THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP IDEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000200020002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1954
• Content Type: SUMMARY

This document has been
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THE CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE GROUP IDEA
~~~
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A. Concept (This is a
~hesis---please attack)
CIG would have been no more nor less tharrIa coordinating committee. It would
not have (need not have) em M a group or agency, independent or quasi-in-
dependent.
reasons: The acting entity (delegation of the President's authority) was the
NIA, consisting of cabinet members who headed the principal establishments con f
cerned with. intelligence and which possessed intelligence facitilites. X1mayxftfttt7
z mxtke:h sags s:Fz txft1gesm The 8irector reported to them.
They provided him wit assistants. Nothing new had been created. The Director
who was to tzke a national," as opposed to a departmental, view of intelligence for
the purpose of bringing intelligence of national scope to the attention of those
making national policy;:and ensuring that such intelligence would never be withheld
from any part of the government having a legitimate need for it. (No more Pearl
had nothing of his own including funds. His job was that of general superintendent
Harbord). The Director's sole duties were (a) to recommend to the NIA when he
te?tw had reason to believe that changes in any hart of the intelligence structure
would benefit the national interest; and (b) to settle disputes as between elements
of the intelligence structure (with reference to the NIA if necessary.)
Lus/Hc24 This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT o L C+ (c
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The record copy has been
released to National Archives
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11 yet even he was, in effect, the servant of ?a these same departments in the
were still, part of their parent departments. Only the Director was ?independent";
distribafing it properly under the terms of the President's letter. They
that which was collected apt through the intelligence system already in existence.
(This being minus OSS which had been abolished, and SSU which was in a state of
liquidation and temproarily part of the intelligence establishment of the War
Department.) The Director's assistants, furnished him by the departments,
were to help him in evaulating Intelligence(from a national point of view) and
Under this scheme, the Director did not collect intelligence. He evaluated
persons of their. Secretaries, The Director could also avail himself of`the advice
of the Chiefs of Intelligence of the same departments. Mother they actually
advised or more nearly directed the Director is not of importance in this connection.
The point is that the whole CIG idea was that of an interdepartmental committee
with a special chairman whose authority dervied from the
President through departmental heads. The ohly changes that had come about since
before the war (aside from the wartime expansion of the in elligence structure in
general) were the abolition of OSS, and the creation of.a committee system whose
purpose was to prevent the intelligence structure from settling back into its pre-
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war compartmentalization`
It would be hard to prove that this system would, not have been effective.
If it had failed, the Director would have been responsible only to the extent that
the failure could be adcribed to a lack of central coordination. A failure to
collect required information would, of itself, been wholly the responsiblity of
the departmental collection structures. Jzftnazex3y A failure properly
to evaluate the intelligence collected would have been more nearly the re-
sponsibility of the Director; yet the actual work of evaluation would have been
and
done by persons appointed by` under the control of the participating departments.
Finally, since the Director was given no authority to do more than recommend, he
could not be blamed where recommendations had not been taken.
II. THE VANDENBERG CHANGES
The clause fr m the President's letter of 22 January 1946 (para. 3,
statin that the Director of Central Intelligence shall
"Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intellignece relating to the
national security" is susceptible of more than one interpretation. As zx=bnm it
stands,
aft, it does not necessarily mean that the Director must diredt the production
of what are now called national intelligence estimates dw~
(arms =kanuclix to be used in the formation of national policy, for which
he (or someone else) must take full repponsibility in relation to the success or
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failure of that policy. It called on him only.to "correlate" (bring into mutual
and disseminate (circulate.)
relationship) and""evaluate" (place a value upon.) /No doubt, intelligence which
had been correlated and evaluated, and had thus become "strategic and national
policy intelligence" would have Been disseminated "within the government" in a
feamm such a form that it would have been impossible to escape a resultant re-
sponsibility which must rest somewhere. Yet it would not have been necessary for
the Director of Central Intelligence to take this responsibility. He. need have
done so more than to make sure that his departmental assistants correlated and
evaluated the intelligence they received; and that whatever might be the result of
their correlated evaluations should be appropriately disseminated.
