CHINA: SECOND SESSION OF FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC) PROVIDES WINDOWS ON CURRENT POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 15, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

S E C R E T
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China: Second Session of Fifth National
People's Congress (NPC) Provides
Windows on Current Policies
Opens Monday; will examine key aspects of policies, ap-
prove senior-level government appointments, review govern-
ment appointments, review government's activities, address
new issues. Despite "rubber-stamp" attributes, provides
good window on state of Chinese policies and leadership
structure. At this time in particular NPC should indi-
cate outcome of major policy debates which have been
going on since mid-March.
On leadership, appointments and removals should indicate
degree of influence exerted by Deng Xiaoping--to assume
continuity of his views, important for him to have people
who support him established in responsible governmental
posts, especially in view of his advancing age.
? Possible, for example, that Deng's protege Hu Yaobang
might be added to list of Vice Premiers. Hu pre-
sently is Party General Secretary and Director of
its Propaganda Department, but holds no governmental
post. Past events have shown that those who exercise
greatest power in China must have both high Party
and governmental positions.
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? Also possible some older high-ranking people who
were purged during the Cultural Revolution and now
rehabilitated could become Vice Premiers, e.g.,
Tan Zhenlin,former Politburo member with responsi-
bilities for agriculture, and Peng Zhen,another ex-
Politburo member who was Mayor of Beijing until 1966.
While not necessarily as close to Deng as Hu Yaobang,
people such as these would in general support Deng's
efforts to revitalize China.
? On the other hand, if people such.as the above do not
receive high positions, and, more importantly, if
individuals close to Deng's principal opponent, Wang
Dongxing, do, it may be concluded that Deng's power
has been curtailed and his policies rendered vulner-
able to significant revision.
On policy, customary for Chairman of State Council (Pre-
mier) to deliver report on work of the government. This
will in all likelihood be Hua Guofeng, as was the case in
January 1978 NPC session (Hua is Premier in addition to
being Party Chairman). Major issues to be addressed:
? Internally
- Approval of revised priorities for "four moderni-
zations," with agriculture taking first priority,
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light industry coming next (ahead of heavy in-
dustry) to serve agriculture and expand foreign
exchange-earning exports, and national defense
trailing after science and technology. Defense
priorities could be controversial in wake of mili-
tary shortcomings revealed during China's attack
on Vietnam.
- Reaffirmation of outcome of December 1978 Party
Plenum, which reflected Deng's philosophy and im-
plementing "emancipation of thinking", democracy,
material incentives, and exercise of initiative in
management of enterprises. (These elements have
been criticized by Weng Dongxing group on grounds
that Deng's approach undermines teachings of Mao
Zedong, whose "every word" should be taken as
gospel.)
- According to reports, acceptance of bills concerning
drastic reform of Chinese administrative system,
establishing a judicial system, and providing for
joint Chinese-foreign industrial ventures. All
these steps are necessary to get China moving again;
most crucial is administrative reform to assure
cadre compliance with Deng's new policies. Wang
Dongxing group can be expected to resist.
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? Externally
- Examination of policies on relations with USSR
(probably permitting some improvement of State-to-
state relations despite continued freeze on basic
party-to-party issues). China's "four moderniza-
tions" require as peaceful an environment as
possible.
Endorsement of improved relations with the U.S.
(There may have been some criticism of Deng in
this area. over U.S. relationship with Taiwan and
tough U.S. line on trade and textiles.)
Explanation of China's stand on such other key sub-
jects as Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Nonaligned Move-
25X1 C
ment.
-- From mid-March until late May
Chinese newspaper editorials indicated that Deng was being
subject to considerable criticism at hands of Wang Dong-
xing group, and perhaps some of Deng's old comrades as
well who felt he was trying to do too much too soon.
Deng backtracked somewhat by putting tighter political
parameters on democracy, incentives, etc., but also counter-
attacked to reaffirm the essence of his new program. A
cessation of critical editorials suggests he has prevailed,
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at least for the moment, and this should therefore be
reflected in NPC proceedings. But Chinese leadership is
clearly now more collegial than was the case in 1978.
-- We should know more about the course of events by COB
18 June.
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In contrast to the situation prevailing at the time of Deng Xiaoping's
visit to the ITS, the leadership situation in China has become quite murky.
There have been no major upheavals, but Deng's preeminent position has
been eroded, and he now appears to be under much greater pressure than
earlier. This may be a passing phase, or it may be more serious. Deng
has a long record for getting himself into hot water and sometimes out
again.
Signs of leadership troubles and friction have been evident since
shortly after the end of the war with Vietnam. They include the following:
-- The "democracy" movement has been circumscribed and
directed into more official channels. Deng has from the beginning
been vulnerable on this question, because iconoclastic dissent is
so offensive to orthodox party bureaucrats. He was trying to
protect himself as early as last December, but we now have had
repeated reports that he was criticized for nurturing the dissidents
at a recently-concluded party meeting. There have been some reports
that he had to perform self-criticism on this and other issues at
the meeting.
