ESTIMATE OF THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R010900090003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 7, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

NTELLOFAX S
Approved'For Release CIA-RDP83-00415RO10900090003-8
CLASSIFICATION
Basi>a f'or t -mati Sti th
COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone)
SUBJECT Estimate of the Personnel Strength of the Soviet
Forces in the Soviet Zone of Germauy
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE
ACQUIRE.
25X1X
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OFYITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794, Of THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION Of THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
A. 'rar==oj r ;th of the drourd fforeft Of the Set stoup of Occupation
Fore ny G:0 )
I u ex ;th estitit has been eI blished on this hitherto t f ..
OR situation of the Soviet ground forces.'.in Garry and was computed
for the armies on the basis of the percentage relation between the
actual ?trength and peace strength of several units. A strength estimate
obtained by merely adding up the troop strengths as reported by regular
sources from military. elts and barracks installations would be inaccurate
and subject to error's, because the sources usually make their abserYa
tions from outsi the billeting areas and thus are likely to over-
estimate the Uurd ier of. troops particularly in times of relatively quiet
routine trainixl. Also it is not practicable in all cases to have
a a source verify the stouts by the first within a period
of from two to three months:, The methhad of establishing a strength
es,timatey which is applied bslot has the advantage that it is based
on authentic figures regarding the actual strengths of units, confirmed
.peace strengths of numerous units and the current GB situation which
is substantiated on the thole,,.
2. The determination of the present actual strength is founded on four
origins. Soviet strength reports from. the Soviet Zone of Austria,
because no original Ilocuments on the strength of units upwards of
platoon level have been received from the Soviet Zone of Germany
during the ps.st six months. The figures in these origina,1 strength
reports have been compared with the peace strengths specified. by a
deserter of the 14th Guards Mechauimed Division in 1911.9 ? These f jVares
prove: ssso Le.y reliable wheezy checked against the numerous akigtnal
dots - obtained during the last two Feat.
CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURITY INFORMATION
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO.
CD NO.
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On the basis of this information the following conclusions can be drawn:
a. The Soviet Army units of the 13th Guards Mechanized Division are maintained
on the basis of an authorized strength which corresponds to the peace
strength of a mechanized division (i e.i 65 to 70 percent of the war
strength) as slecified.by the deserter.
b The actual strength in the fall of 191 was only slightly below the peace
strength and apparently rose slightly above peace strength following the
turnover of personnel in October and November 1951.
There is a possibility that these conclusions cannot be applied exactly to
the units in the Soviet Zone of Germany which might have strengths slightly
jibove those of the units in the Soviet Zone of Austria, There is also a
possibility that the relationship be actual strength and authorized strength
is closer with regard to tank units than infantry and mechanized units.
There is no doubt, however, that the conclusions above constitute a basis-7"for
the hypothesis that the Soviet ground.. units in the Soviet Zone of Germany
also have an actual, strength equaling 105 percent of the prescribed peace
strength. The strength computations below have been computed by using 'tkhis
percentage.
The peace strengths, on which the strength estimates for mechanized divisions
are based,were taken from the statements by the deserter of the 14th. Guards
Mechanized Division, and for all other units they were either Qerived.from':,tbe
figures relative to the mechanized division or on the basis of other information.
The assumed peace strengths of the artillery divisions are probably inaccurate
because the organization of the component artillery brigades has not been
determined,
Little authenti=c iaormation is available with regard to the strength of the
rear service installations of the armies and headquarters GQFG. The following
estimates are based on reports pertaining to supply depots, repair shops and
offices:
Eighth Guards Army and Third Shock Army:
First and. Second. Guards Mechanized-Armies:
Third, and Fourth Guards Mechanized, , m .es:
GOFG
2,100 men each
1,100 men each
1,300 men each
81500 men
The ratio of rear echelon personnel to combat and support personnel in regard,.
to specific armies follawsa
Eighth Guards Army and Third Shock Ar :
"irstl Seconds Third and.. Fourth Mechanized Armies: 3 to 3-5/100
GOFG An additional 3/100
The ratio of rear services personnel to co that and support personnel therefore
swurts to only 7/100 in contrast to about 18/100 as existed during World War 11,
1'his small ratio is explained by the fact that the Soviet Army uses, to a large
extent., German manpower and installations such as the railroad system. In
addition the strength estimate below includes the motor transport units in
support units whereas they were part of rear service units in World Wax It
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Strength Estimate of the Individual Units.
