LECTURE BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN ON PARTISAN WARFARE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, TEXAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000200230003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: SPEECH

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This document has boen
approved fox release through
the I IS'TWl'EC ?,L REVIEW PROCR of
tho Central Intelligence Agency.
This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
only, for the use of DCI/HS.
The record copy has been
released to National Archives
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
Date 7 ~- BY WILLIAMTUREDONOVA ate V2.2 9/ _ HRP
HRH 0 9 ON
PARTISAN WARFARE
ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
JANUARY 11, 1951
Let us commence with definitions -- The
Oxford Dictionary is the authority for the following:
PARTISAN - A member of a party of light Qr irregular
troops employed in scouring the country, making forays,
etc.; a member of a volunteer force similarly employed;
a guerrilla.
GUERRILLA - An irregular war carried on by armed bodies
of men acting independently.
IRREGULAR - A soldier not of the regular army - in
ancient and medieval history we find irregular bodies
attached to the regular forces which, having neither
pay nor position are permitted to pillage.
In his pamphlet on "Guerrilla Parties" written
in 1862 at the request of General Halleck, then General-
in-Chief of the Army of the United States, Francis Lieber
recognized authority in the usage and customs of war at
that time defined the word "guerrilla."
He said a "guerrilla" means an irregular band
of armed men carrying on an irregular war, not being able,
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according to their character as a guerrilla party, to carry
on what the law terms a regular war.
The irregularity consists in its origin, because
it comes into existence at the call of a single individual and not by a national levy nor conscription nor call for
volunteers; in the fact that it is not connected with the
army as to.its pay, provisions and movements; further, it
is irregular as to its permanent status'since the band can
be'dismissed and then be called back again.
He points out that many persons associate with
the term "guerrilla" the notion of pillage, of murder
and of robbery. History confirms this association, but
the law of war as well as of peace, has dealt with many of
such acts and determined their justification or their
criminality under other accepted terms namely:- the
Freebooter - the Marauder - the Brigand - the Partisan -
the Free-corps - the Robber - and the Rising en Masse or
the Arming of the Peasants.
A brief examination will help us better to under-
stand the subject of discussion.
General Halleck in his International Law or
Rules regulating the intercourse of States in Peace and
War (1861 - Vol. I) considers partisan troops and guerrillas
as the same. He regards "self-constitution" a character-
istic of the partisan. He describes both partisans and
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guerrillas as self-organized and self-controlled who
carry on war against the public enemy without being under
the direct authority of the State.
If, however, they are authorized and employed
by the State they become a portion of its troops and the
State is as much responsible for their acts as for the
acts of any other part of the army. In 1870, the Prussians
required each Franc-tireur (one of a corps of light
infantry, originating in the wars of the French Revolution,
and having an organization distinct from that of the
regular army) to wear a uniform recognizable at gun-shot
distance in which case he would be treated as an enemy of
war.
Placed under army command, they no longer are
regarded as partisans and guerrillas in the accepted sense
for they are under the direction and authority of the State.
Partisan and guerrilla bands who commit hostile
acts as individuals and not as legitimate acts of war, are
regarded as outlaws, and when captured may be punished
the same as free-boaters and banditti.
The freebooter or Filibuster was a term still
in common use at no remote period. He was a pirate. At
times he became a privateer through receiving from his
sovereign letters of marque which licensed him to fit out
an armed vessel to use in the capture of enemy shipping.
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(Abolished in European nations by Congress of Paris in
1856.)
The bandit or brigand is an armed irregular
soldier who lives by pillage and robbery particularly in
Italy, Spain and Turkey. Brigand derives from "briguer"
to beg - it originally meant beggar but came to mean armed
wanderers, a class of men which appeared in all countries
in the middle ages, But military terminology even in the
time of our Civil War gave it a wider meaning -- as one who
without or against the authority of his own government
assails the enemy, thereby (though his object is free from
intention to pillage) would be branded a brigand subject
to execution if captured.
The terms Partisans and. Free Corps are vaguely
used. Apart from the use of the word partisan as inter-
changeable with guerrilla, the term has been employed to
designate a corps whose mission it is to strike the enemy
by action distinctive from that of the corps' main army.
Since its duty is to support the main effort it is an
integral part of the army and as such entitled to the
privileges of the laws of war. It generally acts against
the enemy's line of communication and beyond the lines of
operation of his own army in the rear and on the flanks of
the enemy.
