Public Disclocures and controversy on Alleged U. S. Activities Behind the Hungarian Uprising of October 22-23, 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000500090006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 31, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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31 January 1957
SUBJECT: Public Disclosures and Controversy on Alleged U. S. Acti-
vities Behind the Hungarian Uprising of October 22-23, 1956
This memorandum is for information 2!9z.
2, Over the past three months, in the course of the extensive
public discussion (both in the U. S. and abroad) on the Hungarian
situation in general, this office has noted some 350 newspaper, maga-
zine, and broadcast dents (attached herewith, in three volumes)
which pertain to three issues, it particular, questioning whether
U. S. intelligence, informational, and security agencies had parti-
cipated officially or unofficially in the outbreak of the original
revolt of October 22-23, 1956. These three issues are as follows:
a. Was U. S. Intelligence caught by "surprise" at the
b. Mid. Radio Free Europe, through its broadcasts and balloon-
leaflet campaigns or otherwise, "incite" or otherwise contribute to
the original uprising, and what (if any) are its relationships to
the U. S. Government?
C, Did the United States, by mans of other official or
unofficial measures, overtly or covertly assist in provoking the
Hungarian uprising or encourage its underground before October 23?
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3. On the question of alleged "intelligence failure," there
have been some twenty-three comments in the domestic press, twenty-
one of which mention CIA specifically while others refer to U. S.
Intelligence in general or to departmental intelligence agencies in
particular, Only four cpmments assert or imply that CIA was e
prised, while the rest suggest that CIA was quite aware of the develop-
ing situation but could not predict precisely the exact nature,, locale,,
or date of the revolt. Communist propaganda media have ignored,
apparently completely, these domestic criticisms of CIA, but they
have attempted to exploit the DCI' a defense of CIA (at the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, November 12), citing it as "significant"
proof that CIA and the U. S. Government generally were "behind" the
revolt. (See especially Pravda, Nov. 13 and 27, and I'adar's speech,
Nov. 27.)
4?. Duri
weeks of the revolt (Oct.
American press reports consistently suggested that the U. S.
nt, and the State Department in particular, were surprised
the revolt. (See James Reston, New York Times. Oct. 24; Ed Koterba,
News Service., Nov. 9, and All from Paris,, Nov. 19.) No
CIA appeared until November 6, when the Houston C
asserted that CIA was "caught flatfooted" both on the original
revolt and on the Soviet counter-attack. Similar charges were made
nator Mansfield, on November 12, and by a Washington
editorial, on November 13.
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plied to Senator Mansfield's charge of "inteell.i-
nee failure" on November 12, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
He was said to have "categorically denied" that the Government was
surprised
e N. Y.
d Teri. Nov. 13); but according to
later, fuller version (reported by R. S. Allen, November 18) he
explained that "it is difficult to forecast exact timing." In two
subsequent public appearances, the DCI alluded indirectly to this
issue, and seemed to imply that U. S. intelligence may have been
surprised at the extent of the revolt, On November 1h, speaking
before a group of educators, the DCI said that the revolt was "a
miracle" which "pessimists had always predicted was impossible."
Similarly, in a second address (at Yale, November 27)x, he said that
the revolt "tended to disprove the theory, so long held, that revolt
against a tyranny equipped with the modern weapons of war was fore-
doomed to failure." While these quotations appeared as news reports,
no editorials on their possible intelligence implications have been
seen.
6. Since November 13, there have been only five further com-
ments on CIA's alleged "surprise," and none of them has been hostile
in tone. CIA's "listening posts" in Vienna and Budapest "drew a
blank," said Royce Brier (San Francisco Q ronir cle, Nov. 21), but he
concluded that the U. S. military intelligence agencies, "Jealous of
CIA," looked "no better." Three other columnists, much alike in their
balanced approach (Richard Wilson., Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 21;
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P. W. c nine, Providence Jo 1-BuU, n, Nov. 21; and obert Rath
Philadelphia Bulletin., Nov. 25), all said that CIA did
warnirs gs of unrest bi t could not *ix a precise date. An N -A* editorial,
asyndic*ted in at least twelve local newep$per8 from Rovember 23 to 28,
d CIA for not predicting the manpredictable explosion'--one
which was a "spontaneous conflagration which neither the Hungarians
themselves nor the USSR antici_pated." Since %. v ber 28 there bavo
been no press comments whatsoever on the "intelligence failure"
any other Congressman spoken out an the scatter zinc Sena
field's accusation of November 12.
