purged to assure conformity in all programs, such as the National Fzenit.
It is assumed that Ambassador Pushk5a is the guiding spirit behind the puree.
Its pattern conforms closely to tae Hungarian model. Action Committees are
applying well-worn techniques of mot violence, deposing bourgeois functionaries
down to village level, With Hungariece developments seen as pattern, it ie
believed the next phase will be the liquidation of the remaining vestiees of
Church influence followed by the liquidation of Titoist elements. Uneer these
conditions, the Soviets less than over can endure the existence of a Pre?
Berlin amidst an area of slavery.
50 The cumulative effects of (a) the wal-advertised Soviet Zone purge, (b) the
Little Blockade, Cc) the continued receseion of economic life, (d) the lack
of forceful American action in countering the Soviet violation of agreements,
(e) stories spread by persons reissued from Soviet Zone concentration camps
about Russian atrocities and (f) tne skillful campaign through all available media
plugging the line that the incorporetion of Berlin into the Soviet orbit is
only a matter of time, are the creueien of fear amok: the West-Berlin popula-
tion such as was never witnessed during the blockade.
6. In confidential discussions intelleetuals and politicians in West-Berlin ex-
press the opinion that setbacks to eho American policy as evidenced by (a)
the loss of China?(b) the U.S. policy on Formosa, (c) the present :seemingly
unopposed threat to Indo-China , era (d) the leek Of forceful policy statements on
all Germany provide a striking paraalel to the situation just prior to the
Munich Conference where the appeaserent or -containment policy teas proven enable
to stop aggression.
7. These parallels are all evident to the Germans in the light of the U.S,, failure
to make a clear policy statement on the FDJ Deutschland-Treffen on 28 May 1950
(Whitsunday) and on the overall prollem, and in their realization that Soviet
action will be largely determined by U.S. statements made now. The: Germans are
convinced that the United States is a greater determining factor in the shaping
of Soviet policy than the Kremlin. They believe that a firm stand involving pre-
paredness to resort to use of arms in maintaining the Berlin position may forestall
a Soviet attempt to overrun Western Europe.
S. The Germans consider the following to be determining factors which would limit the
aim e of the Treffens(a) a clear statement on U.S. policy regarding permitting
meMbere to enter West-Berlin, (b) a statement on wearing of uniforms
in West-Berlin, (c) a commitment oi Allied troops in Berlin sufficient to cope
with the situation, (d)a statement epeeifying under what conditions rme will
be used by U.S. troops, and (e) a clear indication that the Allies consider this
a threat to their sovereignty. Such actions are to be well advertised, coupled with
an official protest to the Soviets draving a parallel between the FDJ and
the Hitler Youth and naming the Ruse tens as instigetora.
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