APPRAISAL OF SITUATION: A VIEW OF THE EXISTING SITUATION IN THE PROVINCES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100130027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 7, 1976
• Content Type: CABLE

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SUBJECT APPRAISAL OF SITUATION: A VIEW OF THE EXISTING
SITUATION IN THE PROVINCES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
25X1A ACC
elI1MMARY: THE DISRUPTIONS IN CHINA'S PROVINCES ARE NOT YET AS WIDESPREAD
OR AS VIOLENT AS THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN,
BUT THEY ARE LIKELY TO INTENSIfY IF THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE IN PEKING
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DRAGS ON. PEKING HAS ISSUED STOPGAP DIRECTIVES TO COPE WITH INDIVIDUAL PROVINCIAL
PROBLEMS RANGING FROM ARMED CLASHES BY RIVAL FACTION. ''ION-VIOLENTPROTESTS BY WORKERS. THESE MEASURES HAVE BEEN ONLY PARTIALLY
SUCCESSFUL. THE PRESENT DISORDER, WHICH SO FAR HAS BEEN
RELATIVELY LIMITED, HAS DEEP ROOTS. THE DISORDER IS AN OUT-
GROWTH CF PEKING'S OWN FACTIONALISM AND WILL PERSIST AS LONG
kS THE PRESENT DIVISIONS REMAIN IN THE CAPITAL. IN ADDITION
IO THE DRAMATIC AND OCCASIONALLY VIOLENT FACTIONAL CLASHES IN
THE PROVINCES, THERE ARE EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT PROTESTS FROM
ORDINARY WORKERS WHO ARE ANGRY WITH PEKING'S INABILITY TO
FULFILL PROMISES TO RAISE LIVING STANDARDS. THESE PROTESTS,
WHICH HAVE LED TO WORK SLOWDOWNS AND RAIL TIE-UPS, COULD
A'OVERSELY AFFECT THE ECONOMY IF THEY EXPAND. THE MILITARY-
WHICH HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PROVINCIAL FACTIONALISM IN
HE PAST, HAS LARGELY REMAINED ON THE SIDELINES, BECAUSE
NEITHER THE CONTENDING PEKING FACTIONS NOR THE MILITARY
COMMAINDERS THEMSELVES SEEM ANXIOUS TO SEE THE ARMY DRAWN
AGAIN INTO THE FRACAS. 'END SUMMARY.
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I. TENSIONS HAVE INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN CHINA'S
PROVINCES SINCE THE DEATH OF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI ANi .'URGE
CF V ICE PREMIER T E N G HSIAO?P'ING, BUT THE VIOL'`ENT INCIDENTS,
~!iICH SEEM TO BE THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE, HAVE BEEN
RELATIVELY ISOLATED AND HAVE GENERALLY BEEN CONTROLLED. WHILE
;SUCH O"' T.HE TENSION IS DUE TO THE POWER STRUGGLE IN PEKING,
THERE ARE OTHER, MORE COMPLEX FACTORS INVOLVED THAT ARE ONLY
PAFT IAi.,.Y RELATED TO THE SUCCESSION QUESTION. AT THE ROOT, THE
PRCSENT D 1 STUR3ANCES I N THE PROVINCES ARE AN OUTGROWTH OF TEN
YE-RS Or INADECJATE LEADERSHIP AND BROKEN PROMISES BY PEKING.
2. TrERE ARE TWO TYPES OF PROTESTS TAKING PLACE IN THE
RR~'fINCcS, AND T;ESE PROTESTS INVOLVE TWO DIFFERENT SETS OF
1S ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL AND PARTISAN; IT IR
MA ~I ? _STca v ARMED CLASHES AND WALLPOSTER ATTACKS. PHYSICAL
tLAS~_S TEN RIVAL FACTIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN SEVEN OF
CHIN 'S 2 PROVINCES: CHEKIANG, FUKIEN, HONAN, HOPEH, HUPEH,
KIAN CSI. AND YUNNAN. MOST OF THESE ARE TRADITIONALLY TROUBLED
PRCV ICES PRUNE TO FACTIONALISM IN THE BEST OF TIMES. FOR THE
MOST PART, THE ARMED CLASHES THAT HAVE OCCURRED SO FAR HAVE
BEEN PAT-DER SMALL AFFAIRS AND RE;.44TIVELY ISOLATED INCIDENTS,
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?s?aR. '~0.~1E' DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED, CHEKIANG AND FUKIEN PROVINCES
k ;XCFPTION, THE SITUATIONS THERE HAVE
R T'``'iAT ED TO THE POINT THAT MANY GOVERNMENT AND "'PARTY ORGANS
UNCTI ON ING, PARTLY BECAUSE MANY CADRES, SICK OF THE
~NFiGHTING, HAVE THROWN UP THEIR HANDS AND WALKED OFF
`)Sar:
11 S HAVE BEEN FAR MORE COMMON THAN ARMED
'~"ROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF CHINA'S TOP PROVINCIAL
Ef;:?N C R I T I C I Z E D I N THEM, MOST OF THESE ATTACKS
AN ZED AND SEEM TO POSE NO THREAT TO THE TARGET.