General Vandenberg did not take this view of this important c]sause in the
Presidential directive. He considered that hey as Director, must, in the last
analysis, present the National Intelligence Authority and the R W President
with "strategic and national policy intelligence" which would necessarily have a
part in the formation of national policy, and that he, as Director, must personally
take responsibility for it.
The implicat ons in this view need not have been far-reaching. The Director
could have accepted full responsibility under the system described above. He
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would undoubtedly have been unwise to do so. General Vandenbergd did not believe
ttxpmrsxtblwz ezexhwzksdzsamexemztrwixeze= that he could take responsibility
for zprwdsatsxefzmmr stiaxzan&zwss att?axum iasszkexha x correlated and
evaluated products unless he had some control over correlation and evaluation.
Under the system twdbo= gradually coming into force, he had to rely on a sort
of committee, made up of the empl oyees of others, who passed judgment on intelligence
that had been partially correlated and evaluated before the committee received it,
e had no way-of k owing if the information were complete or reliable except in
so far as a committee, which he could not directly control, told him it was com-
"executive agent". But this power, like the clause of the Presidential Directive
(para 5) that made the .NIA';agencies "open to inspection by the Director of Central
Intelligence" depended on what use the Director made of it
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Vandenberg made no use of it. Hillenkoetter dropped it.
Thus the ideas of executive agent and of inspection became more elements of
strategy. In gaining the exectuve power, Vandenberg had, in effect, announced
that he did not believe he could discharge his duties unless he had a reasonable
degree of authirity with respect to the participating departments. Hillenkoetter
started on the premise that he could. The point is academic. Neither tried to
operate authoritatively.
More important tai was Vandenberg's basic insistence that he could not rely
upon sources of intelligence other than his own. This insistence is basic because
it extends into practical application the theory that CIG is apart from rather than
a part of the existing intelligence structure of the government. The terms of
the directive that gave the CIG the power to undertake intelligence research are
innocent. The principle involved is such that agreement to this directive changed
the whole concept of central intelligence. For when it was agreed that CIG could
build up files and retain experts of itxs own, the idea had been accepted that
Central Intelligence could be potentially in position to operate independently of
any part of the existing intelligence structure. Implicit in the idea, of course,
was the right, acquired by Vandenberg, to to employ persons independent
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independently and to pay them independently. Incidental to it was the power of
independent internal and external collection of foreign intelligence. This further
extended the concept of independence, making CIG, if need be, able to operate in
complete disregard for the intelligence agencies it had been called upon originally
to coordinate.
General Vandenbergts reasoning might be summarized as follows:
estimates
a. He must take responsibility for intelligence to be
used in'the formation of national policy
b. He could not do so under a "CIG" system because.that
system gave him no authority, with respect to the material on which *ktax
the estimates would be based
c. Therefore he must have technical authority (something that would
permit him to do more than request cooperation) and practical authority (the
means of dete--mining, rather than trusting, that the sources of his estimates were
sound).
Admiral Hillenkoetter did not think the technical. authority that his pre-,
deeessor had gained was either necessary or desirable. He therefore renounced it.
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He.did nothing simlh owever, regarding his pracitical authority, either because
he did consider this desirable, or because no pressure WSs brought upon him to
renounce it." Consequently, if he chose to act according to the general idea of an
independent agency, as opposed to a coordinating committee, he would have to rely
solely upon his ability to check upon the adequacy of the.inteLigence he received
by the practical means at his command. The logical extension of this theory would
be xx a central agency so completely independent that it could and would act in
utter disregard of any other agency. But the laws were such that this could not
quite legally happen.
ILLEGIB
Of three possible developments of central i telligence, therefore, CIG/CIA
found itself between 1947 and 1950 in the least tenable. For there might have been
a coordinating group which would have taken no responsibility beyond those of
coordination, which would have been a tenable position and might have worked well.
