A PERMANENT UNITED STATE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090008-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 25, 1944
• Content Type: MEMO

Transcribed 26 June 1952 L 12,733g
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
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M E M O R A N D U M
TO: THE.PRESIDE1'T
FROM : MR. LUBIN
SUBJECT: A PEIKANENT UNITED STATE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
October 25, 1944
As you no doubt know, Bill Donovan's Office of
Strategic Services has been doing some swell work. It
occurred to me that there will be room after the war
for a service in the United States Government which
would carry on some of the work now being done under
Donovan+s auspices.
eign policy.
Prior to the present war the United States had no
adequate secret intelligence service, nor any over-all
intelligence organization. After the star I think there
will.be a need for a continuous flow of intelligence
which could be used 'for the developuent of American for-
Such a service should in no manner encroach upon
the duties of the established intelligence services of
the Army, Navy and Air Forces. They have a specific
function to perform which is directly related to size
of armies, location of armies and equipment available.
What I have in mind is an organization that would col-
lect, analyze and disseminate intelligence on the policy
and strategy levels. It should objectively and impar-
tially serve the needs of the combined diplomatic, mili-
tary and economic services of the Government.
It would be made up of specialists who were profes-
sionally trained in intelligence analysis, with a high
degree of competence and knowledge in the economic;
social and geographic factors that prevail in different
countries throughout the world. It was this sort of
information that we sadly lacked when we entered the
The nucleus of such an organization already exists
in the Office of Strategic Services. It has the trained
k,
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personnel, the foreign contacts, the administrative or-
ganization and the operating experience. It should be
headed up by a civilian. Policies should be determined
with the advice and assistance of a board upon which
the Department of State and the armed services should
be represented.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
0 ctob er 31, 19 44.
CONFIDENTIAL
I an sending the enclosed to you
for your eyes only. Will you be thinking
about this in connection with the post-war
period?
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C 0 P Y
ABD 2/8/52
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8. Osi- Service
October 26, 1944.
Bill Donovan's comprehensive plan for a post-war intelligence service
is, I understand, being forwarded to you for your consideration.
In my opinion, consideration should be given to the probability that
the British Intelligence has already penetrated the Donovan organization
and is thoroughly familiar with its methods, plans and personnel. If it
is continued after the wars its greatest usefulness might be as a means
of letting the British think they know what information is reaching us.
Since they will be pursuing their own ends, which are not necessarily
either hostile to or synonymous with our own ends, reliance should be
placed on the alternative method which this Unit, at your suggestion,
employed throughout 19Il.
This is much less expensive and involves a small and informal
central office, adequately camouflaged, utilizing chiefly foreign con-
tacts of American business, with the despatch of occasional "look-see"
agents in special circumstances, and with the evaluation of reports
entrusted to the State Department working in liaison with the F.B.I.,
Military and Navy Intelligence Services.
Since post-war trends will discourage expenditure of Federal funds
for foreign espionage, I recommend that this other system be given serious
consideration. If you should wish.. I would like to organize and direct
it. In any case,, I should like to give any advice and assistance de-
sired by whomsoever you select.
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DOPY
2/8/52 - ABD
7 November 19i
Thank you for your memorandum with inclosure relative to
post war intelligence.
I an afraid that the author is in the "horse and buggy stage"
of intelligence thinking. His suggestion' would hardly meet the basic
requirements of the Armed Services, the State Department and other Execu-
tive branches of the Government.
It was the failure for all these'years to appreciate the
complexity of building and directing intelligence as well"as subversive
operations over a world-wide network that has made the problem so diffi-
cult for us in this war.
Despite these difficulties however, under your authority and
with your support there has been established for the first time in our
history an independent American Intelligence Service which has already
won the respect of similar services in other countries.
Your correspondent suggests that OSS has been penetrated by
the English Intelligence Service. If by penetration is meant that we
have worked closely together with that Service in the spirit'of coopera-
tion that you have urged' upon uss, then the statement is true) but if
more than that is meant$'',the statement is not true and on the contrary
we have greatly profited by our working with the British and at the same
time we have maintained the integrity of our organization.
In point of fact you would be interested to know that both
our Lilies and our enemies know less about our inner workings thanwe
do about theirs.
William 4. Donovan
Director
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rovemer rl 5. ., In e ligence Service
Post War
October 26, 194
Bill Donovan's comprehensive plan for a post-war intelli-
gence service is, I understand, being forwarded to you for your
consideration.