RH:TARIES, HOWEVER, DO SEEM TO BE IN SERIOUS
i)ERS OF CHEKIANG AND KIANGSI MAY BE PURGED--
=BRED IN PUBLIC FOR SIX MONTHS AND BOTH HAVE
disCIZED--WHILE THOSE IN FUKIEN AND HUPEH SEEM
THEIR POSTS ONLY TO LOSE MUCH OF THEIR
WHOLE, THE MODERATE FACTION IN PEKING SEEMS
TO PROTECT ITS SENIOR-LEVEL ALLIES IN THE PRO-
ARE LIKELY IF THE SUCCESS ION STRUGGLE
i PRESENT THE DISARRAY IN THE DOES
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NOT MATCH THAT OF THE CRITICIZE LIN AND CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN,
WHEN SERIOUS DISORDERS WERE REPORTED I N OVER HALF ^r CHINA'S
PROVINCES. THE CRITICIZE LIN AND CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN DID NOT
B E G I N TO APPROACH THE VIOLENCE O F THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.,
5. Tra_ FACTIONS IN THE PROVINCES CONTINUE TO EXIST BE-
CAUSE THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IS TOO DIVIDED TO DO ANYTHING
,.BOUT THEM, AND INDEED, HAS EVEN ENCOURAGED THEIR ACTIVITIES,
ALBEIT INADVERTENTLY AT TIMES, IN MOST CASES, THE FACTIONS
OPERATING IN THE PROVINCES TODAY ARE DIRECT DESCENDANTS OF
THOSE SPA+4NED BY THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THESE GROUPS EX-
P~QIT EVERY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE DIVISIONS IN PEKING
`;`" PURSUE THEIR OWN PRIVATE VENDETTAS, SOME OF WHICH ARE NOW
Tj:N YEARS OLD, THE GROUPS ARE NOT SO MUCH LOYAL TO ONE OF
THE FACTIONS IN PEKING, THOUGH MOST HAVE CONTACTS AT THE
CENTER, AS THEY ARE TO LOCAL LEADERS, WHICH MAKES IT VERY
HARD FOR ANYONE I v PEKING TO CONTROL THEM, PEKING HAS
COMPCUNDED THE PROBLEM BY ISSUING VAGUE AND CONTRADICTORY
DRECT IVES BECAUSE Op ITS OWN INABILITY TO BE DECISIVE. CONTENDING
f'RJVINCIA~_FACTIONS USE THE EXISTING INDECISIVENESS TO ATTACK- EACH
4 OTHER. AT OTHER TIMES, PEKING HAS INTENTIONALLY :,uLPAVATED THE
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SITUATION. LEFTISTS SUCH AS POLITBURO MEMBERS C H I A N G CH'ING
AND Y A 6 WEN-YUAN HAVE DISPATCHED AGENTS TO THE PROVI1h ES IN HOPES
OF S RINGING DOWN MODERATE LEADERS. MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS
Y E H FEI, WHO WAS ONCE BOSS OF FUKIEN, IS REPORTEDLY
ASSISTING THE INCUMBENT MODERATE FIRST SECRETARY AGAINST YEHiS
OLD ENEMIES.
6. THE SECOND TYPE OF PROTEST IS LESS POLITICAL, AT
LEAST IN THE PARTISAN SENSE; IT IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE
ORDINARY MAN IS FRUSTRATION WITH THE SYSTEM. THESE PROTESTS
HAVE AKEN THE FORM OF WORK SLOWDOWNS, HIGH ABSENTEEISM, AND
INCREASING CRIME. WORKER DISSATISFACTION HAS BEEN REPORTED
IN TWC LVE PROVINCES, BUT IT UNDOUBTEDLY IS A NATIONWIDE
KIAN GS I
PHENO-P, NON, PRODUCTION HAS BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN FAC-
TORIES IN AT LEAST SIX PROVINCES (CHEKIANG, FUKIEN, HUPEH,
K IANGSU, AND KWEICHOW) AND, ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT,
POWER !.HORTAGES HAVE CREATED PRODUCTION PROBLEMS IN PEKING.
