(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R010500090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83-00415RO10500090001-4
CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
ShCURTTY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Hungary
SUBJECT Comments on the American Flyers Incident
25X1A
PLACE
ACQU I R E:~
DATE OF
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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
25X1X
1. Source is convinced that the Hungarian Air Force and Hungarian Government
were not informed in any detail of the case until the Soviets had completed
their interrogation of the four American flyers forced down in Hungary. He is
sure that the American aircraft, off its course over Hungarian territory., was
considered a sudden windfall by the Soviets who hoped to be able to tie the air-
craft and. its crew into the recent espionage trials involving alleged American
trained agents in the Soviet Union., Rumania, and Bulgaria. As soon as the Soviets
realized that the aircraft had been on a legitimate flighty the matter was dropped
by them and turned over to the Hungarians for exploitation. This assumption
is borne out by the Tass release and the Hungarian note of protest which
appeared almost simultaneously on 3 December 1951. Between 19 November,
when the aircraft was forced downy and the date of the first Tass release,
thirteen to fourteen days later., the Soviet probably completed their interro-
gation- Only during the last few days of this interval were the Hungarians
briefed by the Soviets, and the time was then too short and the evidence
too tenuous to make a good case out of the. incident.
20 Having entered wholeheartedly into a violent tirade against the "blood thirsty"
U.S. Government, it was impossible for the Hungarians to release the aircraft
and its crew. It was equally impossible, on the other hand, to convict the
crew on any of the Hungarian charges -- if the charges had been proven,
the Soviets would not have turned the crew over to the Hungarians in the
first place. Source then considers the element of blackmail for blackmail's
sake and states that his knowledge of Hungarian economic affairs leads him
to believe that the Hungarian Government is in such a need of hard currency
that it will do anything to procure dollars. The American aircrew detained 25X1 X
in Hungary offered a unique chance of getting dollars with relatively little
effort or risk. Source states that he discussed this Asnc_et of the cagc?
TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83-00415RO10500090001-4
730!2.
25X1A
6 Feb. .9,%2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83-00415R010500090001-4
TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U0S. OFFICIALS ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
. 2-
25X1A
3e Source believes that the "American Flyers Incidents damaged Soviet-Hungarian
relations. Hungarians with whom he has spoken consider the action of'the
Soviet air force in Hungary to have been a breach of Hungarian sovereigntye2 5X1X
The feeling is that if the American aircraft had to be forced down, the
Hungarian Air Force should have done it. Source further states that at a
shoulders which source interprets as an indication of Hungarian bevd1derment,
over the matter and of annoyance at the Soviet action.
25X1A 25X1A
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Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83-00415RO10500090001-4
 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83-00415RO10500090001-4
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83-00415RO10500090001-4