GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF OVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF WAR OR EMERGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000300060001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 2, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

nir~ct'c~r of Central Int,el.~ig~nce
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.~ 1~EPORT
TO THE
1~T,A'~'IO:I~TAL ~'E~t..)'RI'7[~Y ~?TJN~IL
THE ~ SFCRETAP~Y OF STATE
OVERT ~'S~'CHOLOGICAI~ ti~lARTARE iN THE INITIAL .STAGES OF
GFI~F~RAL PRINCII'LFS GOVFRtdING THE CONDUCT OF
~rAR OR ~4FRGENCY
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~'I3IS DOCUMEN'1" CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT:CNG THE NA- r
. TION'AL 73EFENSE. OF THE U1~ITEI7 S~'ATE , WITHIN THE MEANINCr OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 13.S.C., 31 AND 32, As AMENDED......ITS, TRANS-.;
MISSION' OR THE RE~7ELATICJN' OF ITS. CONTENTS IN ANY ,MANNER Z'Q ;;
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August-2, 199 .
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF
OVERT A R .'"~'g OF
R E
Reference : NSC? ~+3
At the request of~the Secretary of State the enclosed
report on the subject, prepared by the organization established
within the Department of State pursuant to paragraph 1 of NSC ~3,
and concurred in by the policy Consultants designated pursuant to
paragraph 2-b of NSC ~+3, is submitted herewith for consideration
? by the National Security Council.
The enclosed report has been pre~aared in conformity with
paragraph ~ of NSC ~+3 which provides that 'this organizatian shall
as a matter of priority make plans and preparations for an interim
arrangement for conducting and coordinating foreign and domestic
information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in
the initial stages of war or emergency, utilizing wherever practi~-
cable existing facilities of the Department of State and of the
National Military Establishment."
The Secretary of State recommends that the members of the
National Security Council concur in the recommendations contained
in the enclosed report.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary
Distribution;
The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the-Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security
~tesources Board
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF
OVERT Y L G RE I HE ~~S OF
'WAR ORE RGE Y
____.,__
THE PROBLEM
1. To establish certain general principles pursuant to para-
graphs l and ~ of NSC ~3 as a basis for plans and preparations for
.conducting and coordinating foreign and domestic information programs
and overt psychological operations abroad in the initial stages of
war or emergency.
DISCUSSION
2. In order that any interim arrangement may provide as sound
a basis as possible for the development of an organization capable
of meeting foreseeable wart~,me requirements, the following general
principles are submitted as a basis for plans and reparations in
the initial stages of war ar declared emergency. For further dis-
cussion see Appendix.) .
RECOMMENDATIONS
3. In time of war or declared emergency the President shall
wstablish by Executive Order~or other appropriate action a mechanism
to coordinate the development and execution of the Federal program
of overt psychological warfare, which shall provide initially for:
a. Rapid transition from peace to wartime operations,
based primarily on expansion of existing activities and facili-
ties which constitute the essential nucleus f'ar wartime psycho-
logical operations.
b. -Control of psychological warfare policy direction by
.the Secretary of State, who shall insure that such policy is
coordinated with the National Military Establishment.
c. Control of the execution of approved policy direc-
tives~by the National Military Establishment in theaters of
military operations, and by the Department of State in areas.
other than theaters of military operations.
d. A channel for transmission of approved policy direc-
tives through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commanders in '
theaters of military operations.
e. Coordination of overt and covert psychological war-
fare operations and censorship and domestic information at the
policy level.
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~4. Domestic information programs should not be combined with
overt psyahalogical warfare in a single agency i;n time of var or
declared ?mergency but should be coordinated at the policy level.