RAIL T E-UPS SEEM PARTICULARLY WIDESPREAD, AND ONE SOURCE
Fld* TO A TWO?MONTH BACKLOG. THE RAIL DISRUPTIONS,
WHICH HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY WORK SLOWDOWNS, HAVE MADE IT HARD
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FOR SOME PLANTS TO GET NECESSARY RAW MATERIALS AND HAVE
EXACERBATED THE FOOD SHORTAGES IN SOME PROVINCEF. ,z A
RESULT, BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY SEEMS TO BE ON THE RISE. IT
IS DIFFICULT TO GAUGE THE IMPACT OF THESE LOCAL DISRUPTIONS
ON THE OVERALL ECONOMY, BUT, AS YET, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE
AS EXTENSIVE OR SEVERE AS THOSE EXPERIENCED IN 2974. WHEN THE
CRITICIZE LIN AND CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN LED TO A DROP IN THE
GROWTH RATE.
7, A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS ARE FEEDING WORKER
DISCONTENT, BUT AT THE HEART OF THE DISCONTENT IS A GENERAL
FEELING THAT PEKING HAS ONCE AGAIN GONE BACK ON PROMISES TO
RAISE WAGES AND IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS. AS LATE AS EARLY
FEBRUARY, WORKERS WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT A GENERAL WA(
INCREASE WAS COMING, BUT THE PURGE OF TEND, WHO CHAMPIONED
THE INCREASE, NOT ONLY KILLED ANY PROSPECTS FOR HIGHER WAGES,
BUT ALSO LED TO A REDUCTION IN WORK PERFORMANCE BONUSES AND
SOME TIGHTENING OF CONTROLS ON PRIVATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY--
I M PO RT AN T SOURCES OF SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME FOR MANY, WORKERS
REACTED AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST BY SLOWING DOWN OR STOPPING
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WORK ALTOGETHER, C H 0 U EN-LA I' S WILL, A, 'ABNICA7iDN
APPARENTLY CIRCULATED BY PRO-TENG FORCES # HAS CC MP LI L;A TE D
MATTERS FURTHER, BESIDES GIVING CHOU'S BLESSING TO TENG,
MOST VERSIONS OF THE WILL CALL FOR AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO RAISE
LIVING STANDARDS, IT HAS BEET WIDELY DISTRIBUTED, OFTEN IN HAND-
COPIED VERSIONS, AND APPARENTLY HAS GAINED WIDE POPULAR
ACCEPTANCE, PEKING HAS ATTEMPTED TO GATHER UP ALL THE
COPIES AND CONVINCE THE MASSES IT IS A FAKE, BUT THE
DAMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE, AND MANY PROBABLY FEEL MORE
BITTER THAN BEFORE,
8, PEKING HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO COPE WITH THE DIS-
ARRAY IN THE PROVINCES,
VERY EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
TENG, THE PARTY ISSUED DIRECTIVES PROHIBITING "FIGHTING
TEAMS" AND "EXPERIENCE EXCHANGES," TWO PRACTICES THAT SPREAD
THE VIOLENCE DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THESE INJUNC-
TIONS, WHICH WERE ORIGINALLY CONTAINED IN CENTRAL DOCUMENT
NUMBER TWO OF 1.976, WERE REPEATED IN CENTRAL DOCUMENTS SIX,
SEVEN, AND TWELVE, SUGGESTING THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN RIGOR-
OUSLY FOLLOWED, OTHER DIRECTIVES, MOST NOTABLY SEVEN, EIGHT,
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AND ELEVEN, DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF SPECIFIC PROVINCES,
r% t~
A-
CHEKIANG. KIANGSU, AND HOPEH, RESPECTIVELY. ON TW ^- -
SIONS. ONCE IN YUNNAN AND ONCE IN KIANGSU. TROOPS WERE USED
BRIEFLY WHEN LOCAL SITUATIONS BECAME INTOLERABLE. IN OTHER
LESS SEVERE CASES, CENTRAL PARTY WORK TEAMS HAVE BEEN DIS-
PATCHED TO HANDLE PROBLEMS. ONE HAS BEEN IN HONAN SINCE
THE SPRING TRYING TO RESOLVE THE RAIL DISPUTE THERE. THE--
MOST RECENT CENTRAL DOCUMENT, NUMBER SIXTEEN OF 1976) ORDERS
WORKERS BACK ON THE JOB. MOST PROVINCIAL LEADERS HAVE BEEN
QUICK TO PUBLICIZE THE DOCUMENT. KWANGTUNG HAS BEEN PAR-
TICULARLY ACTIVE,
9, THESE MEASURES HAVE BEEN ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL.
