YUGOSLAV PUBLICATION, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R006900120004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 13, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

-FORM NO. 51.61
MAY 1949
CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
SUBJECT Yugoslav Publication, Revie
International Affairs
PLACE
ACQUIRED
TN15 DOCUMENT CONTAINSINFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U. S. C.. 31 AND 32. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-
HIBITED BY LAW, REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
25X1A
DATE DISTR.13 December 1950
NO. OF E N C LS. 1 pamphlet
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
* Documentary
Attached hereto for your information and retention is the pamphlet Review
of International Affairs, dated 22 November 1950.
ff FS lJ EMGLOsuaE AI -4
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CPYRGHT,
Review o
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
VOL. 1, NUMBER 13 BEOGRAD, NOVEMBER 22, 1950
O u r Road (BY JOSEF SCHAPPE)
Complications in Korea
F R O M THE U N O:
For Real Suppres.ion of Aggression or for Purposes of Propaganda?
An Eloquent Silence
EDITORIAL COMMENTS:
Soviet Union Places the German Problem in the Foreground
Yugoslav - Greek Relations
After the Elections to the U. S. Congress
The Anxieties of the European Payments Union
Sheffield - Warsaw
LIFE IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA:
Workers' Councils in Action
jS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
OT DETACH
25X1A
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Contributors to this Issue:
Rci wn/'
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
THIS MAGAZINE IS A FREE FORUM
AND PUBLISHES THE OPINIONS OF
LOCAL AND FOREIGN WRITERS ON
VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS
Published by :
THE FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAV
JOURNALISTS
Yearly subscription : $3, or 16 English Sh.
Telephones: 28-451, 26-715, Post Box 125
Checking account: Yugoslav National Bank
PR Serbia Branch Ne 103-906033
Offices : International Affairs, Terazlye 31,
Belgrade.
THE CALCULUS
CON TEN7'S:
Edito.*lai Comments:
COMPLICATIONS IN KOREA
SOVIET UNION PEACES THE
GERMAN PROBLEM IN THE
FOREGROUND . . . . . . . .
SHEFFIELD-WARSAW . . .
AFTER THE ELECTIONS TO THE
U. S. CONGRESS . . . . . . .
A JUSTIFIED MEASURE OF THE
YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT
THE ANXIETIES OF THE EU-
ROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION
THE END OF AN UNSUCCESS-
FUL MANOEUVRE . . . . . .
MOTIVES OF THE CURRENCY
REFORM IN POLAND . . . . .
OUR ROAD . . . . . . . . . .
From the UNO:
FOR REAL SUPPRESSION OF
AGGRESSION OR FOR PURPO-
SES OF PROPAGANDA? . . . .
AN ELOQUENT SILENCE
Life in Socialist Yugoslavia :
WORKERS' COUNCILS IN
ACTION . . . . . . . . . . .
Throueh the Fog of Propaganda:
EFFECT PRECEDES CAUSE BY
FIVE MONTHS . . . . . . . .
Josef Schappe: Editor of "Freie Tribune", organ
of the Initiating Committee for the establishment
of an independent workers' party of Germany pub-
lished in Dusseldorf. Glass worker by profession,
born at Rattingen, he has belonged to the wor'kers'
movement since early youth. Before 1933 he was
editor on the central -organ of the Communist. Party
of Germany, "Die Freiheit". He was prosecuted and
sentenced to a prison term after the Nazis assumed
power. During the war he was confined to the Bu-
chenwald concentration camp, which included com-
munists from various countries. He was a member
of the party committee there. After the war he was
a member of the Secretariat of the CP of Germany
for Rhine-Westphalia and chief editor of the Party's
central or-gain, "Freies Volk", He left the party an
account of his opposition to the Cominformist policy
pursued by the leadership of the CP of Germany. At
the conference in Rattingen, held in July last (in the
presence of 57 delegates from the whole of Ger-
many) and attended by the members expelled from
the Party and those who had left it, as well as by
left-wing socialists and representatives of other
Marxist groups, with the abject of founding a new
independent workers' party, he was appointed chief
editor of the paper "Freie Tribune".
Rade Vujovich: Economic Editor of "Borba".
Other Contributors: Editorial Board and members
of the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists.
S. Karaoglanovich 12
R. Vujovich 14
. . . D. T. 15
OUR COMPUTATIONS UNERRINGLY PROVE THAT THE
YUGOSLAV 24-HOURS' CEASE-FIRE LIMIT IS FAR LONGER
THAN OUR 14-DAY ONE.'
("Jet" - Beograd)
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VOA,. 1, NUMBER,13
Re vie w of
I NTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
COMPLICATIONS IN KOREA
S E they volunteers or regular
troops, the Chinese are warring
against McArthur's forces in North
Korea. This realisation surely could
please no. one who truly mean's
peace when talking about it, and
none of those who are able to dis-
tinguish the dove of peace from
the Sheffield-Warsaw variety of
migrant duck.
The question of whether volunteers
are involved or not is (really irre-
levant to the issue. Even the Peking
Government itself would not be li-
kely to deny that it had been
responsible for equipping, arming
and transporting the Chinese forces
which are in Korea. As for the pub-
lic collections of funds in China for
the purchase of arms and equipment,
this, at best, could only have the
effect of relieving the Peking Na-
tional Bank in view of all that ma-
terial being produced in govern-
ment factories and not being availabe
for free sale.
In any case, the problem involved
in Korea today is not of a type to
be settled by means of juristic jug-
gling. Both the United Nations and
the whole world are confronted by
an eminently political problem,
whose implications far transcend the
bounds of Korea, anal even the Far
East itself as a determinate portion
of the globe.
Approaching the problem of the
presence of Chinese troops in Korea
from that standpoint, we firstly
have to pose the question as to why
it came to Chinese intervetion only
in November, and not, sooner? Why,
for example, did China serenely
watch the vain and costly, desperate
campaign of the North Koreans a-
ga,inst the Pusan bridgehead? Why
did Peking allow that the main body
of Kim Il Sen's troops, equipped by
the Russians, be first smashed?
Although fully reliable answers to
these and similar questions are not
within easy reach, one thing remains
certain - Peking has been visibly
restraining itself from getting direct-
ly involved in the Korean conflict.
The motives which finally led the
Mao Tse-Tung Government to take
active part in this conflict may vary.
Regardless of the degreee of Mos-
cow influence in the matter, the
crossing of the ,38th Parallel was
bound to arouse Peking's anxiety.
The crosssing into North Korea
brought McArthur's troops on the
threshold of Manchuria, i. e. a zone
of momentous interest to China
from the political, strategic and e-
conomic angle.
It is hard to presume that China's
sole reason for intervention was to
safeguard the hydro-electric stations
on the Yalu river, although this fac-
tor too certainly played an impor-
tant part. However, judging by front-
line reports, the activity of the Chi-
nese forces seems to have been re-
stricted to a relatively narrow zone
along the Korean-Manchurian
border. This would suggest that not
even the Peking Government is set
on having the conflict spread, and
that the move is in the line of a
political action rather than a full-
scale armed interference in the
fighting in Korea.
This also appears to be the view
taken by the big Western powers of
the newly-created situation, if one
is to go by the declarations made in
the Security Council and elsewhere.
This kind of both-sided reaction to
the course of operations in Korea
therefore leaves the way open to
r strict the conflict to that territory
alone and to bring it to a close
through negotiations in Lake Suc-
cess, where the representatives of
the Peking Government are also due
shortly.
However, the attitude of Moscow
has to be reckoned with as well.
Failure in Korea so far has cost the
USSR appreciably in prestige. The
liquidation of the conflict by way
of a compromise, attained largely
owing to pressure exerted by the
presence of the Chinese in the front-
ier region, could serve to en-
hance the prestige of China, but
could hardly boost USSR influence
in Korea or China.
It should cause no surprise, hence,
if the recognition of Chinese in-
terests in the border region, prima-
rily of China's right to the utilization
of electric current from power sta-
tions located on both sides of the
frontier, should fail to meet with
enthusiastic reception in Moscow.
This might lead to fresh complica-
tions, the first omen of which oc-
curs in the negative attitude of the
Soviet delegation toward the reso-
lution guaranteeing China's interests
in the frontier zone.
The United Nations Organization
will, nevertheless, be in a position
to overcome these complications for
the Soviet Union's attitude is evi-
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dently not backed by a resoluteness
for direct intervention by the Soviet
Army. The threats of obstructionism
in UNO will surely impress no one
after all the experience had so far
in that direction, and the fact of the
USSR being primarily responsible
for the outbreak of the armed con-
flict in Korea is evident.
Far more serious is the question
as to what sort of situation will arise
if it really comes to the creation of
a special buffer-zone between Ko-
rea and China. In that respect his-
tory has shown the solving of dis-
putes by means of artificial buf-
fer territories to serve only for
the postponement of conflicts, or
rather to act as a constant source
of new friction.
In the case of Korea the method
could lead to the setting up of a
new demarcation line to replace the
former one (38th Parallel) and to
the revival, in a fresh guise, of the
identical situation which led up to
the conflict along the 38th Parallel
in the first place.
