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Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011 100220007-6 7 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 .SECRET APPENDIX 1 The Soviet Bloc Ivey 1950 and 1951) r~ Soviet Bloc USSR Rest of 3 uropea t USSR Item and Unit 1252- 195.0 Dov er Bla 1 22 1 - Coal, million tons 552 100 264 48 287.5 52 290 Black coal 319 100 20.0 63 118.4 37 Brown, coal 233 100 64 27 169.1 73 Coke 4( 100 30 75 10.3 25 Crude oil 45 100 38 85 6.98 15 42 - 43 Liquid fuels and lubricants .,.43 100 35.6 82 7.7 18 Synthetics 2.3 100 0.9 39 1.4 61 Electric power, bill. rs 124 tt ho l 100 90 73 34 27 104 u owa ki Pig iron, mill. t. 24 100 19.5 81 4.37 19 22.2 Crude steel, " '35 100 27.1 78 7.93 22 31.1 * Rolled. products," 27 100 22*) 81 5.38 19 25 ) Light metals, 1,000 tons 340 100 300**) 88 40 12 Motor vehicles***) 000 units 620 1 100 550 89 Ti 11 , Tractors, 1,000 units 13'7 100 112 74 35 26 137 Sulphuric acid 1,000 tons 3,640 100 3, 000 82 64o 18 Synthetic rubber 86 14 288 1,000 279 100 240 39 Presumably includes both forged and pressed products.. of this, 270,000 tons are aluminum (200, 000 t. primary, 70,000 t. secondary) and 30,000 tons are magnesium. Includes motorcycles. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 .E~BCRET AkePZ DIX 16 t o tbs a the 90#1 I octant Combat Units of the?ovi Air h Tanks Assault Gu G=s,, . 37mm 'and. up Worm Peace (Gu 100mm and up) hanized Army 59,000 17i00O 924 1032 (336) Infantry Army 65$000 52x000 543 240 1338 (432) Armored Division 10 1400 7,700 254 21 168 , (54) Mechanized Division 14 ,, 10 0 9,i 90 .208 65 280 . (78) Motorized Infantry Div. 10,800 8,500 52 34 237 (66) Artillery Division 9,000- +) 810010- +) - 298 10,500 9,500 (~26) Antiaircraft Division 2,400 11900 64 (48) +) Depending upon their strengths and organization, Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Appendix 20 22&rati,onal Park a.i. ting to Type of Ready to Uader Repair At Repair le Token to Damaged Lo Mo v' r t a k '~ y rd Vtepai.r Yard Total LO. omcativ s TO Remarks Heichabahn lou6motives 3,0?33 465 523 753 4,82 697 5,503 Coal-dust locomotives (38) (7) (13) (17) (75) (-) (75) Colum locomotives 315 12 31 12 370 - 370 Including 23 of type 01 86 sf 50 261 rx 52 370 Foreign lacomatives Narrow-gauge locomotives 151 30 6 1,055 1,072 6 215 Including 17 for 60-cm go 147 " 75-cm 5 90-cm xa 46 xx 100-cm xa 215 tT Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 25X1A ax-CRET ;JI?PNAIX 21 Freight Csar Inventory as of 15 November 1951 Type of Car Number Available Number of Cars to be 'Returned by the USSR by 31 December 1951.. Box cars 28,6140 5,830 49,350 9,060 Flat cars 13 ,73 0 ~,20O Tank cars ZMW type 12,300 (2,363) Refrigerator cars 790 "- loo, 810 19,090 Foreign cars 8,700 890 113,510 19,980. NOTE: Z,MW-type tank ears are tank cars for carryi3j: apgine fuel (benzine, benzene, diesel oi1p petroleum). SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 COUNTRY SUBJECT DATE OF INFO. PLACE ACQUIRED SOURCE Approved For Relea 0IM l,#FMP8 ff5R011100220007-6 SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION REPOR'T' REPORT NO. CD NO. DATE DISTR. NO. OF PAGES NO. OF ENCLS. on= sum SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. AOSO STC FOP OISTRIONT`ION C?D OADSO STA STD FOB FOR FOS FOM FDi COMM0 TNO STO FDM FDT TGS 0A0 Approved For Release'2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100226007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET DESCRIPTIONOAND ESTIMATE OF. THE SIT.UATIQN; ;'WITHIN; ,THE EASTERN BLOC. AT ::BEGINNING OF 1952 Evaluation of the .World Political Situation. 1. 1951 Developments ji.. The Situation at the Beginning of 1952 III. Evaluation of the Situation .Economic Status of the Eastern Bloc I. Economic Development During 1950 and 1951 III Coal III. Petroleum. IV. Power Supply V. Iron and Steel VI. Motor Vehicles and Railroad Rolling J'took. ..i.VII. Tanks and Assault Guns VIII. Air Armament IX. Outlook and Evaluation C. Evaluation of the Military Situation I. Military Personnel Potential II.. Army III. Air Arm IV. Navy .V. Supply in at Germany D. Transportation in East Germany over wall Evaluation of the Situation Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET U.ATION OF THE WORLD POLITI I SITUATION 1951 Developments. 1. In the f.,eidof "high policy", the year 1951:waspmarked: by the United Statep' attempt to catch up with the political and, military advances ma4e by the: oviet Union in Europe and. Asia'by reinforcing its own armed forces, by assisting in the ant of the free countries of Europe (iu uding Turkey), by negotiatinga Japanese peace treaty, and by concluding military security agreements with Japan, Australia, New 'Zealand, and the Philippine Islands.. The USSR, on the other hand, tried to strengthen its position in Europe,, to lay the consolidate its gains in the Far East. At the same time,, the TISSB took a1,..- measures to thwart United States and West European efforts toward the creation of a balance of power At the beginning of 1951, the question of West Germany's participation inthe defense measures of the West Occupied the -center of attention in Europe. The Soviet Union took numerous diplomatic steps to:prevent German part,ioipation In the United States, Great Britain, and France, it reproached these -catrieo. with violations, of Slovakia; the satellite states bordering on Germany, their agreements. Polandanal Cechy! presented notes. to Holland, Belgium, and. D mark : in Which they expressed a .warning of the danger of Germa:w!s recovery. Cit tg he'FOts'dam Agreems mt~, the U$. also i ist d that a Four Power Conference be called--to deb!te the problem of eapy, The Boviet representatives permitted they "preliminary conference to end in failure, because the question of Germany's contribuiion -to-the defense effort lost much. of its practical aspect during the first .six months, and the Russians believed they, were in a position to avert imminent danger by resorting toother means7 especially by.influenc- ing the peoples of western Europe by means of 'propaganda. For this purpose the Soviet Union mobilized the We t. 'European Commsxnist Parties and the international mass organizations e ntr lled . by them., such as the World ague o. , Trade Unions, the World Peace Council, the Wtrld gigue of Democratic. Youth., the Interr*tional Federation of Democratic Women, the Eurapean Iabo ? Union* etc. .. wo ld-wide collection of signatures "for pea.ce`* was directed. -against the "remilitariZat.iOUof Germany and against the "aggressi-`e" Atlantic Pact.? The projected rearming of Germany was-countered countered by the East with the demand for a .rew unified Germany. This' demand,, as expressed in Grrotewohl's letter of 30 November 1950, has been given unremitting propaganda . support The East German regime tried to create the impress ion that 'it wag seriously concerned .with reunifying .Germany on a democratic basis. It maintained that the arming, of West Germany would make reunification in ossi'b1e and that it contained the threat of a .fratricida.l war., This argument was refuted.,, howeve by the ever -il. reas; , .adaptation of at Germany to. the Soviet orbit system; in the satellite countries.,, the Soviet Union tried to.make its position more see by means of extensive purges.. The moot. significant of thhessse was the arrest in November 1951 of Rudolf Alanskf, 4ecreetary-General of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party., whose omnipotence ha4 been undisputed up to that time, and of .a large number of his followers. The arrest of former Czech Foreign Minister dementia preceded this event by a few. months. These purges prove that, even among the ranks .of the Communist Parties themselves, there is great. disappointment in, the system enforced by Moscow, Nevertheless, there are no indications of a .threat .to the .rule of the Kremlin in the satellite countries, although the Soviet leadership has reason to doubt the reliability of these the event of war. Some signs, particularly in Polaand, indicate that the - Soviet despots .are changing their method of terror and a6mpaision to one -of persuasion and guidance., ssiace they realize' that the satellites must not be merely forced,, but .also convinced. In. , the Far East, the oviet anion tried to intensify its close political relations with Red China. It extended economic and military aid to. the Chinese "volunteers" in the . Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83=00415ROl 1100220007-6 ECRE7 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Korean War, but avoided direct involvement in the conflict.. The impetus for the initiation of armistice negotiations carne from the Soviet camp, At this time it is not clear whether the USSR really wants to bring about an armistice, or whether it .merely wants to gain time to supply Communist China with weapoup, ammunition, military equipment, and economic goods; or to exert pressure toward the achievement of its political aims. The Soviet Union's position regarding the revitalization of Japan parallels its antagonistic attitude toward the strengthening of West Germany. The Japanese peace Treaty which was concluded in San Francisco was a serious political blow to the USSR. The Soviet Union is also making every effort to appear to the peoples of Asia .and the champion-of their national liberty. It is trying its.utmostto create difficulties for the western powers in Indohina1 Malaya, Burma, Indonesian the Philippine Islands,, the Middle East, and North Africa. The USSR has warned the Arab countries and Israel against. agreeing, to the proposal submitted by the three western powers and Turkey for a joint Near East command. The -T1iBSR also expressed its sympathy with Persia's action against-the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with Egypt's demand for the cancellation of its 1936.agreement wi?th.Bngland concerning the Suez Canal Zone, and. of the Agreement of 1899, which calls for the two countries' joint exercise of government in the Sudan. II The 81 tuation at.they Beginning of l952 Although the armament program - is making progress, western Europe is not -yet in. a. position to withstand an attack from the East The United States is. reproaching some of the West: Eur?pean countries .with negligence in the reinforcing of their armamentsand urges a speeding up . of the process.. These. countries, on the -other hand;, are afraid that compliance with the defense tempo.asked . for by the United States would result in economic repercussions, especially in .infla- tion, with all attendant consequences, such as social unrest, radicalization. t masa3es, etc. The problem of coordinating West European defense activities . has been placed in the hands of United States Special Ambassador Averell Harriman, The North Atlantic Trty Organization (NAM) was .considerably, stronger at the begiiug of 1952 than it was .a year earlier. Appreciable progress has been made in the internal organization of NATO, thanks to the energetic approach of General Eisenhower.* The integration of Greece and Turkey into the W0 j and the lift i,ng of armament, restrict ions. under the Italian Peace Treaty strengthen the position of the western powers in the Mediterranean and in the Near East, Even beyond the Sphere of the NATO, this position has been strengthened considerably. The US arms agreement with Yugoslavia, and the material assistance rendered that country by, the United States., have made it .ate important factor in the current defense plans of the western powers. The stability of this factor is a matter of conjecture. The arming of Turkey is progressing satisfactorily,. A military agreement between the United States and Spain is impending. United States air bases in Morocco are .being reinforced . steadily,, and the newly created Libyan state has assumed a mot insignificannt . importance as 'a Mediterranean base for the vestera powers, as a .result ,of agreements with the US, Great Britain, anal France granting these three powers the right to maintain bases in that country. The Arab nationalism of the Middle and Near East countries. eo ',licts with the old colonial powers. The Soviet Union, .which supported .these actions -with adroit propaganda, made use of the same tactics it .applied. in Southeast Asia to create the impression that it is a.friend of these countries. Although the Moslem countries are hardly fertile soil for communism, the .development of extreme nationalist groups,,,.., into .various of which the M, well d.isguised,,.has apparently succeeded in penetrating.,. has created a favorable situation. for the: eastern. bloc and a correspondingly. unfavorable situation for the western powers. It.will take all the skill of Western diplomacy, and a broad understanding ,of the problems -of the oriental countries .and peoples, to take action, within the coz.finee of neutrality;o prevent the Near east.froze becoming dominated by the eastern bloc, not for the moment, but fora long. tiame, to come. The significance .of this source of danger can hardly be overestimated. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Attempts to unite western Europe have not progressed beyond the experimental stage, Partial economic integration, such as the Schuman Plan (coal and steelj, and, the achievements in connection with.setting up a European Army, with a view to bringing about a political merger as well, have developed very slowly. Thus far it has been impossible either to eliminate the political difficulties (formation of political bodies for the control of the Army of Europe) or to create a substantial financial basis [for unification' In West Germany, the "Ohne-michBewegung" (Without=Me M6Vement) has slowed down; however, as, the result of consistent propaganda; the Soviets have succeeded: in creating a sympathetic reaction, among large circles of West Germans, to the thesis that there are only two alternatives for Germany, namely, rearmament and the subsequent threat of a civil war, or reunification. This fact is borne out, by Pastor Niemmller's- trap to Moscow, former Chancellor Josef Wirth's trip to East Berlin, and the founding of the Notgemeinschaft f.r den Fried. Eur~ (Emergency League for the Peace -of Europe) by Heinemann, former edera]f~ Minister for Internal Affairs, and Helene Wessel, former chairman of the Zentrum Party. Meanwhile, the battle for eastern Asia continues to be waged with all weapons of diplomacy, of political and economic pressure, of civil war, and of propaganda. The military conflict in Korea almost.came to an end, because the opposing forces reached a balance of power. Both sides showed interest in_an armistice, but it is quite possible that they have only been sparring for time. United States efforts to end the Korean War, or at any rate to localize it, are apparent. They requests of Great Britain and France for increased US assistance for suppressing the Communists in southeastern Asia (Indochina, Burma, Malaya) have been viewed by the United. States with ascertain reserve, which is probably based on the desire to avoidanother "Korea", if possible. Evaluation of the Situation 1. The policy followed by the USSR since the end of the war has resulted in both sue esses and failures. The satellite countries and China were Eton over to the eastern bloc; Yugoslavia, originally won over, was lost again; Greece and Turkey could not be won over; the blockade of Berlin proved a failure; and Korea.did not result in the dynamic victory which had been anticipated. