MEETING ON INDOCHINA-CHINA-USSR, JANUARY 25, 4:30 P.M., DEPARTMENT OF STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100020005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 25, 1979
• Content Type: MF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
I Eaecuth . y u
79-255
SECRET January 25, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR BENJAMIN C. EVANS
CIA
SUBJECT: Meeting on Indochina-China-USSR, January
25, 4:30 p.m., Department of State
Background papers for the 2irector of Central
Intelligence on the Agenda Ite for/the subject
meeting are attached. r ''
I,, I
Peter Tarnoff -'
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
Background papers.
State Department review completed
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Agenda for Meeting on Indochina-China-USSR
1. Intelligence Summary (updated)
-- Situation in Kampuchea
-- Sino-Vietnamese propaganda over Border
-- Chinese Border Dispositions
-- Vietnamese Border Dispositions
-- Sino-Soviet Border Update
-- Chinese options
-- Vietnamese options
-- Soviet options
2. Diplomatic Actions Taken to Date (Updated)
-- Original Security Council action
-- Follow-up at the UN and in capitals on UN
action and aid
-- Demarches to USSR, PRC and SRV
-- Consultation with Japan and others on
Sino-Soviet tension
3. Congressional Consultation and Reaction (Updated)
4. Public Posture (updated)
5. Possible Military Deployments or changes by USG
6. Implications for Deng Xiaopeng Visit
7. Implications for Kriangsak Visit
8. U.S. Policy towards Chinese military action
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1. Intelligence 'Summary
A. Situation in Kampuchea
Vietnam has accomplished its basic political and mili-
tary objectives in Kampuchea: imposition of a subservient
Kampuchean regime; military occupation of most of the country.
Nevertheless, armed forces loyal to former Prime Minister
Pol Pot, are carrying on guerrilla resistance throughout the
country with up to 50,000 troops widely dispersed, often
cut off and difficult to resupply but still capable of con-
ducting spoiling actions and almost impossible to eradicate
completely.
Vietnam, with over 100,000 troops, uncontested control
of the urban areas, airfields, ports, and roads plus ease of
resupply has the clear advantage. Vietnamese forces are
fanning out into the countryside to search out and destroy
Kampuchean resistance. Peking is likely to renew efforts to
persuade Thailand to permit overland transit of Chinese aid
to Pol Pot forces.
Vietnam is moving rapidly to "legitimize" a close
relationship with the Kampuchean regime it has installed.
Pham Van Dong is scheduled to visit Phnom Penh soon and will
probably conclude various economic, political and military
agreements, analagous to those with Laos, designed in part
to provide the "legal basis" for a longstanding Vietnamese
military presence in Kampuchea, possibly at its current level.
B. Sino-Vietnamese Propaganda Over Alleged Border
Incident
Since the end of December Peking and Hanoi have increased
propaganda attacks on one another. Each side has demanded "an
immediate stop" to provocations and encroachments, and said
that the other "must bear responsibility for all consequences"
arising from its activities. Vietnam's diplomatic notes to
the PRC referred to hopes of friendship with China despite
Chinese activity, while China has omitted any reference to
a hope for friendship with Vietnam in its notes to the SRV.
Peking's propaganda has been harsher than Vietnam's.
A People's Daily article December 24 said "China will not
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attack unless it is attacked" but there is a limit to the
Chinese people's forebearance" and Vietnam should not "com-
plain later that we've not given you a clear warning in
advance." And on January 8, the People's Daily said: "We
want to warn the Vietnamese authorities: Gone are the days
when China could be trampled upon at will. No matter how
strong your behind-the-scenes boss is, you will not be able
to encroach upon China's territory. Otherwise, you will
certainly receive your due punishment."
C. Chinese Border Dispositions
A major military buildup has been underway since mid-
December in the two military regions (MR) Kunming and
Guangzhou (Canton), north and east of the Vietnam border.