That, in effect, would be tanta-
mount to the solving of the Korean
question not on the basis of that
country's unity and independence,
but on the basis of a new division
of spheres of influence in Korea,
with China being brought into it
on top of USSR on this occasion.
It was evidently not the wisest of
decisions to confront the United Na-
tions with such a situation in
which the simplest way of escape
is to liquidate an old problem by
creating a new and equally hard
one. That decision, however, had in
its esence been brought already then
when the troops of General McAr-
thur received orders to cross the
38th Parallel without a previous
mature settlement of the funda..
mental political question of the
future of Korea.
The hopes cherished then in the
circlets which forced that decision, to
the effect that it would lead to the
rapid termination of hostilities in
Korea, have since proved without
foundation. A duplication of this
mistake by the reckless forcing of
a purely military decision fortuna-
telly no longer seems probale. The
chief danger lies in the possibility
of a revival of spheres of influence,
separated by a new demarcation
line.
Today, just like then, although it
might prove harder to effect now, a
way out of this situation should evi-
dently be sought by meeting the
aspirations of the Korean people for
unity and independence, duly gua-
ranteed by the authority of the Uni-
ted Nations. This is all the more
important in view of the over-all
tense situation in East Asia, and its
being pregnant with different threats
of conflict. This tension could only
be relieved by scrapping the perilous
idea that the peoples of Asia can be
treated like objects of a policy of
spheres of influence.
Yugoslav - Greek Relations
T HE deadlock on the question of
establishment of normal re-
lations between Greece and Yugo-
slavia seems to have been broken by
the formation of the new Greek Go-
vernment without Tsaldaris' Po-
pulists. The absence of normal re-
lations between the two neighbor-
ing states is harmful for both sides
so that any step directed at changing
this state of affairs can only be wel-
comed as being in the ;nterests of
international cooperation and peace
in this part of the world, The Yu-
goslavs have for this reason not
ceased their efforts in this direct-
ion although, unfortunately, they
have not net with understanding on
the other side.
Yugoslavia's goodwill to have the
question of normal relations solved
constructively is testified to, apart
from other things, by its decision to
effect the repatriation of 57 members
of the Greek armed forces who had,
for various reasons, crossed over into
Yugoslav territory where they were
interned. A large section of the
Greek press hailed this Yugoslav de-
cision as a manifestation of its
goodwill and a -step toward the nor-
malization of relations between the
two countries. The Greek Premier,
Mr. Venizelos, also made a Statement
to this effect. However, certain news-
papers, while commenting favorably
upon the repatriation, printed cer-
tain inaccuracies, saying that it was-
not only members of the Greek
armed forces who were being re-
patriated but "hostages", or "civil-
ians" who had supposedly been ap-
prehended from Greek territory.
This report about hostages and ci-
vilians is an invented one. There are
no such persons on Yugoslav territo-
ry nor have there been any. The re-
patriates are exclusively members of
the Greek armed forces, 57 persons
in all, and include only those who
expressed the wish to return to
Greece. Those who did not desire to
return have remained in Yugoslavia
where they are living as free citi-
zens.
-4-
Yugoslavia has also shown its
desire to improve its relations with
Greece by undertaking the necessary
measures to accelerate the execution
of the General Assembly re-olutioo
regarding the repatriation of Greek
children. At the initiative of the Yu-
goslav Red Cross, the International
Red Cross - which is the medium
through which the repatriation of
the Greek children is to be effected
- sent a representative to Athens
to collect on the spot the applications
of the parents of the Greek children
and all the other necessary docu-
ments which it will then turn over
to the Yugoslav Red Cross repre-
sentative in Greece. In this manner,
it will be possible to repatriate the
first group of 63 Greek children
whose parents, according to the do-
cuments collected, are in Greece.
The Yugoslav public received with
satisfaction the news about the
readiness of Greece to make it pos-
sible for goods for Yugoslavia to go
through the port of Salonika. (There
were similar arrangements for the
transport of goods when Yugoslavia
was receiving UNRRA supplies in
1945.)
This fact demonstrates that Greece
is beginning to approach the ques-
tion of establishment of normal re-
lations with Yugoslavia in a spirit
of greater understanding. This will
undoubtedly benefit both countries
and make it possible for them to
cooperate fruitfully in the economic
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EDITORIAL COMMENT ---
Soviet Union Places the
German Problem in the
Foreground
A T a moment when Chinese units
have put in an appearance in
Korea and when the tension in
Southeast Asia is approaching its
peak, the USSR has unexpectedly
attempted to place the problem of
G. rmany in the foreground. Soviet
Under-Secretary of State, Gromyko,
on the third of this month, propos-
ed a four-power foreign ministars'
conference to the USA, Great Brit-
ain and France for the purpose of
holding 'talks on Germany. At the
same time, he presented the plat-
form for the talks - the "peace-
loving solution of the German pro-
blem."
This Soviet note was actually giv-
en in official form in the October
Prague statement of the Foreign
Ministers of the Eastern European
countries. This was mainly a Soviet
propaganda move aimed at diverting
the attention of the world public
from events in the Far East and
covering up the failure of the
obstructionist Soviet policy in the
UNO. Silnultaneusly, the aim of this
Soviet Proposal was to introduce the
greatest possible confusion among
the Western powers now when they
are considering the question of
rearmament of Germany.
Official and political circles in the
West gave this Soviet proposal a
cool reception. By and large, they
agree in their opinion that this meet-
ing between the four Foreign Min-
isters would be beneficial but they
have very little hope as to the achie-
vement of positive results. The rea-
son for this is that the USSR has so
far systematically obstructed the
talks on Austria, whose problems
are far simpler than those 'of Germa-
ny. At the same time, these circles
emphasize that at all conferences so
far the USSR has not made any con-
cessions at its own expense in the
interests of regulating international
and inter-allied relations. It is con-
sidered that the Soviet initiative
should be taken up insofar as it
shows a real desire to come to an
understanding.
Judging from past experience with
the USSR and from the policy which
the forces of occupation are pursu-
ing in Germany - every one doing
what is in their own interest - there
is no sincere wish to come to an
understanding on anyone's part.
It is most probable that the Soviet
Union is seeking a pretext for a
meeting of Foreign Ministers in
order to get something for itself out-
side of the scope of the German pro-
blem, adhering to its conception that
various problems should be consi-
dered by the big powers alone, out-
side of and by-passing the UNO. If
nothing else, it is probably meant to
have a certain propaganda effect, to
serve as an injection of fresh blood
to the anaemic Soviet peace propa-
ganda and the hypocritical policy of
discrepancies between words and
deeds. Regardless of the decisions of
the big powers in the West, who also
look at things from their own angles,
even if there is a meeting between
their Foreign Secretaries and the
Soviet Foreign Minister, there will
be no real results. No side will re-
nounce its own interests in Germa-
ny. And in that case, even if the
Western powers agree to a meeting,
it will take place, as all the pre-
vious ones have done, without any
direct effect on a change of destiny
for the German people.
Sheffield - Warsaw
DISCUSSING the preparations
for the Sheffield-Warsaw Con-
gress, which was held recently, the
Soviet press termed the preparations
as the greatest epic fight for peace
ever recorded in the history of man-
kind. To those high-sounding words
(we leave to the appraisal of each
individual as to how far they actual-
ly concur with the true position)
were added others dealing with the
further tasks of the Congress (nor-
mal custom would require the tasks
of different organizations to be pro-
claimed during the actual congresses
- and not beforehand). Such further
tasks also include those well-known
ones like: "The ceaseless unmasking
of the propagators of a new war",
"their being taken to task", etc., etc.
Adding to this the slogan from Shef-
field: "Any war propaganda should
be prohibited", a picture is obtained
which should be portraying in full
the peace-loving intentions of the
sponsors and organizers of the Con-
gres.s. Moreover, all this could be
somehow passed off on uninformed,
well-meaning people, and they
might be called upon to adopt such
slogans as the only possible platform
in the struggle for peace. But this
"epic fight for peace" has again
shown in recent days that it carries
the seal of hypocrisy and falsehood,
and deliberate malevolence, which
again precludes it once and for all
from speaking in the name of those
principles on which the organization
of the World Congress of the Defend-
ers of Peace had been founded.
It again took the Yugoslav men
to point out the character of that
activity, men who, some days before
the opening of the Congress in War-
saw, at the plenary meeting of the
Yugoslav National Committee for the
Defence of Peace, called world at-
tention to the factors which should
not and must not be overlooked in
discussing those people who are
straining themselves to represent
Picasso's dove shut in the cage of
Soviet hegemonistic policy as a pret-
ty and endearing symbol of peace.