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Free-corps on the other hand, are troops not
belonging to the regular army, consisting of volunteers,
generally raised by local leaders under government authoriza-
tion, used for the "little war" and not incorporated in
the order of battle.
In a recent book by Ferdinand Lot, a Professor
of History at the Sorbonne, on Military Art and Armies of
the Middle Ages, there are many references to such troops
during that period.
Of course in the 18th century there were free-
corps in Germany, opposed to Napoleon who received the
benefits of belligerents when taken as prisoners of war.
During the Philippine insurrection, it should
be noted that the United States recognized the legitimacy
of the Philippine guerrillas which operated after the
Philippine forces had been defeated by the United States in
March 1899. In November of that year the Philippine
Government adopted a resolution to the effect that the
insurgent forces which had waged war on the United States
following the defeat of Spain and the cession of the
Philippines to the United States were incapable of further
resistance in the field and it was decided to disband the
Army. According to the resolution the officers and men
were to return to their own provinces and were to organize
the people for general resistance by means of guerrilla warfare.
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Many of these guerrilla forces were recognized
as lawful belligerents by the United States. The dis-
tinction between guerrillas who were and were not recognized
as lawful was emphasized in a trial which took place of
Gumban, a Philippine citizen, for murdering a Philippine
citizen. Gumban was a Captain in the insurgent army and
had the rank of First Official Guerillero in command of
a group of volunteers from Pavia. Pursuant to orders from
his superior officers, Gumban led thirty villagers to Pavia
for the purpose of attacking seventeen American soldiers
stationed there. In attempting to take a Philippine
citizen prisoner, the latter was fatally stabbed. In dis-
approving the conviction for murder, the Commanding General,
Division of the Philippines, ruled that Gumban was a lawful
belligerent who killed the citizen while attacking the enemy
under orders of his superior officers.
During World War II it should be noted that the
United States recognized the lawful belligerency of the
FFI forces in France. This was evidenced by the announce-
ment of General Eisenhower on July 15, 1914 that the FFI
were a combatant force commanded by Major General Koenig,
formed an integral part of the Allied Expeditionary Force,
bore arms openly against the enemy, and wore distinctive emblems,
The "rise en masse" or "the arming of peasants"
as it used to be called is closely allied to the matter of
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guerrilla warfare. Austria armed the people as militia in
1805 -- Russia in 1812 -- Prussia in 1813.
Formerly, a member of a "levee en masse" was not
generally recognized as a lawful belligerent, but this has
changed since the Declaration of Brussels, 1874, defined
"levee en masse" as 'The Population of a non-occupied
territory,.who on the approach of the enemy, of their own
accord take up arms to resist invading troops,' without
having had time to organize. Such combatants, if captured,
now have status of prisoners of war.
When we come to the Hague Convention of 1907 on
the Laws and Customs of War, we see that if partisan and
guerrilla forces can meet the test laid down in Article I,
they would be entitled to the privileges of belligerents.
ARTICLE I. - 1. The laws, rights and duties of war apply
not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer
corps fulfilling the following conditions:-
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable
at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
k. To conduct their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps
constitute the army or form part of it, they are included
under the denomination "Army."
ARTICLE II:-
The inhabitants of a territory which has not been
occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously
take up arms to resist the invading troops without having
had time to organize themselves in accordance with ARTICLE I,
shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly
and if they respect the laws and customs of war.
ARTICLE III:-
The armed forces of the belligerent parties may
consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of
capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as
prisoners of war.
If there is one certain deduction to be drawn from
past experience, it is that guerrilla tactics, when carried
out by a resourceful and persistent enemy, have generally
resulted in prolonged warfare, especially against invading
armies.
Irregulars appeared in a series of wars between the
British and the French in North America, which went on at
intervals from 1689 to 1763. Irregular warfare has been
employed in the wars of every age -- ancient, medieval and
modern. It was carried on in each of the wars of the
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United States prior to 1900. Frontiersmen, in defense of
their homesteads, formed irregular bands. They called them-
selves and were by others called "Rangers."
In the American Revolution, partisan bands appeared,
among them the Green Mountain Boys in the North and the
followers of Pickens, Marion and Sumter in the South.
Bands of guerrillas and irregular cavalry who
operated chiefly in the "Neutral Ground" of Westchester County,
New York, during the American-Revolution:
Westchester Light Horse (sometimes called "De Lancey's
Green Jackets" because of their uniform) was organized in
1777 and was an irregular unit of the British Army until the
end of the war, taking part in some of the principal battles.