Or there could have been a structure in which all parts would have been subordinate
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to the DCI and under which the DCI would have taken full responsibility. This
again would have been'tenable and could theoretically have succeeded. The third
position was one in which there grew up five intelligence agencies taaIb_
wher there had om e been three. The idea of coordination was ruled out by
the retention of independent research and independent finances. The idea of
subordination was ruled out by the renunciation-of authority. Nevertheless,
(i.e. those regarding research and "common concern"
there remained an agreement/under which the central agency could grow
in any activity common to agencies engaged in the work of foreign intelligence.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE "FIFTH" AGENCY
The type of organization under which the Group could have functioned would
have been impossible for the fifth agency. Now the Director, in addition to the
three assistants listed above, must have (a) assistants to
deal with administration, personnel, finances,
law, medicine. The Assistant for correlation and evaluation became the head of
a complete "processing plant" for intelligence of all sorts, owrking alongside
two- chiefs of md3mztJmm intelligence colection who coud theoretically furnish
him with all the material he needed. The Assistant for Dissemination took a part
also in this process, furnishing a variety of services to that end. That one product
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was duplication waxy evident. It was equally evident'that this ;duplication must,
grwo rather than diminish under the cirdumstances.
In the midst of such a situation, it'could not be surprising that the Director's
duties, as originally specified, as coordinator, were all but forgottn. The system
for coordination, in fact, was the only true survival of the original coordinating
committee idea, for here, the Director had no independent repres entative, but only
a coordinating committee made up of officers furnished by, and at least partially
responsible to, the agencies that were to be coordinated. The failure of ICAPS
was undoubtedly due primarily to its own ineptitude, but it was at least partially
due to the impossible position in which ICAPS was placed as a residual
of a system that was no longer in,operation.
}
One other point should b e mentioned which is of circumstance rather than
theory. For whateger reason, Admiral Hillenkoetter did not concentrate on what
General Vandenberg had considered the primary function of central intelligence:
the production of the intelligence on which national policy could be based. In
practical fact, of course, it was not necessary that he whould do so. A persuasive,
case can be made out to the effect that no central g-ency could conscientiously
begin to furnish such intelligence until it could assure itself that it had per-
fected a systme for-the acqutition of evidence complete and reliable enough to mefsit
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drawing conclusions solid enough-to support a national policy. It may have been for
this reason that Hillenkoetter tended to concentrate Won problems of collection .:
rather than t ose of estimate.
THE REORGANIZATION
The new administration in 1950 took.one positive step. t returned to
Vandenbergis view of the primacy of the estimative function. At the same time,
it tacitly renouhced the right that Vandenberg had acquired to engate in independent
research. It made no attempt, however, to regain Vandenberg,s postion of theoretical
ascendancy over the participating agencies. It might be said, in s omwhat Over-
simplified summary, that the Smith administration returned to the "CIG" thsory in
so far as it was possible t? betrun to it under vastly altered circumstances.
To go back completely would have. required disbanding a very large organization
that had grown up over a period of.three years, or of trying to some way, to in-
corporate it into the IAC agency structure. Any such. radical. move would have been
complicated, painful, and, under the circumstances of the Korean war, possibly dis-
astrous. The ama immediate reason for disaster probably would have kmm derived
from the immobiliaation of parts of the central intelligence agency on which the
others had come to rely. In other words, whatever might have been the intentions of
the new administration, a familiar process had taken place under which an organization
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has grown past the point where it can be abolished even though abolition seems
The reorganization, then, might be briefly described as a system under which
Central Intelligence remained a "fifth agency" which, however, proposed to operate
under a"CIG" type of interdepartmental cooperative xpzt arrangement.
TO I WwORGANIZTION
The key to the new organization lay in the substitution of OIC for ICAPS.
ICAPS (or at least a different ICAPS) might have been an adequate means of co-
ordination under a purely "CIG" scheme, in theory at least, for its members would have
been the Directorts go-betweens with the AGencies they represented and would have
facilitated his work of keeping an eye on the total intelligence structure with
reference to its adequacy for national purposes. The actual coordination woul, of
course, have been dome by the Director as his own principal function. ;t w'
nexn*e was rendered useless when GIG became an independent agency r ther than a
coordinating committee.
In place of ICAPS, the new administation set up an I ab1x Office,
devoted to problems of coordination. Its officers were responsible only to the
DCI. In other words, it liad become impossible with the existence of a Central
Inbielligence Agency vice a coordinating committee, for theDirector to give full
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time to pro lems of coordination. He had therefore,. delegated the task, not to
a committee, but an i dividual representing himself in his coordinative capacity.