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's intensified political activity in the Far East and in the Near East. has been responsible for many successful achievements, the frui .which the Soviet Union hopes to reap in the future without much further effort. L+1-range planning is likely to characterize Soviet .foreign policy. Much to the surprise of the Soviet Union, doubt, the Korean entanglement has evoked the threat of a third world wart The Soviet Union has learned its lesson, As a result of the sober realization that its military potential, while adequate for attaining initial successes, could not cope with the considerably superior economic and defense potential of the Western world, it is likely that the Kremlin has restricted its aims and has extended the time limit for achieving these aims.. In view of the foreign political situation, it is highly improbable that the Soviet Union will launch _a .deliberate offensive war in the near future, This opinion is supported by the following observations and considerations: The Soviet leadership and the Soviet mentality tendto give preference to political methods, before resorting to military measures. The Soviet leadership believes -- in accordance with Communist doctrine time works in its favor and that) with the increasing recurrence of economic crises (caused especial.y by defense efforts), capitalism is bound to destroy itself,. The Soviet leadership, which has, a.firm grip on the satellites in time of peace, must expect to encounter all sorts of difficulties in.these countries in the event of a long war and possible Western military victories, Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 In 1952, the Soviet Union will contixtue the "battle for time;$ which it.began to wage in 1951, by undertaking 'p'eace Campaigns" to incite the population ,.of the cspiialist countriest to revolt against their "warmongering" governments; by spreading hatred of "outsiders," in the Asiatic creasy in order to close off these areas to tlae-West to an increasing extent; by sowing :disunity Ong the countries-and eoples of the West, in order to weaken the defensive powers of the Western all a=e lin the future it .will exploit the UNO to achieve this end). The Soviet Union will not hesitate to start or eu port operations of limited scope designed to .split up the military potential of the West, provided ,it runs no risk of conjuring up World War III. 2. The West,- in 1952, will continue its efforts toward a unified +a ope and toward. strengthening the defense potential, Hereby provoking the Fast into employing all. tricks of diplomacy and cold war in order to doom these efforts to failure . According to all available evidence, it-is' doubtf"ti;.l whether the Soviet Union will be .prepared, as early as 1952, to look upon 'the growing militar-y -defuse of the West and. West Germany's participation in the European Army as a ,cos,li. The frequent delays in Western plans and the presumably slow tempo of West opean armament .are apt to indicate, even to the soberly calculating Stalin, that the USSR's fear of attack by the Atlantic Pact. nat ions is unf ounded . Critical situations, which might turn into serious threats to peace, could cow about if the USSR were to effect.any xaeasure or measures which would be incompatible with the prestige and authority-of the-western countries, particularly of the United States; if Communist China were to extend active aid -to the rebels in Indochina; if develop- ments in the Near East, and above all in Iran, were to take another unfavorable turn for the West. Any evaluation of the political situation, moreover, must take into account the that the world situation may still be likened toa powder keg that could be exploded by an unexpected spark which neither side would have wished, to setoff. 4. The wsstern -powers are well aware of these danger. It is pasaihle, therefore, although it is not very probable,, that they will make another attempt, at top- level, to negotiate a provisional political a mistice in the cold war between East and West. Uowever, Moscow -would -hardly agree to a conference unless the- actual political a military potential of the western powers were sunh. as to make the sanesa of a. m.i.litary ak by the Soviet Union questionable at the outset? Kence the West .must not fail to carry out, with all means available to it and at a, accelerated pace,, the policy. expanding its power potential via-a-vis the eastern bloc,, not only in EU ope) brit in. `As is as well, Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 EC 1 C..,' F" TE .E : ERN 10, I E!tceaziomi c evel r sr sit - I iu i 14, Q and I R5 1 The development of the world economy in .. '1950 iwa s ebar ct :.zed by a sh aroa in 1ndus~i? 1. production, wb.ieh showed. a gain off percOn over that .of ? 1919. This increase was due chiefly to the great rise in production in the United gitatesx the USSR, Great Britain, and West Germany. In, the United t :s the increase in the output of industrial goods amounted to 20 percent, and , the t18t., 23 percent thus, by the end of 1950, the UM I s industrial pro ductions ` s 73 percent higher than in 1910In t h e .eastern bloc countries, l t h the exception .of - t h e U (but includ.,ing Yugoslavia) , there was a, ,22 -percent rise in,"frith rial output The rate, of increase in industrial production in Tthe 'entir'e Soviet bloc was about . to - the incre ge rate in the United. States . in western 'Europe the ratesof expa l on,, were . particularly high only in Great Britain and Ger anyj as far as the other countries 'Vere :concerned western Europe lagged eons,i d erably behind the eastern bloc in. its rate , Qt industrial expansion. However, in welts apean countries, agricuitw 4 produ tion recovered more rapidly frc the effects of the war than was the case t the eastern 'uropean satellites, whose productive powers. were utilized in t b a y in ,ustx ializa t ion program.. In 1950, the increase' in the-.:output. of raw" materials lagged beh the rise in the production of finished goods.. throughout the .world epo ;o'y, includi .thy esstera bloc. In 1951 the rate o p ciciuct3bn ' tease 3:n.'-the 3,ndustxial, phase: of the world aconomy lagged somewhat behind that of '1950, Only a ,few fix es f ix steel action will he mentioned as typica1! of the development during 1951, since an over . view of the industrial production is. not yet available ? The relative rise in steel ,pro uctien in 1.951 amounted to 9 percent In the 'United States; and, about 15 Pere t the US and the satellites. The increase in the Fast was .achieved partially by arlx iapratent in .the technical utili: anon.. of the available installations, and partially 1y ;putt?iug. new installations into pperation It has been determined: that there was a considerable relocation of in ustry fro? West to East within the USSR durin.,:1950 and. 1951, Industrial centers;rere established thereby established. in.,vario s parts of the country, which. would facilitste conducting a war on several fronts. 1'ri caparison with the pre-war position, there has. been .a shexp decl .e in Eastern dependence on thee -West . This. is.especially true. of heavy in .u:stry,' . f the machine tool industry-, and, ii the field of raw materials, of copper, lead, And sulphur, 5 . Since the expiration 'of the last Five-year Plan aft 31 .December 195p,,. no new $ ive war , Plan for the U8$B has- become known. The reason may be; that the UDR intends to wait until (around 1955Y).thesatellites .are on. the- sapw level,; so that. it able to issue plains which are applicable to the entire area of the .east. bloc. 6. A table of statistics. on the production of the .eastern bloc is given. _. ~A p :xndi t 1. II 101 In 1951 about 290 million tons of coal were mined in the UB$R , a yield. -w somewhat above the plan. figure. Coal for the production of power is available in..adequate, quantities in. theUSSR.- However, the supply of metallurgical coke muses eonsiderahle difficalties, because the ore concentrating installations have not been sufficiently developed,,. Sisaca the supply of metallurgical coke u atisfactory both damn itat:ively and. gualitat:ively, the development -of the iron-producing industry xcgy be x oticeably retarded. SECT Approved For Release 2002/01/04,: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 CRkT - 6 ~ Since mining output in the eastern distracts of the USSR had already bed to i greatly during .the -war't' the share of the Donets Easin in the natal ctrl output reduced from the pre-war figure of over 50-percent to about 37 percent in 1951. The. . g output per worker - sharply reduced during the war * had not regained the pre-war level "in 1950. This goal may possibly have been reached in 1951. Nevertheless, the coal supply situation in the V is still critic?al; however, this will not be prejudicial to industrial production, but will affect only the consumption of the population which is already very low. The coal output-of the European eastern-bloc countries, amounting to 31.0 - 320 million tons., is approximately at the same ' level as that of the 116 . Qf th f total. the proportion of coal for 'coking purposes as well as that of black coal, is in general, small. Only Poland, and Czechoslovakia cover their own requirements for cokes ,coal and coke, partially by Czech deliveries of coking coal to Polish coteries in. exchange for ordinary black coal. before, Poland, with its coal surplus, assures the .eastern bloc a strong( *position in regard to trade with.the western world* In 1951western Europe was dependent upon goal imports involving about 36 million tone. of this total, 25 million. tons were supplied by the United. States, and almost 11 million. tons by Poland ? Western. Europe plans to import 38 million tons of coal in 1952.y of which 28 million tons will be delivered by the United. Mates, and. 10 million tons by Poland. In Hungary, Ruma,nia,, and East Gem, efforts are under way to solve the coke problem.. By equipping its Metallurgical Combine "West'! with low-shaft blast f X aces,, at Germany has made a, decisive step in this direction. Inthese furnaces., bra.-coal hard coke can be used to smelt pig iron instead of black*caal coke This,'ue process would. revolutionise the production of pig iron.. Particularly the European..:e stern- bloc countries, which are deficient in black coal, would benefit from It,, ;'However, it is yet to be seen whether the furnaces, which were not put into operation until 1951, will give satisfactory results The total mining capacity in the eastern bloc i.s.adequate in the event. oaf wt However,, 50 percent of the satellites,' coal output would be subject to uncertainty because of the overload on transportation facilities in case of.war,. Petroleum 1. After the war. the rise in petroleum output was slower than the increase in yield and the production of iron. a stet. At present,, the petroleums out put, is shout 30 percent above the pre-war lev l# This slow development can he attribute d. ab fly to the sharp reduction in the petroleum yield of the Caucasus region, and, to the fact that output lagged very. considerably behind expectations in the Emba region and some- what behind. in the Volga4lral region. However, as was made known at the end of 1951, the Soviet leaders hope to be able to achieve a petroleum output of 6o million tons annually, the goal designated by Stalin in 19)+6,, before 1960. Despite the decrease in the petroleum output of the Caucasus region, the output of that area still amounts to more than .50 percent of the total output. A further increase in output is execte 3. in the Volga. -tfral. region.: In 1950 the following petroleum derivatives were produtoodr Aviation fuel anda d gasol' Diesel oil Illuml- at:3 . oil Gas oil and fuel oil Lubricating oil 3.4 million tons 55 million tons 3.1 million tons 6.8 million tong 12.2 million tons million taluo Total 34,3 million tons Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECFtiET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 -7 To be added to these quantities are 4.7 million tons of derivatives produced in the satellite countries and East Germany,, so that the USA has at its disposal mor than 39 million tons of petroleum derivatives, - 1951, about 43 to 44 million tong for its own consumption.. The petroleum, deris which. remain in the satellites and. met( Germany barely cover the demand which has been severely restricted. The goals of the last Five Year Plan (including,stockpiling) could never have been fulfilled without the deliveries from the satellite couxttries :and Fast Germany. Whereas .the requirements of the.8ovi t Air Farce for high-grade aviation fuel during World War II could be covered ohiy by deliveries from. the Western Allies,, it was possible after the war to stockpile aviation fuel$ as- a of an.. increase in production. However,, the changa-vver by -the. soviet Air :' ar to jet-propelled aircraft involves such a high consumption of fuel that s pply difficulties are bound to arise during a long-term wary after the stockpiled. i uantitiss are used up,. An in the petroleum output .and in the.' produ.ation of aviation fuel is, therefore, anurgen' necessity. Fuel Re ui.r meats .o the Soviet f4v Force (Figures in thousands of tons) Gasoline Kerosene Total time require- 1,080 3,210 4,320 acute Annual war- time require- merits 3,100 -3,700 5,200 - 6,900 8,300 - 10,600 In time of war, monthly consumption.,figures during the summer may be 325,000 - 40,000 tons. of gasoline and 735, 000 - 950, 000 tons of kerosene ;,.,during the winter, 215,000 - 277,000 tons of gasoline and 485,000 - 705,000 tons of kerosene. Outside of the U ,, the results in the output of crude oil were particularly fa rorable in . ustriaM In comparison with a 1950 yield of 1.5 million tons,, an output of about 2 million tone was. expected for 1951* Furthermore, new supply districts c in the Vien Basin and Mar*ehfl& axe being counted on for 1952 As during the entire postwar period, the Rumanian oil output will probably rise slowly; presumably about 6 million tons will be produced in 1951? Czechoslovakia hopes to be able to ahieve twice its 1950 fuel output .by 1953 The plan provides for ' a crude-oil output of about 25 0, 000 tons, or a threfold increase over the output of 1950, and a synthetic-fuel output of 375,,000 tons, or one and one half times that of 1950. However, a.quantity of 60Q,,000 tons ofderivatives cannot cover the rising demand.,, since neehanization is increasing greatly,; particularly in agriculture. It should be pointed out in this connection that they; Slovakian. crude oils have a low gasoline co tent, and are more suitable for process. into .diesel and lubricating oils p. Si=c P a.7 . ink to produce twice its 1950 fuel output in 1955,, its crude-oil yield is scheduled.. to be 3911.,000 tons instead 6f 1:80,000 tons. In. 1950 only one, fourth of Polarod.'s requirements could be .covered by domestic output#. Even in 1955, the domestic output will barely. exceed. 