In the Civil War partisan corps like "Mosby's Rangers"
were active. Smaller bands existed in Kentucky, Kansas,
Missouri, Arkansas and the Indian territory. Of these,
Albert Pikers band of Confederates composed largely of
Indians, was possibly the most significant.
The line which divides regular warfare froni guerrilla
or partisan warfare -- war from "little war" -- is not always
easily drawn. That difficulty-arises in instances of an
enemy like the Boers, who never had a definite military
organization in the European sense of the term. Their military
genius was peculiarly adapted to partisan warfare,. When after
Lord Roberts' arrival in South Africa, the British moved
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against them in overwhelming force, they turned to guerrilla
Napoleon is reported as saying that the secret of
war is "to preserve one's own communications while threaten-
ing those of the enemy." The Boers, after the fall of
Pretoria, had practically no communications to preserve.
The whole country afforded them their base of operations.
They were tied down to no particular spot or region, for on
every side they found the people friendly and ready to help.
Their obvious policy was to attack the British lines of
communication and out up isolated detachments and convoys.
This was carried out successfully until Britain finally
learned how to counter Boer tactics and with her superior
strength finally won.
But Spain, throughout her long history, has always
been recognized as the country most ideally suited for
guerrilla tactics. There is no region in Europe in which it
is more difficult to wage successful war. It has been said
"if the army of invasion is small, it is defeated; 'if it is
large, it starves."
Even in Livy's time the truth of this was appreciated
by the Romans. The remnant of the Carthaginians who had
taken refuge there after the fall of Carthage had defied the
Roman power with great persistency, while the Spanish in-
surrection of Quintus Sertorius in 80 - 72 B.C. had seriously
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shaken the stability of the Republic itself. His irregulars
were the native tribes and the pirates of the Mediterranean,
employing all the techniques of unorthodox warfare. But
guerrilla tactics alone have never expelled a resolute invader
so that after Sertorius held out for 8 years Roman persistance
finally won.
History repeated itself in the Peninsula during the
long struggle with the Moors, and again'at the beginning of
the 19th century, when the Spanish guerrillas drew upon
themselves the attention of the world.
Rebellion against the invader or the soldier of
occupation is a natural occurrence at any time. What
distinguishes guerrilla warfare is the consistent strategy,
of the refusal to fight a pitched battle, the refusal of any
combat which can be avoided, sticking to the order to attack
the isolated soldier, the small group, the convoy. To set
fire to one's house rather than see an enemy soldier spend
the night there.
Napoleon had the experience on two occasions to
encounter determined, ruthless and tenacious guerrilla forces.
First in the rising of the armed peasants in 1809 when the
whole of Spain was in the hands of the French. Then the
bands of armed peasants -- the Partidas or partisans as they
were called by the Spaniards -- appeared on the scene. Their
operations were spread over the whole country. It was estimated
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that they kept 50,000 French troops employed in guarding
the line. Napoleon rebuked his generals for failing to cut
the guerrilla off the English supply ships. So out off,
they were impotent. Nevertheless, they had contributed
greatly in bringing about the dissolution of Napoleon's power.
In his Russian campaign, he again ran into trouble
with guerrilla operations.
The role of the Russian guerrillas during the campaign
of 1812 was tied more clearly to the Russian army than that
of the Spanish guerrillas to Wellington.
In Russia the difficulties of supply for Napoleon
which lost for him one after another, his convoys, his
cavalry and. finally his infantry, which he could not even
feed, were much more due to the partisans than to the army
of Kutuzov.
Russian historians of the campaign of 1812, particular-
ly the later ones, have showed perfectly the guerrillats
role and his methods.
"It was the Russian peasant," writes Tarle, "who
wiped out the magnificant cavalry of Murat. He killed the
horses by burning the hay and straw which the foragers went
to hunt for, sometimes throwing into the fire the foragers
themselves. The peasants, who hated their slavery under the
Czars, who protested against it by revolt and by the
assassination of their masters,:who had, 37 years before, put
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in danger the whole regime of serfdom, these same peasants
treated Napoleon like their worst enemy, burnt the wheat, the
hay, the fodder, burned their own isbas (wooden huts) to
kill the French quartermasters inside."
One can imagine how Napoleon judged it advisable
to hasten to return to France, leaving to Murat the care of
bringing back the debris of his army.
Why, at the dawn of the 19th century, this explosion
of guerrilla warfare, and its success?
The "patriotism" of the Russian or Spanish people
is the reason generally given by the historian. The
Peninsular War, like the Russian campaign of 1812, bears
the name of a "patriotic war."