Peape Strength
Pz'ejgnt Actual Otrength
1.
Eighth Gds Army
Army Hq
450
450
3I'1I and ZZ Gds -Rifle Corps
400
400
39th Ode Mtz Rifle Div
8,500
8,900
57th Gda Mtz Rifle Div
8,500
8,,900
20th Gds Mecz Div
9,400
9,900
21stt Gde Mecz Div
9,400
9 ,900
13th AAA div
2,100
2,200
43d: (Oda) Arty Brig
1,100
1,150
Two Corps AT Arty Brigades
(7,,050 each)
2.100
2,200
2POth Hv Tan% B,P Regt
750
780
16th (Y) and u/i RL Regts
450 each)
900
960
446th, 27th Oda and u/i
S1g Bns220 each)
660
700
19th Ode, 880th and. u/i
End Bne (320 each)
960
1,100
Two u/i. AAA Beats o Cups
Rq Troops (300 each)
600
630
257th Motor Trans Bn
350
.....
.
Totes Combat and Eupporti
Units
46,170
48,420
Rear Services of the Ar
-24100
21100
Total Strength of Eighth Ode A
48 300 (aypr )
500500 (appr)
2.
Third Shoo) Army
A Hq
450
450
EQ IBC and LXXJX Rifle Corps
420
420
94th Sds Mtz Rifle Div
8,500
8,900
207th Mtz Rifle Div
8,500
8,900
19th tads Metz Div
9,400
9,900
18th Meez Div
94oo
9,900
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'Unit Peace Strength Present A.rtza1 Strength
3d Gds AAA Div
114th (Y) Army Arty Brig
3d Gds (Y) and 4th Gds (r)
2Y100 2,200
1,100 1,150
AT Arty Brigades (1,050 each) 2,100 2;F200
136th Gds Tank SP Regt 750 780
10th Gds and u/i RL Refits
(450 each) 900
105th Sig Regt 580
977th and two u/i Signs
(220 each) 660
19th (i) E4g:C? Regt 780
890th Engr Bn and one u/i
ngr Bn
Tso u/i "A Re fits of Corps
NQ Troops
u/i Motor Trans Bn
Total Combat and Supporting Units
Rear Services of the Army
Total 8trengtb Third Shock Army
First Gd I oz.-,Arn
ArrW HQ
9th Tan Div
11th Ode `Twc Div
8th 0do Mocz Dior
4th Cads AAA Div
'u/i Light Arty Brig
lot Assault Engr R'egt
6th. Motorcycle En
One Big Regt (not identified
960
600
700
820
64+0 680
,. - 350
47,230 19,5140
2l
4.0
19 r30o (appr) 51,600 (aapr )
8,200
8, 2004
9,1400
2,100
1,050
780
350
400
8,6oo
.8,600
9,x900
2,200
1,,,100
820
370
but believed to exist) 580 600
One Rl, Refit (not identified
but believed to exist)
Total Comet And Supporting Units
Rear Services of the Army
Total Strength of let Ode Mecz Army
31,510 33,070
It 100 120
32,600 (app,) 34 0200 ( apps )
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Peace Strewth Present.. Sl
A.ct ?. rexaBth
Pourth Gda Me" Army
Army Hg.