30 percent of Poland's total .epnsum otion.. A comparison of the petroleum consumption .figures of the U I and the ,eastern bloc with .those the West leads to false conclusions, since economically unproductive consumpy tion. in the East is at a minimum,# The crude-oil output of the eastern bloc is inadequate for the conduct of a war of long duration. Seizure of the ' Iranian oil would - except for the transp.cartatioa difficulties solve the problem for the East.. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 25X1A 25 15 1III I I r-N VIII n r4_1 I I I H II II I1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 11n1 II__--_ 1 ITM_ 1_1 I I I I I I I I I I I I ]_--`I I 1', 1-1 1 Ll I i 9 a r 5' 46' 748. 9' 50 51 1940 45 40 4F( 40 4 50 5h 19 M -t, ru ?t; -rw -r, :'- or- Approv Fi !I lease 2002/01/04: CIA- 83-00415R01110022d 'TOOK ECT Poz?erSupply 1. The power supply of the USSR has considerably increased in recent rea oM The 1950 power output ,of 90 billion kilowatt hours exceeded the plan b abdut 10, percent, and. in 1951 there was a .further increase of 15 percent), to l X kilowatt hours. In recent years the capacity of the instalilaticna has increased, particularly through reconstruction in the western regions- through the construction of loge- scale power plants, and through advances in agricultural electric icatioa. In spite of this, it is not clear whether the actual goal was attained,, namely,, to increase the capacity (in kilowatts) by erecting so 'many new installations that the plants would not continually have to operate at peak load, but .would have reserve capacity at their disposal The power supply of the Moscow - Upper Volga central industrial region, pre4ent is still :Inadequate, is to be guaranteed in the future by power deliveries from the large Hu byshev power plant, which is still under construction. The realiation of this project, expected in the course of the new few years, will mean that the group of armament centers established.along the central Volga during the war will be organized into a large-scale, coordinated production effort with regard to power supply also. The two decisive industrial region, the Moscow - Upper Volga region and the Ural region,. will thus be drawn closer together. The power networks of the two regions each comprise one fourth of the total installed capacity in the t $ R ?. 2. Asin the USM., the power supply in the satellites is still relatively weak, However, the differences from country to country are extremely great. The construction of the power-plant network in the agrarian countries is to be accomplished within the framework of very long-range plans. In 1950 and 1951, considerable progress was made in Poland by the couatruction of a power-fool network covering the entire country. Thus, in 195G, the industrial regions of Upper Silesia. and _Z6d , and, in 1951, the regions of ZCd1 and. Warsaw were.connected by high-tension lines. A large power plant to supply Upper ailesia isunder constru tion. In East Germany tru+etion of power-plant equipment probably lagged considerably behind the plan targets in .1951. Power production in the eastern bloc still constitutes., on the wholes an i aportant 'Point of weakness in the economic structure. The greatly expedited .cox.txuction cif power plants is limited. by the resultant load on the sbaehine-building and electrical industries.. V Iron and pteel The production of pig iron, steel, and rolled stock has risen considerably since the war and is . now far 'ab ove the pre-war level. 30 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 _ 9 _ The eastern areas of the USSR (Urals and eastward.) have contributed most to the increase in iron and steel production, Just as they have contributed most to the increase in coal production. At, present the western areas account .for only one half.of the total production (70 percent before the war). The greatest centers of production now are the Ukraine and the Urals, with 70 - 80 percent of the total production. Civilian consumption (construction of homes and household equipment) is.negligible. Therefore, as far as armaments-are concerned, USSR production must be considered equivalent to almost twice the value of the same production in the West. Because of the decrease in scrap reserves, the percentage increase in the production of crude steel? and hence also of rolled stock, was probably lower in the USSR in. 1951 than in. 1950. Also in 1952 one may expect a slower tempo of production :Lnerease,y unless there is a considerable increase in iron-ore deliveries. These deliveries represent a serious bottleneck, because the expanding iron industry of the satellites depends more and more on Soviet iron ore. 2. In 1951 the USSR produced about 31 million tons of crude steel; the European satellites produced between 8.9 and. 9.6 million tons. Satellite production, which is expanding constantly, benefited the USSR largely in the form of finished goods. Pig-iron production in East Germany in 1951 depended almost.entirely on the Ma.titte,. which produced 365,000 tons. The new metallurgical plants at Ffrstenberg and at Cale were set in operation and together smelted 10,0063 tons. In 1952 the two plants are expected to produce about as much as.the Maxh'Itte produced in 1951. In 1951 East Germay revised its 5-Year Plan in regard to iron and steel. The original plan of achieving the 1955 steel-production goal by using very great quantities.of ~ci' p was given up; instead, it was decided to increase ore production. Even if ore production should be increased as planned, East Germany would still have to rely on the import of 2 million tons of high-grade ores, most of which would have to came from the USSR. There may be .difficulties in steel and rolled-stock supplies in the USSR at present from the point of view of quality; quantitatively, however, supplies are adequate. In other countries of the Soviet bloc, however, and above all in East Germany, supplies are quite short. A comparison between East and West shows that the West produced 154 million tons (58,255,000 in western Europe. and. 95,500,000 in the US) while the eastern bloc produced 40 41 million tons. It must, however, be emphasized that since in the West consumer goods still make up a large part of production, two tons. of steel in the West .equal one ton in the East. This ratio will improve in favor of the West as war production increases. At the present level of iron and steel production, the eastern bloc can increase its armament production to any level which appears necessary. For map., see Appendix 2. Motor Vehicles and Railroad Rolling Stpek Motor vehicle construction has increased two and one half times over that of the best prewar year (1938). Under the planned development it mays during the next few years, reach an output three times that of 1938, namely 750,000 vehicles per year. Trucks accounted for more than 85 percent of the total motor vehicle construction (including motorcycles and motor bicycles). The planned output for 1950 of 430,000 trucks was apparently achieved. In the future, with increased production, one may count on a yearly production of 5 00, 000 - 600,000 trucks. The inventory of 2 million truck units planned for 1951 -- compared with 1 million truck units in 1940 -- was presumably not reached. The postwar models, which in 1951 accounted for 60 percent of the inventory, show considerable improvement over the Approved For Release 2002/01 /04$ DP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 standard. types of t aeI war period.. In. comparison with the :consul table increase i ' ty (30 peeeent) and in motor e:rfto.ieucy (2 - 6 percent), fuel consumption rose only slightly (20 percent ) By 'using .S iese 1 motors for the hevy trucks an actual saving .of fuel was achieved. Tractor production has increased considerably-over the prewar level, and motor efficiency has been greatly .1Xriprrov"ed. Acpei"d: g .to tthe plan., 112,000 .trsctora were built in 19501 it is planned. to increase roduction to 139.a.:00 O'units. In. 1950 the inventory of tractors on farms was 550; 040 units; during the wary pro(tu tiou of tractors. stopped completely, and those in service were subjected to. harder wear. It is d.oubt:l rhetler the prewar invgrory figure was again reached by the end of 1950. - In the first postwar Years practically all the tractors built ,were put into farm service. Recently, however, an increasing- proportion of the production has been tuned over to other services (forestry) land -improVernent, and. highway construction) Ii case of wa .r, tractors employed. in the latter ?services could be w1..thdrawn irn eh more easily than those used on faxms in 1000.units in 1000.units 50 I .,100 57 t.'. 74t J i ~ I TRUCK PIRODUCTION .After a slow. recovery from the e'ff'ect output of 2,700?units in 1951 in the course of the next few years .an. inc: 41000 urxits, can be expe ted. freight--car, producti had regained the pre-war level, s 19)7 , ~ present it has ceed.ed that level more than two-fold. (about 145., o0C oars in 1950) . One may assume that. this figure will increase to 2001000*., With. 1.1 illion units the freight-car park is now 30 percent larger than before the war;; capacity haas incre "ed. by 50 percent? because )--ale cars now make up 40 percent of the total number of ears,, whereas in 1940 they made up only 25 percent of the total. (*Figures.are expressed in 2-axle units? locomotive construction rf Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04 :. CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 1.00 Ii I 1 45 4 47 48"49 193 39'40 5 4b 4T 50'51 TRUCK PRODUCTION TRACTOR PRODUCTION 3. Toe motor vehicle ' industry of the sai e.llit untrie _.. has relat3Orely lower output than that of the 'USSR Only tractors are produced: in rather large number to supply the necessary machinery for collectivized agriculture. The wellv,developed motor vehicle industry of Czechoslovakia has adapted itself to the Soviet production pattern by increasing truck production at the expense of passenger-car output. Moreover, the Soviets insisted upon- a sharp increase in freight-car production. In East Germany,, only repair work on locomotives and freight care was carried out izp to 1949. 'Not until then? did new freight- car constriction begin on a large scale. VII. l T 4e nufa,cture ;of ataral 4? d assault 'g? i reached . -t highest lev l 1-in 1944-45,. with 37y,500 units per year. Production .s.lawed. down after the end of the war and dropped precipitately from mid-1916 on. Production for 1951 is estimated at 10,000 units (about 25 percent ofthe production at the exd of the war). s The modu(z'ti"an system was,. cbanged-affter.. the Oar. - The finishing of?'parts -VMS distributed among a far larger number of supplier plants, and the final assenthly was concentrated in a few plants (seven are known). With these manu- facturing cells1 which can at the same time be regarded as basic production centers for developing models and for training specialists., it would be possible to set up the production of tanks and assault guns on a var 4 ue scale' on very short notice. Most of the manufacture is centered in the Ural and Volga Heavy tanks and, assault gms have displaced the medium types. The ratio between tanks and assault guns cannot be determined. at this time (possibly 25 percent) (sic). In l944, assault guns made up about 20 percent of the total; in 1947 . about 15 percent. : nprov d: m e1sq ' veIoped. _fr_,c'k .thee.. ty a 7ueeci in "the . are bee n: manufactured. Their essential cbaracterietics are heavier front armor, improved design and radio equipment' and increased fire power. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET On the basis of the high production during the last phaase.of the war and the.period immediately after the war, the number of tanks and assault guns on hand: can be estimated at 80,000 units. Of these, about 45,000 tanks and assault guns were made during the last weeks of the war and are therefore of limited use in comparison with the improved: types. However, 35,000 tanks and assault guns are modern standard types. The armament of existing organizations and training installations may amount to about 29,000 tanks and assault guns. The satellite countries probably have another 5,000 units, Accordingly, one can assume a total of about 40,000. 45,000-tanks and assault guns in the camps of the military districts and of general headquarters. The satellite countries play no decisive role in tank production, VIII. Air Armament 1. The Soviet postwar production of aircraft frames is shown in Appendix 3, The USSR was able to make up its lag in the field of jet propulsion and jet aircraft very quickly. Three factors were responsible for this; a. The machine equipment of the reconstructed: plants has been modernized as the result of deliveries made by the Allies during the war and of the acquisition of equipment through plunder or dismantling. b. The USSR is in a position to exploit not only German designs and produe tion experience, but also German experts. ain had delivered up-to-date jet engines. E'igbter Aircraft Speed Tactical Penetration Range Armament Useful Load. La-9 600 km/h 700 kin 4 x 23 mm La-11 600 km/h 750 km x 23 mm La-17 1,000 l ./h 650 k 1 x 37 M 2x23mn Yak-L5 700 kx /h 750 km 2 x 20 mm. 6 - 8 rockets .9 750 km/h 300 km. 1 x 37 mm 2 x: Mig-15 1,020 km/h 450 km 1 x 37 mm 2 x 23 mm. Bombers PE-2 370 km/h 500 km 2 x. 12.7 mm 1,800 kg 2 x 7.62 mm, PE-8 330 km/h 11500 km. 2 X-, . 7.62 mm. 3, 000; kg x. ?2 m "l 2,7 mm .Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0111OQ220007-6 25X1A Tactical Speed Pe: tration Range Armame Useful Load 450 m/h 800 kin 2x20 mm 27000 kg 3 x 12.7 amn. 450 km/h 3,300 km.. 9 x 12.`x, nun 6,000 I1-4 i/h 700 km 1 x 12,E I Y500 kg 2 x 7,62 nmi Il-2TI 750 km/h 850 kin 2 x 23 mm: 27000 2' x 12.7;. m (with supplementary tanks) Atta l~ Aircraft 330 km/h 275 I= 2x 23 I x 12.7imn 100 kg 2 7,62 mm 11-10 500 I:/h 300 kin: 2x23r m: 500 kg 1 x 12.7 rim ` "an:s rt Air of t 2 x 7.62 I 230 km/h 900 kn 1 x 12.7 mm 2,225 kg 2 x 7.62 mtn. 11-12 330 /b. 750 k 37000 kg 11-18 425 km/h 1,1100 97000 kg T.70 450 km/h 27500 IM 0100 kg Yak-16 300 /h 500 k . l I .saenger 200 kg DPS-34x6 7 ixslopMt 31/132 850 1cm/h ? 900 km ? I1.-4T , 720 m/h ? 1,000 km 150 920 km/h T 1,500 km 7 2. The four phases of d.erelopmen? in aircraft production are M 2,1+00 kg 3 14,500 kg ? a. From the end of the war to 1946 there was a gradual reduction of war production until an industrial output of 187300 araref,pr year was reached, without bringing production to a, full s ? till as was done in other countries. Full employment was maintained In factories by including the manufacture of consumer goods.. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SF' ~i .. In large-scale prcductiom; Aircraft models Fighter aircraft Attack aircraft Light bombers La-9 PE-B Tu-2 In dev lopme.. Fighter airor DFS- 16 Mig-9 YYkkl5 Tu-11 B twe n 1946 and the beginning of 1947 the air arz 'zt indust r wa i again brought to full production. German. Plant capa ttY a d German to haicians were dawn on. Without let-up in current prod action the ind istr r xs converted to new moapls Production for 1947 'amounted. to i7r7OQ aircraft. production Aircraft model : Fighter aircraft La-: Attack aircraft Light bombers PL-2 Ta-2 1'I.4 bombers Tu aircraft LT-2, IL-12 -18 N-70 Productitn started on let fighters g-9 Yak-l5 In development i et fighters Mg-15 Law17 , ototd dot 'bom'bers 'P 131.1.! (Built bri th6 model of `-281 ILA- SIC; Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 By the beginning of 1947 the contrersioia of plants was considered om- peted, and the construction of protottpes and of new models iras begun. Most plants worked in three a Production in 1948 increased to 21,000 aircraft, because added production: of prototypes of jet fighters. In 1949, despi the added production of prototypes of sru.lti-engine jet bombers and the start of mass production of jet fighters, production droppO4'to 18,500, because the large-scale production of traditional fighter aircraft with reciprocating engines and of attack aircraft eamo, to an end:. in large-scale production: Aircraft model Jet fighters Mig-9 Yak-15 gig-15 La-17 Transport aircraft IL-12 iL-18 Yak-16 Tu-70 arge-sale production being terminated: Fighter aircraft Attack aircraft La-l1 IL-10 Light bombers P1 -2 in develop ,Tot fighter prototypes Light bombers Medium bombers Tu-2 TL-2 (jet) IL-4 (jet) P-150 May 1949, the standard models bad been set. Large-scale productiprx of new models, which are now being used by the military f+ r es, vas, begun, and by 1951 the following yearly production was reached; Seaplanes 1,000 Multi-engine bombers (E-29 model) boo Light tactical bow (jet-propelled) 1,000 fighees 1P-y500 Total 2 0,100 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415ROl1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET 16 - large-scale production: Aircraft model: fighters Light jet bombers Medium bombers Transport aircraft In development Jet fighters Further development of supersonic fighters Medium jet bombers P-150 T\e d'evelopment and production of high-performance aircraft is dependent. A on the production of jet engines. At the end of the war, the USER was using only reciprocating engines in its aircraft. In 19511, jet engines 'with capacities of ,800 gv thrust were being mass-produced. Development of engines with capacities of approximately 5,000 kg. thrust is nearly completed. Outlook and Evaluation Since 19.5,0' the ebonomic plans of the S rviet bloc have been'. even more countries of the Soviet bloc are being industrialized and the capacities of the more industrial countries are being expanded. in Lacc ianee= with current five-year plans, forces the USSR to give these countries considerable aid and to_forgo, to some degree; drawing upon these countries for goods. The 'SS despite modern pl.n,t equipment, is still behind the other large industrial nations,in productivity per worker in most industries. In the years 1953-55 the USSE will strive to increase its industrial output by using these `hidden reserves"", even though this may result in overloading the plant equipment and in disproportionately heavy wear and tear. t nea t,~f ea USSRT jwiil sldkw,:dove:?'the, expans orx ac nits dry count s, , industries in order to concentrate more on investing in the satellite since it, expects, in the long run, to achieve a greater increase in the ind-dstria: potential of the Soviet bloc in this W. Particularly in the preac :nant ' gricu1t is countries the USSR is attempting, through, large-scale farms. , ivert more labor to industry. Tractors, which are incaspensable for modern 1g. are to be produced in sufficient quantities during the ive-year plans:. 'Without using forde at pret, the collectivization of farms is to be cat out step by step (as far as possible, without creating too many managerial or psychological difficulties). In East Germany col' ectivi- zation bas at present been halted for political reasons The forms of ogllectiv, eeconomy" vary from. "associations for co11ecti re working of fi l:cl.s' to out- ndi.out kolkhozea. From its of experience with collectives, v ,eh lee to starvation and mass ding, the USER advises proceeding cautiously, in general.. However, the Soviet model is still being folloved In 195051 the arena of colle 'ire farms were considerably increased In decor nee with the increhs d tempt of collectivization, the original industrial goals set for the end of the plans were raised eansid rably% SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 vx n Via; 4 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 - 17 It is still quite difficult to get the necessary labor for industry-' Despite some caution, the tempo of industrialization is too fast for the required labor force to keep up with it. In addition, it is impossible to shift more labor from agriculture to industry in either such highly industrialized areas as Czechoslovakia or such slightly industrialized areas as Hungary: without reducing the already low agricultural output even more. 14 the next few years, the lack of technicians and labor in general will .often..Wste the fulfillment.of plan quotas difficult, if not impossible. The present .food shortages will also increase. Nor will the industrial equipment be ready on time or without difficulty. (See Appendices .laid 5.) The foreign trade .of the satellites is dependent on the countries in the Soviet bloc, particularly-the USSR. Building up the satellites' industry without raw materials of their ovn.-ilxnre-ases their dependence on the USSR, The USSR thus has considerable power to control the economy of its satellites. However, during,this decisive and difficult phase of industrializing its western front, the USSR-will be careful to steer clear of external political disturbances. The eeonomic condition of the Soviet bloc is at present not strong enough . to carry on. a .world: war ,lasting several years. Rowever, if these countries continue their present development, they will be strong enought by 1957-60. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET - 18 - Evaluation of the Military Situation Military Personnel Potential At the beginning of 1952 the armed forces personnel potential, in terms of men of draft age, i.e. between 18 and 1.9, totaled approximately 38 million men. With only the most essential deferments for service in the defense industries, a mobilization potential of 26 million men can be counted on. In view of the intensified manpower requirements of the armament industry in the event of war, the Soviet leaders will have to limit themselves to placing 12 million men under arms as the initial step in a total mobilization to be carried out in three waves. (The total strength of Soviet armed forces in May 19+5 was 10.8 million men.) Army The Soviet Army s,. Total Strength and. Grouping of the Soviet.Ar- Numerous first-hand indications from within the Soviet Union bear out the estimate of the present total strength of the Soviet Army as 3.2 million men and 177 combat' divisions, including 27 armored divisions, i-5 mechanized divisions, and. 12 cavalry divisions. The supporting units are composed of 15 artillery and. 50 anti-aircraft divisions. Units equaling the strength of 6 airborne divisions have probably been formed from the airborne brigade and several of the airborne infantry divisioh utilized in ground combat during World War II. In the event of mobilization, the total number of combat divisions of the Army could be raised to 350 (see Section C, I); i.e. the number of peace-time divisions could be doubled. The number of mechanized units, which is particularly high in the peace-time Army, could not be increased by so great a proportion as could the number of infantry units, which have not been so much emphasized in the peace- time Army. With 70,000 - 75 000 tanks and assault guns available? (29,000 utilized in peace-time units),the above-mentioned infantry units, too,"can be given strong armored striking power. This large number of organic tanks is the distinguishing feature of the Soviet postwar divisions, which, although they have a relatively small personnel com- plement, can bring an astonishing firepower to bear upon the enemy. This fact is apparent from the attached, table (Appendix 6.), which contains figures on the personnel strengths of the most important combat units. The Ministry of War, which serves as the planning organ for the Army and Air Force, and which includes the Soviet Army General Staff,. directs the Army 'units within the 21 military districts and the four occupation areas. Army staffs have been installed in the most important of these areas. The High Command for Ground Forces, which is incorporated within the Ministry of War, is charged. with training and inspection functions. The distribution of the Army divisions is shown in Appendix 7'. The distribution of the peace-time Army shows, in addition to a concentration of 20 percent of the existing armored forces in East Germany, military concentrations in the most important peripheral areas, such as the Baltic area and the White Russian, Carpathian, and, Trans-Caucasus military districts. Of the eight mechanized armies presumably in existence, four are stationed in Germany and one each in the Baltic, the White Russian, the Trans-Caucasus, and the Trans Baikal-Amur military districts. The creation of these strong points shows that the Soviet dagger is pointed at western Europe, now as before. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET _ - 19 - b The Occupation Forces of the Soviet Army in German- A quick glance in retrospect at the development of the situation during 1951. in East Germany, the largest and most transparent window in the Iron Curtain, will serve to give a generally applicable picture of the activity as well as the striking power of the Soviet Army in so far as personnel and materiel are concerned, and will permit an insight into probable future developments. With a complement of 320,000 men, i.e. 10 percent of the total Army strength, the Soviet occupation troops in Germany, under Army General Chuikov, are the Kremlin's most important concentration of troops and are those stationed closest to western Europe. The positions of the two infantry and four mechanized: armies, with their 22 subordinate combat divisions, are given in Appendix 8. The total number of units has not changed since 1947. However, the two rear units,? the 3rd and 4th Guards Mechanized Armies, were expanded: between autumn 1949 and autumn. 1950 from skeleton units containing only one third of the personnel called for by their tables of organization to full-strength units. As a result of this increase in strength, they were enabled to form organic antiaircraft divisions. As early as February of the 1951 training year, various units were sent on brief assignments to the maneuver areas for range-firing drills. Marching drills were undertaken in the vicinity of the posts. Individual training was carried out in garrison until April. A small number of specialists were brought from the Soviet Union at the beginning of February. After 10 April 1951, the majority of the combat divisions left their winter quarters for a stay of several months in the forest camps of the maneuver areaa. The over-all picture showed a distribution of forces similar to that of the previous year, except for the Letzlinger Heide area. The 7th Guards Tank Division of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Army and the 10th Guards Tank Division of the 4th Guards Mechanized Army were stationed in the vicinity of this former German proving ground., now converted by the Soviets into a tank target range, a deviation from the usual practice of stationing units of a single army there. In addition, the two adjacent divisions of the 3rd Shock Army carried out maneuvers there. The 9th Guards Motorized Infantry Division in Schwerin and the three divisions of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Army in Mecklenburg carried, out their seamiertraining in the vicinity of their garrisons. While platoon and company training was being carried out at the maneuver areas, the engineer units of each army were concentrated,, from May on, along variou sectors of the middle Elbe, for special training with heavy bridge-building equipment. At the end of June or the beginning of July7 some 75,000 replacement troops in the 1930 and 1931 age classes arrived, and after a short period of basic training were sent, in August, to the maneuver areas, where the training ~%?,. .. t lion proportions. At the same time, some 40,000 men and non-commissioned, officers of the 1927 age classes who had had- previous service were discharged. As a result of this replacement, the army units exceede their planned peace-time strength (approximately 65 percent of the var-time strength) by approximately 10-15 percent. At the beginning of July, small units of the 39th Guards Motorized. Infantry Division took part in airborne maneuvers between Dresden and. Altenburg, Except for staff training exercises for.the commands of all six armies, which took place in the Wittenberg-Delitzsch-Halberstadt area at the end of September, the troop units remained in the maneuver areas until the beginning of October, having begun training on a reinforced regimental scale at the end of August. The asseml in turn, of artillery at Altengrabow, of antiaircraft units at Wustrow, and of engineers in the Elbe area continued. during this same period. The units began to move out of the maneuver areas approximately on 10 October. Before moving to winter quarters, the majority of the units carried out large- scab autumn maneuvers, They were divided into four maneuver areas ~ as follows Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 -20 - Combat units of all three divisions of the lst Guards Mechanized Army were observe from 20 to 27 October engaged in an exercise covering the area from Osehatz and Riess as far as the vicinity of Zeithain. Units of all four divisions of the 8th Guards Army, supported by units of the 6th Artillery Division, Engineers, and."Group Transportation units,*.ytook part in a river-crossing exercise during the period 20-28 October. During this exercise, the reinforced `IXth Guards Motorized Infantry Corps, after assembling in the Zerbst-Rosslau area, set up a bridgehead: south of the Elbe which was attacked,. hemmed in, and destroyed by the reinforced XXVIIIth Guards Motorized Infantry Corps from the Weissenfels-Merseburg area. A similar problem was assigned for maneuvers of the 3rd Shock Army,, whose main body crossed the Elbe to the east from the Letztinger Heide area and was then attacked by the reinforced 7th Guard? Armored Division.. During this same period, 20-27 October, the nth Guard>MechanizedArmy staged a final maneuver in the area southeast of Rathenow; the problem of this maneuver was probably to engage and repulse an enemy coming from the west. The combat units of the occupation troops in Germany returned to their winter quarters at the beginning of November. Thereafter, the rotation of personnel, which had been initiated at the beginning of October, was resumed on an expanded scale. By the time the rotation operation was completed, 10 December 1951, 64 troops, trains bearing 77,000 recruits from the 1931 and 1932 age classes had arrived westbound,, and 56 troop trains bearing approximately 68,000 discharged men of the 1928 age class had departed for the east. November and December were devoted to the maintenance of weapons and equipment and to the assignment and basic training of the newly arrived personnel. The relocation, about the middle of December, of the staff of the 3rd Guards Mechanizes Army from Luckenwalde to the barracks at Wuensdorf/Zossen completed the transfer, in 1951, of all army and corps staffs from requisitioned civilian buildings to barracks. This gesture vis-h-vis the East German Government served the purpose os isolating the personnel more completely, an action which was first noted in Autumn 1951, when German personnel were replaced by Russian women. A regrouping of units of the 8th Guards Army took place in Thuringia at the end of November. In the course of this regrouping, the main body of the 39th Ouarda Motorized Infantry Division was transferred to the Ohrdruf area, and troops of the IIth Guards Motorized Infantry Corps were transferred from Gera and Zeitz to Rudolstadt and Saalfeld. It is known that during the winter, as in previous years, small individual units were sent to target ranges for training in marksman:ship. .Intensive individual training, special courses given by subordinate commanders.; and the maintenance of equipment characterized the activity of the Soviet units in garrison at the beginning of 19.52. In February, these units will presumably again engage in small-scale exercises in the vicinity,of their stations. a. Estimate.oof the Present Striking Power of the Soviet .A With the inductions of the autumn of 1950,. the Soviet Army reached the peace time induction level prescribed in the military service law. The wave of di charges during summer 1951 marked the completion.of the transfer of men with military service experience into the reserves. Because of the-large size of those age classes (an average of 1,900,000 men each), 'the personnel potential is now at a postwar high, both as to total number of men and as to age classifica- tion and training status of the reserves. The decline in the size of the draft-age groups, which began in 1952 and which will reach a low of 900,000 men in about 1963, will cause the personnel potential to decrease over a period of 15 years, so that it will be possible to maintain a peace-time army of the present strength only by extending , the .period of military service. Without advertising the fact, the Army has already inereased,,the period of service from 2 to 3 years. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 In so far as materiel is concerned, the Soviet Army is still being supplied with weapons produced during the latter years of the war. The weapons developed up to 1945 still makeup 80 percent of the standard weapons of the Arty, Tanks and. antitank weapons form the mainstay of Soviet armament and have been constantly improved in mobility and firepower. They equal in effectiveness and exceed in numbers thosee of any modern opponent. Materiel s=hortages still exist with regard to radar equipment and motor vehicles, although the supply of these two items has been increased considerably in recent years. The status of military training is excellent as the result of unusually strict and intensive instruction:. Ha 'ever, because of the close adherence to centralized planning which is peculiar to the Russians, there is bound to be a tendency to s chemati sm. The actual strength of all units stationed in the border areas of the Soviet Union has reached 65-70 percent of war-time strength. In the zones of occupation it has risen to 70-80 percent of war-time strength. The undermanned units do not impede the immediate readiness for combat. There are no obvious supply shortages, notwithstanding the fact that the extremely sparing use of gasoline in peace-time may indicate that in the event of a long conflict there would-be a shortage of this particular item. Rigid. isolation from non-Soviet surroundings and unusually close surveillance by political and state security organs have made desertion and resistance within the Soviet Army practically impossible. Even in the event of a. war, internal subversion is not apt td; occur unless the USSR were to sustain a decisive defeat. To summarize, it is apparent that after the induction of the latest contingents of reerti';ts, approximately in the spring of 1952, the Soviet Armywill have reached a postwar high in personnel strength, and that as the result of increased mechanization during the past year, it is capable of:engagin in mobile combat with considerable striking power, on short notice. The armed. foroes facing western Europe in. Germany and in the western peripheral military districts constitute an unusual concentration of armored forces which could engage in initial penetration operations even if the relatively weak infantry and artillery units were not reinforced. The absence of any indications of preparation for war, the normal passage of the training year, the normal status of supply facilities, the fact that units are below war-time strength, and the discharge of the last group of combat veterans during the sutra .er of 1951 all point to the 'probability that the Soviet leaders are not planning to carry out offensive action in Burope in the immediate future. Presumably the 1952 training year will be similar to the.previous year, and it may be expected that in the most crucial border and occupation areas the Soviet Army will be maintained in a state of readiness.for? armed attack, even on short notice. Satellite Armies a. General; The Soviet influence on all satellite armies was further increased during 1951, although the system varied according to the political and national conditions in the various countries. In Poland, for example, the top military posts have been filled with Russians. af?' P olish extraction. No Soviet officers have been incorporated into the Czech Army,; but a large number of troop units, and especial the military schools, are controlled by Sovietofficers who serve as advisers. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET 22- onsiderable progress has been made in the introduction of Soviet weapons and equipment an& in' the standardization of the military organization and the replacement system. Appendix 9 shows the distribution of the satellite army divisions. b Poland Since RokorssowskiTs appointment as Minister of Defense, the Soviet Union has been much more liberal in its shipments of weapons. Tanks -of the T,34/85 and JS 1-3 types, as well as assault guns-of the JSU 152 type, are appearing in greater numbers in the Polish Army. The artillery utilizes all types of Soviet guns up tt 152 mm. caliber. The engineers are utilizing the TEMP type of heavy bridge .equipment. Mechanization has made additional progress, although the numerous US vehicles hate not yet been completely replaced by Soviet types. At present, Poland has at its disposal four or five motorized or mechanized divisions, and 10 or 11 ordinary infantry divisions. In addition, it has available army units equivalent to five or six armored regiments and approximately 15 GI14 artillery regiments. The total estimated strength of the Polish Army, which at present is not in a position to enlist all men subject to the draft, is approximately 200,000 :men. The police forces -- the Internal Security and Border Patrol Corps -- are organized and equipped along Soviet lines. Their strength is estimated at approxi- mately 50,000 men. There are inexistence approximately 15 border guard brigades, and there is one brigade or one regiment of the Internal Security Corps in each of the 17 wojewod$twos . Czechoslovakia: The expansion of the Czech Army during the past year was hampered considerably by personnel problems. A target- number of officers, including the commanders of two military districts, were arrested or dismissed from the Army in connection with the Clementis trial. As a result of the numerous purges, a.critical shortage of active officers and nori-commissioned officers has manifested itself. Notwith- standing this fact, considerable progress has been made in the expansion of the Army.. The previously weak motorized units have been brought. up to strength anal reorganized into four mechanized or armored divisions according to Soviet pattern. Mechanization was also greatly improved in the remaining units, so that at present it may be presumed that four of the nine remaining infantry divisions are fully motorized. In addition there is an independent armored corps, and approximately 12 GHQ artillery brigades. The influx of Soviet weapons and tanks is continuing,, so that it is likely that only a few of the formerly. numerous German and British tanks still remain. Control of the border was increased considerably. On the Bavarian border alone, there are six border patrol brigades, totaling 12,000-15,000 men. In addition, field fortifications, mine fields, and barbed-wire entanglements have been set up along the border. Since the draft age was lowered in the fall of 1950, an additional age class was added, so that there are-now three age classes on active duty. The present estimated Army strength.of 175,0.00 men cannot be increased appreciably, without at least partial mobilization. Hungary: Hungary was the last of the satellites to begin building up a new army. Because a new officer corps had been trained which hewed to the (Communist) line, the Soviets considered the Hungarian Army more dependable than the armies of the other satellite countries. The delivery of weapons was therefore begun early, at the time the units were organized, and is being continued uninterruptedly.. In addition to several partially motorized infantry divisions, there are in existence one armored division, one ,mechanized division, presumably two anti- aircraft divisions, and various independent army units. Soviet supervision is exercised by numerous advisory or liaison staffs. The combined strength of the Army may be estimated at approximately 100,000;,: men, to which may be added some 501000 police troops. In Hungary, too, this total cannot be measurably increased without mobilization. e. Conditions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are similar to those in the above- mentioned countries. It.may be presumed that at presents Rumania has at her Approved For Release 2002/01/04 :DP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET disposal 15 divisions comprising 175,000 men, that Bulgaria has 11 divisions comprising 130,000 men, and that Albania has 3 divisions comprising approximately 35,000 men. In addition, these countries also have police troops, as have the other eastern-bloc nations. f. To summarize, it has been established that the armies of all the satellite countries are still in process of expansion, despite the fact that the army strengths laid down in the peace treaties: have been exceeded by a .considerable margin. It may also be presumed that further developments: will tend less toward increasing personnel strength than toward even closer emulation of the Soviet pattern, especially in so far as training, organization, and, armament are concerned. Even at their present stages of expansion, the satellite armies represent an addition to Soviet military power of 800,040 men, 3,000 tanks and assault guns, and approximately 2,000 heavy guns (artillery), although the combat value of the units is far from equal to that of comparable Soviet units. As auxiliaries to the Soviet Army, the satellite forces could successfully be assigned to secondary operations and to security missions. However, they can hardly be expected to display any penetrative power if assigned to independent offensive operations outside their own borders, against a tough, modern opponent. There were no indications of preparation for war in any of the satellite countries at the beginning of 1952. Air Arm 1. The Air Forces of the Soviet Union a. Total Strength and. Organization At the end of the war, the Soviet Air Arm demobilized only approximately 40 percent of its war-time units. Of the Air Force regiments in existence at the end of the war, probably 600 are up to war-time strength and ready for action. The Soviets probably have approximately 24,500 front-line aircraft available (see Appendix 10). These can be broken down approximately as follows: 14,000 fighter aircraft, including 10,000 jet fighters; 5,500 light and medium bombers, including more than 1,000 jet bombers; 3,500 attack aircraft; and 1,500 reconnaissar aircraft. The majority of these units, approximately 18,500 front-line aircraft, are based within the European area of the Soviet Union (including the Soviet occupa= tion areas). The 18,500 aircraft are broken down as follows: Army Air Force - approximately 12,000 aircraft LongRange Bomber Force - 1,500 aircraft Air-Defense Force - 3, 000 aircraft Naval Air Force -- 2,000 aircraft More than 2,000 twin-engine and four-engine military transport aircraft are avallab Organization and Conbat Efficiency 1) Organization The Soviet Air Arm is not an independent component of the armed forces. Nevertheless, it occupies the same relative position within the armed forces as the Army. It comprises various forces, which vary greatly in their assign- ments and uses. The A;rmg Air Force serves primarily to support front-line ground operations It comprises the bulk of the Air Arm, and its training status.and combat efficiency are good. It consists of the following units: The 2kth, the 59 (formerly the 2nd), and the 4th Air Armies in the occupied areas;-nine additional air armies based in the various military districts-of the European portion of the Soviet Union; four air armies in the Far East. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 - 24 The Long Range Bomber Force. (ADD) is means of tactical aerial warfare. The ADD is composed of eight corps with subordinate regiments. In its present status it is not in a position to carry out its intended mission,: which is based on'the US pattern. For some time to comet therefore, it is, not likely that these units will be employed for any operations other than tactical army support.. Air Defense Force (PV6) has been furthered by all possible means during the ast few years. The PV0s fighter units, with approximately 3,000 jet fighters, rank second. in strength after the Army Air Force. The antiaircraft artillery in the European sector of the Soviet Union is -composed of four PV0 fronts (see Appendix IQ), which, together with the adjoining military areas, form air defense areas. Other air defense areas encompass the military areas in the interior of the European sector of the Soviet Union., With the aid of up-to-date antiaircraft artillery (guided missiles), and. a very extensive network of radar stations and airfields in the military areas, the Soviet Air. fefense Force will be in a position to offer effective resistance to tactical attack units, although it will be unable to prevent breakthrough by high-speed formations., especially at night, in view of the great size of the area. The Naval Air Force, with approximately 2, 000 combat aircraft,. is in a position to carry out coastal patrol and escort missions in Europe. Attacks on naval, units by combined fighter, bomber., and attack units must be expected. Judging by the present aircraft equipment, it is highly improbable, that extensive operations will be carried. out,, with the excep_ tion of long-range reconnaissance. Special significance attaches to the cooperation of the Naval Air Force with the submarine force. The Parachute 'and kirborries units are estimated to have a minimum strength of 1 divisions `ith a total. of more than . 