The cause of the guerrilla warfare in Spain as in
Russia was attributed to patriotism or fanaticism.
However, another explanation is more practical. It
was no coincidence that this guerrilla resistance appeared
in the interior of Spain in 1807 and five years later in the
desolate marshy forests of White Russia.
In each of these places, the soldiers of the Grand
Armee had been guilty of pillage. In each place this meant
the reaction first of the Spanish then of the Russian peasant
who has his cow taken from him without payment. Relations
became strained between the soldier who was starving and the
peasant who would starve himself: if he feeds the soldier.
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Added to these facts is the fact that vulnerability
to guerrilla warfare is a malady peculiar to modern armies.
The root of this vulnerability was the importance of
material by Napoleon's increase in artillery, and the increased
number of effectives through Carnot's conscripts of the
Revolution.
Napoleon suffered from the inconvenience of being
unable to find anything to buy in Spain and in Russia.
Clausewitz who was with the Russian army through the
Napoleonic operations, criticized in his History of the
Russian campaign of 1812, the lack of foresight of Napoleon
in failing to warehouse provisions along the route of his
attack. This lack of such provision made his army a direct
danger to the life and property of the peasants -- thus began
the real "patriotic war." Alison in his History of Europe
says: "During the first three weeks of October the partisans
around Moscow made prisoners of no less than 4,180 French
soldiers; and the reports from Murat announced the alarming
intelligence that one-half of the whole surviving cavalry
had perished in these countries."
From the historical facts, it would seem that against
a victorious army of invasion, guerrillas alone have effected
no permanent victory. Against such a foe they may hamper
and harass and delay but they cannot destroy.
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France took 30 years to bring Algeria to complete
subjection; Russia took the same length of time to gain
control of the Caucusus where Schamyl had resisted --
Andreas Hofer in the Tyrol with his peasant army elected to
fight pitched battles against the Franco-Bavarian armies.
Guerrilla tactics might have enabled him to last longer than
he did.
A small state when invaded by an enemy in over-
whelming strength naturally resorts to guerrilla methods.
In 186+ Denmark was invaded by the Austrian-Prussian armies
and was able to delay them for a time by surprise attacks
upon their lines of communication.
During the Franco-Prussian war companies of Francs-
tireurs were secretly formed, which carried out daring and
successful exploits against Russian troop trains and small
German detachments. Hardly a day passed without a German
sentry being found shot, strangled or bayonnetted at his post.
There were strong reprisals against these acts. When the
railroad bridge at Fonteney was blown up by the Chasseurs des
Vosges, the Germans burnt down every house and levied a fine
of ten million francs upon the entire population of Lorraine.
In June 1938, the German General Alexander von
Falkenhausen, military adviser to General Chiang-Kai-Shek,
together with his military mission, were recalled to Berlin.
This was reported as being done at the insistence of the
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Japanese government.
For 7 years, the Chinese had had the assistance of
a German military mission in building an army.
German literature on the subject of "Kleiner Krieg"
or "little war" discloses German belief in the principles
generally held as to the means of sustaining by minor
secondary actions the conduct of friendly operations and of
hampering those of the enemy. Certainly, for 7 years, the
Chinese were effective in limiting the Japanese occupation
forces to the territory contiguous to the rivers and railways
with the rest of the country under the rule of Chiang-Kai-Shek
and the war lords.
Let us examine curtain incidents during the period
of World War II and'the manner in which guerrilla forces
were used.
After Dunkirk in 1940, Hitler had overrun Western
Europe from the North Cape of Norway to the Pyrenees and was
then poised for what seemed a coup-de-grace -- the destruction
of Great Britain as the final obstacle to German world
domination at that moment.
In all of the countries taken over by the Nazis,
there were hundreds of thousands of individuals who remained
spiritually uncrushed, and who refused to accept defeat.
While waiting for their armed forces to be restored
and strengthened, the British decided by the use of unorthodox
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means to strike the enemyts war potential wherever exposed,
to drain his strength, disperse his forces, and generally
to weaken his war effort, while helping secret forces get
armed and trained.
The British realized that maximum results could be
obtained only by cooperation with the various allied
governments which had sought and found refuge in England.
Accordingly, British liaison groups were set up to help
organize and work with resistance elements in each of those
countries. United States forces were called upon to cooperate
with the British in this phase of warfare.