The Yugoslavs, who for two and
a half years have been exposed to
an unheard of campaing of intimi-
dation and sabre rattling on their
frontiers, declared at the peak of
that "method of persuasion" (in July
this year) that they would "never
take up arms as an instrument of
their national policy, except in self-
defence". In order to convince the
world that their peace-loving words
were not out of step with their
deeds, the Yugoslavs applied to
all the peace-loving organizations in
the world, among them also to the
World Congress of the Defenders of
Peace, to send their representatives
to Yugoslavia to satisfy themsel-
ves on the spot about the untruth-
fulness and falsity of the charges ad-
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vanced by the Cominform govern- After the Elections to the are hoping, though, that such re-
ments and their propaganda to the ductions in U. S. aid would not sub-
effect that Yugoslavia was prepar- U. S. Congre' stantially affect American participa-
ing a war of aggression against her tion in the humanitarian actions
neighbours and the USSR. Numer- HE successes scored by the Re- being implemented through UNO or
publicans in the November 7 through bilateral agreements.
ous organizations and individuals elections were not entirely unexpect-
responded to this invitation, and ed That the votes of the ruling The prospects for any major re-
they established the true state of party should suffer in the "off- orientation of American policy seem
affairs in Yugoslavia. And those year" elections, when the issue is to be non-existent, however. The dif-
who at the time were engaged in the not dominated by the election of the ferences between the Government
"epic struggle for peace" did not res- future President, is almost a normal and the opposition do not enter Into
pond to the invitation, allowing the phenomenon. In the American sys- the essence of the aims pursued by
world instead to go on being intimi- tem, where the outcome of the off- American policy on a world plane,
dated through their propaganda ma- year Congressional elections does not nor do they concern the American
policy towards UNO and in UNO, or
chine by allegations of Yugoslav pre- engender a change of government,
the. latter not being politically res- armaments. The disagreements are
parations for the provoking of a war primarily confined to the sphere of
ponsible to the Congress, the voters
in Europe. By allowing such activity express their criticism of the govern- tactics and methods to be employed
they were responsible for the World ment by casting their ballots for for the attainment of such aims and
Congress of Defenders of Peace fal- the opposition, without at the same the accents to be given to the va-
Ling in line with the same elements time endangering the government's rious aspects of American policy. On
which are busy fostering an activity survival. It is probable that many of the other hand, the election results
which threatened world peace. those who voted against the govern- do not force the government to make
Rather than opposing the hege- ment on November 7 would not have essential concessions. The Democra-
monistic policy of the USSR Govern- done so had the Presidential Elect- tic Party has kept a majority in
ment, which stops at no means to ion been involved where the fate Congress, although a considerably
force Yugoslavia to renounce her of the government is decided. The reduced one. The opposition, on the
off-year elections, therefore, often
national and political independence, have the meaning of a warning to other hand, has neither the strength
the Congress of the Defenders of the government and serve as a use-
Peace nor the unity to be able to impose
proceeds to sustain the wan ful corrective of the latter's activ- its will and views. It is most pro-
psychosis in the world and the lie ity. Nevertheless, this doe:; not mi- bable therefore that a compromise
that Yugoslavia was the alleged nimize the significance of the Repu- would be found for the consolida-
country which is threatening other blican Party's success. tion of the same bi-partisan policy,
countries. The best answer to this The election results indubitably which had been so far baseically pur-
type of their "peace-loving activity", mean a stronger stimulus and sup- sued. In this connection, it might be
"such as had never before been re- port of a more resolute foreign po- Pointed at the Republican demands
corded in the history of mankind" licy in the Far East and of greater for the resignation of Secretary of
- as the Soviet press ventured to participation by the Republican Par- State Dean Acheson. There are no
describe it - came from the Yugo- ty in the formulating of that policy. Indications, however, that this might
slav men through the words of the They will certainly reinforce the po- happen in the immediate future. At
distinguished author, Miroslav Krle- sition of those who favour the any rate, an eventual change in the
za, who said at the meeting of Yu- strengthening and re-militarization State Department would not signify
goslav Fighters for Peace: or Germany and Japan. Further, the also a change of U. S. A. foreign
"Our message to that peace con- new Congress will undoubtedly be Policy.
gress (to the gentlemen in Warsaw), restrained in granting credits Viewed from the angle of internal
, in aid of different countries, e.
at which our death is a subject of 9. affairs, though, the election results
discussion, the message of a socialist the Marshall Plan, the rearmament mean that some fundamental points
country which has no cause what- of European countries, etc. This ap- of the "Fair Deal", President Tru-
ever to go to war (becau=e byits own plies more particularly to assist- man's social programme, will have
sanguinary and hard struggle it had gnce to the countries of Werstern to be abandoned, and that more
ensured all the prerequisites to Europe, which will be required in stringent measures of economy and
over-
come its backwardness and po the future to invest greater effort in administrative expenditure, and
in the direction of self-aid and to against "communists and their fel-
verty, the heritage of a six-year agree to: bigger sacrifices in connect- low travellers", as the membres of
war) is that that slogan of theirs, a- ;ion with armaments and to con- leftist and progressive organizations
bout our war preparations is an in- cessions to American demands, e. g. generally are termed in U. S. A.,
ternationally established lie." regarding Germany. Many people will also be introduced.
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The Anxieties of the Euro-
pean Payments Union
I T took six weeks for the results
to be published after the ac-
tual closing of the first audit in the
life of the European Payments U-
nion. Whence so much mystery re-
garding the Union's statement of ac-
counts? It is probably due to the
desire to avoid the consequences of
the publication of the unexpectedly
high deficits of individual countries
before decisions had been made for
the removal of the resultant der-
rangements. The initiators of the
Payments Union plan were not ex-
pecting the earmarked credits to be-
come exhausted within a mere pe-
riod of three months and that defi-
cits would ensue which automatical-
ly entail payments in gold or in dol-
lars for all future procurements.
The entire mechanism for the e-
qualization of payments balances of
the Union's members has been seri-
ously shaken already at this first
periodic accounting. The reasons for
this ought to be sought only partial-
ly in the quotas (the loan limits for
individual members and their credit
commitments toward the Union res-
pectively), which had been set too
low for some countries. It is to be
emphasized that, for the sake of lli-
beralization of import trade - which
obligation is assumed at the very
joining of the Union - a number
of countries had to open their fron-
tiers to the import of foreign goods,
and that in proportions which could
not be even imagined if these goods
had to be paid in foreign exchange.
The functioning of the Union, in-
eluding the utilization of consider-
able credits; has made possible
an increase in the imports of all
those countries which, owing to the
lack of foreign exchange, had pre-
viously been unable to obtain the
required supplies iin sufficient quan-
tities. Cognizant, as far back as Ju-
ly; I. e. at the start of the Union's
operations, that the, prices of key
commodities would inevitably mark
a constant upward trend, many
countries took maximum advantage
of the Union mechanism for the pur-
chase of large quatities of mer-
cxhandise. In this fashion, they were
able to cover also many of their fu-
ture needs, and to avoid later
buying of indispensable raw materi-
als at higher prices. This has placed
them in the position of debtors to-
ward the Union who had com-
pletely exhausted their determinate
quotas. In effect, such countries have
been financing their -current and fu-
ture import requirements at the ex-
pense of the other Union members,
who in their turn became large cre-
ditors of the Union.
At its November session, the Ad-
ministrative Board of the Union was
due to resolve this crisis in its me-
chanism, that is, to settle the po-
sition of such members who could
no longer benefit by the multi-la-
teral transfer because of having to
pay for any future imports in gold
or in dollars. The choice lay between
two alternatives: either to raise their
quotas (credits), or to see them leave
the Union. It appears that the Coun-
cil of the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation will
adopt the proposal of the Union's
Administrative Board for increased
credits so as to ensure the continued
functioning of the system of inter-
European payments, subject, how-
ever, to the countries granted in-
creased quotas undertaking certain
determinate measures.
Judging by -everything, the first
obstacles encountered by the Pay-
ments Union have strongly shaken
this institution in which its foun-
ders had vested such great hopes.
This initial crisis seems to have
been weathered, at the cost, how-
ever, of direct control and inter-
ference by OEEC in the internal af-
fairs of the countries scheduled to
be granted fresh quotas. The rea-
sons underlying the unusual and
protracted postponement of the pub-
lication of the Union's balance sheet
for the first quarter are hence not
quite devoid of significance.
A Justified Measure of the
Yugoslav Government
D UE to the application of terror
and pressure against the Yu-
goslav diplomatic representatives in
Albania, and the ~restrictions, im-
posed on their freedom of movement
and personal liberty, the functioning
of the Yugoslav legation in Tirana
had been made impossible for over
six months now, as a result of which
Yugoslavia had been placed in an
unreciprocal position in relation to
Albania. At the same time, the Al-
banian legation in Beograd had been
converted from a diplomatic insti-
tution into a plain instrument of the
unpacific and provocative policy of
the Albanian Government toward
Yugoslavia.
For these reasons, and after the
Albanian legation in Beograd had
returned, on October 28, without
motivation, the Yugoslav Govern-
ment Note of Protest dated Octo-
ber 22, concerning the armed attack
(on October 12 this year) by Alba-
nian frontier forces against Yugoslav
frontier guards, which led to the
serious wounding and subsequent
death of the Yugoslav frontier guard,
Milorad Djuric, the Yugoslav
Government, on November 11 this
year, communicated to the Albanian
Government that it considered the
further stay of the Albanian repre-
sentatives in Yugoslavia as super-
fluous.
