CHINESE ATTACK ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100080042-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 12, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
Copy No. 5
12 April 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director, National Foreign
Assessment
National intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT: Chinese Attack on Vietnam
1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is for
your information only.
2. Background: Attachment A is the memorandum which
Dr. Brzezins mentioned to you on 11 April covering the re-
port made to him by Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin on the Chi-
nese attack against Vietnam. I had been informed earlier by
Mr. Oksenberg of the NSC Staff that the memorandum would be
sent to you directly by Dr. Brzezinski, but the signals were
evidently switched. The version forwarded herewith has some
minor gaps due to secretarial problems in transcribing Chai's
comments.
3. Chai notes the total Vietnamese ground, air, and
naval OB; the Vietnamese forces actually arrayed against the
Chinese; and the units deployed by the Chinese for their so-
called "counter-attack in self-defense." He describes the
progress of the Chinese attack, and lists the casualties on
both sides (allegedly 50,000 Vietnamese to 10,000 Chinese).
He indicates that the Vietnamese were well-dug-in along the
border, and by inference suggests that the Chinese found the
going tough in the initial stages. He points out that de-
spite "severe punishment" inflicted on Vietnam which make it
likely it will "restrain itself a bit" it is nevertheless
stepping up its military deployments to the North and can
still cause trouble.
NSC review(s) completed.
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ter lUY JILttrI NOW
4. Attachment B is an OSR comment on Chai's report,
which states that the reporting we ourselves received during
the fighting generally supports his comments. There are,
however, discrepancies in OB: we held a small number of
Vietnamese along the border and a greater number of Chinese
deployed against them. The Chinese may have upped the Viet-
namese strengths to make themselves look better, but having
actually fought the Vietnamese the Chinese could also be
expected to have a somewhat better fix than we did. Perhaps
the differences in Chinese OB can be attributed to Chai not
listing armies in reserve which were further away from the
border even though posted in the general region of Yunnan
and Kuangxi.
5. It could be significant that Chai volunteered this
information. The Chinese may have felt under some obligation
to respond to your briefing of Huang Hua, and may also be
signifying an interest in continuing/-this kind of substantive
exchange.
Attachment:
A - Brzezinski Me
B - OSR Comments
Distribution:
Copy No. 1 - DCI, w/atts.
2 - DDCI, w/atts.
3 - ER, w/atts.
4 - DD/NFA, w/atts.
5 - NIO/CH, w/atts.
6 - NFAC Reg., w/atts.
TOP SECRET
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Comments by Ambassador Chai Zemin, March 29, 10:00 a.m.
Meeting with Dr. Brzezinski
Our counter-attack in self-defense in Sino-Vietnamese border
area started on February 17. On March 5 China declared that
it was going to withdraw from Vietnam. And on March 16 the
withdrawal from Vietnam was completed. All our troops returned
to China's territory. Our counter-attack in self-defense
deflated the arrogance of Vietnam, the myth the
invincibility of Vietnamese troops. Our counter-attack gave
Vietnam necessary punishment and therefore attained our set goals.
Now I would like to give you a count which is divided into four
parts:
-.MILITARY STRENGTH AND MILITARY APPOINTMENTS PRIOR TO THE
COUNTER-ATTACK,
to our intelligence, the Vietnamese ground
troops have four corps headquarters, 29'combat.divisions, 22
production division, 2 training divisions
and a number of
local independent regiments and some of the
artillary troops.
The Vietnamese Air Force has three
with more than 500 airplanes of different types.
Air Defense Force has five divisions. The Vietnamese
two fleets, one brigade of marines with more than 200
and
divisions
Vietnamese
Navy has
ships
of different types, A total number of Vietnamese troops is
about one million, Vietnamese troops deployed in North Vietnam
include one Corps Headquarters, ten combat divisions, eight
production divisions, two training divisions, one Air Force
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two air defense force divisions. seven combat divisions
and more than ten local independent regiments deployed along
Sino-Vietnamese border. After we started our counter-attack
in self-defense, we found some of the production divisions in the
Vietnamese army were redesignated as combat divisions. They
11, WAR. SITUATION
Our army started its counter-attack in self-defense on
February 17 with emphasis put on attack on Laocai, Cao Bang,
and Langson,
LAQCP T, AREA
One column of our army forced the Red River and early in the
morning on February 19 conquered Cocleu and Baothang,
annihilating one Vietnamese infantry regiment. The other column
of our army penetrated the defense line of the Vietnamese troops,
and in the afternoon of February 19 conquered Muong Khuong and
have also relocated some of its aggressive troops stationed in
Kampuchea and also stationed in South Vietnam to the North in
order to strengthen its defense in the North.
2. Before we started our counter-attack in self-defense,
we had assembled five armies and two independent divisions.
Three armies of the five armies and the two independent divisions
are deployed at the One army at Hekou. One independent
division at Jinping. One army at Jingxi. One army at Longzhau.
One independent division at Dongzing, And we also deployed
onearmy at Mengzi and another army at Chongquo as reserves.
To support our infantries, we deployed a proper number of
artillary'and a small number of tanks,
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at Laocai annihilating one infantry regiment and one artillery
regiment of the Vietnamese troops. Starting from the 20th,
our army's main forces continued to push southward along the
banks of the Red River. After it had annihilated No. 345
Division of the Vietnamese troops, they conquered Camduong on
the 25th. At the same time part of our troops were deployed to
hold off enemy reinforcements heading eastward from Pinglu???
and the enemy reinforcements is Vietnamese No. 3168. And the
one regiment under that division was dealt a crushing blow.
And afterthat our troops searched in the area and wiped out the
remaining of the Vietnamese troops. The Caobang area. The
army's main forces launched attacks separately from Binhmuong.