This was done through the Office of Strategic Services,
established as an operating agency of the Government under
the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It was charged with the collection of secret intelligence and
its evaluation, secret operations within enemy countries and
enemy-occupied or controlled countries. It was also re-
sponsible for the execution of all forms of morale and physical
subversion. This included the organization and support of
fifth column activities, sabotage, organization and conduct
of guerrilla warfare, and direct contact and support of under-
ground resistance groups.
The British and the French used to say to us:-
Because of your many minority groups you are especially subject
to penetration. We said we'll show you that what you consider
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a liability, we can turn into an asset.
So, we took men of the racial origin and the language
of the countries we were seeking to liberate. In addition
to sending such men into the various countries as intelligence
agents, organizers, saboteurs, we developed a pare military
unit.
This was in the nature of an officers' patrol of
5 officers and 30 men. We Americans called our units
"Operational Groups" and used them as activating nuclei of
resistance groups in the different theatres. The British
had similar groups without the language and racial qualifica-
tions.
The final military conclusions as expressed by
General Eisenhower will show that through these groups with
knowledge of the language, working behind the enemy lines,
giving leadership to partisans and guerrilla parties,
assistance was given to the main operation.
The report of General Eisenhower stated that militarily,
organized resistance helped the main operations of the Allied
Expeditionary Force as follows:
a) by sapping the enemy's confidence in his own
security and flexibility of internal movement;
b) by diverting enemy troops to internal security
duties and keeping troops thus employed dispersed;
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c) by causing delay to the movement of enemy
troops: (1) concentrating against Normandy beach-
head; (2) regrouping after the Allied break-out
from the beach-head;
d) by enabling Allied formations to advance with
greater speed through being able to dispense with
many normal military precautions, e.g., flank
protection and mopping up.
e) by furnishing military intelligence.
The British did not operate in the same way as we
did since they had no language groups.
Before we finished, we had such groups with so-called
guerrillas or partisans, working behind the lines living
and working with the resistance people, speaking their
language, instructing leaders, furnishing supplies and
ammunition and food, helping in the training of recruits and
having available cargo planes for the transportation of
personnel and supplies by means of radio sets maintaining
contact with and transmitting orders for the allied invasion
forces.
We sent such groups into Norway and Denmark, Belgium
and Holland, France and Germany, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Siam, China and Burma.
I quote from citations of General Eisenhower as
illustrative of the manner in which O.S.S. units carried on
successful guerrilla operations in various theatres.
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"In Italy from 15 April to 1 May 1245. OSS officers and
enlisted men volunteered for extra-hazardous duty behind
enemy lines, under the direction of the 15th Army Group
Headquarters. These men,organized_into small operational
groups. were infiltrated behind theenemy,lines b parachute
and ma.intaini contact with their headquarters by radio,
organized extensive~pertisen forces In thefina.l phase
of the offensive of the 15th Army Groqn__they_led these
partisan forces in all-out attacks,"
",In southern France from 1 to 1Augus 1~?Ep
Assigned the mission tosarachute into central and southern
France in strategic areas in advance of the invasion forces.
OSS_off icers and enlisted men. contacted French forces of
the Interior, arranged- for their supply bg_,_parachute drops
of arms, ammunition and. other SUQQ1 ,ies, andled them in
a erations as directed by Allied Force Headquarters. These
men, along with French Forces of the Interior, established
road blocks,__mined roads, ambushed columns,-attacked enemy
installations, and received the surrender of-over 1MOO
German troops. ""
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"In action against the eneMy in Greece from 1 August
to September 1944_ A totalof 15 OSS officers a.nd.199
enlisted menwere _parachuted into strategic_areas of Greece,
or entered it by sea, and organized and led the Greek
partisans in a campaign to out off the lines of retreat
of the German forces. They _destroged many ridges blocked
roads, attacked German convoys and caused severe loss in
enemy_personnel and equipment."
"SERVICE UNIT DETACHMENT NO. 101, 033 From $ May
to 19 June 1 captured the strategic cenemy strong points
of of Lawksawk, Pangtara endLoilem_in the Central Shan States,
Burma. This unit, composed of approximately 00 Americans -
officers and menu volunteered to clear the enemrvfrom an
area of 10,000 square miles, Its subsequent activities
deprived the_Japan_ese 15111 Army.of the only _East escape route
and secured the Stilwell Road a m nst enemy counterattack.