150,000 men. These units are organized in regiments. The training status for commitment within a heaty weapons division may be evaluated-as satisfactory. The. Soviet Air Force (24th Air. Ar in East Germa 1) The distribution of strength of the 2]tb Air Aa:M up to autumn 1951 was essentially the same as during the second ha]:f of 1950'. At that time, the" Soviet Air Force maintained the following operational units in East Germany (see Appendix lJ,) 2 fighter corps with a total of 18 regiments, with a total of 6 regiments 1 bomber corps with a total of 6 regiments 2 air reconnai sanee regiments 1 air transport regiment 1 air transport squadron At the beginning of October 1951, this fixed set-up was disrupted by a series of changes which took place between then and. the end of 1951 .see Appendix 1). The most important. of these changes was the transfer to the east of the flight personnel of '50 percent of the fighter units, i.e., the personnel of nine regiments Most of the aircraft of these units were left in East Germany. Besides this disbanding of old fighter units;, two attack regiments were trans- ferred, from the Berlin area to 'the area of the former- Province of Saxony, which is closer to the front. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET 25 - Mid-November 19 1 marked the bgegi ing of the reorganization of replacement units for the fighter regiments which had been disbanded in October. Initial observations were made in. IC then and Finow,: and by mid-December all nine regime t were reorganized, for the most part at the old sites. The personnel :of these new units have had ex:tensiiie flight training, but are now being retrained for 1'iIG-l5 jet fighters. Presumably all personnel arrived from the USSR recently. This is certainly true in the ease of the two new units' - tatioxoi in K the,?:,. At .the- end of December, these units had not yet been completely equipped with personnel and materiel; their pilots were still undergoing individual training, The reason for the rotation of flight personnel is presumed to be as follows: The outgoing personnel had been in Germany since the end df" `the war and were exceptionally well trainee. It is in the interest of the Soviets to employ these personnel elsewhere (as training, instrutors, in critical defense zones, Korea?)", The new personnel are to gain experience,, close to. the. front, in flying the mgst up-to-date aircraft, under the special conditions prevailing in central Europe. mid- ecember,, a few other,, less Important, shifts took place in.East Germany. For the distribution of units at the end, of Lecezber 1951,, see Appendix 13.. Equ.iument of the, 24th A3 ` Army Fighters: IIG-15 Attack aircraft: IL-10 Bombers PE-2; TLS'-2; twin ng, e jet bombers Reconnaissance aircraft: IL-2; IL-10; FE-2; TV-2; twin-engine jet.bombers Transport aircraft: LI-2j IL-12; C-47. Strength of the 24th Air Amity, Number of Aircraft Per Unit Total 6 Fighter division staffs 18 Fighter regiments 2 Bomber division staffs 6 Bomber regiments 2 Attack division staffs 6 Attack regiments 2 Reconnaissance regiments 38 2- 684 6 transport regiment 1 Air transport squadron e the disbanding of '50.. pereeni of only 980 - 1, 0001.. arsws;I 234 2 lk 56 336 o 36 1,374 I the ~,"i.ghter units in October 1951, ve been ; ready '.for assignment. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET 26 - Traini status combat Value Flight training, of the units consisted for the. most part. of joint exercises tarried out by several regiments of the sane .brash of the service) under a joint command which issued its orders through a radio installation on. the ground These exercises, which were observed -more. frequently in the autumn:of 1951, sometimes in conjunction with Soviet Army exercises, were later abicl cted. with the participation of various branches of the Air Arm. The control of entire twits by means of ground -installed radio or radar no longer geed td` offer any difficulty. Presumably, therefore, the units of the 214th Air AVW are in a position to carry out theirmissions to the fullest ex cnt, bathe event of a critical :situation. It maybe sss m d with reasonable certainty that especially the nine fighter units 'which were not affected by changes. b;ra equal in air combat efficiency to any Western.. opponent. The nine fighter regiment, s which have been in the proaesa. of reorganization with. new personnel since mid-November 1951, will not be e2Weeted to attain. ,this very atief t ary training status and .combat .value until after completion of training with regimental units and after the 1952 autumn maneuvers j, at the earliest lda in at (rmarty, which has been in, progress ?fi e 5) The expansion, of aix 1948, was continued in. 1951 with the constraction.of 2'500-mete' take-off runways at five airfield-S. Of the 25 airfields with--.permanedt runways (t' in 19+8) two have rtuaways at least 2,00.0 metes bang. The radar system for picking . P enemy aircraft and f`or c -ntrolling SpViet Air Arm. =its in. the a was expa e . in. 1951. T'h mpst nota'ble, achi.eveteeft` ' wao t qr, at ion o the rte s: r b It rf th .satins near other. ' one l and 3ege1 ?sue lt The exft x a .off" . av 3 t- t'ccupi i Gexlorw io~ nod ,e rod a rol It may be est Cm9.t that radar equip$ , in the western part- of the Oprim ri Democratic .Rcpt b1ic ears. c over as.far . as. tie ,Touth..r, of the The, 33 keburg and 1 anau. 3i"? r positions of radar ins all..ati see Appendix 15. d. The soviet Air Arm. in the Satellite Countries i) Besides the 214th Air Army in. East Germany, the Soviet AIV Arm at present has at its disposal the following combat, elements in Soviet-occupied. Austria ate.. in the satellite countries (ee Appendix 16): 4th Air Army in Polish-occupied. Germany 59th Air Army in Soviet-occupied Austria and-in western E y of the 5th (1) in mania The fighting quality and training statue of the 14th and 59th Air AX"-'- *0 eoza are unfavorably with those 'of the 214th Air Army, because of. a shortage of modern airc-.raft. Zguipment of the bomber unity with the ouG ed TI B-2 aircraft and the lack of modern let bombers preclude the carrying out of extensive operations beyond the scope of tactical missi one o, The fighter units, on the other hand, are being .equipped with an m tires , .number of the fighter and it is reasonably certain .that :at least 50.0f XIG~lSs, units have been re-equipped4. It is impossible to venture e a d anclus,ive opinion regarding the fighting quality, and training status of those parts of the 5th Air .Arm' whieh;..&re stationed in. Runiax H.owever,, it appears more e erluipiaecl with jet aircraft l so sly that.the fighter units -there e a 3) The units of the 14th and 59th Air Army are stationed' n ma y. on airfields which were used by the German. air force during Wrrid War IT . In the 14th Air Army area the runways.on airfields at which fighter units are stationed (A.rieg$ Ghlau, P ottaLi) .-hav'e been lengthened.. to about r00o meters. In, addition, units have been expanded G vi t b . .o e y airfields which,are not now, occupied e iasily in. the following ssareas.z Stoip dl ,nia,44arlenburg Bydgos ZoZ-Tor Warsaw B.adom- ,6d. ' Approved For Release ?9,J 4 t DP83- RWRO1 IQ" Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 27 Soviet units are stationed in Czechoslovakia at present, it iay be assumed that airfields are being expanded and newly constructed, a't..teast partially under Soviet control, with a view to the possible cozmitment..or units of the 4th Air Army. The areas in question are the ZateePlzet t"agu region in Bohemia and the Brno-Prerov region in Moravia. No conai etion or reconstruction of airfields has taken place in.the Bd Zone of Austria, in view of the possible, evacuation of that area,, fdllowiz the conclusion of a treaty. The Strasshof (Beutseh Wagram) airfield is an exception. For the accommodation of units of the 59th Air .Army,,. in the event of an evacuation of Austria, numerous airfields are now .being.const eted . Hungary. The fact that 10 airfields "witl 2,,000-meter or 2,500-meter take-off runways have already been constructed in Hungary would seem to indicate that Hungary is to serve as an air base in the event armed conflict involving Yugoslavia. The same interpretation must be given to the expansion of air- fields in Rumania and. Bulgaria. it is obvious that,, since the expansion of airfields in East Germany is more or less complete, similar expansion will now be carried out with aceer'a"td speed farther back in the satellite areas, in order to create a belt . of airfields between-the Baltic and the Black Sea which will be echeloned. in depth and projected toward the West in a broad curve. Air Armam. nt (See also Section:B/III) 1) Postwar elc pments and present status: After the war, the Soviet,air armament industry, unlike that of other ntrie.s, was not deactivated, reduced,, or converted to peace--time production* On the contrary, its efficiency was increased, both quantitatively and qualitative-? By exploiting every possi..bility, the Soviets succeeded in improving the qu*lity of modern engines, fighter aircraft, and light taetica:1 bombers sO that they, are now on a par with similar aircraft of the western powers, *hile quantitative-' the USSR*s industrial output of this equipment exceeds that of the Vest a) F i.ghter Aircraft To begin with, the greatest stress was placed on the development ?a, production of serviceable fighter aircraft. At present,, probably e t.h two thirds of all fighter units are equipped with modern jet .fighters. With a monthly output of 800.-1,000 jet fighters, conversion is proae6dfn Lavochkin,, and. Yakovlev) is on a par, in every respect, with that of the most up-to-date U.S. combat types. Maximum-, , speed approximately 1,000 km/h Ceiling 11,000 - 15,, 000 m Penetration range 450 km Modern weapons Sighting mechanisms One 37-mm and two 23-mm cannon Nightflying and blind,: flying instruments All fighter units in East Germany.have been converted to MIG-15's (See Appendix IT. ) at a rapid pace. The performance of jet fighter aircraft (based on designs by. Mika Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 SECRET - 28 - Bombers: The development of jet propelled. fighter aircraft was succeeded by tie development of two-, four- and six-jet bombers. Apparently, the twin- jet bombes are now being mass-produced. The bomber units in East any are at present being converted to this type. The performance of this type of bomber (see Appendix 1$) correspond Ls approximately to that of the Bri? it Canberra, according to size and aerodynamic construction. Useful load 2 tons Maximum speed over 800 km/h Tactical penetration range 850 km There are-no indications that a new-type attack aircraft, equipped for modern aerial warfare, has been developed. Attack units are .still equipped with IL-10 type aircraft Observations made would indicate that, following conversion of the fighter .nits, attack aircraft units, will be eq Lipped with jet fighter aircraft similar to those of the fighter units (aid is customary in the air forces of western countries).. Performance of IL-10 maximum speed 350 km/h Penetration range 270 km Bomb load. 400 kg Armament: two 23-= cannon; two 7.52-a machine guns; one 12.7-mm machine Pt in ;* the objective of the soviet air armament industry to improve the 3) performance of the MIG-15,, to make available a light bomber with a more extensive operating radius than that of the IL-2 jet in user and to fill the current gap between the medium and heavy bomber types There can be no doubt that the $oviets will improve the performance of *he fighter aircraft and that they will make every effort to penetrate the sonic barrier. In view of the more powerful jet engines now avvai.7abie production of-light bombers' with improved performance should be fairly simple. Model P-150 will meet the specifications for medium-heavy bGmnbers. This .type will be constructed as soon as the turbocjet engine for 5,,000-1 g. thrust is -ready for mass production. No strategic bombers-, however, a apt to be produced within the foreseeable future. The Air Forces of the Satellite Countries The total strength of the various satellite air forces is as follows; Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary Bulgaria 400 combat aircraft with 8, 00o men 350 100 250 180 10,000 41000 6, 000 5,200 b) The organization of -then Air Forces can be seen in Appendix 16, CPET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 si CRiar - 29 - Combat Readiness and Combat Valiie The air forces of the satellit cauxLtries are still in the development stage. The politically condit.ioned,,rpersofnei policy and the charateri stie distrust of the Soviet TJniono which is giving way very slowly, have had a distinctly unfavorable influence upon this development. For the most part, the satellite air forces are equipped with the omtmaa standard Soviet types o With the exception of Czechoslovakia,, none of the.s atellites has its own aircraft industry) and they are therefore entirely' dependent upon the USSR. The training of pilots is based essentially on the traditional pattern. The first retraining of satellite air force personnel in modern jet aircraft was carried out in the 1786R in 1919. Since 1951, some of this retraining has been taking place at the following training centers outside the U$SR 3 ersaw: Bernerowa (Poland) Milovice (Czechoslovakia) Iunmadaras (Hungary) Bucharest-Pipera (Rumania) It can probably be assumed that the active fighter units in the satellites will gradually be equipped with jet.aircraft during 1952. The accelerated expansion and construction of airfields is carried out in close collaboration with the Soviet Union., which is thereby creating,, for its own purposes, an aerial ground organization which covers the area between the Soviet zonestof Cer.vany and Austria and the western regions of the Soviet Union proper. The present .combat value of the satellite air forces is limited to patrol, and combat missions within the respective satellite countries. In the event of a war with Yugoslavia, however, greater significance may attach to the fighter waits, especially to those of the Balkan countries. Nov 1 The soviet Navy a. Str. `en&th and L istr ibut ion. At present the following modern or in service; odernized' units of the Soviet Navy are Battleships Cruisers Baltic I 4(13)** c Ocean 2(2) Black Sea 3:(2) Pacific 2(2) Total 11(9) Destroyers 19(5) 100) 12(2) 18 59(10) Torpedo boats 6 3 24 Laa'e submar ine s* 24 6 30 Medium .submarines 22 16 510 119 Small submarines 43 20 35 112 ECBET Approved. For Release 2002101/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 f ECBM .To this total mast be added p, lar*e number of submarines of all sizes which are either in reserve or under .0.b 8t act ion, ( ) Ships under construction. Harbor's and PjxZort Bases The five possible, separate naval war theaters of the USA .:- the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean,, the Pacific Ocean,, the Black Sea, ahd the Caspian Sea - require five largely independent shiprd and replacement :organizations.. The most important one is the IeniiZgrad..