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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 23, 1998
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April 2, 1952
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ANwroyed For Release 2000109/14: CIA-RDP83-00744R000600100049-3 25X1A5a1 Mr. Lertua BekeT 25X1A6a De,r 3eoker: April 2, 1952 A second readiAtrOf the interesting:essay confirms my judgment that it is a purelY theoretical evaluation based on informationevallable to any student of the subject. The characterization* conform strictly to the typical current "outside" rationalizations. The analySis of roles is nine parts typical "outside" theory and-one-pert guess. One guess seems to me fantastic. One important assumptiOn ccntradicts, by implication, the best "inside" information now available. The essay seems to be at attempt to cover everythitg from now forward in the'k,ommu- nist-Capitalist struggle - without really saying anything that yau .!an pat your finger on as a clue to a single- predictable future move or.the part of the person* discussed. WFI : mt ? 25X1A5a1 Sincerely yours, 4fic;.,;/,r dec., ofe4rs46..4L.? detowcf.".&, 14?64.44Z---- 75( or Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 Ts 63312 Approved For Release 20 0/09/14 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 *OW Securtt MEMOR.ANDU11 F'ORR. BECZER 25X1A2g ormation SUBJECT: Comment on March 1952, "Events Leading to a Split in the Soviet Communist Leadership.? 20 March 1952 1. The subject document is unneually interesting. The probability of the existence of tensions and cross-purposes within the Politburo has long been recognized, but with the exception of past purges and questionable caees, such as that of Ihdanov, which, if they ever existed, have been resolved, our knowledge of their actual existence, nature, points at issue and groupings of person- alities is, as far as I know, a complete blank. If the content of this document is reliable, ita intelligence value is very high and could well have a major effect on our planning and action. I do not believe that it merits auch 2. In Feneral, the viewpoint and reactions attributed to the nopportuniets" are much closer to orthodox Bolshevik thought than are those attributed to the nrealiste". I have no doubt but that it is possible, given sufficient knowledge, to group the Politburo into those mho are inclined to favor Lore aggressive policies and those who would act less boldly. Such a grouping mihht also be a source of strain, but both groups would view things in the lihht of long- accepted central concepts, and the pattern of their divergences would depart materially from that set forth in this document. Neither group would hold the view that their own masses would not permit the use of atomic weapons (par. 55), and often the view attributed to the Realists as being in opposition to that of the Opportunists could not fail to be held by any good Communist. Sometimes, as in the supposed contrast between the bSA and socialists, (par. 58) the views of both groups are actually orthodox and can be held simultaneousay in the Russian mind with no difficulty. ? 3. If a division as extreme as that which is portrayed existed, the so-celled Opportunists would be very apt to brand their opponents as "opportunists" and themselves as trealists,,,, far some of the more important view- attributed to the ,ealists are so inconsistent with a very consistent Bolshevik pattern of thought that those who held them would be regarded as adventurers. Those aspects of Realist thought seem to me to be unnatural to a hard- core Communist (which must be a prerequisite for Politburo oveo.r. Re I ease 91.14i.-..CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 'Security In or Approved ForRelease2000MPI4ACJA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 .0 Infthmation -2- membership evi patens 4. In the sense in which the Beleheviks define the term, it would take some unaccustomed wishful thinking to consider the world situation ripe for immediate revolutionary action, even without the risk of war (6). No true Bolshevik, even if discouraged (and there is little to discourage them), could consider that all political means leading to final Communist victory had been exhausted (55)? or seriously doubt that there would be time before 1954-1958 to take measures to interfere with a war initiated by the Americans (56). Nor would they consider that revolutionary intervention in favor of world Commas% as distinct from military intervention, has become so perilous as to constitute a major limitation (30 b), nor that aid to bourgeois Islamic feUdal lords or any of the bourgeoisie, for that matter, need be unconditional (52). S. The date of 1950 as one by whichthe recovery of the Soviet Union and the absorption of the satellites would have been achieved is not in accordance with realities, and would not appear so to ease an optimistic Soviet mind (15). Much different vie are con- tinually given to the Russian people by their leaders, and one has only to live in Russia to know that the time element is much longer. I believe that major questions of policy are settled in the privacy of the Politburo, and not in the breeder publicity of joint meetings with the Cominform and Chinese statesmen (23). There are ample means other than external adventures, for controlling the chronic dangers arising from the inactivity of the Soviet Amy and the failure of Soviet workers to obtain the promised benefits (14). I do not believe that the Soviet leaders have fallen into self- deception by coming to believe their own propaganda, but rather that they believe in the ultimate validity of its orientation and aims and are completely conscious of its (to them legitimate) distortion of supporting fact (14). 