The news reports and comments
which appeared in the world press
in that connection referred to the
severing of diplomatic relations with
Albania, which, however, is incor-
rect. In its Note the Yugoslav Go-
vernment expressed its readi-
ness to maintain further diplomatic
contact through its legation in Bu-
dapest. The abstention from the se-
verance of diplomatic relations in
this situation is in fact a fresh proof
of the patience and pacifism of the
Yugoslav Government. For, in order
to grasp what it amounted to, and
still does, to maintain diplomatic
contact with the Albanian Govern-
ment, it is necessary to know that
it involves correspondence with
such state functionaries who in their
notes adhere to a vocabulary hither-
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EDITORIAL COMMENT
to unknown in diplomatic corres-
pondence, including such samples as
"cannibalistic regime", "gangster
act", "fascist act", "an act of Trots-
kyist ,banditism", etc., etc.
It was the Albanian Government
itself which by displaying so
far in a whole series of moves
towards Yugoslavia that it was
not anxious about the nor-
malization of relations with the
latter, or the resolving of disputed
questions - all of which originate
from the Albanian side - actually
caused the further functioning of its
representation in Beograd to become
superfluous. And that this course of
action strained the relations with
Yugoslavia ever more cannot be dis-
guised by any phraseology of the
Cominform press, which endeavours
to portray the chief culprit - the
Enver Hoxha government - as some
alleged victim, one whose lot it was
to have Yugoslavia even sever di-
plomatic relations with it. But this
attempt only serves to show that
press as having again been indulg-
ing in the distortion of obvous facts.
Motives of the Currency
Reform in Poland
T HE official statement about the
currency reform in Poland is
primarily designed as propaganda
for the people inside the country. It
does not speak at all about the real
motives and aims of that reform.
This statement is characteristic only
in that it brings the reform into
direct association with the plan,
which, - by an order from Moscow
- had to be subjected recently to
a radical change.
The currency reform was carried
-out for reasons which are really
of an internal and external nature.
of wages shall remain unaltered pro-
vided the prices of certain pro-
ducts do not rise or if the state
taxes and dues are not increased.
As regards the capitalist world,
the currency reform will not have
any significance. From now on, as
before, capitalist countries will not
trade with Poland on the basis of
the zloty but on the basis of the dol-
lar. The internal rate of the dollar
for the zloty shall not have any in-
fluence on the exchange relations
between Poland and the foreign
countries.
However, there is a matter concern-
ing which the statement makes no
mention. That is the relationship of
Poland and the Soviet Union in the
sphere of the payments and currency
exchange in general. It is certain
that this transference of the zloty
on a gold.standard and the establish-
ment of its parity with the rouble
is neither accidental nor without
significance it is the first change of
this kind in the Soviet bloc. It
should be kept in mind that Poland
is the first country which, after the
revaluation of the rouble, began to
report the value of its foreign trade
in roubles. Now, it is the first to es-
tablish the parity between its curren-
cy and the rouble, It is true that
the exchange between Poland and
the Soviet Union is conducted on
the basis of world prices, and that
it is immaterial in which currency
these prices are reported. In such
a case the curency reform need not
signify any modification in the
sphere of trade exchange. But
it is certain that it represents one
of the further elements in the plan
"for unification", i, e. subjugation.
It represents one of the moves -
neither the first, nor the last - for
strengthening the Soviet hegemony
and the exploitation and subjugation
of Poland and the growing loss of
Poland's independence. At any rate,
the motives which determined the
character of the present currency
reform in Poland were by no means
of a secondary nature.
One of the primary internal rea-
sons was the checking of excessive
inflation; confiscation of .money from
the hands of those who acquired it
under conditions favourable for
speculation; and to again establish
the balance between the monetary
and the goods funds. The unfavour-
able ratio between these two
funds began to deteriorate very ra-
pidly after Poland terminated the
ration card system. This measure
The End of an Unsuccessful was represented as one of the great-
O N November 8, the world press
carried a brief, scarcely visible
item: The representative of the
USSR had returned without any mo-
tivation to the session of the Allied
Council for Japan.
It was on January 18th this year
that the news was published of Ge-
neral Deveryenko, representing the
USSR in the Allied Council for Ja-
pan, having left a meeting of this
body in protest against the placing
on the agenda of the question of re-
patriation of Japanese POW's from
the Soviet Union.
This demonstration is now over,
the representative of USSR is back
in the Council and - just as the
exit from the Council had been un-
pricipled, so was the return to itun-
glorious and unpricipled. The Soviet
press has been silent on the subject,
tarrying as usual to report on fai-
lures in the USSR's foreign political
manoeuvres which have been mul-
tiplying in the past few years.
From that day onwards prices began
to rise higher and higher, and on
the markets there were less and
less goods. There arose insur-
mountable obstacles in the -supply of
goods for the people, and Poland had
to return soon to some sort of ration-
ing cards for supplying the workers
at least with the basic necessities.
With this measure, the difficulties
with supplies were not solved. On
the contrary, they were growing,
and the purchasing power of work-
ers' wages was declining. So now the
question arises, is the working class
of Poland going to gain any advan-
tage from this currency reform? Or
wheter, and to what extent, shall
the relation of prices and wages re-
sult - after the reform -- in a rise
of the purchasing power of the
workers? The manner of currency
reform, as it was defined, does not
change the previous relationship of
prices and wages.
After the currency exchange is
carried out, the purchasing power
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OUR ROAD
By Josef SCHAPPE
T hat the influence of the Communist Party
of Germany is decreasing steadily is a fact
that can be observed every day. The working
class, and the working people of the decisive in-
dustrial regions on the Rhine and :in the Ruhr
have, to a certain extent, turned their backs on
this Party. The leadership of the Party attempts
to interpret this by saying that the 12-year rule
of fascism dulled the class consciousness of the
German proletariat, but such an explanation is
not in the least satisfactory. The very fact that
the influence of the Communist Party was much
greater in 1946-47 than it is now shows the
untenability of such a lukewarm excuse. Apart
from this, in recent months we have been able
to note an increase in the class consciousness of
the working class in Germany, especially among
the construction workers, which found obvious
expression during the strikes of workers em-
ployed along the inland waterways.
What are the reasons which led hundreds
of thousands of German workers to turn their
backs on their Party? Why did tens of thousands
of old working class functionaries leave the
Communist Party of Germany, a Party for
which they had often languished in !prisons and
concentration camps? Why does the youth no
longer have faith in the Party which the immor-
tal Karl Liebknecht founded? The leadership
of the German. Communist Party will never an-
swer these questions. It dares not approach
these delicate questions with socialist argu-
ments. But we must do so because we are
socialists and because the rehabilitation of the
socialist working class movement in Germany
requires a. squaring of accounts with the harm-
ful relics dating from the past.
After 1945, when the Soviet Army became a
force of occupation in Germany, when certain
regions in Germany were wrested away by force
and annexed to the, Soviet Union and the Peo-
pie's Republic of Poland, it was clear to many
communists that the policy of the Soviet Union
could not longer be brought into accord with
the principles of Lenin, for Lenin had sought
peace without annexations and tributes and ex-
plicitly established that only imperialist powers
indulge in the grabbing of another's territory.
In addition to this, the Soviet Union's ruthless
and raw occupation and reparations policies
ruined all the hopes of socialistically-inclined
people. Erroneous principles applied in their
own Soviet territory now began to be imple-
mented in Germany, too. Walter Uhlbricht and
his friends took orders which were ruthlessly
carried out in Germany. The recognition of the
Oder-Niesse boundary line by the leadership of
the United Socialist Party of Germany,, 'the
elimination of factory councils in. the Russian
Zone of Occupation, the holding of public
elections in which candidates were not nominat-
ed in a -democratic manner, the imprisoning of
hundreds of old, tried and true working class
functionaries who, had expressed doubts in. the
correctness of such methods, the application of
purely fascist methods to stifle all criticism -
all this succeeded in creating the quiet of the
tomb in the Eastern Zone of Germany and
threatened to wreck the socialist movement in
Germany.
Soviet leaders in Berlin - in Karlhorst,
sought that the leadership of the United Social-
ist Party and the Communist Party of Germany
implement a policy corresponding to the poli-
tical concepts of their own bureaucratic caste.
They regard the German Democratic Republic
as some sort of state and country subjected to
their will, having only to fulfil the tasks set by
the Soviet bureaucracy. The relationship be-
tween the Soviet leaders and the Secretariat of
the United. Socialist Party and the Party leader-
ship of the German Communist Party is that
of master and servant. The working class has
seen through this apathetic subordination to the
orders of a foreign Government apparatus,
which had heretofore been unrecorded in the
German working class movement; it has
perceived its harmful effects and rejected it.
Taking the big landed estates from their
owners and the power from the big capitalists
was not the work of the German working class.