-Kira tadt z :industry; it aceor nts for about 50 percent of the -total USSR capacity- and takes .ease of the Baltic fleet and the Arctic fleet. In Leningrad, alsor are the most productive submarine yards. The shipyards of East Germany, especially the Neptun yard. in Rostock, are relarly used for repair work. The Arctic Ocean coastal region has developed its own. shipbuilding industry, centered principally in the.ports of Murmansk and Melotovsk. In Nikelaev, on the Black Sea, there is an independent .and productive iruiurrtry for the construction of naval vessels which,. after elimintion of exteniiv ; 14 damage caused by the war, is once again operating at full capacity, In the ._, harbor of Sevastopol there are newly erected extensive kepair^ it otallatians and art e l The center of warship construction in the Far at is Komsomolsk, the importance of which, however! is reduced because of its location (some 1t00 kilometers up the Amur River) and because of ice drifts. and: ,the formation of sandbanks in the river. The Caspian Sea is Joined to the Baltic Sea and to the Arctic Ocean by the network of inland waterways. Connection with the Black Sea is "'being achieved with the construction of the Volga: Bon Canal. The Caspian Sea' is important not. only because of its connection with Persia but also because, with itd favorable conditions, it is ;used for development -and experimental projects, particularly in regard to to edoee.and mines Personnel The personnel strength of the Soviet Navy can be estimated at 450,000 ?500,040 men 250,000 of whom are on naval vessels. Obtaining suitable per4ion l causes difficulties.. Therefore, mach of the personnel of tkie Soviet merchant marine is being utilized for the Navy. Armament Eguiamet Nevelvpment of Types In. regard to battleships It seems- that the USt is limiting herself to those. modernized. shipsalr'eady on hand; the existence >of the new battleship SOVIET C SO , an eed as being in the Baltic Sea, has o. far not been confirmed. There are no aircraft carrierg, and apparently- there are none under construction. Only a few seaplane tenders, of small value for,. fighting, have been reported. Nothing has become known about equipping ships ..With rockets. The modern heavy cruisers, the eonmtruction of which~hao..been .repeatedly noted, belong to the. "Kirov" class. In the newer models the .:ms.i . battery of three turreti with three 18-centimeter gds each has been Increased 'tai foui turrets w The installations, for carrying_ a it ` t aboard have been gradually removed Anti- p nt of the ships ,nadegaat6.. (The German e ircraft armxa e t and radar eot ' e-. oed Only as quarters ships L ZSW, SE DIiTZ, an 2 FF.= appaenbiy 1a for personnel*) The situation con eerning ?the deeat oyes i,4. more fav arable,s ' Those destroyers .s.1.ready at .hand during the war ham been modernized and made more `s irorthy..e The new types have greater seaworthiness-.,',,,' 7 ' in r ass `xr nent they ca1i'. be. 'classified as "high- sea destroyers SEC BI! Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 d'1=o `R lease 2/01/4? _ - _ __. Ap- prove - 31 - Torpedo boats are clearly no longer being built. Their functions have been part to convoy vessels and in part to the motor torpedo boats, which have greatly increased in number. In regard to submarines, those types known fi?om the war, which are still avail- able in large numbers, have been modernized, principally through installation of snorkels, The installation of new radar equipment (S-Gergt--Asdic) has been reported. It is doubtful whether the experiments with new power plants for greater underwater speed (conducted with the help of many German experts) have been successful. So far, it has not been possible to determine accurately whether the Russians have other submarines than those which fell to them from the German Navy. On the other hand, one may assume that advanced methods of submarine construction are being applied everywhere, and so one may count on a fairly rapid increase in the number of submarines. There have been numerous attempts to make submarines safe from detection when submerged; the methods used are those on which the Germans worked unsuccessfully during the war. There has also been a great increase in the building of small boats. In general, these boats are of s; basic type which is equipped as minesweeper, submarine chaser,, or patrol boat. C last artillery has in general remained on about the same level as at the end of the war, or has been brought that level. Some rocket-launching bases have been added, particularly along the Baltic. The experimental station at Peenemuende is not in operation. During the first World War, the Russians were quite successful in the develop- ment of mines, but today there is no evidence that they are doing any serious work along this line. At present,: the West probably possesses a definite superiority in this field. e. Evaluation The USSR is a continental power. Since, however, she would in any conflict be obliged to fight sea powers, she has faced the necessity of having a strong fleet. Her navy is being increased; its importance was emphasized by the forma- tion in 1950 of an independent Ministry of the Navy. The USSR must maintain sea strength in five widely separated theaters of operation. To the defensive operations (coastal zone security and coastal defense) must be added the offensive ones: attacks on the numerous and extensive sea lanes of the western powers. It is striking that the strongest part of the fleet is stationed in the Baltic. These forces are neutralized as long as the entrances to the Baltic and the banish islands are in the opponent's hands. Either this area must be won immediately at the beginning of the 'War, or the sea war must be carried out from the start by offensive units (cruisers and submarines) based in the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic' Ocean bases (so long as northern Norway is not occupied by enemy troops) are more favorable because of their more protected position, because of the open sea room, and because of the depth of the waters. The special importance which the USSR lays on. small craft in the Baltic indicates that the intention is to rely on landing parties operating with small boats. The great number of small fishing boats being built-in ast; Germany could be pressed into service, too. The geographical position (Vf the Baltic is favorable to landings which would threaten the flanks of hostile: coastal defense troops, or to a surprise attack on the Danish islands. The number of small craft in the other naval theaters io, inefficient for large- scale landing operations. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 SECRET -32- In any evaluation of the distribution of sea forces one must remember that a certain shifting of forces 'between naval theaters is possible, only the Black Sea is really isolated.. As long as Turkey was not a meex` of NATO, the Black Sea fleet had no essential duties to perform. Now the Black Sea has assumed real strategic importance, since the western powers can carry the war there. Accordingly, important defensive duties now fall to the Black Sea fleet. The offensive task of the Black Sea fleet is to get control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles so that the fleet can penetrate the Mediterranean Sea. There it would be able to use Albania, with the Bay of Valona and the island of Saseno as a base, without such bases the Soviets could not conduct a sustained war in the Mediterranean. These bases would make it possible for the submarines of the Black Sea fleet to attack the West.'s sea lanes to the Orient. Viewed as a whole, the naval preparations of the USSR seem uncoordinated and to some extent caught up in an outmoded concept of the existing situation. This is, in some measure, the result of former naval policy, of the available bases, and of technic limitations. However, many new plans and developments are recognizable which will tend gradually to meliorate the existing weaknesses and to strengthen the influence of the Soviet sea power in a war. 2. The Navies of the Satellite Countries The navies of the Boviet satellites - Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania'- are negligible in comparison with the Soviet Navy; they have practically no combat value. Nevertheless, they do have some geographical importance and can be of some use to the Soviet Navy as reserves, particularly from the point of view of personnel. These navies are, more or less overtly,- under Soviet control, and there are a number of Russian personnel even in the lower ranks. The bases are permanently or temporarily used by Soviet units and are correspondingly equipped with Soviet materiel. The combat units consist of: 1 Destroyer 2 Motor torpedo-boats 15 Minesweepers 3 Submarines 12 Submarine chasers In addition there are river boats on the Vistula, Oder, and Warrthe rivers, The main base of the combat units is Gdynia, the main practice area the Bay of Danzig. Other naval authorities are at Swinemtinde and Kolberg. A.Russian "8` 4 ,~ .., .,to al strength, including coastal defense units, is estimated at a minimum of 6,000 men. All necessary shore installations are set up at Gdynia. The naval vessels use the Danzig..shiprard and the Elbing shipyard; the latter is at present used mostly by submarines. b. Rumania The combat units consist of: 2 Destroyers 2 Torpedo boats Several special craft These units are united under one naval and coastal command; the main base is Constantza. The craft stationed on the I ,nube seem to be under Soviet command. According to the peace treaty, the total strength is 5,000 men. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011.100220007-6 c. Bulgaria The combat units consist of;. 1 Destroyer 2 Submarine c.basers 5 Motor torpedo-boats 5 Torpedo boats 12 Patrol boats 3 Submarines 12 Minesweepers These units are formed into a Black Sea Fleet and an Ocean Division. There is also a Danube River Fleet. The main bases are Varna, Burgas, and Ruse on the Danube.' According to the peace treaty, the strength is 3,500 men. The Army determines the commitment of these naval units in time of war. Special training courses for officers, for submarines, and for torpedo ordnance are conducted in the USSR, d. Albania Albania possesses a few insignificant naval. craft. However, the Bay of Vajona and the island of Saseno at its entrance form a geographically favorable base which is of paramount importance to the USSR for any possible operations in the Mediterranean. On that account the USSR has become very much interested in Albania -- particularly since the defection of Yugoslavia, The USSR is continuing the work, begun by the Italians, of making Saseno into a naval base. It is not possible to state positively that Soviet naval forces are stationed there; however, Soviet merchant vessels call frequently at the port with con:- struction material and supplies. Supply in East Germany The Soviet occupation forces draw their supplies extensively,,from the occupation zone and do not consider themselves bound by the generally recognized principles of international law. Supplemental supplies from the USSR include only ammunition,- special equipment, weapons, communications and engineering equipment, and tanks., including replacement parts. The Soviet supply organization is purely military and is similar to that of the Germans during the last war. (See Appendix'l?j, for supply depots.) In . rip s :e: ~atus, the supply system has been relaxed, and is now somhng 'between a peace-time and an emergency system. At present, the mobile supply installations are utilizing permanent installations, At the beginning of January 1952, the location, type, and size of approximately 325 Soviet supply installations were knownri About 100 of these are under special guard, because they are group and army installations. Concurrently with the release of German workers at,the end of 19511, a stricter supply system was instituted. In addition, a decentralization of the large supply depots was begun. New ammunition and fuel depots are being set.-Up according to military standards; i.e., camouflage, protection against fragmentation., and accessi- bility at all times are being stressed, 2. Status of the Various Supply Categories Supplies are obtained exclusively from the. USSR;. and are,,,within.normal limits, The depots are well filled, so that there is an adequate stockpile of ammunition on hand. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 34 b. Weapons and Materiel Supplies are obtaci ied from the USSR. There are n f gores available on the production of weapons in-East Germany. The suppliep in the depots are scant and presumably can meet only current needs . There Ts a fair-sized supply of water-crossing equipment at'KKtsehendorf. I Fuel Situation The,Soviet Army requires 30,000 35,000 cubic meters of fuel per month,. or approximately the equivalent of 40 percent of the present monthly output of the hydrog nation plants of East Germany. In contrast to the situation in 1950, current requirements are at present being covered almost completely by the East German output. With the exception of rnakhorka, tea.x and buckwheat, the required r ;ti one are drawn entirely from East Germany. At the beginning of January there was a stockpile on hand sufficient for 25 days. e. Clothing The troops are entirely supplied from Eas:t?~Germany. f . Motor hi cles There are approximately 60,000 Soviet motor vehicles in East Germany, including those belonging to the Soviet Control Corm. ssion. A large number of these are American vehicles (Studebaker, Ford) and captured. German vehicles. Consequently, a certain percentage of these vehicles must be considered: antiquated and of limited use only. Tank Repairs Tank replacements come from the USSR. There are adequate tank repair shops in East Germany where general repairs can be made and where German spare parts can be utilized. The quantity of supplies In the known depots is insignificant. Med~ib.l care must be described as, inadequate from the Western point of view. 3. Evaluation The Soviet supply organization is ready,for action, and there Is a normal store of supplies on hand. In the event of sudden. military action, there would be no immediate supply problems. So far as supplies are concerned, there was no evidence of preparations for an offensive military action as of the beginning of 1952. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 SECRET 35 D. Transportation in East Germany 1. General: An analysis pf 1951 reports indicates that the sovietization of the East German railroad system: is making further progress. The old. German reliability and workmanship has had to give way to Soviet methods based on improvisation and to a striving for unconditional fulfillment, and if possible even overfulfillment, of theoretically calculated quotas. As a result, noteworthy achievements have been accomplished, which, however, are limited by"thy present material shortages and which, furthermore, were made at the expense of quality. As a result of Sovi,et?