The other important organizational change was, of course, the establishment
of an independent Agency ffi"I~E Office devoted to one aspect of the intelligence-
producign function. that of furnishing the intelligence on which national polciy
might be based. This was distinctly a step backwards toward the CIG plan. The new
Office was to base its conclusions xk*i on information received from the IAC A,encies
Its emphasis was to be, not on producing intelligence that it felt justified in
taking responsibility for,.but upon furnishing a product that would represent the
consensus of all A,encies.
A minor consequence of`.this move, chiefly of practical appliation, was the
removal from the new office of all responsibility except for the production of the
one type of intelligence it which it specialized. This decision necessitated the
creation of new offices to undertake the production of other twom necessary forms
of intelligence which might be grouped loosely as service of common co cern. The
concrete results were the establishement of an office to specialize in all forms of
current intelligence and another to specialize in economic research. The Office
specializing in scientific intelligence, which was of the same order, was left in-
tact.
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As can ,easily be seen, these did not represent true changes. With the ex-
caption of a more realistic substitution for what had been ICAP3., the essential,
organization and concept of the CIA of 1947-1950 remained what it bad been before.
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Probable Organization required under the CIG Idea
Unde this concept, the Director would have needed four assistants:
one for inter-agency coordination; one for correlation and evaluation of intelligence;
one for problems of dissemination, and possibly a fourth to be concerned with the
Director's responsibility to protect sources and methods. (The last, however,
since all actual sources and methods were under the Departments, would have been
xxxx primarily a coordinator s function and therefor might well have been part of
the first-Office.) Each of these assistants would have needed a small orgainzation
of his own, which, however, would have been drawn entirely from the Departments.
There would have been no need for.any further organization under CIG. Such routine
01 f unctions 'as personnel and administration xzxwdIza exIKL=xdxIzg4g+aadrya
would have been handled by the Departm - s.
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so far
The I al history produced/by this office would leave the impression on
a visitor from Mars, or Congress, that the story of CIA was a continuous high-
level squabble which never quite succeeded in straightening out what CIA was or
where it stood with relation to the rest of the government. -
This is an accurate picture but only a partial one.
It leaves largily out of consideration what was going on in the Agency while
high-level committees clashed in the realm of theory vs. special interest. whereas
i is made reasonably clear that one office of the AMency was producing the
final product of intelligence---estimates---amid confusion and recrimination, no
one would ever know from this record that the Foreign Documents Division of 00
WAB painfully grinding out translations of documen* some of which could very well
become mdre important in a future emergency than the very highest-level estimate
praised by the Dulles-Jackson committee,which paper stated that whereas the Russians
would probably not ",
start a war in 194, on the other hand, they might.
There was no mention,'other than in passing, of the Strategic Intelligence
Division whose members were grimly engaged in the daily drudgery of assembling
prosaic basic intelligence which would, nevertheless, be what military commanders
and others would have to turn to in case of war rather than finely spun essays on
presumed enemy intentions. There is no reference &t all to the administrative
branch which was, among other things, devising the complicated mbhtods through
the funds could be disbursed to make possible the collection of information without
which high level estimates would have to be based on imagination only.
In Volume II, I propose to change the emphasis accordingly. Instead of'
having an analysis of institutional development with occasional reference to the
the activities and achievements of the institution, I should like to have a record
of its separate parts, how they developed and why, and what they accomplished---with
such ananlysis of institutional evolution as seems required.
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I already have a good deal of the basic information I shall need for this-,
Since all problems of covert security have been ruled out by fiat,
purpose. /I should not anticipate much difficulty in getting the added documentary
evidence I shall need. But I should like, as far as possible, to base my studies
on first-hand ams?c knowledge as well as documents. This would involve talking
with people---not General Donovan or General Smith, but the people who do the actual
or aid in producing
work in the actual branches that produce/the actual intelligence. I should also
like, if possible, to visit them in their natural habitat in order to become familiar
with what they. do and how they do it. Even though the end product would be their
history from 1950-1953, I should be enabled to write that story in relation to
reality as well as theory.
There is no implication here that one type of history is superior to another.'
It is mttjc rather. that the first has already been done. There would seem to be
room now for the second which is capable, like the first, of serving a good
purpose..