Both regions are now under the command of senior, combat
experienced officers. Combat units of at least four Chinese
armies in these military regions have been moved toward the
Vietnamese border. We do not know what proportion of their
total personnel complement of between 120,000 and 150,000
have moved. Similarly, we do not know the exact disposition of
Chinese forces in the Vietnamese border area, but approxi-
mately 11,000 men are believed to be based in the northwest
within 50 miles of the border along the rail line leading
from the Chinese city of Kunming to Hanoi and another 11,000
men are believed to be in the east within 100 miles of the
border along the rail line leading from Guangzhou (Canton)
to Hanoi. Possibly several times this number are already
in the border area. We know that transportation of military
material and personnel has disrupted rail traffic throughout
east China, and may have caused a total ban on non-military
traffic as of January 20.
The massive air redeployment observed between January 16-
19 has slowed down, but additional augmentation of air
strength appears to be still going on. In all, a total of
146 high performance aircraft including at least 37 F-9's,
China's best ground'support fighter bomber, and 28 MiG 21's,
China's highest performance fighter, are in the border area.
This constitutes at least a third, and probably closer to
one half, of China's entire inventory of MiG 21's.
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China has also markedly increased its early warning
radars since mid-December. There are 22 new sites in the
Grangzhou and Kunming MRs most of them within thirty miles
of the Vietnam border.
PRC naval activity in South China remains at near normal
levels, but there is evidence of an increased state of readi-
ness and of increased naval air patroling.
D. Vietnamese Border Dispositions
In the provinces adjacent to the border, Vietnam has
at least two economic construction divisions, one possible
infantry division, and considerable numbers of border and
regional forces. It is almost impossible to estimate Viet-
namese troop strength in the border area. But at a minimum
there should be in excess of 100,000 lightly armed troops
serving as the front line of defense. Numerous defense
works and artillery positions have also been established
near the border since mid-1978, but overall Vietnam is not
in a good position to defend its border against a determined
Chinese attack.
Protecting the immediate Hanoi-Haiphong area are four
main force infantry divisions (approximately 30,000-40,000
troops), several brigades, regional forces, and other eco-
nomic construction and training divisions. Five major air
bases, well-protected by AAA and SAM sites, ring Hanoi.
There are probably close to 200 Soviet-made fighter aircraft
positioned at these airfields (compared to nearly 300 fighter
aircraft and medium size bombers now positioned at Chinese
airbases near the border).
Vietnamese ground, air, and air defense forces are on
full alert and would put up stiff resistance to any Chinese
attack. If Chinese ground and air forces which could be
deployed from southern China struck deep into the Red River
Delta, Chinese advantages in troop strength and firepower
could overwhelm the Vietnamese defences and enable the
Chinese to penetrate perhaps even as far as Hanoi.
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E. Sino-Soviet Border Update
Codeword material will be made available at the
meeting.
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F. Chinese Options
in considering its options, China may be motivated by
a determination to punish Vietnam for'alleged border provo-
cations and for its aggression against Kampuchea; to force
a redeployment of Vietnam's forces from Kampuchea; and to
show the world that China will stand up to Soviet "expan-
sionism" and "hegemony." Moreover,evident leadership dif-
ferences in Peking could result in a harder stance towards
Vietnam than would appear to be prudent. Whichever option
is pursued, China will have to weigh the risk of Soviet
military reaction.
--China could continue its air and ground build up
but stop short of major military activity.
--Using the pretext of Vietnamese provocation for
which China has already laid the groundwork,
Beijing could attack and hold territory in the
border area, --as it did in India in 1962--with
the forces already assembled. China might
destroy military installations and personnel in
the vicinity but not advance more than several
kilometers into Vietnamese territory.
--China could use its air and ground power assembled
along the border to mount a deeper punitive attack
from the northwest and northeast. The objective
might be the air fields and associated aircraft in
the vicinity of Hanoi as well as the main force
divisions which defend Hanoi. The drive might be
followed by a relatively rapid withdrawal.
--The worst case scenario would be a two pronged attack
on Hanoi in which the primary objective could be
the central government itself and the Vietnamese
military headquarters. This would severely disrupt
the command and communications links between the
High Command in Hanoi and subordinate units through-
out Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos.
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G. Vietnamese Options
--Hanoi may calculate that Beijing's build up is
designed to force some redeployment of main
force units from Kampuchea to cope with the
Chinese threat. For this reason, and because
Hanoi's forces are heavily committed elsewhere,
in response to a limited Chinese attack confined
to the border area Hanoi will likely rely on
regional forces, and border militia.