In my opinion, consideration should be given to the
probability that the,British Intelligence has already penetrated
the Donovan organization and is thoroughly familiar with its
methods, plans and personnel. If it is continued after the
war, its greatest usefulness might be as a means of letting the
British think they know what information is reaching us. Since
they will be pursuing their own ends, which are not necessarily
either hostile to or synonymous with our own ends, reliance
should be placed on the alternative method which this Unit,
at your suggestion, employed throughout 1941.
This is much less expensive and involves a small and
informal central office, adequately camouflaged, utilizing
chiefly foreign contacts of American business, with the despatch
of occasional "look-see" agents in special circumstances, and
with the evaluation of reports entrusted to the State Department
working in liaison with the F.B.I., Military and Navy In-
telligence Services.
Since post-war trends will discourage expenditure of
Federal funds for foreign espionage, I recommend that this
other system be given serious consideration. If you should
wish, I would like to organize and direct it. In any case, I
should like to give any advice and assistance desired by whomsoever
you select.
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October 31, 19Lii
CONFIDENTIAL
I am sending the ;enclosed to you for your eyes only. Will
you be thinking about this in connection with the post-war period?
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.
TO: General William J. Donovan
Post Iffar
7 November 19L4
This will confirm our several recent conversations in
regard to relations with Dr. Lubin, etc. at the white House
in regard to a permanent central intelligence agency.
One of the recent important developments is that Dr.
Lubin definitely stated to Major Rosenbaum and the writer
that the FBI should not have any intelligence functions out-
side the United States. This completely eliminates this agency
from consideration,.as it should be.
Louis h. Ream
Deputy Director
Administrative Services
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mawh or OSS
C.I.S.
x Exec. Order
x Organization
INTERPRETIVE NOTES OF NR4G11,ANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT
18 November 1944
The present situation in the intelligence field
is analogous to a large industrial plant producing parts of
a complicated product without an assembly line. Our
intelligence system consists of a number of disparate
agencies, each trying vainly to satisfy national require-
ments. The ill-defined functions of each permit confusion,
duplication, and inevitable competition. The resulting
waste of manpower and talent, while deplorable, is not the
worst aspect. None of the agencies has both adequate re-
sources and logical scope of activity to satisfy national
requirements.
The extent and nature of such essential authority
has been outlined in a memorandum to the President dated
18 November 1/044. The enclosure (Tab A), 'tSubstantive
Authority Necessary in Establishment of a Central Intelli-
gence Service," provides essentially for the effectuation
under the supervision of the President of a central operating
agency with authority to:
a. Formulate national intelligence
policies and objectives;
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b. Coordinate the intelligence activities
of other Government departments and
agencies;
c. Perform certain secret intelligence
activities inappropriate for other
departments and agencies;
d. Prepare for the President and other
appropriate agencies of the Govern-
ment intelligence on the strategic
or national policy level as dis-
tinguished from the departmental
level.
Lacking authority for these broad functions, no
substantial improvement in national intelligence is believed
to be possible. The purposes of the specific provisions
enumerated in the memorandum are explained below in the order
of paragraphing in Tab A.
Paragraph 1. The intelligence objectives sought are
national in scope. The ,effort is concerned with problems of
peace as well as war and is designed to be permanent during
varying fluctuations in relative interests as between
military and civilian departments of government. Any authority
less than the President is too restrictive for the broad
purposes of national intelligence.
Paragraph 2. It is contemplated that this Advisory
Board be charged, subject to the approval of the President,
with the delineation of national intelligence policy and
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plans; with setting forth intelligence objectives, where
practicable, well in advance of events; and with coordinating
or harnessing the several departmental intelligence agencies
in the common task. The director of the central agency
administers the agency in accordance with such basic policies,
plans and principles as may be approved and promulgated by
the President. The intelligence resources of the central
organization are available to the Advisory Board for the
research necessary to these ends.
Paragraph 3.. Note that in its operations the central
agency relies upon the advice and assistance of other depart-
ments and agencies of the Goverment. The central agency is
not to be a thing apart, but rather the means for synthesizing
the intelligence resources of them all. It serves than all
in their joint or combined operations.
Paragraph 3(a). This paragraph needs no clarification,
and should require no justification. See paragraph 2 above.
Paragraph 3(b). In order to have available comprehensive
subject material required for intelligence studies bearing
upon national security, policies and interests, systematic
collection is necessary. In principle, collection should
be decentralized as far as'practicable and should be pri-
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marily a responsibility of departmental intelligence agencies.
Intelligence so gathered and in form required must be fur-
nished promptly and unreservedly to the central agency.
(See discussion of paragraph 7.)
Some types of intelligence material, however, can
more appropriately and economically be collected directly by
the central agency. This is true of certain highly secret
or highly specialized information of vital interest to the
Goverment as a whole but not alone to any individual de-
partment.