M
ans
7. The relationships of RF ,'s radio broadcasts and baloon
.>
leaflet campaigns to the uprising of October 22-23 have been discussed
an fifty occasions in the American nreaes
times in Communist propaganda 'Media (USSR and non-Soviet co
up to mid- cea,ber 1956. Uurtn the first twelve days of the r
1 the viet coca tear-sttaciC on Novsa r 4 ). American press
pinion was entirely friendly and congratulatory t jrAl "E' s port in
the uprising. (See Ed Sul.'Avan, M. T* Newer Oct. 29; C. L.
H. Y. Ties, Nov. 3; and Life magazine, Nov. 5.) Later,
opinion has been divided, as the rebc1s' sitcation
as the U. S. policy of non-intervention became clear.
d misgiving* and criticisms of RYE operations on one
kept alive the hope of ultimate freedom,
onto have continued to give a measure of credit to
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point or aanot aer, for estamplet for being too ineffective or overly
ssffectivar as a propaganda weapon; for being too aggressively anti-
t oa aunist or too moderate toward the Cor sunist regime L -al Street
Nov. 30) and for being too much in stop or too uch out
of gea:
. 5. policies toward Hungary di the
itea generally
Childs, t aashington p ,, a*ec. 5; das nJ `'aaylor, o
c. 27). In addition, other questions have persisted in the dotes
;erases: whether any ` broadcasts actually promised U. S. military
aid (A?, Hey. 19; Paul Wohi, Chr ie tin Science Monitor, Nov. 151 and,
statements, Jan. 23); whether the rebels were confused by faked
.Nov. 30; 'Washington Post, T*c. 17); whether RF'E st
more closely coordinated with official, U.
"en:
have been
or.ational agencies
th U. S. policy objectives; an: whether R had beco*e
pegoat" in the astern European situation generally.
8. itself at first officially claimed partial credit
gs contributory factor" in the Hungarian uprising (i. Y. Herald Tribune.
Oct. 39), but later withdrew the clams (Washington ltsily Me",v gov. 1h),
except to reiterate, then and on subsequent occasions, that, its purpose
was simply to 'keep alive the spark of freedom. R.01 also denied, Nov* lit,
that it had promised U. S. military aid, explaining that the roadcaas
in uestion (about which a number of Hungarian freedom fighters and
exiles had complained) case either from Cos aunist-taken,
*itters or from a Rissiaan-emigre station in #.at Germany (a&zington
U14
IN [, ,,
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had "+close, confidential liaison with various intelligence
and to the West Osman government ) and none of the resultant studies
ire revealed any direct promises of aid. On January 23, 1957s UT's
director trounced his willingness to subject 1t1 to official investi-
gation either by the UN or by the ii. S. Congress, and acknowledged
that had wade two *aistokes" on unaryt a tone of "excitement
and urgeexcy* in its broadcasts; and its failure to qualify resident
's assurances to the hunarian freedom fighters
them to 'amoral support."
9. MIS unofficial status has been emphasized and reiterated
in most of the fifty dostic press counts seen, with only four
exceptions. Couglas Larson (s. Y. 'world Telegram, Nov. 20) asserted
branches of the U. S. > rov-ernm ent," and that it was partially subasi-
bs the Oovernint.
also said that
said,
cation to see
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,pport of these denials, RFE has made
icordins of its broadcasts to journalists
uis Childs (Washington Posts 'Ac- 5)
so subsidized. Later, Senator
, probably
ng to S, urged an investigation to determine whet
absidising "private" propaganda agencies whtcb, he
e National Th view, called for a Congressional inves
d "false hopes of U. S. aid" to Hungarian reb'ils. (AP, Vic. 9).
enturous ideas of the CIA." In contrast with these
pyE is Govvernaent-financed or "s stalkrl ngharae
vely few coreenta, there have been many Coasuniat propaganda
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(eighty in all) in which q FE has been identified directly as
of the C. S. Covern!
and (in several cases) an arm of CIA
ticular; but as for as it is known,, in only one single case
l : eview, above) has this alleged association with CIA
noted, editorially, in the American press.