6. Many of these points seem to me to be very representative of viewpoints that are held by those who have not lived for long in the Soviet Union and are not familiar with its realities. They are part of the normal Western or non-Russian thinking. The explanation of Thoree presence in Moscow as a make-weight for Eisenhower's presence in Europe (33) and regarding Korea as Stalin's first major politico-military errors together with its connotations (29a? 30, 50), seem to me to be non-Russian interjection's. There is reason to believe that hussia's appraisal of atomic weapons is not consistent with the absolute weapon (2a). Especially noteworthy is the attribution to any hard-shell Communist of a belief that Approved For Release1:10,009/14r:ICIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 Security lufarrnalion Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 11110,- international problems could have 'open settled by their arguments at the Paris conference (9), and to Aolotov's disillusionment (10). They 3uet don't think that way. 7. Major consideratioua, notably problems of weaknesses and limitations of a peculiarly Russia-4 nature, are completely untouehed. In Ay opinion, the Politburo is well uware of them and they weld profoundly condition the thinking ot the Realists and be reflected in the issues under discussion. , The problems that would arise in the minds of any responsible Russian are simplified out of existence. They know that there is more to overrunning Eurasia than a purely military capability (9c). 'Even when Russia is not directly involved, issues are over-simplified and a genuine echism would be more apt to cleave along other lines than those etated. Thia applies sometimes to the -viewpoints of both Realists and Opeortunists. Eennples are the favoring of an attack on Tito (51), the reasons for calling off sea an attack (33)2 the cleavage on further Chinese expansion (19), future action in Indo-China, hone- Kong and Formosa (3), and the policy towards the satellites (54). The realities involved, such as the intervention of the Seventh rleet in Formosa and the fact that the soviets are not being forced into either contrasting policy in the satellites, are missing. 8. Khruschev is something nore than a cOlorlese careerist, for he is an expert industrial and political trouble-shooter and admin- istrator. aussian officers have told me that vasilievskii does not repreeent the Aimee, but is as much of a politico as Felganin (60). 9. kroon: the minor incensietencies and misstatem s that the satellites were exploited at the expense of devastated Soviet territory (2b), expectaton of hele from international Zionism (3.4), and US need to withdraw troops from roma for the rearmament drive elsewhere (36). 10. Other explanations than those @yen sometimes seem to fit . the facts and the situation better, sech as the reason for naols viait to Moscow (20) and anti-Secitism (34). The Koniev plan for overrunning Europe may- have existed (10), but it is a normal function of the military to make plans within the limits or their capabilities. ;nether or not they are seriously considered for implementation is another question. It is probable that Kuznetsov and the eld.grmy chieft do not alwaye fully support Yolotov (61), but this does -not necessarily mean a Politburo split. Approved For Release 206 t14(.:.C1A-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 incurov Imkrm,f, Approved For Release iCi00/09t44 CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 Socui ity intorm,d,ou -4- 11. The document is lengthy, and very much of it is not abject to these objections. Much of it can well be accurate. Even the grouping of .personalities may be true, but if so it would be on different issues' and different platforms. A doubtful point which seems to be capable of authoritative independent intelligence check- ing is that regarding Communist strength among the Indians of - Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil and Chile -.(47). A genuine sehism might arise on the subject of military security versus ideological security in Germany (50), and there is undoubtedly more than one opinion on how best to exploit Communist gains and succeeses (5). I believe that it is very true that no firm deotsioes or blue prints have been nade by the Politburo, and that tot hes a continuing .impact in -the satellite, including China, and in the little Politburos of all the Communist parties of the world (6) I do not believe, however, that there is any fundamental struggle in the Politburo for acceptance of a Plan with a capital but that instead the Russians will continue to be opportunists and adjuat themselves with a high degree of flexibility to whatever comes as they have -in the past, without changing their basic Communist aims, intentione and orientation. 12. This document, in my opinion, is an able and probably sincere effort of a central European to construct what gots on in the Politbero? based on rumour, gossip, and inforlAion which is probably classified. I do not think that any such individual has access, classified or otherwise, to idiat really goes on in the Politburo. Too much of the document is- not understanding, sincere Communist, and too much of it ie in oonformity with Western patterns of thought rather than Russian. It is recommended that the align- ment of Individuals, but not their suoposed viewpoints or powers, be kept in mind as a possibility. 13. Since prepartng the feree 1Nilve read the very able analysis done by CIA's organization which takes into account external rather than internaL evidence. The only comment I have to make on that analysis is tat it mei ley too much stress on the discrepancy between the announeed role of the Comintern and the role implied in the document under discussion. It would not only be contrary -to Communist training and doctrine for the Cominform to adhere to its publicized functional but most of tboee particular inconsistencies disappear when one accepts the high probability that the influential meMbere of the Cominform can and will continue to function in a broad area as Communists under a 25X1A2g different hat. In any eventailliplistrongly reinforces the conclusione which have dr 25X1A5a1 tio--1 66 Approved For 0 /09114 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3 Security int ore, Frocit