400
400
10th Gds Tank Div
8,200
8y600
25th 'kaak Div
8,20#0
8,600
6th ode Mecz My
9,1400
97900
7th (ids Metz Div
9,14t i
9,900
T/i AAA Div
2,100
2,200
11th (?) Ode Light Arty Brig
10050
1,100
312th Gds Regt
1+50
480
118th Sig Regt
581
600
3d EW ,egt
780
820
51st (2) M. c . Regt
4TO
500
Total Combat = Supporting unite
41,034
43,100
Rear Services of the' ,Army
1
1, 1 O
Total Strength of Fourth Gdo
Metz Army
421300 (anr)
44,400 (agpr)
General HQ Unite of G01FG
oroupQ
600
600
It TV Arty Corps
200
200
6th Arty Div (4 3rige)
7,500
7,900
34th (i) Arty Div (2 Brigs)
3,500
31700
24 0 AAA ?iv
2,100
2,2 0
6th (t) Oda AA, Div
2,100
2,200
326 (?) AAA Div
2,100
2,200
4th ( t) AT Arty Brig
1,050
1,100
25th (ode IL Regt (or Brig)
450
480
66th (t) Sig Regt
580
U/i Engx? Regtr
780
820
36th Pontoon Bridge Regt
780
820
56th Motor Trans Regt
800
850
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Peace Strength 'Present Actual pt 'e
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th
57th Motor Trans Reg-t
-~ 8QO
Total Combat and Supporting Units
23,31+0
24.t520
Rear Services IV Arty Corps
Total Strength.GHQ Units
24XI00 (appr)
253Q0 " (apex' )
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OP SECRET/CONMOL - V. S. OF'F'ICIALS ONLY
Total Strength of the Soviet Army Personnel of the GOFG. On the basis of the
above calculations, the grand total of the personnel strength of the Soviet
Army forces in German (excluding the personnel of the SCC, Wismut Corporation
and economic agencies is:
Approved For Release 2002/08/ YEA-
Eighth Gds Army
50,500
Third Shock Arw
51 6Oo
l9xst Gds Mecz Army
31+,2OQ
Second Gds Mecz Army
33800
"third. Gds Mecz Army
/+4 - 0
Tgt th Gds Mecz Army
441400
GRQ Units of the GOFG
25,00
Rear Services of the GOFG
8
Total Strength of Soviet
Ground Forces- in Germany
293,000 (ap rr )
o Pers=sel Strength Of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army.
Ia'4ut?datiron for . a-. Strength Estimate,
1o positive inf rmation such as Soviet documents, reports by deserters, etc.r
is available on authorized: and actual strengths of any single component of the
; enty$ o th Air Army. A strength estimate of the total personnel of this air
army is feasible . however, on the basis of various items of information, such as
reports by loca residents On the Personnel strength at. airfieldsr records from
civilian l.s,Mdries which work for air force units and, records from bakeries
' ' ?---W -^ -I - anias!. Lf.4ii-- 4-1{ D Mfr
cases because of the modernization of aviation regarding air traffic safety control,
the extension of the radar net, etc.
On the basis outlined, above.,, the actual strengths of the headquarters ansi air
units of the 'wenty-4'ourth Air ,army are tentatively estimated as follows:
headquarters and, axT headquarters unite o
Total (officers =& RK)
iead..guterr?s (including the signal regiment
It operating the radar sets in the
1,500
a 500
section.* motor transport and courier units
Stationary aircraft repair shop: (BAR) 400
Aircraft repair shop train (PAR) 300
Stationary motor' vehicle repair shop .(SABM)
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Total (officers and Eh+L)
Tactical, air 'units:
'Fighter regent 240
Ground attack regiment 3,50
Boater regiment 400
Division: hea4s uerters (including signal cc iany) 200
Corps headquarters and corps headquarters units:
Corps headquarters (including the signal company) 2 +
A (including signal-couanunications person 1) 200
Xo toz transport company 2 !.
Construction battalion I~0
GV 10
Motor vehicle ;repsir shop (',etusbki) 50
aaissance regiment 350
Air t ansoport regiment , 200
0A (per regiment) 25?