10. The third and broader question, whether the United Mates
had, by word or deed, directly or indirectly contributed to the out-
break of the revolt, has been both widely debated in the domestic
press (see vol. I. of the clippings) and intensively exploited in the
Co st propaganda media abroad (see vols. 2 and 3), the latter
attacks culminating in a UN action, on '?ecember iIs, to investigate
the U. S. had interfered in the internal affairs of HHary.
atic controversy, CIA has evidently not been mentioned
1, as an alleged factor behind the revolt, while in the
Co ist radio and Dress media (both in the USSR and among the national
Communist parties), CIA has been repeatedly attacked as a prime mover
in planniing., training, and directing the Hungarian underground before
ad during the revolt, along with !M, 70A, and a variety of other
asures firmed and supported by Congressional
.egiss az1on.
11. The domestic comments on the origin of the Hungarian
revolt, extending to some sixty press clippings (in vol. 1 of the
attached compilation), for the most part assert, imply, or take for
granted that the revolt was spontaneous and that at the same time.
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U. S. policies toward Hungary and. the other Satellites did encourage
the hope of ultimate freedom. In general, the comments are less
concerned with documenting these historical points than with debat-
ing the wisdom of U. S. having encouraged, however directly or
indirectly, a revolt that
"out of hand" after the Russian occu-
pation of November 4. (See summary by Chalmers Roberta. feporter,
Nov. 29.) In at is frequently called this "agonizing reappraisal"
;cats anti-Communist position in November and December, both
official and unofficial opinion has been divided; opinion has shifted
as the early success of the revolt was followed by Soviet occupation
and counter-attack; and opinion has revealed disagreer.+ents (frequently
cutting across party lines) as the nature, extent, and effectiveness
of U. S. responsibilities for leadership in Eastern Europe and among
the Nuncomittedfl countries generally.
12. Among U. S. official public statements, for example,
administration spokesman at first praised the revolt as a "victory"
for U. S. foreign policies (Vice-President Nixon, Oct. 29, and
Congressman Hilling4 of the "Republican Truth Souad," auoted later
I. Post Nov. 1, and M. Y. Dam Na, wsNov. 28), while others
disassociated the U. S. from the Hungarian underground, in particular.
Secretary Dulles, for example, replying to a Soviet sac usation on
October 29, said it was "tom rot" that the U. S: had used "funds
and agents" in Hungary; Secretary Wilson said, categorically, that
the U. S. has no agents to ny knowledge" in Hungary (TV interview,
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bassador Lodge called the accusation "absurd" (:pct. 28,
at the US). On October 31 President Eisenhower (in his TV address)
"consli
bi-partisan U. 3. policy, since I915, to "seek to
Soviet-dominated govern ats, "not . . . by resort to force" but by
helping "to keep alive the hope of these people for freedom." At a
later press conference (Nov. 18), the president said that the 'J.
"doesntt not, and never has, advocated open rebellion by an undefended
populaces against force over which they soul not possibly prevail."
On November 19, Lodge, again rejecting the Soviet charge
said that "on the highest authority--and this has been gone into very
thoroughly no one has ever been incited. to rebellion by the 1. S.
in any-.-by radio broadcast or in any other way."
when the UN agreed to investigate the USSR accusation of US in
arising," and said that it was
date, it has msarnhile figured prominently in some fifteen
his controversy, to the extent of not a single press cant
13. ikile CIA has so far not been drawn into the d tic
d" such an investigation.
