(Classified) DDI PLANNING STAPP STUDY OF(Classified) TRANSLATION SERVECES, 13 MARCH 1969
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270002-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 22, 1999
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Content Type:
STUDY
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270002-6.pdf | 273.44 KB |
Body:
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STATSPEC STATSPEC
CS ' ::NT a N ODI PLANING STAPP
TRA SLATION SERVICES, 13 Marc 1969
I. On reviewing this study, we find it to be a workmanlike
job which gives a fairly accurate representation of procedures STATSPEC
as they now exist. This evaluation is not intended as cost on
the drafter's coepr+ehersion of the subject, but rather a recognition
of the unusual complexity of the subject sender review. "Thu
initial coresnt is that time would have been saved had the STATSPEC
I Planning Staff roles in this exercise been reversed. and
we provided a study of this subject for 001 review.
any event, since the problem to which the study is
addre-sed now has lass pertinency than when the study was undertaken,
will be brief and are Intended more to record our views
to encourage further dialogue..
3. Our only disagreement is with the main operatic
proposed, namsely, that the exploitation of foreign language publica-
tions should be conducted by non-staff personnel. Although this mode
of operation works well at our overseas bureaus, it could not, and
indeed should not, be anpl,ied on a wide scale to our domestic
exploitation program for the following substantive reasons :
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ntrol over its
ions STATSPEC
The Tt, report, to which this study is also responding,
expressed concern and noted that "much. of the press-
exploitation effort in the te,S. depends on translations
done by independ ntractors working for M Staff STATSPEC
employees in thel"field offices do not have the time
or in many instances the talents to check all translations ?STATSPEC
Errors have been published, has initiated a pxogran
of quality chocks, but spot checks at best will be possible."
To turn over also to non-staff personnel the task of
selectin what will be translated would significantly and
su surely compound the loss of_control. further#STATSPEC
contractors are generally individuals who have other.
--time jobs and who are located throughout the U.S.
Thus, the proposal that "close supervision would provide
the continuity and flexibility for effective selection"
is not a practical concept.
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25X1A Although the Mcontractor is always a competent
linguist, he is not usually directly involved in the
flow of information on a given subject or area. Our
experience with selection by non-staff officers indicates
that it is impractical to attempt to apply this concept
on a wide scale. Responsive press exploitation ruires
work, contract translators tend either to underselect,
which delay* the production of essential information, or
to overac lect, which increases costs and passes on to the
end user the problem of locating needed information in
a. varies by subject category but the fact reezains
that if it served as guidance to the collector, he would
be responding only to part of the production officer's
needs. In the case of Indonesia, for example, only 24
of 93 reequirents would be listed.
4. Statistics can be Interpreted in so many ways that I see no
erved by attempting a detailed reanalysis of the per-
ited in the report. 'test of them we accept.
classified requirements. Lacking this context for their
!requent contacts with and users, and a thorough knowledge
reful Interpretation of collection guidelines,
convinced that most production analysts would share y
view. What it consists of, in fact, is only the
unclassifl4i entires in the CIRL. The percentage of
requirements on Communist, China. I disagree an
for contract translation in advance. Annex E of the Bahr
was submitted as an example of the adequacy of sanitized
monitoring of contract selection requires as much or
more staff linguist time as is required to select material
Basses of translated paper. Further, retrospective
n an ref
Ing, however, we differ:
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is not used for `training, leave, and other administrative
house staff officer. I assure you that 32% of such t
Some misunderstanding in definition must have occurred
between the drafter and our people in designating the
distribution of "productive time" (Annex A) of the in-
necessities." oour records show that 3 of our overall
staff time is
on scanning pt.,
inquiries;, in Ian
work done by t
trans lated by
materials for
on classified translation work., 24%
ens for relevant information to he
slating unclassified
lectively reviewing
g telephone or other
training.
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I referred earlier to the unusual celerity o
overall exploitation program. The natter of costs
good exale. For instance, it is unlikely that anyone
not directly and deeply involved in the translation
effort would realize that in assessing costs in STATSPEC
since, in *nany ling-Cages when t' , `ise are translated into
English there is an expansion rate of at least 25'%, the
total words produced increases by that percentage w
your costs ro ain constant, Si ilariy, it is easy to
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that over 80% of the translations produced
pvidee in caera-ready copy and thus need
no further processing, whereas, in our London 41) effort,
the trap:;lati ns produced must be teletyped to headquarters,
a cost not included in the study, a-57
in Headquarters
fear Publication.
Last:Ly, in assessing P41 costs, we believe that
of the staff officers and the clerical group
+lered since they are inherent part of the operation.
The cost for both staff officers ($52,000) plus the costs
of the other six r MU eeployeees ($15,000) would almost
double the overall P4U cost figures.
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