-- Much of the criticism on Deng's encouragement of the
dissidents'is reported to have come from a group of younger leaders,
loosely allied with Hua Guofern.g, who opposed Deng's return to active
leadership in 1977.
-- Deng appeared to have rendered this group powerless at
party meetings last November (which also approved normalization).
Now, however, they appear again to be strong enough politically
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xti .,.g:I
to criticize Deng. Our reports indicate that this group of leaders
has considerable support from middle-rank party bureaucrats who feed
threatened and blocked by the return of veteran party leaders who
had been sidelined in the Cultural Revolution.
-- Criticism of the Cultural Revolution itself has slackened.
At the same time the virulent, thinly disguised criticism of Mao
has also slacked off. Mao's mausoleum, closed since late last year,
is again open and "Mao-thought" is mentioned frequently and in a
positive context. Because nearly all Chinese associate Deng with the
attacks on Mao, at the very least his prestige is affected by the
change.
-- Modernization has been slowed down and "sobered-up" and
trade policy has consequently been affected. Much of what has happened
here has occurred for good ec nomic reasons and may in fact he
salutory. But Deng's prestige again has been affected. There is
growing evidence that the modernizati-n program is now in the hands
of Chen Yun, who was restored to the Politburo last December after
a 20-year political eclipse. Chen is as much of a "rightist" as
Deng, but if he,rather than Deng,now oversees this most important
of Chinese programs, Deng's political standing is bound to be
affected.
--Ilea Guofeng has also become more active politically recently.
Much of the thinly-veiled criticism of Hua has ceased, and he recently
delivered the only important speech made by a Chinese leader in the
past several months. Ilua's statement, although less "maioist" than
speeches he made in 1977 and 1978, shows continuing differences with
the '
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Europe, cancelled earlier this -year, has now been rescheduled
and is due to take place this fall. Many of the handful of Hua
protegees in upper-level positions have also been active recently.
-- Deng, on the other hand, is reported to have told Henry
Kissinger that he does not expect ever to travel abroad again.
This categorical statement, if confirmed, has strong political over-
tones. Deng would not speak so categorically of never going abroad
again if his colleagues had not reined him in.
However, not all the indicators have been bad, from Deng's point of
view. His basic policy positions are still popular with wide segments of
the Chinese populace (although probably not with much of the middle rank
party cadre). His protegees hold many of the most important and sensitive
positions in the party, government and provincial administrations. He
probably still has extensive--although not universal--support in the
Chinese military.
In particular:
-- A delegation of visiting US congre-smen was told by a
hat Deng was unquestionably the most
important man in China.
-- While Mao's image has improved, he is still not being treated
as the source of unquestioned wisdom.
--Deng still has wide latitude in decision-making -- at least
in areas particularly visible to us. During Secretary Kreps' trip
to China, Deng personally opted for a successful conclusion to the
protracted claims/assets negotiations and facilitated initialling
of the trade agreement -- without apparent consultation with his
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Politburo colleagues and in the face of obvious bureaucratic
resistance.
None of the indicators on either side is conclusive. Deng appeare?'
powerful and personally self-assured during the Kissinger/Ford visits
in late 1975, only to fall from power a few months later. But he has also
recovered repeatedly from apparent set-backs.
In any case, Deng is clearly vulnerable on a series of issues:
the disruptive consequences of "democracy," de-Maoification, impetuosity
in pursuing the modernization program and in contracting for foreign
purchases, the Congressional legislation pertaining to Taiwan, and perhaps
some aspects of the recent war with Vietnam.
The war seems to have created or exacerbated frictions within the
military establishment and between the military and civilian leaders.
Some commanders are reported to have opposed the attack on Vietnam; others
may have been criticized for performance during the fighting. The deputy
commander of the attack has not appeared in public since the fighting ended,
and other senior leaders have been hurriedly transferred in recent weeks.
The slowdown in modernization, with the new emphasis on light industry
means less hardware for the military just at the time the recent fighting
demonstrated, the need for new weapons. The consequent infightings -- about
which we still know only a little -- could have had some adverse affect
on Deng's hitherto firm base of support in the military.
Ironically, some of the "rehabilitations" of Cultural Revolution
victims which Deng engineered late last year probably have resulted in an
additional erosion of Deng's support among fellow victims of the Maoist
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purges. Previously Deng was the sole leader of the group of party veterans
seeking "justice" for the wrongs they had endured; now he must share leader-
ship with such luminaries as Clien Yun and from Beijing party boss Peng Zhen -
men who were his rivals in the 1950s and 1960s. Fragmentation of leadership
among the party veterans may have made it possible for the "leftist" factions
headed by Wang Dongxing to increase its assertiveness.
In short, the Chinese leadership appears to have entered a new round
of infighting and jockeying for position. In the past week Deng has begi.u7
something of a counterattack against his critics, but he still seems
strategically on the defensive. It is still too early to tell how serious
and how prolonged the current troubles will be.
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