11,
n Hungary t s internal affairs, Lodge announced that he
propaganda attacks by the Moscow-controlled radio and press rod
from October 28 to aid-December, and in some twenty-five further
attacks in the C
. (Those,
to "CIA," its director by na, "American
intelligence,'" "American secret service," "Project ," etc.) CIA
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iso been mentioned in the UN Cenral Assembly debate on the
Soviet charge, chiefly in a detailed recital by Sbepilov, on November 19,
and in similar, briefer statements by Satellite delegates at the MR.
14. The propaganda line of the USSR, since October 28, has been.,
in general, that the embattled Hungarian peasants and workers, willing
to fight to defend their hard-won socialist republic, found themselves
powerless in the face of an attack planned in Washington, financed
by the U. S. Congress, and led by former Hungarian-Fascist "Horthyte"
s who were aided by agents armed and trained by (and sometimes
U. 3. Supporting this "subversion" were CIA and "Project X";
propaganda balloons, radio broadcasts, and clandestine intrigue by RPE;
headquarters maintained by the U. S. in Europe; supplies sent
Austria, under the cover of Red Cross vehicles; and contacts
brought out of Hungary, (See volume 2 of the attached
ings.)
Satellite Communist prose has generally echoed the
Mcxscow, llines especially in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Albania, and Hungary, while the Yugoslavs and Pelee reflected their
somewhat peculiar position with respect to the Hungarian affair.
Consmunist China has said relatively little about the "subversion"
charge against the U. S., and spoke frequently of "mistakes" made by
the previous Communist regime in Hungary. In the Western countries,
the Italian Communists have followed the Moscow line, but there had
been little or no comment on alleged U. S. complicity by the Communists
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in other Western European countries, up to mid-December. The Co eu-
U. S. has frequently discussed the "sub srsion"
rge and CIA's relationship to it, and has shifted its position
volume 3 of the attached clippings.)
of the 300-some comments, in press clipping
for , are attached herewith in three volu s (each chronologically
armed for convenience of reference) r Vclune 1, U. S. official and
unofficial comments October-r- cemberr 1956; volume 2, soviet propa-
ganda
the U. S. Cos euniat Party, October-December 1956.
t propaganda items from other countrioa, includi
A fear relevant items of earlier and later date are also included.
While most of these clippings deal directly (and -somewhat Later-
the three issues outlined in paragraph 2 abe
tow are also included on certain secondary issues that have been
raised in the domestic and foreign press, In which U.
informational., and security agencies are alleged to be involve
teed matters illustrate, for example, the followin
from press and radio r: edia, October-Tete r 1956; and
a. battle near and "combat intelligence" on the unfolding
of the revolt in its later stages (U. S. News and =World Report. Nov.
b. the nata of (and VGA) broadcasts, and broadcast,
later in the revolt; (T
26; AP, from Bonn, Iov. 19);
a. U. S. intelligence warnings at the unfolding of the
counter-attack beginning November 4 (Houston Chronicle, Nov. 6);
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4, contacts with fwzgarian rebels pleas ing for U. S.
uprising was underway, and occasional public
aid to the! (for exa>sple
exploitation of Hungarian refugees who
ter-attacks began; and
ablaee of the U. S. and other Western
a.
there has been far more public discussion and
s Policies of t U. S. .love nt as a
CIA d roc tly t
CTA has h
Abe s Nov. 2'2 } f
ftifically on CIA # e alleged participation in the revolto,
tions
---, -- - ,I .saw ?v ale uyr
policies and operations. Judged according
In prevailing in other lose sonsitive agencies,
od press?" do stically, on Hungary; a
a reela tii
had on the concurrently developing situation
OeYar
better press than tha,s enjoyed by the
pol4ry and operating departments in either area.
urity prim iples underlying $ ID
favorable publicity about Get. c
said to have been really *good,,* in relation to CIA's fundawntal
d its sensitive intelligence and operational
from penetration, eii ecloiuro, and c
it LE! J. o oAw
iartant to the D.
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