Our army's main-forces launched a princer movement toward the
Caobang area, And in the-'afternoon on the 19th our army cut off
Highway No, 3 'along which the Vietnamese could have flagged to
the interiors, Thus closing in all enemy troops in that area.
After that our troops affected a breakthrough and cut off the
enemy forces in attempting to encircle and annihilated Vietnamese
troops, As a result, our troops annihilated Division 346 and
occupied Caobang,
LANGSON ,PEA
When our army was attacking Laocai and Caobang, our army also
launched attacks at Vietnamese troops deployed in advanced positions
in the'Langson area, and they conquered Dongdang completely wiping
out one regiment and Division No, 3 of the Vietnamese troops.
Starting from the 27th, bur army launched attacks on all fronts
from Thatkhe to Mongcai with Langsan as the main target of the
attack, our army occupied Langsan on March 2 badly wounding
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rr
three Vietnamese regiments.
III. CASUALITIES ON BOTH SIDES
Our counter-attack in self-defense altogether annihilated
about 50,000 Vientamese troops. We have captured more than
7,000 rifles of different types. More than 600 canons of
different types and other military materials. Our army has about
10,000 casualities with more people being wounded than being
killed. And the kill. ratio of soldiers being killed between the
Vietnamese army and our army is five to one. (MO interpretation:
More were wounded -- fewer were killed.)
IV, FEATURES OF THE BATTLE
Our counter-attack in self-defense is a special w
in. a rather hilly and jungle area,
fought
In North Vietnam in the area along the border the
terrain is especially difficult which is characterized by high.
mountains,, dense forests, deep. ravines, and it is also terrain
where you canfind very few roads and many grottes (or.caves?).
terrain,, and it is also difficult for us to use many tanks.
It Is difficult for large contingents to move around on this
The Vietnamese troops have made long preparation for
War in the area along _.the border r At the first line they have
built fairly solid fortifications and built up. large reserves
of ammunitions,,.grain, and other war materials in positions of
strategic importance, Taking Laocai as example, the Vietnamese
troops have built up a reserve of munitions sufficient for them
to fight (survive?) for one year.,
3, Generally speaking, Vietnamese troops are no good at
fighting large-scale battles but not too bad at fighting guerrilla
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war and dispatching special agents to be engaged in sabotage.
At first, after the action had started they could put up a
resistance at various positions of importance. But once their
fortifications were conquered they would then break the whole
into parts in attempting to continue their resistance by taking
advantage of natural caves and remaining fortifications. Our
army adopted appropriate measures in light of the kind of
terrain there and the characteristics of the Vietnamese tactics.
We mainly relied on our infantries, and we used a relatively
small number-of tanks. The kind of tactics we applied arethat
we organized small contingents and it affected breakthroughs in
order to-cut up the enemy forces. And now small contingents
concentrated relatively superior forces to encircle and annihilate
Vietnamese troops. In the course of applying the tactics,
?our troops succeeded in annihilating troops scattered all over
the area.. Our counter-attack in self-defense has given Vietnam
a severe 'punishment, so it is likely that Vietnam will restrain
itself a btt. But nevertheless,according to our information,
Vietnam is stepping up its military deployments in the North so
it is still quite possible for Vietnam to make troubles and
commit sabotage along the border. The Vietnamese authorities
in face of the strong demand voiced by both public opinion at
first expressed their willingness to accept the suggestions
put forward by the Chinese side concerning the negotiation to
be held at the Vice Foreign minister level and has stated that
negotiations could start one week after our withdrawal. But
when the Chinese delegation is ready to leave at short notice,
the Vietnamese authorities have changed its position after its
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"W Nuir
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behind--the-scene consultation with the Soviet Union. But now it
is spreading the lie that Chinese troops are continuing to
occupy many places of Vietnam. Obviously, the Vietnamese
authorities will continue to push its plan for the establishment
of the Indochina Federation in order to meet the Soviet needs
of the Soviet strategy of pushing southward in exchange for
Soviet support and existence, To this aim, Vietnamese maintain
the attention in the border area so that it could enforce the
general mobilization with some reason and strengthened its
war-time system and continue to be engaged in arms race and armaments
expansion. Under these same circumstances, it seems thus that the
Vietnamese side does not want to start negotiations now. We
will continue to urge the Vietnamese side to agree to resolve
the boundary dispute between China and Vietnam through
negotiation. If Vietnam continues to commit armed provocation
and encroachment into China's territory in the border area,
we will deal forcefull counter-attacks at them.
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- ,~ I I I
11 April 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/China
SUBJECT Comments on Ambassador Chai Zemin's
Remarks
1. Reporting we received during the Sino-Vietnamese
war generally supports Ambassador Chai Zemin's comments
on Chinese and Vietnamese tactics and on the progress
of the war. We have somewhat different information,
however, on Chinese and Vietnamese order-of-battle and
casualty figures.)
25X1
25X1
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l
25X1
25X1
4. Our information on casualties sustained by
either side during the conflict is sketchy. We believe
the intensity of the fighting supports a high level
of casualties for both sides--the Vietnamese forces
were clearly outnumbered, and the Chinese forces in
the first few days of the war were spread quite thinly
along the border. -]Vietnamese losses F___] 25X1
generally ranges between
34,000 and 45,000, however, somewhat lower than Ambassador
Chai's report of 50,000. Moreover, the ambassador's
estimate of 10,000 Chinese killed a ears to
be too
low. 25X1
(casualties on the two sides were about
even; we believe this report more closely reflects
Analyst
Asia Branch
Regional Analysis Division, OSR
25X1
25X1
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 25X1
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