FOCUS REVIEW -- THE PHILIPPINES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B00100R000200130001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
35
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 27, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 1, 1980
Content Type:
MF
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1 Memo for Distribution from JHH, dtd 1 May 80
Subj: FOCUS Review -- Philippines (NFAC 3239-80)
STAT 2 Note forl CRES) from JHH, dtd 9 May 80
Subj: Release of Cable
3 Memo for D/MS & D/P from CN, dtd 12 May 80
Subj: Request for Waiver of Medical Requirements,
STAT for (NFAC 3458-80)
4 Memo for DD/NFAC from HLH, dtd 13 May 80
Subj: Request to Submit Article for Publication (NFAC 3469-80)
STAT 5
6 Memo for Record from JHH, dtd 15 May 80
Subj: Reported Soviet Request to Vietnam for Secure. Perimeter
at Cam Ranh Bay (NFAC 3585-80)
Note to DCI from JHH, dtd 15 May 80
Subj: Visit of Amb Woodcock
Memo to DD/NFA from JHH, dtd 20 May 80
Subj: NIE 11/13-80 (NFAC 3691-80
25X1
12 Memo to DCI from JHH, dtd 21 May 80
Subj: PRC Mtg on the Situation in South Korea (NFAC 3735-80)
13 Memo to DCI from JHH, dtd 23 May 80
Subj: Korean Situation Reporting by Gen Wickham in Defense
Channels (NFAC 3802-80)
14 Memo to DCI from JHH, dtd 23 May 80
Subj: Warning Assessment
15 Form to D/S from JHH, dtd 27 May 80
Subj: Request to Speak
16 Talking Points, dtd 28 May 80
Subj: Korea, the US, and Western Europe/Japan
17 Memo for Record from JHH, dtd 28 May 80
Subj: PRC Mtg of Situation in South Korea (NFAC 3921-80)
18 Note for Distribution from JHH, dtd 28 May 80
Subj: FOCUS Philippines (NFAC 3858-80)
STAT 19
Approvea or Release - 001-0
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?
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1 May 1980
ME FORA?NDUM FOR: See Distribution
STAT FROM
National Intelligence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
25X1
SUBJECT FOCUS Review -- The Philippines
REFERENCE Our Memorandum, dated 18 April 1980,
Same Subject (NFAC 2079-80)
The FOCUS Philippines meeting scheduled for 6 May has
been rescheduled for Friday, 9 May at 0945 hours in Room
7 E 62, CIA Headquarters. Please telephone
by COB 8 May to give her the names of those who will attend.
OCR/Acquisition Branch
NIO/China-EAP
NFAC Reg
Distribution
(LDX to each member
1 each - DDO
NFAC/RES
C/NIC
C/DDO/EA
OPA/EA
OER/IJP
EO / O SWR
OCR/FE/PAC
D/OGCR
FBIS
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'15 F
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
12 May 1980
STkTrE FOR:
Here is the paragraph you asked me
for. I would like it back with your
signature appended as quickly as possible.
STAT
~J_ ~ ~', "
I _1. \-_S ~` , \Zr,x l- w C,
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NTFAC 3469-80
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
13 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, National Foreign
Assessment Center
VIA Chairman, National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
FROM : I
SUBJECT Request to Submit Article for Publication
article
1. I request permission to submit for publication the attacbpa
3. None of the material presented in the article is, to my
knowledge, classified.
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0 ?
4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an
Agency employee, but will append the standard disclaimer
indicating that the views expressed are my own and not nose
of the Agency.
Attachments
As Stated
I have reviewed the attached text, to the best of my
knowledge have found it to be unclassified, and approve it for
publication.
Chairman, National Intelligence Council Date
14 MAY 1980
Deputy Director Date
National Foreign Assessment Center
Distribution
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1 - C/PRB, w/o att
1 - C/UIIC, w/o att
2 - NIO/Ch-EAP, w/o att
1 - NFAC/Reg
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13 May 1980
Our analysts think the.
-- article puts forward articulate well reasoned arguments
that, for the most part are historically correct.
-- There is a quarrel over the tone of the presentation.
These differences lead our analysts to be generally
more pessimistic about the SRV's interest in a political
settlement. Folks here think that the notion that the
SRV sort of stumbled across the Mekong is overdrawn.
SRV is portrayed as being more reluctant on Kampuchea
than they probably were and as being more anxious to
settle and able to settle than they probably really are.
-- OER analyst doubts rebuilding the economy was really
principal objective after war,with us. The economy is now
in a shales, with Kampuchean threat elimated why haven't
they devoted more attention to it. They do not know how to
go about long range economic development.
-- OSR picks up on last paragraph about the kind of
government Hanoi would need and is skeptical that there is
really sufficient common ground for settlement. They don't
see how China could abide government in sympathy with Hanoi.