Although Detachment No. 101 had been engaged crimali in
intelligence and guerrilla activities, it set about the
infantry mission of-ousting adetermined enemy from a sector
long fortified and strategicallvpreered. These American
officers and men recruited, organized, and trained_3,200
Burmese nat iv entirely within enemy territory. Theythen
undertook and concluded successfully acoordinated 4-battalion
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offensive against importantstrategic objectives through an
area containing approximately 10,000 battle-seasoned
Japanese trop s."
"From 15 September 1943 until. the surrender of the
enemy forces in May 1945 OSS uniformed Officers and enlisted
men by parachute deep behind enemy lines in areas of strategic
importance. Their mission was to contact Italian Partisan
and resistance groups and to oKSaniza themes arranfze for their
supplyof arms and clothing by-par chute drops and then lead
them in e erations against the enemy forces as directed-
hy radio by the Special Oyerat .ons_Section of Gz _of these
ead uartera In_all29 officers and 118 enlisted men were
parachuted behind the lines many of them remaining there for
several onths. The role ofthe Italian partisans in
supplementing the operations of the Allied Armies in Italy
has been a. most important one. Their attacks on enemy_supplV
lines.-dumps, convoys and similar targets during_the fall of
1944 and winter of 1~?+~werea constant and serious harassing
problem for the enemy. During the final offensive in April
and May 1945 these Partisans caused great damage to enemy
installations, troop convoys and other targets and were success-
ful in blocking many of the escape routes. The Partisans
liberated many important cities and towns and successfully
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prevented the enemy from destroying public utilities and
industrial installations."
SIGNED -- MARK W. CLARK
Mark W. Clark
General, U.S. Army
Commanding
The effectiveness of the operation of the Italian
Partisans is found in telegrams from General Kesselring
to his superiors asking for help: I quote: -
"Activity of partisan bands in the Western Appennines,
and along the Via Emilia, particularly in the areas of
Modena, Reccio and Parma, and southwest of them, as
well as near the neighborhood of Pacenze, has spread
like lightening in the last ten days. The concentration
of the partisan groups of varying political tendencies
into one organization, so ordered by the Allied High
Command, is beginning to show clear results. The
execution of partisan operations shows considerably
more commanding leadership. Up to now it has been
possible for us, with a few exceptions, to keep our
vital rear lines of communications open by means of
our slight protective forces, but this situation
threatens to change considerably for the worse in the
immediate future. Speedy and radical counter-measures
must anticipate this development.
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"Wide areas are occupied, or endangered by partisan
bands, particularly in the Western Appennines and in
the Western Alps. A large number of vital supply
routes are now only useable in convoy, and are to
some extent completely in partisan hands. In addition
to these numerical increases, it is easy to see that
there has been a reorganization of the Italian partisan
heads, which are grouping themselves into military
formation taking military titles and uniforms and
appearing as formed bodies of troops.
"It is clear to me that the only remedy, and the
one which is unavoidably necessary to meet the
situation, is the concentration of all available forces,
even if this means temporary weakening in other places.
I request you therefore to combine with the lkth Army
and Army of Liguria, in carrying out several large
scale operations which will nip in the bud the increas-
ing activity of the partisan bands in Northern Italy.
Please let me have your proposals as to when these
measures can be carried out and with what forces.
Kesselring."
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In the Soviet Union, guerrilla warfare neither took
an exclusive role as in Yugoslavia nor even a preponderant
role as in China; the decisive part was played at the front.
But the action on the rear contributed powerfully to the
wearing down and the immobilization of the enemy forces.
Wide zones, especially in marshy forests, remained practically
forbidden territory to the German troops. The Russian partisan
corps which established itself in that area multiplied its
expeditions against the neighboring routes of communication,
which ranged from a surprise attack executed by a few civilians
to an expedition conducted by important effectives of the
regular army. At the beginning of February 1943, a communique
relating the return to the Soviet lines of a group of cavalry
which had left in November under the command of Colonel
Koursakov, attributed to it 4,000 German soldiers killed, 40
wagons, 6 aeroplanes, 47 pieces of artillery, 40 cannon, 300
trucks and motorcycles end a large amount of material of war
destroyed.
Raids of this strength forced the Nazis toyrelease
their forces of weak effective strength, and to maintain in
the East more men in the occupied regions than there were at
the front. The Hitlerian war machine in that area wore itself
out because it had to place in every train an armed detachment
and it had to transform every station into a fortress.
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Since the formal ending of World War II, under the
threat of the Red Army, the Soviet Union by use of penetration,
domination of political groups, economic pressures, has in
5 years without firing a shot, set up between itself and
the West, a bulwark of satellite South Eastern States which
can be of great military and economic importance.