These measures were put through by order of
the Soviet occupation organs, and the German
working class was not, nor did it dare to be, an
active factor in this process, which means that
Russian patterns were used in Germany. The
socialists, however, could not but know that
the emancipation of the proletariat from ex-
ploitation could only be carried out by the
working class itself. However, in this case it
was exclusively a foreign state apparatus that
was dictating its will so that the reforms car-
ried out, especially in many areas where the
big estates were divided up into small and
very tiny parcels, were without a dobut not
guided by socialist ideas. The founding of Soviet
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stock companies was an arbitrary act by an oc-
cupation power and finally, the following must
be said clearly and loudly: the working people
in the German Democratic Republic can barely
defend their own vital interests because the
occupation authorities and a new bureacratic
machine of willing German assistants are hold-
ing the state power in their hands.
While the old reactionary forces in Western
Germany - naturally not without the help of
the three Western occupation powers - have re-
gained their old political and economic power,
while they have been burdening the working
masses with the cost of the lost war and invest-
ing many billions in new enterprises during the
last two years, while capitalism in Western Ger-
many has been able to strengthen its positions
in relation to the proletariat by force, the work-
ing class has not been in a position. to organize
any real resistance owing to the d e p e n d en t
policy of the German Communist Party leaders.
The present strength of the Social-Democratic
Party of Germany rests on the fact that there
is no independent socialist workers' party which
could hold high the principles of Marx and En-
gels, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and
embrace the science of Lenin.
While the Social-Democratic Party is un-
conditionally subordinating itself to the policies
of the Western powers, and Dr. Schumacher is
offering some sort of economic opposition to
Adenauer's Government, the leadership of the
Communist Party of Germany, upon instruc-
tions from and to the advantage of its Soviet
bosses, are preaching to the workers in West-
ern Germany that they must fight together
with the bourgeoisie of Western Germany in
one united "National Front". It is true that the
German bourgeoisie has lost its primary posi-
tion in the world and on the European contient,
it is true that the leading force of the imperial-
ist states - the USA - will not stand for Ger-
many playing the first violin in its cacophonous
concert, but it is also true that in the exploita-
tion of the Western German proletariat Ger-
man monopoly capitalism is acting independ-
ently. The well-known paragraph from "The
Communist Manifesto" which says that the
working class must temporarily link itself to the
bourgeoisie when the latter is acting in a revo-
lutionary manner, cannot be applied to the
Western German situation and to the Western
German monopoly bourgeoisie. There should
be no "National Front" between that bourgeoisie
and the Western German working class. There
must be no hypocrisy here. A clear stand must
be taken and a truly socialist party in Ger-
many must pursue a policy which will cor-
respond to the scientific, political and cultural
needs of our own country, of the German pro-
letariat. In this connection, the need to act in
concert with the working class of the ' whole
world must never be lost from view.
The equality of all communist parties and
all socialist parties must be an irrefutbale prin-
ciple. No one Party must sidbordinate itself
to the interests of some other country and it is
unworthy for the Soviet representatives to con-
trol the German newspapers, maltreat their
editors, appoint persons to their places who do
not enjoy the confidence of the German work-
ing class but have the support of the Kremlin.
On the question of the independence of Com-
munist parties, and in no case on that question
alone, we agree completely with the courage-
ous Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
The fatal course of the Social-Democratic
Party of Germany and the Communist Party of
Germany impose upon the responsible working
clas functionaries in Western Germany the
need to create a new socialist movement. The
new independent workers' party must inherit
the admirable traditions of the German work-
ers' movement. This new Party, if its adopts
the teaching of Marxism, will be free and will
not subordinate itself to either the system of
American monopoly capitalism or Stalin's bu-
reaucracy. Thousands of real socialists, who
were already organized in the Communist
Party of Germany and the Social-Democratic
Party of Germany, or even stood aside from
these two traditionally working class parties,
welcome our efforts aimed at creating a new
working class party in Germany.
We know we shall come upon great dif-
ficulties and it really was a hard decision to
take the course we chose. But we know that the
Communist Party of Germany is no longer in
a position to lead the proletariat owing to its
absolute dependence on the Soviet apparatus.
One of the most important instruments for the
achievement of our goal is our socialist weekly,
"Free Tribune", which renders possible lively
and socialist discussions of all socialist problems
and simultaneously points out the way to the
workers, the way in which they can deliver
themselves from misery, dependence and mis-
fortune.
We are at the beginning, but thousands of
hands are being extended to us and the social-
ists of all countries can be certain that the
German working class is not lost. It still has
enough strength to again become a powerful
factor and from these columns, which were the
first to allow us to offer an exposition of our
views outside of the borders of Germany, we
send our greetings to the communists and social-
ists in the whole world. I send my personal
greetings to those comrades from the many
countries of Europe whose fate I shared for
many years in the Nazi concentration camp at
Buchenwald.
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FROM THE U N O
FOR REAL SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION
OR FOR PURPOSES OF PROPAGANDA?
O N the 9th of this month, the Political Comi?ttee
of the UN General Assembly adopted the Yu-
goslav Draft Resolution "on the duties of states
in case of the breaking out of hostilities." According
to the proposal, two states finding themselves enga-
ged in an armed conflict must undertake all steps
to bring the dispute to an end. It is the duty of
that state whose armed forces crossed over into the
territory of another state to declare that it will with-
draw its forces and, simultaneously, to inform the
UNO of this In adopting this resolution, the United
Nations have laid down the principle, stretching to
any eventual cases of aggression, to the effect that the
invitation for the cessation of hostilities and for the
withdrawal of troops from alien territory shall take
immediate effect, and not later than 24hrs. following
the outbreak of hostilities between states. Keeping in
mind the right of an a'taoked state to self-defense, the
Resolution also provides for action by the UN Com-
mission for the Control of Peace in case it is not al-
ready functioning at the location where the conflict
has broken out.
The Soviet Delegation and the delegations of
Eastern Europe under its control took advantage of
the discussion preceding the adoption of the Yugo-
slav draft resolution to speak about the question of
peace in their usual propaganda-like . manner. They
approached this important question for the preser-
vation of peace and constructive international co-
operation not from the angle of concrete political
action which moves a cause forward and wins over
people by its positive results, but for the aim of
propagating their own policy. The Soviet Delegation
submitted its own proposal of a "declaration to elimi-
nate the danger of a new war and to, consolidate the
peace and security of peoples" only for the purpose
of putting forward an antithesis to the Yugoslav
Resolution.
In contrast to the Yugoslav proposal which was
adopted by 51 votes in the UN, the great majority
of them from small states, and which takes the in-
terests of those states into account, the Soviet Re-
solution did not contain one word about the interests
of the small 'states. On the contrary, It made mention
only of the various forms of and pretexts for aig-
gression against some state but no provision was
made for measures to prevent that aggression. In e-
numerating the forms and protests, which was done
for purely demagogic puproses, the Soviet representa-
tives submitting the resolution avoided defining
blockades by land sea and air and economic blockades
as aggression. This last is also one of the forms of
pressure and aggression. They refrained from doing
so because in that case the USSR would be forced
to stop its current practice.
A reflection of the Soviet aspirations is contained
in the criticism tendered by the delegates from the
Soviet bloc of that point in the original Yugoslav
proposal providing for the cessation of war opera-
tions within 24 hours after the outbreak of aggres-
sion. According to the concepts of the Soviet Dele-
gation, this period of time was "too long."
Regardless of the fact that it had a few days
earlier sought that in case of aggression a special
session of the UN General Assembly should be con-
vened not in 24 hours but in two weeks, the Soviet
Delegation made this objection! Under the present
conditions of development of war technique and the
balance of forces among states, the Soviet two-week
period would be ample time for a big power to li-
quidate any small state whatsoever and to place
every international forum before an accomplished
fact by way ofvariouis diplomatic machinations.
Keeping in mind the present policy of the USSR, it
is not harrd to arrive at the reason why the Soviet
delegates sought a free hand for the aggressor for a
full two weeks.
When it became clear that the revised text of
the Yugoslav Resolution and the mechanism it pro-
vides for were really acceptable to all the UN imem-
bers, the Polish delegate, on behalf of the Soviet
bloc, made the observation that the Yugoslav pro-
posal contained the ".shortcoming of not referring to
the duties of states before -the outbreak of aggres-
sion." This he did with the aim of diverting the
course of the discussion into futile channels, pro-
longing it and decreasing the significance of the pro-
posed resolution.
It did not just happen in a haphazard sort of way
that the Polish delegate was the one to make this
illogical observation which was entirely out of place.
So that the Soviet delegate would not be one of those
from the, Eastern European bloc who actually spreads
the fear of war while speaking about peace, the
Polish delegate took this duty uncn himself. In re-
ferring to this "shortcoming in -the Yugoslav Reso-
lution", he delivered an address mainly about the
dangers threatening the countries of people's democ-
racy. This speech can be described only as disguised
warmongering propaganda, calculated to intimidate
the people in the Eastern European countries, so
that they would silently and unconditionally adopt
every Soviet proposal and Faction.
In the scope of these Soviet aspirations not only
in relation to the Co:minform countries but to the rest
,of the world as well, the Soviet counter- proposal to
the Yugoslav resolution does not in essence provide
any sort of guarantee against the aggressor. It is li-
mited to a mere legal -formula, without taking the
substance into account, which in this case is much
more important than bureaucratic forms.