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 This i; a.TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
only, for the use of DCiIHS. ppraV for release t1; ough
The reCoVe6f r~-eRe~lea te08bfii I Bf 3 0602)00020002-6
released to National Archives .the Central Intelligence Agency.".
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM. Date 612 /q/
Date 6l2 s ~g HRP S-q - 2-
G'S
6/10/54
`"U1:_1ftY: The essential decisions affecting the future of the Central
Intelligence Agency were made tu1?er the administration of General Vandenberg in
1946. The position taken by the Smith administration implied a return to the
pre-Vandenberg concept of the Agency which was, however, impracticable under the
circumstance s of 1950.
EXPLANATION
I. The idea for a Central Intelligence Group outlined in the President's direc-
tive of 22 January 1946 need not have entailed a new Agency and might, if tried,
have proved a workable solution of the National Intelligence problem.
A. CIG, under this concept, would have been essentially a coordinating
commit tee ,rite yin an intelligence structure already in existence.
1. Although the Director was independent to the extent that he was
appointed by tin President, he was answerable to the heads of the departments of
the. government concerned with intelligence.
2. The Director had neither funds, personnel, nor sources of intelli-
f once of his own; for these he was dependent on the NIA.
3. His position with respect to the NIA r>gencies was that of arbiter
HS/HC- to one ,ry rt'.c -i1.ar- aspect of their -Jerk.
?24 7
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i3. The Director's _,esoonsiI_.)ility under this concept was limited.
1. The Director was not necessarily re; u:.ired, under thc, terms of the
presi(lential directive, to produce national intellig=ence estiria.les and t a',e res-
ponsibility for them; he was directed only to "cor-i?elate" and "evaluate" the
intelligence that the Group received from the Departments, from a supra-depart-
mental point of view, and to ensure proper dissemination of "the resultant
strategic and national policy intelligence 'within the government.
2. T - s a tee) then, the Directors responsibility was xae- ~
(~ y a rv b, j t` x~ I f I o art ` E =ti )t x ?.
to **Now 0 fil6llil-ence , ... ;`
of national import id not escape those making national
n olicy.
C. The CIG elan might have droved satisfactory
1. Assuming that the intelli ,once organizations within the State and
military departments, as dc-,-c-loped b:.fore the war and perfected during it, pro-
vided a means for t"21 production of intellL-once and :-;are susceptibl6 of e-:pan-
aion and i prorc rfct t, it would not have been ncce _..-,aa-? to create a new organiza-
functions which they could be p.'eumed capable of adding I ,o their duties.
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tion to ,-)e rrerm any of the functions to ,.(h ey as a"tr'm d, or a `tonal
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A
2. The only real need was to see that narrow departmental pre-occupa-
tions did not result iii failures to detect int lli:fence of national import, or
in prevention of it" ca is r_11J': t'_C'_1 to all parties no d .n'g, it.
3. A coon 11-nator, with depart-(-nl'.al ass stance, wou.1'' have sufficed
for t}'-_is purpose.
1.. At a minimum, a system such as t i.i.s,. would ha:-e avoided the inter-
agency strains and r,u.ch of the expense entailed in .ost other pl_a~ s.
II. As a result of certain decisions made under the administration of General
Vandenberg, developnnnt of Central Intelligence as coordinator within the NIA
became impossible, and the emergence of a quasi-independent agency was assured.
A. The most basic of these dec__s' ens derived from Vandenber(Tts inter,)re-
tation of paragraph 3-a of the President's directive to mean that the Director
must take indivi''ual responsibility for Intel -'-1 Bence 1lSe'. j n the formr;.tion of
national policy.
.1 -i
B. In order to take such 1 iC ' lit r as t..i S `:7
"I c --lrg c
considered
i a
;;A;._ v th!_', ?1,,,P,GtOi" be to -kG ..:. ,el-i. or -h a-
reliability of infors?ation recei?c
Gr oa_p from t'he 7I ,
(,:nich r cull
dP t.." r !. of eM{e
,arn`1 3, c" ''-,he D rector o
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C. In taring this position, Vandenberg had declared a a ?>st a coordinating
group within the I\JIA and for an indenen'ent agency.
