PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING ON THE HORN OF AFRICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B00100R000100050019-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 10, 2001
Sequence Number: 
19
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 13, 1978
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP83B00100R000100050019-0.pdf60.93 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIAIRt$ 0100R000100050019-0 13 March 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Presidential Briefing Coordinator I National Intelligence Officer for China SUBJECT: Presidential Briefing on the Horn of Africa China and Eritrea/Ethiopia 1. Chinese support to the Eritrean liberation groups ended about the time of Haile Selassie's visit to Peking in 1972. Since then, representatives of ELF/PLF have attempted to regain Chinese support through contacts with Chinese dip- lomats in the Sudan. So far, these Eritrean approaches have been unsuccessful. 2. Risks outweigh the benefits that would be involved in Chinese aipport to the Eritreans: -- An independent Eritrea might reduce the potential for Soviet influence in the Red Sea region, -- however, Chinese support for Eritrean indepen- dence would be at cross-purposes with the OAU policy of inviolable borders. -- The Chinese are still trying to maintain rela- tions with Addis Ababa despite the Soviet and Cuban presence and some Ethiopian slights. -- International support and Eritrean internal strength are not great enough to give China reason- able confidence that its involvementwould succeed in the face of rival Soviet efforts. Peking would not want to risk an embarrassing defeat. E2. IMPDET CL BY 57050 Approved For Release 2006/10/17 CIA-RD'83B00100R000100050019-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA- tO 00100R000100050019-0 3. Peking has reportedly cultivated members of the pro- scribed Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Party in Addis Ababa. There have been rumors of some sort of Chinese assistance to this Party, but they are unsubstantiated. The Party is extremely small, however the Chinese may feel that it is useful to develop contacts with these activists in the event the Military Council collapses. Distribution: Orig. - Addressee 1 - NFAC/Reg. 2 - NIO/China Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP83B00100R000100050019-0