For obvious reasons this is also true of clandestine
intelligence, which may be defined as intelligence regarding
the activities and capabilities of foreign nations and
nationals affecting U.S. interests which the foreign govern-
ments wish to withhold from our goverment, and which
normally must be obtained by an organization operating
covertly. Clandestine intelligence includes counter-
espionage which constitutes the means of protecting the
entire intelligence and security systems from penetration.
The collection of this type of intelligence requires intri-
cate operations, and, except for specific tasks which may
be delegated to departmental agencies under careful security
measures, must be centrally administered.
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Representatives of the central agency abroad en-
gaged in clandestine intelligence would operate under a
variety of appropriate covers. In many instances this work
should be coordinated by a representative of the central
agency on the staff of the chief of the local diplomatic or
consular mission. The chief of mission should be afforded
the results of counter-espionage operations and all pertinent
clandestine postive intelligence which cannot embarrass the
chief of mission through his knowledge of operational details
or which does not endanger sources. In turn the chief of
mission should make available to the representatives of the
central service pouch and radio communications facilities
under complete security.
While the col:.ection of certain types of intelli-
gence material can bd partially or wholly farmed out to de-
partmental and other intelligence agencies, the cataloging
and central assembly of such material is national re-
sponsibility and can be accomplished effectively only by the
central agency. Despite much duplication in these fields,
no complete records exist. Typical of deficiencies in our
intelligence system is the absence of national libraries or
catalogs and indexes of:
Maps (Maps are essentially intelligence material.
Reference here is not to historical collections,
such as that in the Library of Congress.)
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Pictorial Records (Strategic or other intelligence
i s and 'sill photos.)
Biographical Records (of all foreigners who do or may
in the future influence our national interests.
These records do not include subversive in-
dividuals. Such individuals are recorded in
highly secret files--also on a national scope--
of the counter-espionage branch of the central
agency, whose functions are elsewhere described).
Paragraph 3(c). This fills the most serious gaps in
the existing intelligence system, namely, the lack of an
"assembly line" or focal agency where all subject intelli-
gence material is finally evaluated, analysed and synthesized.
The resultant memoranda, studies or estimates should repre-
sent the most comprehensive, complete and precise intelli-
gence available to the Government. Only a central agency is
competent to furnish the intelligence studies required by
Goverment agencies responsible for joing planning and policy
affecting national security and broad national interests.
Such studies involve expert research into some or all of the
following factors: military, economic, political and tech-
nological.
Recipients of such intelligence would include:
The President.
Policy making agencies specified by
the President.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and its
agencies.
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Commanders of Joint operations (in
so far as they require other than
combat and departmental intelligence).
The justification for the two latter recipients
may be less evident than the others. Agencies of the Joint
Chiefs cannot be expected to evaluate and synthesize partial
contributions of the several departmental intelligence
agencies. This should be done by a central agency. At
present the mechanism for this work is the JIG. But the
JIC suffers from the ineffectiveness inherent in committees
and, in addition, from its lack of coordinating or other
authority.
Commanders of joint expeditions at present have
the option of setting up their own joint intelligence
agencies or being dependent upon haphazard intelligence from
the various departmental agencies. Both expedients are un-
satisfactory. In building up individual joint agencies,
either they lack resources and talent or else they waste
manpower. In depending upon the separate departmental
agencies, experience shows that the intelligence from the
departmental agencies has been fragmentary and narrow of
scope. While the situation varies in each theater, broad
strategic or policy intelligence available to theater com-
manders has generally been deficient.
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The British Government is not to be condemned when
high American commanders in Europe lean heavily upon British
strategic and policy intelligence. There exists no American
agency wholly competent to prepare or responsible for fur-
nishing intelligence of American origin. Intelligence staffs
in the various military commands may satisfy combat demands,
but policy intelligence from American' sources is inferior.
Hence it is supplied largely by the better developed British
system.
Paragraph 3(d). An important feature of the project is
the procurement and training of superior intellectual types
for the varied specialties required in the higher intelli-
gence field. In the armed services those officers who have
demonstrated their superior aptitude for intelligence work
in the departmental agencies should be chosen for key
positions in the central agency. There should be a recog-
nized career for officers who devote themselves to intelli-
gence work with benefits comparable to those in other
specialized fields.
Military, naval and air attaches and observers of
the future should be indoctrinated in the broader intelli-
gence requirements by service in the central agency before
being sent to foreign posts.
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Of even greater importance, however, is the oppor-
tunity which a central agency afford for exploiting the
wealth of civilian talent in the United States. The objec-
tive is to create a framework in which the professional
military man and the professional civilian can collaborate
to mutual advantage and to the benefit of the nation.