Taking into consideration the state of affairs in
the countries of the Eastern European bloc, the pre-
sent policy of the leaders of that bloc and the stand
taken by their representatives, it is not hard to see that
the USSR has the intention of obstructing the work
of the Political Committee and of diverting its at-
tention from the most essential question of today -
how to prevent and suppress any eventual aggres-
sion.
Thanks to the correctness and the force of ,the
Yugoslav proposal and the understanding it met
with among the majority of the delegations, the So-
viet maneuver did not succeed. But it did succeed
in showing that the. USSR is not at all concerned with
sincere international cooperation.
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AN ELOQUENT SILENCE
SILENCE can sometimes actually mean silence,
but it can occasionally be very eloquent. And
in this silence one can either utter a truth or a lie.
In connection with the article "Powerful Weapon in
the Struggle for Communism", published by the
"Pravda", the organ of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on October
1st, 1950, J. V. Stalin keeps silent.
The article states inter alia:
The publication of this book by Stalin 'A Short
Course of the History of the Communist Party of the
Soviet i ,ai,rin (B)' represents the mist important event in
the ideological life of the Soviet Union and the entire
world communist movement. The great victorious ideas of
Marxism-Leninism, whose victories are recounted on the
pages, of Stalin's work ...
"The victorious ideas of Marxism-Leninism"?
One of the fundamental ideals of this science is the
struggle for truth. But Stalin keeps absolutely silent
when ascribed a work which represents the most
important event in the ideological life of the Party of
the Soviet Union and the entire world communist mo-
vement. And what about the "Capital" and all the
other works by Marx, Engtlls, and Lenin? What do
they represent in the struggle of the proletariat? Ac-
cording to the "Pravda" estimate they are undoubt-
edly of secondary importance. However, the silence
of which we wish to speak does not refer so much to
the attitude with respect to the "Pravda" estimate of
the importance of he "Short Course" as to the fact
that Stalin keeps silent when ascribed the merit of
having written a work published a mere twelve years
ago, when the history of this book is still known to
many.
Propaganda in the USSR to all appearances as-
sumes the young generation to be of very limited
mental faculties;assumes that no one will even think
of asking why the "Short Course", if indeed written
by Stalin, was published in 1938 without his signature?
Or why, instead of the name of the author, can one
read on the covers of the "Short Course" that this
work has been "Edited by the Commission of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union". Or why, again, the decision of
the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
Party of November 14,1938, on the "Organization of
Party Propaganda", in connection with the publica-
tion of the "Short Course", d.d not mention by a
single word that Stalin is the author of this work?
1`nld so on and so forth. To all these auestion's the only
answer from the USSR is - silence. E. Yaroslavsky
would probably have quite a lot to say on the matter,
but he too keeps silent. The motives which induce him
to this are, however, not identical with those of J. V.
Stalin.
Should we decide to believe the "Pravda's" as-
sertion that the "Short Course" is the work of J. V
Stalin, we would have to pause in surprise at page
95 of this book, The -author introduces himself to his
readers in the following way:
At that time Comrade Stalin carried through tremen-
rteus revolutfunairv work in the Lower Caucasus. Comrade
Stalin exposed and defeated the Mensheviks, as the
opponents of the Revolution and armed uprising. He
prepared the workers radically for a decisive struggle
against autarchv.
Truly, very "modest". But that is not the only
place where we encounter such "modesty". On page
307 we come upon the following paragraph:
Of great Importance for the ideological defeat of
Trotskyism was the theoretical work of Comrade Stalin,
i On the Foundations of Leninism'. which was published
n 1824. This brochure is a masterly 'exposition and pro-
foundly theoretical elaboration of Leninism. It provided
and is now providing Bolsh'cvi;>rs ahrou,mhout the world
with the sharp weapon of Marxist-Leninist theory.
Other similar passages could be quoted. How-
ever, what we are dealing with here is neither mode-
sty nor immodesty, but far graver problems. While
the "Short Course" was considered the work of a
oomrnission, of which E. Yaroslavsky was also a
member, it was only logical to expect that, the Com-
mission, though not stressing it explicitly, should
have made use of the earlier work of its member, E.
Yaroslavsky. The Commission of the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist Party was certainly
under no obligation to mention that the "History of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)", by
E. Yarosiavsky, -served as a basis for the "Short
Course". But since it is being asserted today that the
"Short Course" is the work of J. V. Stalin and that
it "represented the most important event in the ideo-
logical life of the Party of the Soviet Union and the
entire world communist movement", one feels com-
pelled, for the sake of truth, to set 'ou't the relation
between the "Short Course of the History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ('B)" and the
"History of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (B)" by E. Y'aroslavsky.
The second edition of E. Yaroslavsky's "History
of the CPSU (B)" was published in Moscow in 1934.
The first edition of the "Short Course" was published
in 1938, likewise in Moscow.
'Iwo books can be compared in general outlines
and in details. We shall begin with the particular and
proceed to the general. Are there any similarities
in the details? Yaroslavsky's "History" and the
"Short Course" contain passages which refer to the
same period of time and which read as follows:
E. Yaroslavsky: -
The Moscow uprising was suppressed regardless of
all the heroism d'is'pliaved by the upsurgent workers.
The Moscow uprising was not isolated. Revolutionary
uprisings spread to a series of other towns' and regions.
Armed uprisings broke out in Krasnoyarska, Molotovilih,
Novoroeisk, Sevastopol, Kronstat. Especially tenacius
struggles were waged in the Baltic region (Latvia). in
Georgia, and in the region of the Yekaterinoslavska
railway ...
How did the Bolsheviks judge this uprising, and how
the Mensheviks?
The Menshevik Plekhanov after the uprising rebuked
the Party: 'Erne should not have taken to arms ... They
(the Mensheviks) in all possi:ble' ways belittled the signi-
ficance of the uprising and mocked it, endeavouring to
prove in all possible ways that the course of uprising was
a hopeless utopian course or struggle'.
The Bolsheviks did not take this attitude to the
uprising. For them the test of the Moscow uprising only
confirmed the possibility of a successful struggle of the
working class ... To Plekhanov's rebuke 'One should not
r, rve taken to arms'. Lenin reiplied: "On the contrary, one
should have done so more decisively ...
'use "Short Course": -
The Moscow uprising was suppressed.
The uprising 'did not restrict itself to Moscow alone.
Revolutionary uprisings spread to a series of other towns
and regions. Armed uprisings broke out in Krasnoyarska,
W itotovilth (Perm), Novo,ros;sk, Seamov, Sevastopol,
Kronstat.
The oppressed peoples of Russia also rose to arms.
The uprising spread to almost the whole of GeorQla? An
uprising of bigger proportions broke out in the Uraine,
in the Donbas: in Gorlovika Alexandrovska, Luganska
(Voroshilovgrad). The struggle in Latvia was of a tenacious
character...
The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks judged the De-
cember armed uprising In different ways.
The Menshevik Plekhanov after the uprising rebuked
the Party "One should not have taken to arms". The
Mensheviks endeavoured to prove that the uprising was
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unnecessary and harmful, that one could switch over to
a revolution without uprisings, that success could not he
attained by means of armed uprisings, but by peaceful
means of struggle.
The Bolsheviks branded such an attitude as traitorous.
They considered that the Moscow uprising' had only con-
firmed the possibility of an armed struggle of the working
class. To Plekhanov's rebuke One should not have taken
t,o axm"s . Lan.kn replied "On the c,intrary, one should have
done so more decisively ...
And one can thus read through the entire "His-
tory". To each page one can find a corresponding
text - somewhat altered in .some places, textually copi-
ed in others. There is no need to prove that this is
impermissible, all the more so when one omits to
mention the source which has been made use of in
the work.
And when this is how matters stand with the
details, what are we to say of the whole. An expe-
rienced reader who is interested in certain problems
starts by reading the contents of a book. If we take
a look at how E. Yaroslav.sky laid out his book, and
then cast a glance at the "Short Course", we shall
immediately be able to establish that what we have
before us are two variations of one and the same
plan. (Many of the chapters of the "Short Course"
have exactly the same titles as the chapters of Ya-
rosla.vsky's "History of the CPSU (B)".
The "Short Course", written later, has in every
respect gone a step further ahead from E. Yaroslav-
sky's History - both in a positive and negative
respect. The connections between the CPSU (B) and
the other parties in the world are far more emphasis-
ed in Yaroslavsky's book than they are in the "Short
Course". Yaroslavsy, in 1934, as literature for dif-
ferent chapters - for the part up to Lenin's death
- quoted Lenin almost exclusively. The "Short
Course". true enough, quotes no literature for the
different chapters, but displays many odd symp`oms.