5? In view of paragraph ~ above:
a. NSC ~+3 should be amended by deleting the words '!and
domestic" in paragraph 1, line 3, and paragraph ~+, line 3.
b. Tt should be noted that ~n this event the National
Secur3'ty Resources Board could consider the appropriate steps
required to accomplish the plannirr-gg and preparations for
domestic information. ~. -
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APPENDIX
DISCUSSION
1, The "Recommendations" in the attached paper establish a
frame of reference for the Federal program of avert psychological
.warfare in the initial stages of war or declared emergency, If
the recommendations are approved, they will serve as an agreed basis
for the development of detailed plans far the interim period. Such
plans will be submitted ts~ the National Security Council for approval
in-the near future. They will provide for the coordination of
psychological warfare operations with domestic information programs,
but will not develop operational plans and requirements for the war-
. time conduct of domestic information activities:
,~. With respect to domestic information programs, it is con-
cluded that these should not be combined with overt psychological
warfare in a single agency in time of war ar emergency. This con-
clusi~n is unanimously supported by the Policy Consultants repre-
senting the Department of State, -the National Military Establishment
and the National Security Resources Board, on the basis off' experiene4
in the last war and foreseeable wartime requirements in the Future.
`Mr. Elmer Davis in his final report to the Fresid~nt as Di.~ector of
OWI concluded that domestic information programs should not be c~n-
ducted by the agency responsible for psychological warfare, but
should be attached directly to the office of the President. Without
passing judgment at this time on the proper organization of domest~.c
information functions in wartime, it is the view of the Department
~of State that the requirements for planning domestic information
programs are essentially different from those in the field of
psychological warfare. Planning for domestic information is closely
and intimately related to plans for civilian defense, industrial
mobilisation, censorship, etc., which are conducted under the
guidance of the National Security Resources Board. The methods,
techniques, and operational procedures employed in overt psychol~gi-
cal warfare differ from those employed in the conduct of domestic
information programs. While the Department of State has clear re-
sponsibility in the field of foreign information propaganda and overt
psychological warfare, it has neither the authority nor the compe-
tence to deal with operational plans and requirements for domestic
information. It is concluded, therefore, that NSC /+3 should be
amended to exclude plans-and preparations for the conduct of domestic,
information programs, and that in this event the National Security
Resources Board could consider the appropriate steps required to
accomplish the planning and preparations for domestic information
~ T e term emergency" or "declared emergency" is defined a$ "a state
- of. national emergency declared by the President,"'
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programs in the initial stages of war or emergency. In order to
assure liaison with NSRB, it is suggested that the provision for a
policy consultant and liaison representative of this agency as pro-
.. vided in NSC /F3, be retained .
3. With respect to the interim arrangement far overt psycho-
--logical warfare, a relatively simple coordinating mechanism is cvn-
temp].ated. The initial requirement is to assure continuity of
.propaganda policy and rapid transition of propaganda operations from
a state of peaca to a state of war ar emergency. Tn addition to
the general principles enumerated in the paper, the following factors
have been considered;
NSC
re s fully effective only (1) when
prapa,~a,nd~. ,~c:~.icies are based upon aver-all national, policies
~~1r-~ p1s.Ils, ail~~ (2) when there is unified control aver the
a. Propaganda is one of the four primary means by which
national policies are implemented. It is a permanent tool of
foreign policy. It i$ fully effeet3.ve only when coordinated
with the other means -- diplomatic, military, economic.
b. The essential elements which constitute the nucleus
for psychological war~'`are activities are now in being. They
consist af;
(1) The for~aign information services of the Depart-
meat of State -- radio, press, motion pictures, informa-
tion offices abroad.
(~) The coordinating facilities provided in NSC ~+.
NSC x+33) The planning responsibilities authorized under
(~) The covert propaganda operations of CIA.
(5) The Armed Farces' overt information services
in occupied areas, and procedures for coordination with
U. S. Military Commanders of the areas (including unified
commands).
(6) The broadcast monitoring service of CIA.
(7) The intelligence and research facilities of
the U. S. Government.
c. To insure continuity of policy and rapid transition
of operations, planning for psychological warfare in emergency
or the initial stages of war should be based upon expansion
of existing elements listed above.
d. Ps~rcholagical warfa i
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formulation of such propaganda policies and their c?ordinated
implementation.
e. Clearly defined national policies are essential pre-
requisites for psychological warfare. The President is respon~
sable for determining ,national policies at the highest level
in peace and in war.
f. The responsibility under the President for formula-
tian of psychological warfare directives should be vested ~.n
the Secretary of State, who sha11 insure that such directives
are coordinated with the National Military Establishment.
NS!; ~3~1 ~ SECRET
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