CONTROL OF CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY/TITO U ZHDANOV/MARSHALL PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00423R000500420002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 3, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/09/03: CIA-RDP83-00423R000500420002-8
trity Jnf4r a ion 25X1
Cf,
CIA INTER)RAL USE ONLY
in 1910, , the C-echos7 ovak Cowinmist Fart war iot controlled
Coninforr ,. which was only a facade, a secretariat, of the
25X1
?olitbuz?o, but directly by the Politburo. This direct control was exercised
form of special. LZER couriers who, frarn time, to times, arrived in Prague to
instructions directly to dri eh Ge indeer Klee at Gott d ~3 .r e-k Finrlin er
to Malenkov and that these couriers were really specialists on Malenk
and Rudolf S lansky all hinted teat was close 25X1
2,
taU of 1946 an
requested t
ue.
which he put to Qemi
th n at? ec ire
kove s staff was in Prague
red to send delegates to Prague,
plane ? hich was, of courses, sent i diately
ovide transportation for the Albanians*
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eti. bet- e*en the
~that fi L,J,x I
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lbenia
the request
by Ti.to's
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Security Information- 25X1
25 YEAR RE-RF-' -- .. 1,~~ y ~ 1i
Approved For Release 2009/09/03: CIA-RDP83-00423R000500420002-8 3" 1953
JUN
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'uIt~ I
Se urhy InfOr n t O1
ally Stalin towards a preventive war. Gi ntisexpressed the opinion25X1
;istin and that Zhdanov was running into difficulties part.icu-
The first time that Zbdanov' a name was brought try =attention,
was 1947. It ha pened like thist
o ajdu, who headed the German Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
wria was very close to Geminder and Siansky, and part .culerly Gerainder.
elaborate further regarding this statement. Cleme~tt s
r rked, "With in cane year it i .l not be neceasar to have v sas to go
t (lest; all of urope will constitute one territor .0 He did not,, howevor,
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25X1
explained that Z~Ihdw= was plxshi.n the Politburo and 1bAl
with " alenkovfa proverbial cautic isnesa.M 25X1
%0-
N A w c s A j I< o r n uA v Varmi-Iiv Infrnrenafing
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 Approved For Release 2009/09/03: CIA-RDP83-00423R000500420002-8
GCIlrI Information
CIA I
0NLY
11- Regarding the relationship between Zhdanov vnd lenlcov
Malenkov sided with Stalin 100 per cent con- 25X1
`
inns decision to protect the Soviet rapine and not to jeopardize
by a premature war. lenkov's apparent eclipse was 25X1
omatic of Stalin's general belief in a poles' of divide and conquer.
laved in taking his time to make up his mid before throwing his weight
behind one or the other of the disputing internal factions. 25X1
Cotmutmist circles in Prague were convinced that Stalin ordered Zhdanov's murder.
-,,Undoubtedly Tito's rebellion was the last nail in Zhdanov's coffin.
Tito
of unlimited ambition and it was obviou
lit even in 1945 Tito was dissatisfied with the high-handed methods of the
Soviets, He would take orders from Stalin but would not submit to asewuin
role as the rest of the satellite Comzunist leaders orl'tacin ; carders from
other members of the Soviet Politburo.
Tito to break away from Soviet controls
and the Bulgarian leader, Dimitrov,R were holdin
confederation. At this time provocative articles appeared in "Pravda" and other
Soviet organs which created a sensation in.Prague and which Clement is and other
Communist officials were inspired by Zhdauov. These articles severely 25X1
rimanded Tito f or his participation In discussions about the proposed confed-
Clement.
ere not puppets and who were of outstanding intelligence;
if the Kremlin had offered Tito th
ship of 'astern Europe, he would not have broken with Moscow.
CIA In USE 3 N tk
Fi~ was in Jane 1945 tY t Tito 25X1
scurvy tnf, t!r
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 Approved For Release-2009/09/03: CIA-RDP83-00423R000500420002-8
CRET
CIA INTERii" L security Information
The general feeling in Prague was that the
Czechoslovakia by issuing such a statement,
pressure from the West, -However, regardin . a turn-a:?bout on the part of Tito and
future collaboration with the Soviets, the prize which 25X1
ghten
the arch enemy of
lenkov, namely Zhdanov# was also an arch ene n of Tito. Tito
not feel relieved at Stalin's death. a feels more secure from
orders from Tito, and the strain used upon the Soviet control of the satellites
would reach a danger point..
and this activity would not be tolerated by Tito. Another problem would be
created the fact that other satellite leaders would greatly resent taking
be obtained through Soviet infiltration into the Yugoslav police and army
Tito would demand, namely a position far superior in Eastern Europe to that of
the other satellites, would be too high,, and Moscow could not
trust Tito unless specific guarantees were obtained. These guarantees could
I Molotov is an operator, an excellent servant, but
not a ruler, l o" 0-t .lso hates the West and would not be adverse to risking a
war .
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170
only after Molotaves visit to Paris that it would be impossible to sabotoge this 25X1
plan from within and thus reafused to allc Soviet satellite participation in the
the USSR originally intended to join the Marshall Plan but learned 25X1
18.
CIA I h L USE i L
SECRET
.
e rg 1ntorflatIon_
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Approved For Release 2009/09/03: CIA-RDP83-00423R000500420002-8