HISTORY PROJECT FOR THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000300090015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 3, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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3 AUG 1964
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SUBJECT
FOR: C
Historical Staff
21 May 1964
Ristory of the Clandestine Services,
Preliminary Appraisal of the
Problem (Part Two)
RZFERENCE
My Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated
14 May 1964
1. In the first of these related memoranda, I made two
proposals which I consider a minimum response to Task 1-b of
EN 1-46. This memorandUm will discuss ways in which a useful
historical structure might be erected upon this groundwork.
It is based upon the assumption that there is a valid require-
ment for a Clandestine Services history adequate to fulfill
the purpose described lit your note of 15 October 1963:
"To consolidate a record of problems and solutions,
failures and accomplishments which will put the past
into historical perspective as background for the cur-
rent direction of central intelligence and provide a
reservoir from which particular requirements for his-
torical material can be satisfied."
That purpose, with which I agree will necessitate a good deal
of thoughtful time-consuming voilt.
2. Within that framework, however, there is still need
for somewhat more precise requirements in order to arrive at
even a rough judgment of hoe much time and haw much work.
Reliable gauges are hard to find. Most ordinary histories
are pretty much beside the point. Massive institutional
histories such as the combat records of the armed services
would provide a model tar beyond the capabili4y,pf any past
or present concept of a CIA Hi 4.?al 5taff:-"TW4 Darling
effort for 1946-49 and that of-eirnmosir-and or 1950-
53 deal with quite a different quality of pro em oscause they
are concerned almost entirely with the domestic and non-action
components of the ageney; additionally each of thew, in its
own way, has inadequacies for the purpose you have net forth.
The ONS War Report and the present South Vietnam study are
not directly comparable, either to each other or to the pres-
ent problem, but they are more to the point.
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3. The OSS R.port cOvered a period of somewhat more than
four years. It was begun in July* 1946 and submitted in fin-
ished form 5 September 1047. During that time it engaged the
services of seven officers, six researchers, six consultants
and part-time writers, and two clerk-stenographers, consuming
a total of roughly 20 person-years. When printed in 1949 it
occupied 718 double-column pages, plus illustrations, exhibits
and appendices. Yet it was admittedly incomplete and partly
sketchy. It suffered from the problem of coping with source
material which in some respects was nearly overwhelming in
volume and in other respects inadequate or lacking. There was
no sense of continuity on the task force; it ens a job to do
and be gotten over with. It benefited from the fact that
memories 'ere fresh and the time span to be covered was
relatively short.
4. The Vietnam study illumines from quite a different
angle. Initially one experienced and more than usually artic-
ulate officer, with part tine clerical assistance, was given
eight months to complete an account of the agency's activities
in Vietnam. 1950 was taken an the year of commencement, that
being the time when the first OPC and 0130 (Clandestine Serv-
ices) representatives were sent to Vietnam. The deadline was
set to match that of a comparable State-Defense study. The
job required poring through thousands of documents inter-
viewing several hundreds of persons, many of than abroad,
sorting and balancing 0,81010 of often conflicting material
and ultimately will require, of course, the writing of the
finished product. The impossibility of the task, with its
Limitations as set, quickly became apparent; after two months
one CS researcher was detailed almost full-time to assist the
officer originally assigned. Later at the request of this
officer the DDI assigned an assistant to assemble the con-
tributive material from his offices, and another CS reseacher
began working part time. As of this writing, the original
deadline is 45 days away and the probable actual completion
date at least four months more. Fortunately the State-
Defense historians appear to be no better off.
3. It is clear that neither the OBS nor the Vietnam
example, although pertinent, offers a solution to the over-
all CS history problem. The task force approach would be
organisationally dinruPtive and probably would not produce a
satisfactory product. The Vietnam approach, applied to the
rest of the world, would reach astronomdcal proportions.
It seems to me equally clear that there is no rationality in
expecting that a single person, whatever his experience and
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could produce anything that might honestly be des-
"history" of the CS in your definition. What then
short of resigning oneself to responsibility for
a foresecably inadequate job? Perhaps something, given a will
in the right places.
S. I propose that such of the original drafting be done
by selected officers of the several CS components, under the
general guidance kilt not the direct jurisdiction of the Histori-
cal Staff?topics to be chosen and draftsmen to be suggested
by a small CS historical board which would have to meet no
oftener than perhaps four times a year.
7. This proposal has a number of advantages, the most
taut of which is that it stands some chance of getting
ob done. In addition:
a. It in flexible; it 'could provide both for the
compilation over time of an accurate general history of
the C$ and for more detailed appendices; it also 'would
accommodate and make use of such special studies an
might be requiredifrom time to time by DW and DCI; its
scope and pace could be adjusted as circumstances re-
quired.
b. It would insure that each topic or area was
treated by a person well qualified to deal with it; at
the same time it should not unduly overburden any one
draftsman.
c. It would not be organizationally disruptive
and 'mould not expand the Historical Staff beyond the
modest proposal of reference.
d. It should provide the important elements of
continuity and a sense of participation on the part of
the CS components.
?
*In addition to country histories, any number of subject his-
tories suggest hemselVes, including (in no order of import-
ance): proprietary organizations, cover generally, relations
with other agencies, especially military, State, FBI; defec-
tors, emigrees generally, uses and problems of aircraft,
foreign liaison, the records problem, labor activities, etc.,
etc.
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ft. Finally, it would leave the responsible officer of the
Historical Staff with a job which would be neither a sinecure
nor a. ludicrous impossibility. Among his tasks;
a. Preparation of an over-all historical outline and
of proposals for consideration by the historical board;
b. Editing, rewriting and rechecking first drafts
as necessary and generally preparing theta for a place
in a finished work;
c. Writing intermediate chapters and other connec-
tive or prefatory material to provide coherence to the
finished work; personally preparing such other contri-
butions as night not be better assigned elsewhere;
4. Interviewing such historical personages as Allen
Dulles and Freak Wisner, e.g., for intimate insights
unobtainable elseuhere;
te. Dupery/slag the work of the research group recom-
mended in reference and assuring that it supports, as
well as possible, other work currently in progress while
pursuing its longer goal of organizing true historical
archives;
f. Undertaking such evaluative functions as may be
considered suitable for historical purposes; (there seems
to have been considerable conflict and confusion as to
whether this is an historical staff function and, if so,
bow to go about it).
0. It must be emphasized that this proposal will work
only if it has the clear, and unequivocal endorsement of DDP.
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