--If the Chinese attack in force and penetrate well
beyond the border area and threaten Hanoi, Vietnam
will probably allow the Chinese to advance. Ground
and air forces already in the Red River Delta would
attempt to blunt the Chinese drive. Only if the
Chinese military action were protracted would
Vietnam redeploy military units from further
south or from Kampuchea.
--Whatever military action China may take, Hanoi
will almost certainly invoke Article Six of the
Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty calling for consultations
if Vietnam's security is threatened.
H. Soviet Options
In the absence of Chinese military action against
Vietnam, Moscow's interests would seem to be best served by
doing nothing, i.e., maintaining a non-provocative stance
on the Sino-Soviet border and exploiting politically and in
propaganda Peking's setback in Kampuchea.
Minor Chinese military action against Vietnam that
did not endanger Hanoi and that was ineffective in helping
the Pol Pot forces, i.e., would not cause the Vietnamese to
redeploy troops from Kampuchea, would probably result in
low-keyed responses. Moscow would likely confine itself to
non-hostile military moves--calling for consultations under
the new treaty--a conspicuous air or sea supply of military
equipment, maneuvers or alerts on the Sino-Soviet border,
and a possible naval port call at Cam Ranh Bay, Danang or
Haiphong. Moscow would also exploit Chinese "aggression"
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to the maximum diplomatically (e.g. in its warnings against
Western arms sales to China). The possibility of trans-
border operations by small Soviet units cannot be excluded.
Major Chinese action against Vietnam would require
a more substantial Soviet counter-move. This could even
take the form of "punitive" strikes across the Sino-Soviet
border or naval bombardment of Chinese-held South China Sea
islands. In the former case, Moscow may prefer to strike
against Xinjiang (Sinkiang) as the Chinese apparently expect.
This could be done in the guise of supporting local
minority dissidents and might be preferred to a strike against
Manchuria, because of the Tatters proximity to sensitive
Soviet installations.
In any event, the Soviets are unlikely to move
against China unless it first attacks Vietnam and then Soviet
reaction will be measured.
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2. Diplomatic Actions Taken to Date
A. Original Security_ Council Action
The Security Council's 13-2 vote demonstrated inter-
national solidarity and Soviet isolation on the principle
of territorial integrity and put the U.S. in support of
the non-aligned rather than choosing sides in intra-
canmunist struggles.
B. Follow-up on UN Action and AID
We have been actively pressing sane twenty countries,
at the UN and in capitals, trying to stimulate Security
Council or General Assembly action to follow up on the
Security Council vote. While there exists some sentiment
among the ASEANs and other non-aligned states for pursuing
the issue further, no governments are yet ready actually
to ask for a meeting. Our efforts are being intensified .
On aid, we have approached all major donors of bi-
lateral aid and leading members of the non-aligned world
to build support for a possible freeze on future bilateral
and multilateral development assistance to Vietnam. A
number of governments have indicated they will suspend or
reduce future aid (e.g., Japan, Denmark, Belgium and
Britian). Others, including the EC and Sweden, are review-
ing the issue and should make decisions soon. We have in-
formed the PRC of these results.
C. Demarche to USSR, PRC, and SRV
We have twice urged Chinese restraint in discussions
here with Ambassador Chai. In Peking USLO has also raised
our concern about a widening of the conflict. We have told
the Chinese that there are alternatives to military action
(e.g., aid squeeze, UN action) which can be used to keep
pressure on the Vietnamese and the USSR while maintaining
broad international support for the PRC. Under these
conditions, the U.S. can continue to support and work
closely with the PRC. , Chinese military action would tend
to reverse international sentiment, cast doubt upon the
stabilizing effects of US-PRC normalization and seriously
undercut the benefits we see from Deng's trip to the U.S.
Chai told us that the PRC is keeping its options open, and
that in the event of continued provocations, the SRV would
have to accept the consequences.