Specific legislative provisions should be sought
to permit the employment of outstanding civilian talent
under favorable conditions of pay, emoluments and terms of
service in order to insure continued availability of
requisite experts both during peace and war. Civil ser-
vice regulations should be made inapplicable to such specialists.
Administrative provisions should permit the
rotation of expert civilian personnel in order to permit
recurrent employment of the best available talent from
academic, 'scientific and other specialized professions.
These experts would bring their specialized abilities to
government service and carry back to their institutions
knowledge of the realities of official practice.
Paragraph 3(e). This paragraph applies primarily to
wartime but it also may be an effective weapon in defense
of national interests in any situations where these interests
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are actively threatened. In appropriate situations, sub-
versive operations include these activities listed in para-
graph 5, a and b. in JCS 115/ll/D.
Subversive operations and clandestine intelli-
gence are recognized by all foreign governments as ancillary
to each other. In peacetime war experience must be pre-
served and the study of such operations on a basis of current
intelligence must be continuous in order that when war again
threatens, the subversive operations may be quickly d evel-
oped and enemy activities of the same nature circumvented.
Paragraph 3(f). (See discussion under paragraph 3(b)).
This coordination is essential for orderly and mutually
supporting methods of collection by the central agency and
departmental agencies. Except for certain types of highly
secret intelligence, it should be a principle to place
responsibility for collection as far as practicable upon
the departmental agencies.
Paragraph b. Recognition is here given to the fact that
there are two distinct functions: that of a security police
system at home dependent upon coercion and law enforcement
as its weapon; and an agency wholly without coercive or
police duties whose functions is intelligence alone which
intelligence is made available to such appropriate law en-
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forcing authorities as may exist,. either civil or military.
The counter-espionage and other clandestine activities of
the central agency are of the latter type.
Paragraph 5. While recognizing the principle of de-
centralization in the collection of intelligence to depart-
mental agencies and of making each of these agencies re-
sponsible for evaluating, synthesizing_and disseminating
intelligence appropriate to its on operations, it is just
as important to delimit clearly their activities and functions
as it is to centralize responsibility for strategic and
policy intelligence in the central agency. It is only by
this method that each agency produces intelligence appro.-.
priate to its operational necessities and thereby eliminates
duplication and confusion in the intelligence field.
Much of the existing confusion and waste of man-
power is due to futile attempts on the part of some depart-
mental. agencies to undertake the responsibilities of an
over-all, focal service.
Paragraph 6. This paragraph is designed not only to
give authority to the Director to draw on the best functional
talent but, more importantly, to cause departmental agencies
to assume responsibility for effecting within the framework
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of the central agency the best research in the field of their
operational interests.
Thus the central agency becomes not a thing apart,
but rather a national intelligence cartel in which all de-
partmental agencies have a participating interest. For
example, the State Department, having a primary interest in
political research, should furnish supervisory personnel to
insure that such research is of high order and meets its re-
quirements. State Department personnel likewise must see to
it that all information in the Department is available to
political research workers. The same is true with respect
to FEA in the economic field, and the armed services in the
military field.
Paragraph 7. The whole system of intelligence fails
unless the central agency has access to all pertinent in-
formational sources of the Government. The principle of
security has scrupulously to be observed, but information
is useless if casually suppressed on the score of security.
The arbiter of security should be the central agency. Security
should not be allowed to become either a fetish or a device
to obstruct rational dissemination of information to appro-
priate agencies.
The central agency is not conceived to be the re-
cipient of masses of raw material. Some selected and evalu-
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ated raw material may be requisite to the research groups of
the central agency. Particularly is this true of current
information and cable despatches. Generally, however, requi-
sition should be made on departmental agencies for particular
types of information, data and memoranda or studies covering
specific aspects of intelligence work in progress.
Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10. No remarks necessary.
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 AREA OR COUNTRY( PP
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUME
Exchange 0
SECRET (llhen Filled In)
orzkdeteas
Organiz ati.on
W~2~,0.~O9g11 ES
H : S F . D . Rxx Tl
i meiuioranda between President Roosevelt, General
d others discussing the creation of a permanent
telligence Service, 18 pp.; typed.
Donovan an
Foreign In
DATE:
25 October' 4
18 March 194
LOCATIONi
Item S V
Those memoranda discuss the merits of a foreign intelligence service
and the need to extend its operations after World War IT. in a memorandum
to President Roosevelt, Mr. Lubin of the White House Staff points out
that the United States will need to continue its intelligence service in
the post-war period to keep the military informed, and that the Intel-li-
g;enco service should be a centralized agency which would control all
intelligence activities, thereby leaving the FBI out of foreign intelli-
gence collection,
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