4-MINUTE NIGHTMARE FALSE SIGNAL HINTS ATTACK, SENDS U. S. BOMBERS TO RUNWAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01022R000100180007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 1, 1962
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP83-01022R000100180007-8
Nol
THE WASHINGTON STAR
Sunday, 1 April 1962
tomi a
R
-Minute Nightmare
False Signal Hints Attack, Sends
U. S. Bombers to Runways
_Cop right 196'2 by The Evening Star Newspaper
By RICHARD FRYKLUND
Star Staff Writer
At the height of the Berlin crisis
late last fall, signals at Strategic Air
Command headquarters indicated the
United States might be under attack
and hydrogen-bomb-loaded planes
-even rushed to the runways of SAC
bases- all over the world.
The bombers did not take off. It
Was a false alarm.
The four harrowing minutes that
the alert lasted revealed a flaw in
SAC and Air Defense Command com-
munications. But it also showed that
the safety devices that control our
-retalitory forces do work, and it proved
for -the- first time that SAC actually
has half its bombers on effective 121/2-
minute alert.
This is the story, never before told: -
It was 5 a.m., cold and dark at
Omaha, Neb. Underground, near the
_sleeping city, SAC officers were alert,
--as always, before the huge display
boards that would be used to plot the
course of a global war.
Suddenly, lights on a signal board
'indffaed that something had gone
wrong with BMEWS, the two giant
radar stations designed to detect en-
emy Missiles high across the Arctic
wanes.
_SAC officers understood instantly
-that- -the signal could mean that the
stations had been destroyed by the
enemy. They knew it would be logical
f -0-f? the enemy to destroy BMEWS as
- the first overt move in a massive at-
tack on the United States.
Co.
Gen. Power Notified
If it was the start of an attack, the
Strategic Air Command had only min-
utes to act. Enemy ICBMs could land
on the United States within 15 min-
utes of the time they crossed the
Arctic.
The officers swiftly informed the
boss of SAC, Gen. Thomas S. Power,
and also started a check with Air
Defense Command headquarters in
Colorado Springs, Colo.
But the lines to Colorado Springs
were found to be dead.
There could be two explanations for
the dead lines and the signals on the
display board. Either an attack was
under way, or there was a foulup with
the equipment.
Both explanations seemed unlikely.
The Berlin crisis was at its peak, but
there were no intelligence reports of
Russian preparations for a strike. In-
telligence did say, moreover, that if
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tected command post and take
over active direction.
For slightly more than four
minutes war seemed possible.
Then, just as suddenly as they
were broken, communications
; between SAC, BMEWS and th
Air Defense Command were r
sumed.
It was quickly clear th
BMEWS was unharmed aft
all, and no one had hit Colo
rado Springs. There was to 13"
no war.
The tension broke at SA
headquarters, but to be com-
pletely on the safe side, they
let the bombers continue to
move to the runways. Just 121/2
minutes after Gen. Power sent
out his first order, the word
was give that one-half of
SAC's bombers?the full alert
force?were waiting to take off.
Back On Routine Alert
the A3.1sS1ans attacked at that time,
they would haveonly enough missiles
aud bombers to wound the 'United
tates and insure their own cleStruc-
At th.
e same time,.. d uPlicate --even
iittipled=eleetronic Circuits made
iniposSible, in theory, for communi-
cations :to be cut SithultaneouSly with
BMEWS-in-10)C heakiiiii-ers:
? ,
,agtOgn;49wer ,tptilcl not wait for
an explanation.ife iirEkia? up 'ffie'red
telephone that connects him with
every ,SAO base in the world and or-
dere a all ?bombers on alert to text
to the runways and be reicrY to take
off.
Jet enginesStarteCi "t'.6 rhin?ridrews an pell-mell for their planes.
ydrogen bombs were already on
oard; each crew had its list of tar-
ets. -
13aCk7ninclerground at Omaha, 84C
'cers,wtre going through their ouin
rations for war and also looking
or a.436.-?Sible -defect in their commu-
ications equipnent.
:
InformattoA
auening InVash g ,ison
according
e D:ep_argheiii spokesman.
ming such an alarm, the
eetary orr ellse and
milt -Chiefs of Staff
?1,ie_47147 They eoTd?
it -ajfb--
,
r-
If the original order had
been to ascramble," almost all
of those planes could have been
in the air and on their way
already to enemy targets. -
They did not take off; Ge
Power ordered them _back
outine alert status.
This story was kept seer
by SAC and the Pentagon until
yesterday for two reasons:
First, the Pentagon feare
that if the public heard abou
the alarm, people would think
mistakenly that- this country
had gone to the brink of war
over an error,
SecOnd, SAC wanted to find
the cause of the Communica-
tions break and correct it be-
fore the enemy could find any
Possible advantage in the
incident.
_ Mistake irOesign
_ . _
Totl.-a.y the malfunction -las
been found and corrected. Ap-
parently it was a design mis-
take. The multiple lines that
were supposed to provide back-
up if one Or More of them
failed all ran together at one
point, and the trouble occurred
there.
They no longer run together,
at any point.
The exact cause of the troubl
will not be made public. N
'tt?WiiOther the cause
the disruption was man ma
rar there may be so
bene
the?detEdIs.
FOS'Sitilfti" of public Intel
the Oinion of Pentad-6-1i of ri-
&Is:- That is why they -Warit
-----hasize that thei'e waS
pc
"ef?eir;a-c-Cideri-tAl
e;fid. has __safeguard to
Approved For
se 200
000100180007-8??
any Double Uneck
First of all, no one simp
pushed a button and started a
war. Gen. Power used his pro-
fessional judgment and ordered
his forces into a position to
fight?he did not send them
off to fight. -
Even if he had, the bombers
would have turned around and
returned to their bases unless
they had been sent a further
order to proceed.
Meanwhile SAC and the top
civilian and military leaders
?
would have had at least two
hours to check out tile alarm
before a final "go" signal would
have been sent.
During that time, other signs
of an attack would have been
checked and the President
would have made a decision to
proceed or drop back.
Any one of these multiple
layers of checks would have
stopped an attack which did
not, in fact, start.
Safeguards like these have
been used before. In one well-
publicized incident more than a
year ago the BMEWS radar
picked up the moon and sent
a false signal that one ICBM
was on its way. SAC responded
quickly, but again stopped well
short of an accidental war.
Beat Its Goal
SAC is proud of its actions
during the alarm. But it is most
-4
proud and relieved to have
ound out during the alarm that
it does have an ability to keep
i half of its bomber force on
under-15-minute alert.
Under the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, SAC was building
toward a 15-minute alert of
one-third of its force. Before it
! could achieve that. President
Kennedy ordered the alert
stepped up to one-half of the
force.
Some SAC officers thought it
couldn't be done. Both men and
machines have their limita-
tions, and the goal of one-half
of the crews and planes ready
to take off in 15 minutes
seemed to stretch resources un-
,.reasonably.
--On that late fall night when
e alarm sounded, SAC was
ot at _all sure it really had
guch an alert force. But during
that completely unscheduled
pre-dawn test, SAC found it
'Qui& 'rat the goal by 21/2
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