THE PROVINCES SEEMED TO BE A LITTLE QUIETER IN JUNE, BUT THE
PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO FESTER JUST BELOW THE SURFACE. AN
INTENSIFICATION OF THE SUCCESSION INFIGHTING IN PEKING IS
LIKELY TO TRIGGER NEW INCIDENTS IN THE PROVINCES. INDEED,
AS LONG AS PEKING IS ONLY ABLE TO ISSUE VAGUE DIRECTIVES
BECAUSE OF I T S OWN D I V I S I O N S AND AS LONG AS INDIVIDUAL POLIT-
BU RO MEMBERS SECRETLY UNDERWRITE LOCAL FACTIONS, RIVALS I N
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THE PROVINCES WILL SEIZE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK THEIR
ENEMIES. PEKING'S EFFORTS TO CURB ECONOMIC DISRUPT 10N.7
WILL NEVER BE WHOLLY SUCCESSFUL UNTIL PEKING STOPS TREATING
THE SYMPTOMS-- WALKOUTS, ABSENTEEISM. SLOWDOWNS, ETC.. AND
TACKLES THE CAUSES, DEEP-SEATED WORKER DISSATISFACTION WITH
r'RESENT WAGE LEVELS AND THE PROSPECT OF EVEN MORE SPARTAN
:.IVING CONDITIONS IF THE RADICALS SUCCEED IN COMPLETE ELIMINA?
"ION OF MATERIAL BENEFITS,
10. THE MILITARY REMAINS THE ULTIMATE SANCTION SHOULD
THE SITUATION IN THE PROVINCES FINALLY REQUIRE IT, BUT IT
IS A SANCTION BOTH FACTIONS IN PEKING WOULD HESITIATE TO EMPLOY
EXCEPT UNDER THE MOST DRASTIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THE LAST TIME
THE AHM' WAS USED ON A NATIONWIDE SCALE TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE PROVTNCES IT TOOK
SEVEN YEARS TO GET THE COMMANDERS TO RETURN TO THEIR BARRACKS.
NEITHER FACTION WANTS TO REPEAT THAT EXPERIENCE. IN THE TWO
%STANCES IN THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN WHERE THE ARMY HAS BEEN
USED, IT. HAS BEEN TO ASSIST, NOT REPLACE, LOCAL AUTHORITIES
AND ONLY FOR SHORT PERIODS. IN FACT, THE ARMY'S UTILITY TO
5 PEKING IN COMBATTING FACTIONALISM IS LIMITED IN SOME CASES BE-
4
3 C~~USE THE ARMY IS ALSO FACTIONALISE' , DIFFERENT UNITS ARE
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APPARENTLY ARMING DIFFERENT FACTIONS IN CHEKIANG. DURING
TENG'S TENURE, SEVERAL MILITARY COMMANDERS AND SOME t;,iITS
WERE TRANSFERRED TO REDUCE IN GENERAL THE MILITAF'Y'S SAY
IN PRGVINCIAL POLITICS AND TO END FACTIONAL ACTIVITY IN PAR-
TICULAR. FOR THEIR OWN PART, ACCORDING TO ONE SENIOR CHINESE
OFFICIAL IN A POSITION TO KNOW, MOST SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS
.WOULD PREFER TO STAY OUT OF THE CURRENT STRUGGLE, BUT THEY WILL
NOT TOLERATE WIDESPREAD PURGE NOR CIVIL DISORDER. SO FAR
THE CHEK IANG EXAMPLE SEEMS TO BE THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN
THE RULE.
11. AS MAO 'S HEALTH DECLINES, THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE
IN PEKING WILL PROBABLY INTENSIFY. IF SO, PROVINCIAL MALAISE jS
LIKELY TO INCREASE AND INTENSIFY. THE LONGER THE
SUCCESSION STRUGGLE DRAGS ON, THE UGLIER THE SITUATION WILL
3ECOME, AND IT COULD CONCEIVABLY REACH THE PROPORTIONS OF THP
CRITICISE LIN AND CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN OF 1973-74. THE PROBLEMS
IN THE PROVINCES WILL CERTAINLY COMPLICATE SUCCESSION POLITICS.
WHOEVER EMERGES WITH A MANDATE TO RULE WILL HAVE TO COME TO
GRIPS QUICKLY WITH THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNLEASHED BY THE
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SUCCESSION STRUGGLE, AS WELL AS WITH THE REVITALIZATION OF TmE.
PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THOSE PROVINCE? WHERE THEY
HAVE BEEN BADLY DAMAGED, I T TOOK CHOU, TENG, AND THE OTHER
X10 DE RA TE S SEVEN MONTHS T O GET THE PROVINCES BACK ON THEIR
FEET AFTER THE CRITICIZE L IN AND CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN. AND
1T 'COULD TAKE THAT LONG AGAIN, EVEN THEN, THE PROBLEMS
T;iAT BRED THE DISORDER WILL REMAIN AND FESTER UNTIL THE
LEADERSHIP IN PEKING IS SUFFICIENTLY UNIFIED TO ADDRESS THE
.AUSES. AS WELL AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE.
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