USSR-PRC-VIETNAM TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 30, 1979
• Content Type: OUTLINE

18G3, 30 Mar 79
Approved For Relqpe 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP83B00100RQW100
USSR-PRC-VIETNAM TALKING POINTS
Map)
I. Summarized military situation this morning in PDB.
-Larger question is, "How might events unfold?"
II. This much seems clear about players' intentions
A. Vie
-Has decided on hardline versus China
-Is sticking to "Indochina Federation" plan
B. Laos has clearly shifted t P y;Ptnamese side of the quarrel
+s-. woo
C. 5Quiets have decided not to op?nly ttacCh.ina in the north,
at least for now.
III. But more things are unclear, so we have to ask what the following
collection of evidence means.
A.
PRC-Vietnam ys1,Psnics &.threat - counterthreat games remain intense
-Notably C + the ._"r
aunte
k" if the
-
Vietnamese continue their "provocations"
B.
Vietnam's incr eased stxelgth in the north, general mobilization
and deployment of scratch divisions to Kampuchea
C. Increasing Soviet invglvement in_ Vietnamese military logistics.
.
D. Tremendous Vietnamese Q,can^, is b ird.pn of-wars
,Map)
IV. All of the above suggests
A. We will see a prol
1. Vietnamese trying to make their puppet regime viable
2. Pol Pot forces holding their own or doing better against
diluted Vietnamese Army.
3. Chinese aid flowing to Pol Pot's forces through Thai
sanctuary, especially island logistics base, while
-1-
Approved For Release 2001~OW06 : ILA fDP83B00100R000100030010-2
-Related report by Vietnamese that Hanoi is considering
initiating small scale incidents.
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Approved For Relapse 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP83B00l00RO"100030010-2
4. Chinese maneuver to try to find an alternative to Pol Pot,
-perhaps Sihanouk
-not optimist
B. Laos likely to become a guerrilla battleground again ~-ith Chinese
military aid aoina to Meos
C. We see the Vietnamese reluctantly falling into an increasingly
dependent relation nntne ovie_ts
-Soviets demanding more and more concessions
-Vietnamese refusing, but gradually giving ground
D. Two armies continuing _t_ taree at one another across Sino-Vietnam
border
1. Tensions will remain h.1
2. Chance of renewed hostilities at least on a small scale, involving
perhaps hundreds of men on each side
3. Cannot absolutely rule out large scale fighting again involving
tens of thousands arising from momentum of events such as
-Heavy Vietnamese artillery barrages laid down on PRC
troops in a disputed border area
-PRC counterattacks to neutralize artillery
-Vietnamese respond
-etc. up the scale 0
E. On the other hand, we can't rule out a sh'ft the other way months
from now.
1. China's plan now almost surely is for a steady effort to
-rod oi's-pasitinn in Kampuchea & Laos
-isolate Vietnam internationally
2. Until it is forced to
-trim its objectives in Indochina
-move away from-the Soviets
-accommodate the PRC
3. This may happen, but not likely and certainly not soon.
L r [l c~7 f' c3
-2-
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030010-2
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