Thus, for example, in the part dealing with the Oc-
tober Revolution, Stalin is placed on an equal foot-
ing with Lenin. The glorification of Stalin has be-
come . a permanent process. The Soviet propaganda
in a roundabout way glorifies Stalin as one of the
founders of the Bolshevik Party. In the "Pravda"
and elsewhere, Stalin has been proclaimed the au-
thor of the "Short Course", and moreover the "Pravda"
article with which we are dealing does not stop at
this assertion only. The article also asserts that:
Historical experience and implementation have con-
firmed the theory of Lenin-Stalin .on the victory of soci-
alism in one separate country, on the Soviets as the best
form of the political organization of society in the trans -
tion period from capitalism to socialism, on the Party as
the Guldina and chanelling force in the system of the
working class-leaders and the organizers of the masses in
the struggle for communism .
Whom is one to believe? The "Pravda" article
or the "Short Course"? On the theoretical premises
which the "Pravda", as we have shown above, ascri-
bes, in addition to Lenin, also to J. V. Stalin, the
"Short Course" says the following:
On the grounds of all this Lenin came to the con-
clusion that it is perfectly possible for the proletariat to
force the imperialist front anywhere, in one place or in
several places, that the victory of socialism is, possible,
first in several countries, or even In one separate one...
Lenin announced th's premise in an article en-
titled "On the Slogan of the United States of Europe",
published in August 1915. The "Short Course" does
not by a single word mention Stalin as being the
author of this theory.
On the other theoretical premise, which refers to
the Soviets, the "Short Course" says:
The Revolution of 1905 showed that the Soviets are
the bodies of an armed uprising and at the same time
the seeds of new, revolutionary government. The idea of
the Soviets lived in the consciousness of the wo Cuing
masses, and they realized it on the morrow of the
overthrow of realized it on the morrow of the overthrow
of tsarism ...
Thus, here, too, there. is no question of a theo-
retical premise which Stalin laid down together with
Lenin. On the third premise, namely, on the Party
being the guiding force, the "Short Course" says:
Lenin more than forty years ago (today more than
fifty years ago) co(rectly pointed out the course of the
struggle of the working class, determined its role as that
of a guiding revolutionary force of society, determined
the role of the peasantry as that of the allies of the
working class .
Lenin worked out the whole of his theory on the
dictatorship of the proletariate alone, using the
works of Marx and Engels. That is what we are also
told by Stalin in his book "Questions of Leninism".
And to all this J. V. Stalin is silent, silent and
approving. But that will not make lies turn into
truth. And neither will the assertion that Stalin is
the author of the "iShort Course" actually make him
become this. The Soviet propaganda has resorted to
this unworthy trick in order to help in the efforts
to raise Stalin to the pedestal of Divinity - as ido-
latry corresponds to the system of bureaucracy.')
The process is developing. But parallel to it de-
velops the consciousness of the lndllions of the people,
who will once ask that this silence cease and that
they be told the truth about many matters.
Siena KARAOGLANOVITCH
1) We shall give a small example: in its efforts to
present J. V. Stalin's theoretical work greater than it actually
is, the Soviet propaganda has resorted to such naive means
as to publish V. I. Len'in's and J. V. Stalin's works in, the
same form, at first glance. 11lowever, while 16 pages of
Lenin's work have ;7,600 typographical signs, the same number
of pages in Stalin's works have only 25,600 signs. A text of
the same length when printed under Lenin's name makes
two and under Stalin's name, three volumes.
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LIFE IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA
WORKERS' COUNCILS IN ACTION
T HERE exists a comprehensible interest abroad,
especially among workers, in connection with the
activities and organization of the Yugoslav Work-
ers' Councils and their Managing Boards. They re-
present a new, revolutionary phenomenon along the
line of consistent application of the teachings of
Marx and Lenin. Hence their importance and the
broad interest attached to them.
Tens of thousands of workers are engaged in the
management of Yugoslav economic enterprises. Re-
cent days have seen the consultation of the manag-
ing boards. and directors of different undertakings
according to industrial branches.
Parallelly with .the above, the 13th Plenum of the
Central Committee of Trade Unions was also held.
Both the consultations and the Plenum are character-
istic and important for the internal life and develop-
ment of the new Yugoslavia. The consultations by
virtue of having for the firs time, after 3 to 4 months'
practical management of enterprise;, brought to-
gether the workers-managers from all parts of the
country to compare notes, review the successes and
weak points of their activities and to lay down plans
for their future work. The Plenum placed into the
centre of attention the question of the role and place
of the trade unions in the building of socialism, more
specifically in relation to Workers' Councils and
Managing Boards.
These are the initial steps of the complex revo-
lutionary process of conversion of direct producers
into managers of economy and -- in the last a-
nalysis - of the state itself. New legislation concern-
ing economic enterprises and a new financial system
are being worked out by the Yugoslav Government.
Both are due to be adapted to the basic goal, i. e. the
taking over of factories by the workers and the ac-
celeration of the process of incorporation of working-
men in their management. Under the new financial
system, the workers of a factory share in the distri-
bution of their surplus work. The practical meaning
of this is that they take part in the determination
of their wages. In the Soviet Union and the Comin-
form countries the workers' wages are fixed behind
the backs of the working class, without the latter's
participation and control. They are decided by a
bureaucratic caste which is beyond control and which
itself disposes of the surpluses. And the measure of
personal freedom - in the last analysis -- is deter-
m'ned by the degree in which the people have a de-
ciding voice in the disposal of the surplus products of
their labour.
The working class of Yugoslavia is proceeding to
grapple in practice with the difficulties necessarily
imposed by the revolutionary path it treads. It is
already scoring its first feats along that path.
The Management Board of the "Impel" factory,
in Slcvenia, is rightly proud of the results accomplish-
ed by it. It largely consists of machine operators
(three-quarters of the board members must come
from the workers' ranks under the law). It is a fact
that they are still insufficiently familiar with such
professional matters like accounting, the various o-
perations requiring a specialized knowledge of che-
mistry, physics, etc. But then the factory possesses
its experts for such jobs. The Managing Board has
proceeded to subject to :minute analysis the entire
mechanism of the work organizat,lon, it has detect-
ed the weak spots and posed concrete tasks both
before the experts and the individual departments
of the factory. The Managing Board of the "Bade
Koncar" factory, on the other hand, subsequent to a
study of its. enterprise, found that the tool shop was
undeveloped and inadequate to meet the enterprise's
requirements. Tangible conclusions and the assign-
ments given to the technical staff resulted in the
construction of a new tool shop which has infused
new life to the smooth running of the factory. Many
are the examples of creative ability and initiative
on the part of the workers engaged in managing the
enterprises. Practical experience shows that the
transfer of factories to the workers has fostered the
zeal, enthusiasm and the forces of the working class,
although there still exists a certain amount of wan-
dering, exploration and apprehension at the magni-
tude and importance of the task.
The 13th Plenum of Trade Unions, held in Bel-
grade on November 15 and 16, discussed precisely
the role facing the trade unions in the new conditions
of Yugoslav practice, and how to assist th^ work-
ing class to raise its cultural and professional level
as rapidly as possible in order to meet the great tasks
at hand and those that lie ahead.
The Centrlal Cpmmityee of the Trade Unions,
acting in conjunction with the Yugoslav Council for
Science and Culture and the republican ministries
of education, drafted and submitted to the Plenum
a new schedule for the general education of work-
ers. The proposed system would be put into effect
in the form of a law. It envisages three grades of
general education of workers.
A preparatory and educational courriculum would
serve to familiarize workers with the basic elements
of mathematics, history, and geography of Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia.
A basic educational course would provide work-
ers with a more solid knowledge of natural science,
their native tongue, geography and history of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and it would
last nine to ten months.
A school of general education would have a two-
year curriculum, and would cover the subjects and
enjoy the status of the lower high-school.
The first two courses would be organized and
financed by trade union organizations, whereas the
school of general education would be, sponsored by
the state like any normal school in the educational
system of the country.
The Plenum especially insisted on elucidating
the role of trade union organizations in conditions
where the workers themselves manage the enter-
prises and where they are gradually to take over the
management of the entire economy. The trade union
organizations are due to help the Workers' Councils
and Managing Boards, and, which is. ,particularly
vital, to engage in a full-scale cultural, educational
and ideological-political drive for the enlightening
of the working class.
All these efforts aspire toward the assisting and
accelerating of the revolutionary course of consist-
ent application of the teachings of Marx and Engels
in Yugoslav practice. It is understandable, therefore,
why the Cominform circles and their followers in the
Western countries should fear Yogoslav practice and
have only words of abuse for it. On the other hand
however, the efforts of Yugoslavia are meeting with
true sympathies and interest of all the progressive
peoples in the world, and primarily among workers.
R. VUJOVIC
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THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA
EFFECT PRECEDES CAUSE BY FIVE MONTHS
H ARD IS THE STRUGGLE being
waged by the leadership of the
World Congress for Defense of
Peace because its enemies are Aso
strubborn.
In its long fight to show the
world that, only the atom bomb is a
danger to peace, and that the ex-
pans'ionistic tendencies of the USSR
serve the cause of peace, one of its
powerful enemies has been the So-
viet Government which caused an
upheaval in Korea without use of
the atom bomb, simply by its poli-
tical moves. And in another s`ruggle
which is b-i.ng waged parallel with
the first, these unfortunate leaders
have another equally hard-headed
enemy - the chronology of events.