-dismantling of approximately T,000 kilometers` of track, the railroad network of Bast Germany has become single-track with the exception`of five lines, and as a result its capacity has decreased considerably. The reconstruction of double-track lines, strongly propagandized, faces a shortage of rails, ties,., and fastenings, No shipments of rails are forthcoming from the USSR or the eastern- bloc countries. Because of West - East trade restrictions, shipments from the German Federal Republic or other western countries are no longer possible, or are possible only by illegal means on avery small scale. As a result, reconstruction of double- track lines in East Germany must be limited to short sectors carrying heavyy' traffic. Even here the necessary material can be obtained only by further dismantling or by exchange with other lines (exchanging heavy rails for lighter rails), a method so wasteful that it could have developed only out of a serious emergency. The following lines have been dismantled or converted to lighter rails: Dismantled; Biamark - Peulingen, Salzwedei - Bergen, Schwerin "- Rehnax Schh'nberg - P itenitz, Grevesm1hlen - Nl tzr Neubukow - Bastorf, Haldensleben - Letzlingen, Bleicherode - Zwinge, Pretzin Gommern - Loburg, Karow - Ro gsen , Gr. E'reutz Lehnin,- Sch8nefeld - Mittenwalde, Golpa - Burgkemnitz, Mosel - Ortmannedorf:, Wolkenste k`nigswalde, Grantal - Deutschneudorf, Dresden - Fossendorf, Gros6dorf - Eoh;xastein, Petersdorf - Silberberg, and other short lines near the westefu zonal border. Converted to lighter rails; Hagenow - Zarrentin,'Ludwigslust - DDmitz, Stendal - Salzwedel j, and.. Radibor - Weissenberg. Appended map No. 1 shows the railroad networks as of the end of 1951. The following changes, brought about by the reconstruction which followed the dismantling campaign, are noteworthy, a. The new construction of the Berlin outer freight belt, single-track to the east and north (l hlheide Marzahn Karow - Basdorf - Oranienburg) and double- track to the south (Gr. Beeren Mahlow Sch8nefeld Grifnau). It serves on the one hand to ease the load on the Berlin rail center,, and on the other hand to create a possibility of avoiding the sectors of Berlin which are occupied by the western powers. b. The expansion of the Lfwenberg eustadt/posse .- Rathenow line as a main. line to create a serviceable northwest by-pass arroundBerlin. c. The,reconstruction of the 2o'1lptririg,; dismantled lines . Pritzwalk. Meyendorf and Schwaan - Rostock, to impro the.connection with Baltic ports, Z"ehaenick Templin, to improve transportation facilities to the Soviet training ground in Templin; and Frankfurt - K 1strin=Kietz",, . to establish a direct line between these two border points. d. The reconstruction of the second.. track on the..:+fo11oving lines; J terbog - Bflzig, Belzig - Wiesenbur ,. Wittenberge G stgottb.erg and Frankfurt/Oder - Guben. The latter do nstruction.,will. not be: completed until spring 1952, because of the difficulty in procuring rails Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 SEC:' 36 e . The new' construction of a second track on the Aue ? Schwarzenber`g -_ Joharzngeorgen- staat line, to improve transportation conditions in ,the- uranium, mining region f. The reconstruction of the important double-track ra.3lroad-.bri es aeress the Oder at K stria and Frankfurt. These, projects havre,been started and.v l'l be completed during 1952. 3. The locomotive park is old and in need of repair (of. Append;ix2O for break-dawn). It has not been possible to ascertain whether new locomotiYes are t it g built. Particular emphasis has been placed on the conversion of norial locomotives ,;to coal- dust locomotives. This measure was made necessary by the almgst e o1 usiv ,+t e cif,. brown-coal briquettes,. which can be shored for only a short time and have tat thermal value. On 30 November 1951 there were 75 such L'ocomotives. 'However, only 38 were in operating condition, indicating that a fully satisfactory''desi i!1- ,s not yet been achieved.. 4. The freight-car park shows a picture similar to that of the locomotive, park (of. Appendix In order to alleviate the shoxage of cars the US bas declared itself ready to return 20,00.0, formmer German freight cars which' had. bp~,teken to,, the Soviet U iion as. booty. In connection with this it has beeti,' fo and.. that the German Democratic Republic must pay 3,000 marks for each car; that almost all the .cars are considerably damaged and can be put in operation only after. `e S s rex.r pairs; and that the German freight ear, with it.. smaller load capacity,, is uneoOiampal for the Soviet broad-gauge network., This project of returning cars beg.n during the first,part of June 1951 and was to be completed by 31 De ember 1951.. The cars were returned via the border points K stria Kietz,Frankfurt (Oder), and Guben. 5. The coal reserves play an important part in the appraieal..of.,railroad Qperat ons, particularly during the winter. In comparison with the previous year .-vhen;ythe Fast German. l:eichsbahn had over 4OO,000 tons of fuel at its disposal, on 26 December 1951 only the following amounts were on hand: 95,902 tons of blabk oal- 22)401 tons ofscrude brown coal 136,655 toxis of brown-coal briquettes- 1-,750 tons of, coke 821 tons of brown-coal; dust Total 2.57,.529 tons This corresponds to 11.5 days of- fuel eonsumptioa. In view of the small amount of black coal (37 percent of the total-, reserve) and the low thermal value` of the brown coal, the fuel situation for the .winter. must hbe described as poor. 6. The Soviets use German railroad cars,;;,;aerman. locomotives, and. German personnel for the transit traffic through -Polan&.to supply the occupation authority in East Germany. This contradicts international practice, according to--which Poland,, as the transit country, would supply locomo i:ves..and pers1pn:nel, for which it would be reimbursed. There are probably, two re0 for this. deviation, from established practice: It reduces eacpgn es, because the German servieea are considered to be reparations and are therefore free. b. There is a certain distrust . .' Poltah ser .c'eps'.:, SECRET ; . . Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 For these purely,Soviet assignments the German, personnel and the German locomotives are organized into columns of 25 - 30 brigades each. Each briga e consists of. a locomotive and a dormitory car for eleven men.. (three engineers r , three firemen,, two conductors, two trainmen, one car foreman) . At the end of 1951- there were six active columns, four in Frankfurt/Oder,, one in Cottbus, and one in goyerswerda. Besides these; the locomotives of six columns deactivated in autumn 1950 are'kept cold in operating condition at various stations as reserve (cf. Appendix '29-)! There is also the Soviet column No. 42, which,, with German passenger locomotives, operates the daily Soviet passenger through-train between.Berlin. arrd,.BredtLitbvsk and the two Soviet furlough trains between Frankfurt/Oder and.BrestLitbvak,?one of which runs daaily the other three times a week. Altogether, 370 loco oti e's. of the best and heaviest types in the German locomotive 'park ark being add or these purposest 23 locomotives of type 01 86 261 SECRET - 37 - ti et 50 it ft 52. Border traffic.: Only the East German border points Seheune (Stettin),'R strip Kietz, Fra fort/Oiler, and Guben and the corresponding transit lines through BoZansd.habeen used for Soviet purposes. The following minimum numbers of daily ains have been agreed upon by contract among the USSR, Poland, and the German De ttocr :tic Republic; Soheune nstrin-Kietz Frankfurt (Oder) I train in each direction 6 trains 10 trains 8 trains With the exception of Frankfurt (Oder), actual traffic in 1951 as below these minimum` figures. East German uranium ore shipments from the Aue area run via Frankfurt (Oder ) w Brest-Litovsk exclusively. During the past four months they amounted tea"en average of .8 trains per day (on the basis of 45 loaded boxcars per ti,a:T x) Also in use for Soviet interests i the Bad Schandau boarder .rossig, `which is used particularly for crude oil.. shipmexits from Zistersdorf (Austria)' viia Gzeeho- slovakia to hydrogenation plants in East Germany. Inceased, oil traffic, amounting to a daily average of 70 - 73 tank ears,. was 'rioted from, 20 November 1951. on ('still noted on 30 December). Soviet control: ores and influence on the East German Ne chsbabn are extremely strong and far exceed the usual extent of suxerv'isiom by _an occupation rower six years after the war. Attached to each Reichsbehn d:irectora:te Is a Soviet staff of 10 - 15 officers and numerous subordinates. 'T'hi's staff receives its orders from and reports to the transportation- departmtxeht? of the Soviet `ontr l CCammtss n.. Almost all j .measures affecting organization, construction, and taperation 'require prior Soviet approval and their pfrp qe, and priority are primarily determined by Soviet needs' Party loyalty to the` MI and thus to 'the Soviets, outweighs profession, c-oxpetenee in appointments to executive poa tionb. This fact, and an extensive system of keyhole-spying and informing on,, even the lower officials, clerical .employees and laborers, ensure the development of the R ichs' hn ' .ecording to the - Seviet. concept which in many cases is contrary to German_ iaterea+s Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 - 38 - 9. Evaluation. Compared with We tern stsnd:ardsy the railroad situation in East C many is poor. However, contrary to frequent assertions in the western prey's,, -the rai1roa. s do not by any means face imminent` llapse . In their present form they can carry on another 5 - 10 years -without any substantial aid. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 39 E. Over-All Evaluation of the Situation. 1. The important objective of all evaluative work is to find. ah answer to the question whether and when the Soviets will attack the West. This question can be answered. with a certain degree of assurance only by one who examines all aspects - politics, economics y the military situaation.,-together, and obtains a total evaluation from judgments of these individual aspects. At the same time the evaluator must attempt to put himself in tt ,position of the Soviet leaders . so that, in addition to the facts. he can take into cons deration, in so far as is possible, the imponderable elements of all types, of which those in the psychological field are of considerable importance. Such .an estimate of the situation - viewed from the Soviet standpoint and developed in. accordance with t h e details given in Sections A to D i y 6ppear as follows a. The political situation of the eastern bloc is, to a .l,arge,tent,. "'balanced:"r. The political consolidation of the countries drawn into the 'bloc since the end of the war has been essentially successful, but it is not yet mpl te. 'A war would interrupt this consolidation process, `and. could even lead to a partial or complete loss of the gains. Western hopes for a collapse' of the r4gime ' in peae-time are unfounded. The political structure of'the West is not uniform, the,'West has not yet succeeded in concentrating its manifold nations and peoples into a`?united, forceful defense. The minor successes achieved in this respect-do not constitute a serious threat for the East in the near future. The Soviets will therefore be better able to 'serve their -19t%1. - achievement of world. Communism under the direction of Moscow at the present time by an intensive continuation of the "Cold War" than by 'setting~sff a Third World War. The results achieved so far in this direction are 'satisfactory (trouble spots in the Far and Near Fast; strong Communist parties in wester~n? Europe", only slow progress in the unification of the West), there is no cause to doubt that in the future too, these "`successes'" can be continued and developed. b. In contrast to the political situation of the eastern bloc, the e ono ic situation must be judged as "" i' . al an dlt . Mining and production exceed the requirements of 'a long-term Var in ,ny.rogi ans, but are still completely inadequate in other regions. The conversion of the satellite countries to the C t iMt ist "system.,,(`?tcalle tiviza- tion of agriculture, industrialization) is still underway; this process cannot be definitely completed until.1955 at the earliest. Only then will a 'Centralized exploitation of all economic factors be possible. The oceurr'ence" of a war before this time must lead to serious disruptions of the economic structure. in terms of mining and production, the economic position of theWest is._good, but it suffers just as is the case with the political structure of the West from the diversity and lack of uniformity of the economic strums etur0y which lacks a common leadership. Herein lie the weak points, which - according to Communist dogma -,will one day result in capitalism" s ' destroying itself (perhaps even without a Third World War) e. The military position is characterized by the" overwhelming 'superiority of the mobile armed forces of the eastern bloc. However,, the most favorable time for the ' utiliza=tion of this superior strength was lost-; with the putbreak of the war in NOrea because since- that the West has ,seriously begun to rearm. SEET ' Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6 The military situation of the West shows the same characteristics as the political and economic structure: non-uniformity and the resultant weaknesses. Although the rearmament of the West has been started, it probably will not develop into a serious threat for the East within the next few years. The over-all evaluation - seen from the Western point of view - is as follows: a. The struggle for preponderant authority in the world is at present ""uad:etermined:" The East, which did not attack Europe when it was practicaly defenseless - from 19+5 until today - will also, in all probability, not begin a war of aggression in the near future, that is, not in 1952 and presumably also not in 1953. The reasons for this prediction are that the preparation of the eastern bloc for a war economy and itspaliti:caj development are not yet ready for an offensive war, and that the Soviet leaders can better serve their ultimate objective of world Communism at the present time by means of the Cold War. Only if the Soviet leaders believe that they must forestall a possible Western attack, or that they must take advantage of a very crucial weakness on the' part of the West (which is highly improbable), will they take the offensive. Disregarding the latter possibility, the East will continue, in the near future, to promote consolidation and development in all fields within its territorial domain; and, outside of its geographic boundaries, it will fight through the medium of diplomacy and the Cold War to approach its goal of world Communism. b. Two. factors elude speculative evaluation: The world situation today resembles - as it will in the future a powder keg, which could be exploded by a spark unforeseen and unintended by either side. The characteristic feature of a dictatorship is the fact that in the final analysis one man makes the decisions - even though he generally is accustomec to rely on the advice of several members of his staff It is true that up to the present time, Stalin has proved to be ,a calculator possessed, of sober, unimpassioned judgment; despite this, emotion may one day conquer reason, and thereby evoke unforeseeable developments. Approved For Release 2002/01/04: CIA-RDP83-00415R0l1100220007-6