P. T'-.e ultimate logic of this position is far.-reac ilng because
1. A tie means of checking reliability ' '_ ' incor: nletet ,~
the Director would always be inzlnnrable to that extent.
2. The only sure means of protecting the Director's full responsibil-
ity would be through the duplication of virtually the whole existing intelli;.;ence
strl.lcture.
3. This being absurd, the only other logical procedure would be to,
subordinate the existing intelligence structure to the Director .a.n-l the Central
Group.
E. Such subordination a= unobtainable) Vandenberg, , had to be
content With independent group which had only a + means or checkin.^
the r l.ia? ility of inform:,.tion. (iTO?r_,: The grant of aithocity as recutivc
n 'f o ' th:: NIA ir,? lied _i ittl , -___ an,r, ;.GYc o,aer tI"ian thy' ector alr -ady
had t1'.~
in 't:n,~ .J-. 1 : '", IiC UJ_
had 'd"
CG,7.ld1 actuall'c C 1.L: e _ thi 17 G!"t01' ty~ would -~C: r71d (, on
he . ,; own
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success in maneuver. It is doubtful that the Executive :q gent power would
greatly have altered the histb y of CIA even if Hillenkoetter had retained it)
F. As a resc_1.1t of Vand^ -J)erg',s decisions, Admiral I3-i_11, nkoetter inherited
a Situation in .,Thi_cI;?hc .ate:.. take, responsibility for "strategic and. national
policy inV-lligence" with no protection of that responsibility err- pt a na:`tiewl
means of checking information through research and through son.ewhat duplicative
collection activities.
III. Admiral Hillenkoetter made no essential changes in the organization he had
inherited despite some gestures late in his administration in the direction of
full central control.
ITT. The philosophy of the Smith administration implied a revival of th-. CIG
idea.
4JNCI/VfG~Cd
1. Zdillin.ness to accent limited rather than ; responsibility
for "strategic and national policy intelliccnce.
cam... 1G,to (:'isncnSe, with _ndepen'eni', rese2.T'ch.
?. ';?e return to emphasis on tie Director's as coordinator cf
1.
-~.!a,1,
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200020002-6
B. although the ultimate J.o,-ic o' t'hi pouition ~. call for a return to
a coordinating committer: within an e.. sting _ntclli..;_? :nee .structure, such a move
ha c, -Proved uractical in 19x;0 c, :Te.i it had. been intended.
1. The terms of th )efenst'e 21 ct had been internreted in the direction
of an i.ndc.peadnnt or quasi-indener'_-?ent
2. T~,e weight of precedent had tin.~ec3 the balance in this direction
3. The ragency had grow-m too large and its interrelationships with the
rest of the intclli:hence structure too intricate to allow o: the radical changes
that a return to anuthing like th full CIG idea :ould ha',,e entailed.
4. The circumstances of the Korean her would have made such Changes
es eecially dancccerous at this time.
C. Therefore, the Smith administration was left exactly where the
Mlle kaetter adm . n i.st ? a. i,ion ha c?. ., en -rite, t h- except ion that it did not carry
~ (, l.t
on 7.T ~. t
n^,11.r1_ent __Ylt,, i l ge 1Ce reS^".T'CC .. and c: ned. fi e~ O s bil'1_ty -4 tha
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-7-
A. -L uust_."~ ..t on of OIC f. o_^ 'C' "3 a/CO:APS hich i pliod coordination by
T)
t')" Dir. ec'?er (rr7.t1icr t'tan b, a cornaittee) as had bean originally intended
f,li]Ction al on( (Ti ich neces-itated esta'~Jlis?i ient of Other
of,-ice- e ~C.'?" i :i 1 t ~.^ other C,S=Y";ti 1 f:inct .On i t :ie Of_'ic had super-
intended --)ret rioi s1;,T)
C. 1"C' -!' -'- ,_)?ink aCti Vltie`" 'ln,ler a c1.o n
A.sts.T, airs zr to con :ic:e.rlt-ion t>. pact ti-vat zr have n vcr heard of O?C
or any of its nror'eny?
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}
 This docw4t has barn
the central inteiii a Lgency.