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In Paris, Bangkok, and New York we approached the
Vietnamese and called for Vietnamese withdrawal. The
Vietnamese responded formally, blaming Peking for the
escalation of tensions. We have gone back to them
stating that we consider Vietnam's invasion the direct
cause of area tensions, again urging their withdrawal,
and stating our support for a genuinely independent
Kampuchea.
We initially asked the Soviets to urge Vietnamese
restraint. They offered a formal response that there
were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. We took Dobrynin
to task for this evasion and emphasized the concerns
about spillover incidents in Thailand. As indications
of possible Chinese action grew we expressed concern to
Dobrynin's deputy, and again to Dobrynin himself, about
the possible widening of the fighting. The Soviets
expressed confidence that Thailand has nothing to worry
about and ventured the opinion that China would not move
against Vietnam. They did point out, however, that they
would anticipate consultations with Hanoi under the
Soviet-Vietnamese treaty if China should take action
against the SRV. (This could lead to direct Soviet
military support of Vietnam.)
D. Consultation with Japan and Others on Sino-
Vietnamese Tensions
We have informed our major western allies and Tokyo
of our concern about the PRC military buildup and asked
them to approach Peking to urge the Chinese to exercise
restraint on the Sino-Vietnamese border. We are attempting
to stimulate ASEAN and other non-aligned leaders (Yugoslavia,
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Jamaica) into taking the lead at
the UN and in non-aligned circles to keep the pressure on
Vietnam and thus perhaps lessen the possibility of direct
Chinese military action.
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3. Congressional Consultation and Reaction
We have informed key Congressional leaders of the
Chinese military buildup and our efforts to forestall
any action by a combination of demarches to the PRC,
SRV and USSR plus efforts at the UN and approaches to
our close allies. Some Members may also be aware of the
detailed situation from the press. To date we have had
little expression of concern and almost no inquiries
from the Hill as to the situation on the ground. How-
ever, in our conversations with those who know the
situation (e.g. Senator Nunn's group, Senator Church)
they anticipate that a major escalation of hostility on
the Chinese/Vietnamese border, which appears to have
been provoked at least in part by China, would seriously
erode receptivity towards normalization and our China
legislation. it was generally believed that a major
Chinese military initiative was likely to increase
support for maintenance in some form the U.S. ROC mutual
defense treaty.
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4. Public Posture
We have expressed our belief that the Vietnamese
invasion of Kampuchea violates the principles of
territorial integrity and of the inviolability of
frontiers and raises the danger of a wider war. While
continuing to condemn the human rights policies of
the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, we have stressed that
the internal policies of one country do not justify
the external aggression of another. We have made
public our approaches to the USSR, Vietnam and China
urging restraint, and our support for Thailand. We
have indicated publicly that there is a Chinese buildup,
which causes concern, but avoided specifics and projected
an image of calm rather than panic.
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5. POSSIBLE MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS OR CHANGES BY USG
Our principal objective is to reduce the scope,
intensity and duration of any Sino-Viet conflict.
Our military activities must thus be carefully
coordinated with our diplomatic initiatives, and
tailored to our estimate of the changing situation.
For the present we do not wish to take actions
which would heighten tensions, e.g., increase in
DEFCON, redeployments, or ad hoc exercises. However,
there may be a need for changes in reconnaissance
activities.
In the event that the PRC should opt for
military action against Vietnam, with or without
an early Soviet response, we will need to consider
whether or not there are certain military actions
which we should take as a signal of U.S. concern,
or to position ourselves should Chinese actions
result in a much more serious situation. An inter-
agency study of possible U.S. options could usefully
be undertaken on an urgent basis, keyed to Chinese
and Soviet options. Of special concern would be the
deployment of Soviet ships, personnel or aircraft to
Vietnam, as well as a direct Soviet military con-
frontation with China.
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6. Implications for Deng Visit
Chinese invasion of Vietnam will weaken some argu-
ments we are using for normalization: (a) it enhances
the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific area; (b)
Chinese stress on internal modernization programs, etc.,
makes attack on Taiwan unlikely for the forseeable future
(i.e. if the Chinese attack Vietnam, why shouldn't
they be prepared soon to be equally belligerent toward
Taiwan?)
Without an invasion we expect Vietnam will be a
major topic in the President's meeting with Teng.