The. Soviets sought to bring Greece within that group
through proxy military invasion. Under'the guise of civil
war-organized guerrilla forces under Soviet trained leaders
were placed in the mountains with light detachments sent
out to burn, to pillage and to terrorize.
In Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, schools, hospitals,
and supply dumps were established for replacements, indoctrina-
tion and training. In each of the countries, but especially
Albania, were places of refuge for the Communist guerrillas
when hard pressed.
The impression sought to be created by Soviet propaganda.
was that the war was an internal war fought by true democratic
elements against reactionary forces. As the war lengthened,
however, investigations by the Greek Security Police dis-
closed that the great number of attacking troops were not
Greek citizens but bodies of Communist guerrillas based in
adjacent countries, equipped and led by Soviet-trained leaders.
I was in Greece periodically during 1948 in respect
to the trial of the Communist murderers of Polk, the American
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{
correspondent. The Attorney General showed me the interroga-
tion of hundreds of captured Communist guerrillas. Investi-
gation showed that they were not Greek residents but men of
foreign origin who had joined up outside the Greek borders.
What I shall say now is a brief paraphrase of the
memorandum prepared for me by General Van Fleet when I told
him I had been invited to be with you today.
In substance, among other things he said that in
early operations against these Communist bands, the Greek
army made only piecemeal attacks, conducted no night operations
and were careless in their efforts at entrapment. After
some months of failure, they finally accepted a basic plan
whereby the Greek Army units echeloned in depth by the
distance of a night'.s march carried on operations against
guerrilla formations by encircling enemy pockets simultane-
ously over a wide area. These echeloned troops would march
toward the center of that area. If the enemy infiltrated the
inner circle, he would run into the next hemming force.
To supplement these ground tactics, it was also
necessary to have simultaneous counter-measures against
Communist intelligence networks.
All known suspects in a wide area, were arrested prior
to the start of the field operations. They were detained
and denied outside contacts until the operations were completed
or until positive proof of each individual's innocence had
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been asserted beyond any doubt.
Accordingly, Communist leaders in the hills were
unable to receive reliable information regarding the location
and plans of the Greek Army forces. As a consequence the
guerrillas were obliged to operate without detailed in-
formation about the enemy, were at a loss where to run, and
usually ran straight into the arms of one of the encircling
forces.
General Van Fleet described the cleanup of the
Pelopennese Campaign as an excellent example of this anti-
guerrilla operation,
By the same type of widescale operations with
deployment in depth, prior arrest of collaborators, thorough
search and subsequent adequate policing, cleared up Central
Greece by June 1949 and Northern Greece along the border, in
August.
In his words "The method is the approved solution
as evolved in Greece."
In Korea we see how guerrilla action was used by
Soviet satellites to support orthodox operations of the
regular forces,
All sources agree that guerrilla activity in that
theatre is for the United States a, problem of major proportion.
The American command has made clear that long-range
planning and careful implementation of such plans was carried
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on for more than two and one-half years prior to the Korean
war. In South Korea civilian sympathizers were cultivated
and opportunities created for the eventual utilization of
guerrilla forces. One of the major tools in this effort was
the establishment of the South Korean Labor Party -- a
Communist-inspired and Communist-directed group which had
as a major function the support of the guerrilla operations.
These partisans are of two categories: (1) those who actively
assist the rebels in skirmishes and attacks and are constantly
in the rebel areas; and (2) those who recruit personnel and
supplies from South Korean villages and wage a ceaseless
propaganda program. This latter group plays an important
part as intelligence agents in passing on information of
American and South Korean Army strength, locations, and plans.
Guerrilla activity has been intensified since the
Chinese intervention. Air force commanders say that Communist
irregulars figure heavily in their aerial offensive. Now
intelligence spokesmen estimate that there are 6,000 to 7,000
armed guerrillas behind the United Nations lines in4centrally
directed, organized groups. It is said that they will be able
to carry on their activities throughout the winter.
General Van Fleet has shown us how necessary he found
it in Greece to work out a plan for counter guerrilla action.
I assume that the command in Korea has undertaken to do this.
Viewing it from the outside it would seem to require drastic
action and a hard hand.
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I have given this brief review of partisan action.
One cannot help but be struck with the recurring fact that
the common demoninator of that action throughout the centuries
has been rapidIty,and surprise.