National Policy and Strategic intelligence is that staff intelligence prepared
in a in errest of the national security y the Director of Central Intelligence
for the President, and the State, War and Navy Departments and, as
appropriate, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee., the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and other governmental'departments and agencies having strategic
and policy functions related to the national security. (CI G 23)
Intelligence Information is that information collected to meet the needs
of al Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national
security. (NSCID 5, page 1)
Investigative Information is limited. to that information which has been
obtained or is obtainable) by means of a security investigation. (Reg. 10-230)
National Security relates to the protection and preservation of the military,
economic, and productive strength of the United States, including the
security of the Government in domestic and foreign affairs, against or from
espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and any and all other illegal acts designed
to weaken or destroy the United States and the national intelligence effort.
The term national security shall also relate to the protection of intelligence
sources, methods and organization from u a sure.
This is a TehRAhD
is determined to be the best available. .(CI G 23)
and general interest-which, as result-of evaluation and interpretation,
o? encyclopedic rmation of more or less continuing-or static nature
Factual Intelligence isthat intelligence which results from the collation
nature and general interest which, as a result'of evaluation and interpretation,
is determined to be the best available. (NSCID 3, page 1)
Current Intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types
and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which
is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete. evaluation
or interpretation. (NSCID 3, page 2)
Staff Intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency
through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials
available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and re pponsib'lities.
ZNS CID 3, page 2)
Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including basic, current, and
ata f intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency of the
Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof to execute its mission
and to discharge its lawful responsibilities. (NSCID 3, page 3)
National Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the
broad. aspects;:of national policy and national security, is of concern to
more than one Department or. Agency,.and'tra.nscends the exclusive competence
of.a single Department or 'agency or the Military Establishment. (NSCID 3, page 3)
Basic Intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the
collaat on'of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static
.1 Im. Y'9 ?--'
Date ELI
(Reg. 20-730)
only, for the use of DCIJHS.
FHs/Hc-24 The record copy has been
H/25Jg1 s~9'~Z
r Release 2003d2Md 1g1Pt Wrf V
tnil rtho WISTC}RICAL REVIEW PR G
00020002-6
 Approved- For, -Release 2005/12/23 CIA-RDP83-01034R002000Z00O.24
-2-
Psychological Warfare is the planned use, during time of war or threat of war,
Of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the
thought, morale, or behavior of .a given foreign group in such a way as to
support the accomplishment of our military or national aims. (NIA 7)
Communications _Intelligence is intelligence produced by the study of foreign
communications. Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications
Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as
pertains to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications
Intelligence Board.
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 Approved Four Felease 2005/12/23 : CUDP83-010
00200020002-6
T'h S doCW-eZ'1t bWn
04
approved for g~IEW~PRQGFtAI~ of
the HISTORICAL nCe Y%
AS
they Central Intelliw
vat* 6
This is a TEMPORARY-00 C ENT
only, for the use of OCIIN
.cord copy has been
1110 1
released to National Archives
REVIEW
under the HISTORICAL PROGRAM.
Date 6 ~- ~ q HRP g? 4 _ v
~
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200020002-6
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 tip/ -...
Approved Fo Release 1005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-010 4R000200020002-6
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Aar poetti Of i 1119eWo Staff
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Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200020002-6
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Approved For Release LOO-5/1 2/2-1 - - - 34R000200020002-6
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 25X'
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 TRANSMITTAL SLIP
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REMARKS:
3t21& 2/27/52
GATE
Here's the outline you said
you would comb over. I tried to
leave enough space so that you can
add and comment to your heart's con-
tent and hope you will as it will con-
tent mine too.
.This Is'>f6flAAAl11'~
only, for the use of DCtIHS.
The record copy has been
released to National Archives
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
Date 4LS-1171 HRP'2-
Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200020002 6
FROM:
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 Approved For Release 2005f12/23 : CIA-RDP83-010p4R000200020002-6
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 Appr aI Release [" 83-01(3 000200020002-6
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 Approved F _ Releas A 1P83-01034R000200020002-6
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Approved For 0- -rail L2/23- G IA RDP83-01034R000200020002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200020002-6
25X1
si";41ARIi5
OFFICE MESSA-.. ,
. I IN Etc o. _
TI l t th-
r.M..
RETURNED YOUR CALL
EXItNSIDN WILL CALL AGAIN
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