Signal plate on (per regiment) 100
A (alrtie .service company) (per field) 100
iepai.r shop
(per field.) 10
r__ V
On the boars of the Hier of units specified in paragraph I, the strength
.
the Twe ty- durtb. Air Arm is s uted as fo ,.owe:
t?al (officers and EM)
A headquarters (according to paragraph 1/1) 2,920
o s } a4quartera (ac-cording to Para 'aph t/2} 5 r2i t ,
Ten division headquarters (according to
agi h 1/3)
round units and airfield service personnel:
Eighteen fighter regiments (16 times 240)
Six ground attack regiments (6 time 350)
.r regiments (6 times 1
2,100
4$ 320
2,,104
2,4t
Two air reconnaissance regiments (2 time 350) 700
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Total (Officers and, EM)
One air transport regiment
One air transport squadron
70
Thirty-four O, s (34 times 250) 8,5t
.f.;rty'-four sigiaal platoons (34 times 100) 37400
Twenty-five ATR (25 times 100) 2x5 0
wentywfive aircraft t repair shops (25 times 3.0)
Grand total 34,560
2w In aliti= to the units mentioned. in paragraph II, there are some hitherto
unidentified fir force units in the area of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army. For
ale, there is an air unit with an OA! B having a total strength of about
500 men in 1?oethenj a motor transport unit of about 600 men in fresden-Klotzsche;
a school for radar operators in Wittstock etc. On the other hand, about half
of the fighter z?e imitts are still short of personnel because of the recent
activations. H ;noe it is believed that the number of air force personnel
actually stationed: the Soviet ZOne of Germany dues not deviate substantially
from. the total of about 340500 officers and. men,
Strength : stimate of the M and SCC personnel in the Soviet Zone of Germny,
1a Despite the lack of positive data on the strength of MGS units and offices,,
it is possible- to compute the strength of MGB personnel in the Soviet .Tone
of Germany on the basis of motor vehicle number analysis. Regarding the
Soviet Axe, the ratio between motor vehicle numbers and personnel strength
is about 40,000: 300,000, that is 1 '. 7,.51 and with regard to the Twenty-
Yourth Aix A myx about ,000 : 311.,000, that is 1:6.5, Regarding MOB units
and,- in particular, offices, it is believed that the ratio between motor
vehicles and personnel is substantially lower. Assuming that the ratio is
it 6, the approximate figure of 1,000 motor vehicles assigned, to the M indicates
that the strength of MM personnel is 6*000 MOB units with a strength of
4 regiments and 3 battalions have been identified, in the Soviet Zone of Oerexy
to date. With 700 men to a regiment and 300 men, to a battalion,,? the M GB unite
total 4,.?300 m on. The MOB headquarters and its signal unit have an estimated
strength of. 00 men9'and all remaining MG offices have an legate strength
of about 1C man. Thus the strength of the MOB personnel in the Soviet
Zone of Car is believed to be 6sooo,
Z There has been no usable formation on which to bee a strength estimate
of the SCC personnel, Nor can a relationship, between SCC vehicles and,
pereozael be established because the four-digit vehicle auger of the
sac 'black have not been analyzed to date. The strength of the personnel
belonging to the SCC and theeconomic agencies in the Soviet Zone of Germany is
very r aghl ,estimated at 11,000.
3. gkgth of Soviet.roroes . in t:Llg S2:rjet pone t '~C r
The strength estimates itemized in Sections A through C and estimated strength of
Soviet Naval personnel add up to the following grand total of Soviet military
personnel in the Soviet Zone of Germany:
"C ?
'T enty 'ourth Air Army;
Mo /Mh personnel
293,00
34,000
Pereo3inel of SCC and Soviet
economic agencies,
I'L.V000
Soviet Naval personnel:
Ago
Grand total. ~of Soviet military forces:
3461PI000
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