Certain principles we: should keep in mind. Among
these are the following--
I. In the usage and custom of war the basic
distinction between a regular army and an irregular force
is this. The regular army comes into being by State authority
through conscription or by national levy or a call for
volunteers and this army is controlled by the State. The
irregular forces are self-constituted or self-contained and
are created through some local leaders like Mikhailovich of
Serbia or Tito from Croatia contending as much against each
other as against the common enemy. However, if they became
employed by the State or are given recognition by and are
under the control of the theatre commander (as did happen to
both these leaders) then the State is responsible for their
acts.
II. The terms Guerrillas, Partisans, and Rangers
apart from their special significance may sometimes be applied
to certain regular forces whose mission is to attack the enemy
by action distinctive from that used by the main body of the
army to which they are attached. The principles of war to
which they become entitled are determined not through the term
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applied to them but by the character of the duties they
perform. It should be remembered that a ruthless enemy may
well ignore the wages of war and execute such groups as
Hitler did in World War II.
III. Past experience establishes that guerrilla
tactics carried out by a resourceful and persistent enemy
have generally prolonged a war especially against invading
armies.
IV. The special characteristic of guerrilla warfare
is not that it is "the poor man's war" but that it has the
consistent strategy in refusing to fight a pitched battle.
V. Modern armies by reason of their lines of
communication, their equipment, and their numbers of service
troops in rear echelons are vulnerable to guerrilla warfare.
VI. Our new experiences in this phase of war should
stimulate us to explore the possibilities of creating counter
guerrilla units for attack and defense which could cooperate
with the para military units charged with organizing re-
sistance movements in the various countries. Such'a study
would enable us to develop a body of doctrine in the whole
field of subversive war of which partisan warfare is only a
part. The attack is made with ideas as well as with men and
weapons. We have seen that the tactics and strategy of
guerrilla action is not new - neither is subversive action
against spiritual and moral defenses.
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Generally nations make use of two methods for reach-
ing the goal of their policies. The employment of skill in
diplomacy and the use of violence in conventional warfare.
Hitler and Mussolini took subversion, modernized
its propaganda and fifth column activities and used them as
an auxiliary in support of their main operations.
Stalin took a more revolutionary step - Beginning
with the end of World War II the Soviets have been waging a
war in which subversive methods constitute the main means of
attack under cover of the threat of the Red Army.
The pattern of that program can be found in its purges
in S.E. Europe, its pressures upon France and Italy, its
activities in Africa and the Middle East.
In Germany, less violent than Korea, but more vivid
as an example of moral subversion, we see the attempted
breakdown of loyalties. West Germany shows us the devices
and techniques by which a nation is sought to be subdued -
East Germany gives us an insight into the making of a new
satellite by applying pressures to all phases of l1.'fe, of all
social classes, groups and individuals.
The Soviets have perfected the art of breaking the
will of their victims to resist. It seeks its end by political
and economic attack (as in Yugoslavia) fifth column penetration
and terroristic tactics (as in Germany, Italy and France) with
periodic violence by proxy as in Greece and Korea.
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But her war of maneuver by subversive means begins
to disclose weaknesses which cannot be entirely concealed by
diversionary methods.
The Chinese Communists under Soviet guidance sought
to exploit the conquest of China.
As the invasion gained momentum moving from the North
to the South the Communist leaders began to pay less attention
to patient political inducements and concentrated more on rigid
military control. As a result, anti-communist guerrilla
forces have been increasing in the coal mining districts in
the Shantung provinces and in the area south of the Yangtze
River.
Here is a chance for us to give aid and assistance
to that movement.
Another weakness is already apparent -- Disaffected
elements within the population of the Soviet Union are
already running great risks to escape into the American Zone.
They take these risks even though unsure they will not be
It was a great loss to us in this respect that as a
result of the Yalta Agreement a great mass of Soviet Prisoners
of War and forced laborers in Western Europe numbering two
million were sent back to Russia in many cases over their
violent objections.
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To date the United States had done little to persuade
people to leave Soviet control. We know that dissatisfaction
is widespread in the ranks of Soviet occupation forces in
Germany and Austria and among the population of the Soviet
Union itself.
An Inducement Program would lead them to come to
the Americans with assurance of good treatment, protection
and the opportunity to participate in Anti-Soviet work.
This would not necessarily result in an organized attack upon
the Soviet Union. It could result in disaffection and
resistance to internal order. This could make Stalin keep
looking over his own shoulder until we are able to build and
strengthen our regular and orthodox military position.
By such positive and affirmative action we must help
buy time to strengthen our regular forces and prevent Stalin
from the further consolidation of his position until those
forces are ready.
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