The executives of the World Con-
gress for Defense of Peace are on
a war footing in a big way - with
the calendar.
Certain episodes from this un-
equal struggle are rather well-
known. They are the ones connect-
ed with the preparations for the
Peace Congress in Sheffield that did
not come off. Arrangements in va-
rious countries were made for
the election of delegates to this
Congress - free elections of
course. Everything in connection
with the elections was going
as smoothly as apple' pie ex-
cept for the fact that the calendar
balked and would not allow itself,
to be tamed down ,and put in order.
And so it happened that the dele-
gates in Austria were elected on
October 21, while on October 5 the
British Government already had in
its hands, in the form of application
for visas, the complete list of these
delegates who were freely elected
16 days later. In Hungary, the de-
legates were elected November 4,
while 12 days earlier, on October
23, the complete list of these dele-
gates was already in London. A
commentator on the London radio
was able to play the role of prophet
on November 3 and inform his Hun-
garian listeners the exact names of
all 20 delegates who were to be
elected on the morrow in the free
elections.
But, as we have said, these are
well-known episodes. Less well-
known is the struggle with the ca-
lendar which went on in connection
with the expelling of Yugoslavia from
the World Congress of Defenders of
Peace. We learned about this from
the reports on the press conference
which the organizers of the Shef-
field Congress held November 3 in
London. At this conference, one of
these organizers, named Ivor Mon-
tague, answering the question as to
why the Yugoslavs had been evict-
ed from the "world movement for
peace", gave the following answer
in the desire to prove that it was
not true that the Yugoslavs had
been thrown out for the simple rea-
son that such an order had come
from the Soviet Union: "We expel-
led the Yugoslavs because they are
supporting the policy of their Go-
vernment which is persecuting
those who signed the Stockholm
Appeal in Yugoslavia."
In this statement there are two
things that are true, one that is
untrue and ,one that is impossible.
The true things are as follows: first,
that the Yugoslavs support the po-
licy of their Government and, se-
cond, that the Yugoslavs were ex-
pelled from the World Congress of
Defenders of Peace because they
support the policy of their Govern-
ment; it is untrue that there were
any people in Yugoslavia who sign-
ed the Stockholm Appeal; and it is
impossible for the Yugoslav Govern-
ment to persecute people who do
not exist. And the whole thing adds
up to a war with the calendar.
The Yugoslavs were evicted from
the World Congress of Defenders of
Peace because of their negative
stand toward the Stockholm Ap-
peal - says the leadership of that
Congress through one of its mem-
bers, Ivor Montague. And here is
what thecalendar says] the expulsion
of Yugoslavia (the consequence of
its disagreement with- the Stock-
holm Appeal) was carried out on
October 18, 1949, while the Stock-
holm Appeal (that is, the proclama-
tion that was the cause of the dis-
agreement, and, therefore, of the
expulsion of the Yugoslavs) was
adopted at the Congress in Stock-
holm which was held from March
15 to 19, 1950. That means, as the
stubborn calendar bears witness, that
the effect preceded the cause by a
full five months.
T HE SHEFFIELD CONGRESS, as
we .know, was transformed into
the Warsaw Congress. This was de-
cided by the leadership of the World
Congress of the Defenders of Peace,
as a sign of protest because the Bri-
tish Government did not issue entry
visas to a large number of dele-
gates.
A storm of protest followed this
act by the British Government. The
most vehement in uttering their in-
dignatian were the "defenders of
peace" in Prague. The whole Pra-
gue press devoted columns and co-
lumns of space to this case, brand-
ing the "warfare by means of non-
issuance of visas" as something ex-
tremely uncivilized, unpacific and
base.
The Indignation of the Prague
Cominformists is a favorable sign.
It shows that there has been a
change of mind in the last fourteen
months, a change for the better. Be-
cause the following happened in
Prague in September last year:
The Executive Committee of the
International Journalists' Organiza-
tion was sitting in Prague at that
time. The session was attended by
delegates from many states, but not
all of them. For instance, the Yu-
goslav representative in `the Exe-
cutive committee was not present
- because the Czechoslovak Go-
vernment had not issued him an
entry visa. The Czechoslovak secre-
tariat of the International Journal-
ists' Organization did not answer
the telegram of .protest sent by the
Yugoslav representative. When the
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Yugoslav Newspapermen's Associa-
tion authorized one of its members
residing in Prague to represent it
at the session, he was forcibly pre-
vented from entering the hall in
which the session was being held.
That is why the present stand of the
Prague Cominformists on the ques-
tion of issuance or non-issuance of
visas gives rise to great hones. They
are obviously progressing in their
conceptions. Fourteen months ago,
there was not even one single voice
of protest in all Czechoslovakia a-
gainst the "warfare by- means of
nc n-issuance of visas" being waged
by the Prague Government. Today
the whole Czechoslovak press is
thundering against a similar war
being waged by another Govern-
ment. Who knows, maybe in the
fourteen coming months, on the oc-
casion of some sort of international
congress in Prague, even the Prague
Government itself will give the
world a pleasant surprise by issuing
visas to all foreign delegates without
exception?
Y HE FIRST DAY OF THE CON-
GRESS IN WARSAW is also a
source of new hope. Judging from
the address delivered on that day
by the President of the World Con-
gress of Defenders of Peace, Mr.
Joliot-Curie, the leadership of that
organization is following the same
course taken by the Czechoslovak
public: the course of correcting
their viewpoint on certain matters.
I am thinking here not only of
the condemnation of "warfare by
means of non-issuance of visas". This
matter is much more serious than
that and much more far-reach'ng.
The point is that the stand of the,
World Congress of hake Defenders
of Peace seems - to be changing fun-
damentally on various questions.
Certain alterations (or rather ad-
d(itions) were already hinted at:
after the speeches by Tihonov,
Ehreniburg, and other Soviet mem-
bers of the leadership of the Peace
Movement, in which they condemn-
ed all aggression and war propagan-
da, it was clear that the non-Soviet
members of that leadership had
adopted their opinion. But there are
bold changes in that stand which
we did not expect. Two of the
changes are so bold that it is still
not clear to us if they are the fruit
of extensive consultation or if Joliet-
Curie announced them on his own
carelesly trespassing over the
boundaries set up by the Comin-
formists for development of (the
struggle for their kind of "peace".
First of all, Mr. Joliot-Curie stated
on b: half of the whole organization:
"We have no intention of imposing
a government of our choice on any
country." This statement is sensa-
tional, because if the World Con-
gress for Peace were to adopt the
viewpoint of its President, it would
be passing sentence on the policy of
the Cominform which has been di-
recting the main part of its activi-
ties for the last two years toward
the provocatitrn of a coup d'etat in
one countr ;- Yugoslavia, toward
changing its 'leadership and impos-
ing an it some government of its
own choice.
The second statement made b3
Mr. Joliot-Curie was equally sen-
sa?tional: he said that the Congress
vgould condemn all economic dis.
crimination. If the Congress con-
demne-s, all such discrimination, it
will also thereby condemn that to-
tal, almost hermetically-sealed block-
ade which the Comi.nforrn countries
have been applying to Yugoslavia
for over two years.
If these two things :should be
condemned, that would mean that
the World Congress of the Defend-
ers of Peace had emancipaled itself
from service to the policy of one
power, the Soviet Union, and that
it had really begun to serve peace.
Hopes are fine things. But the
Warsaw Congress has still not drawn
to a close. And we know that the
first day of all these congresses of
"peace" -- is a day of words. The
deeds come later. So far, they have
differed from the words. Dare we
now believe that such positive
changes have already taken place
within the World Congress of the
Defenders of Peace that the Con-
gress,. realizing the two fine pro-
mises of its (President, will even
reject the foundations of Comin-
form policy: discrepancy between
words and deeds?
LBANIAN ECONOMIC POLI-
A CY, according to the Warsaw
radio, is achieving great results.
The prosperity of the Albanian peo-
ple is rising", broadcasts Radio
Warsaw.
After this, one might expect such
an assertion to be followed by sta-
tistics chowing that the Albanian
people are living better, eating bet-
ter and dressing better. But no such
data are given by the Radio War-
saw reporter. He does give some fi-
gures, true enough, but these figures
refer to something else. "In compar-
ison with 1945", he says, "there is
4 times more oil being produced, 5
times more coal, 11 times more bi-
tumen, considerably more cement..."
and there the tale ends.
The figures are fine. But they only
show that - Albanian exports to
the Soviet Union are growing. These
augmented exports do, admittedly,
contribute to someone's prosperity -
but that someone is in the USSR.
Perhaps there is someone here and
there in Albania getting more pros-
perous, too. But - what is the re-
lationship between the growth of
exports and the growth of the pros-
perity of the Albanian p e o p l e ?
The Radio Warsaw reporter probab-
ly knows. But precisely because he
does know, he would rather omit
the figures on the increase of the
people's prosperity and restrict his
comments to the figures on the in-
crease of - production for the needs
of the "leading state."
Revue w of
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National Bank PR Serbia Branch
TJb 103-906033.
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006900120004-8