Chinese build-up on the border, whether or not the PRC
acts against Vietnam before or during the visit, will
make it all the more urgent that the talks focus on this
issue. Pre-visit press attention to the border buildup
also will require Deng, in his appearances on the Hill
and in other public fora, to explain the PRC's Vietnam
action. We hope he will also make a clear distinction
between Vietnam and Taiwan. The tense situation may also
require the President to adjust his public remarks --
welcome statement, White House dinner, JFK Center -- to
avoid too close an identification with Chinese action
against Vietnam.
If a Chinese invasion takes place before or during
the visit, we will have to consider adjusting Deng's
schedule, particularly the more effusive manifestations
of hospitality, to distance ourselves from the Chinese
actions. However, we believe little change in this
schedule will be practicable or advisable, because:
(a) the essential purpose of using Deng's trip to gain
support for and weaken opposition to normalization will
remain; (b) the domestic pressures on the Administration
to permit the trip to proceed as scheduled will remain
very high. Furthermore, we will not want to handle the
Deng's visit, even in such a changed Asian context, in
any manner to give comfort to the Soviets.
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CONFIDENTIAL
7. Implications for the Kriangsak Visit
Prior the SRV invasion of Kampuchea, the visit of
Thai PM Kriangsak was already important as a demonstration
of our new relationship with Southeast Asia and ASEAN.
Reinforcing that relationship remains important, but we
must now also devote more effort to a balanced but
firm security support for our friends in SEAsia. Our
credibility is important not only for Thailand and ASEAN,
but also for a successful process of normalization with
China and stability in the Korean peninsula. At the
same time, we want to avoid any relapse to earlier eras
when the security focus was excessive and dominated other
policy interests. We will have to walk a fine line of
measured reassurance and response.
Principal Thai security concerns now are how to
balance three potential acts of external pressure:
-- SRV military action along the Thai border would impact
very negatively on Thai politics even if accidental.
Deliberate military action could place the U.S. Manila
Pact commitment squarely on the line.
-- The Thai Communist Party based along the Thai-Cambodian
border is a modes insurgent threat which could, if taken
over by the SRV, become a more serious long-term threat.
-- The PRC desire to support Pol Pot's querillas through
Thailand forces upon Kriangsak an agonizing choice
between antagonizing the Chinese (whom he views as some-
what supportive) or provoking the Vietnamese (whom he
sees as very threatening).
At present, the Vietnamese are being careful not to
approach the Thai border and are not yet in a position
to dominate the Thai Communist Party. Should Thailand
become a base for support to Pol Pot's querillas, the
Vietnamese attitude could change. This issue may come up
during both Deng's and Kriangsak's visits.
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B. U.S. Policy Towards Chinese Military Action
The policy we have pursued to date has minimized
the damage by reassuring Thailand and ASEAN, focussing
as much pressure as we could generate upon Vietnam as
the cause of new tensions in the area, enabled us to
avoid being seen as taking Peking's side in a struggle
with Moscow, and offered the PRC an alternative to
direct military action. There has been remarkably
little Congressional or public concern and criticism.
Should the PRC decide that its strategic posture vs. the
USSR requires direct military action against Vietnam,
this would change radically.
An immediate problem would arise with Congress and
the public concerning our normalization policy. An even
more serious problem would be posed at home and abroad
concerning our posture with respect to the PRC, the
USSR, our friends and allies, and the non-aligned.
Current uncertainties, tensions and fears would be
substantially magnified. And should the USSR respond
militarily, the world could face another major conflict
unless we and others were somehow able to contaon the
threat.
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Comments on State Paper
(in areas in which we made an input)
Situation in Kampuchea
State sees military advantage definitely with Vietnamese
(no mention of VN logistical difficulties); we
believe
Kampu-
cheans might be able to hold off until rainy
season.
However,
we agree on fact Chinese will probably renew
efforts
to per-
suade the Thais to permit overland transit of
Chinese
and
to Pal Pot.
Chinese Border Disposition
State does not have a firm fix on Chinese troop strength
(they speak of 120,000 to 150,000 men if all of four armies
are involved); we estimate their build-up at 80,000 troops.
Vietnamese Border Dispositions
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