-- OPA says it stronger, although they would no doubt prefer
to establish a viable puppet regime which could gain
international acceptance and support -- as the regime in
Laos has done -- they will keep military forces in
Kampuchea as long as necessary to insure their control.
-- OPA also notes even during the Vietnamese Foreign Minister's
recent trip to Malaysia and in preparations for his upcoming
discussions in Bangkok, the Vietnamese have shown no real
signs of interest in a political compromise in Kampuchea.
They may make some gestures to draw out the ASEAN states
and weaken their unity -- token troop withdrawals or
consideration of another Khmer leader as a figurehead for
the regime -- but Hanoi still clearly considers the Kampuchean
situation to be "irreversible." In the near future, Hanoi is
not apt to compromise on the central issue of its domination
there.
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-- There are of course several other key factors that
figure prominently in a discussion of the prospects
for a settlement.
- Chinese attitude
- SRV's concern at being labeled a Soviet Satellite
- ASEAN attitude.
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13 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Donald P. Gregg
Office of the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Comments on "Vietnam: Past Restraint Suggests Desire for
Kampuchean Settlement"
25X1 9 May 1980 article, clearly designed as a
provocative t ink-piece, succeeds in raising a number of
interesting concepts. His analysis wanders, however. Al-
though Hanoi did show restraint in 1977 and 1978, as he
acknowledges in his final paragraphs. there is little
evidence that it will be willing to seek a political
25X1 settlement in Kampuchea.
25X1
25X1
ampuc ea. As Sino-Vietnamese tensions increased, however,
the Vietnamese apparently viewed the Kampucheans as Chinese
surrogates and a potentially more serious military problem.
F
It is true that Kampuchean forces, rather than the
Vietnamese, provoked the border clashes during 1977 and
1978, and that the Vietnamese would have preferred in early
1979 to concentrate on economic development rather than
becoming embroiled in military operations against the
Kampucheans. They showed restraint because of their broader
priorities. That does not mean the Vietnamese had no.designs
on Kampuchea, however--they simply favored economic pressures
and political subversion at that early point. With more than
!50 million people, compared to an estimated 6 million Kampucheans,
and a much more powerful military apparatus, the Vietnamese
,were no doubt confident of their long-term ability to dominate
K h
ou
prefer to establish a viable puppet regime which could gain
int
n CL 11 L. eir
dominant position in Kampuchea. Although they would no d bt
Pol Pot, moreover, was acutely aware of the threat. He
warned repeatedly that the Vietnamese intended to "swallow"
Kampuchea, and apparently launched the cross-border attacks
to demonstrate that Kampuchea was much tougher than the
Vietnamese assumed. II
The Vietnamese are clearly determined t h
ernational acceptance and support--as the regime in Laos
has done--they will keep military forces in Kampuchea as long
Li as necessary to insure their control. The Vietnamese fear
reinstatement of a pro-Chinese regime, but even if the Chinese
had no access to Kampuchea at all, Vietnamese forces would
continue to perform "police" duties and to prop up the pro-
Even during the Vietnamese Foreign Minister's recent trip
to Malaysia and in preparations for his upcoming discussions
in Bangkok, the Vietnamese have shown no real signs of interest:
in a political compromise in Kampuchea. They may make some
gestures to draw out the ASEAN states and weaken their unity--
token troop withdrawals or consideration of another Khmer
leader as a figurehead for the regime--but Hanoi still clearly
considers the Kampuchean situation to be "irreversible."
In the near future, Hanoi is not apt to compromise on the
25X
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
15 May 19 80
1. Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, our representative in
Beijing, will be visiting the Agency beginning at 0900 on
Wednesday, 21 May. I will be seeing him privately for 30
minutes, after which he will be debriefed by NFAC representatives.
DDO will be meeting with him beginning at 1100 and will host a
lunch in his honor.
2. If you wish to meet briefly yourself with Ambassador
Woodcock, I will make the necessary arrangements with him.
cc: DDCI
DD/NFA
C/NIC
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
20 :day 1980
NEMORAYTDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National intelligence Otticer for
China-East Asia Pacific
SUBJECT NIE 11/13-80
1. Apropos of your comments at the NIO meeting on 20 May,
I would appreciate any guidance you can provide on where you
think the Key Judgments section of the Sino-Soviet Estimate might
be expanded to reflect more fully the language of the text. At
Dick Lehman's suggestion, I would propose to insert appropriate
phraseology from the text (which has already been agreed upon by
the representatives) to insert in the Key Judgments. In this
way a further meeting of the representatives might be avoided.
2. If this procedure is not feasible, it will probably be
necessary to convene another meeting of representatives to review
once again the Key Judgments section.
cc: C/NIC
Distribution
1 - ?'D/NrA
1 - DD/:;FAC
1 - C/:TIC
1. - Action Staff
1 - NIJ/USSR-?E
1 - :TIO/China-EA,P
1 - TFAC Reg
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON MAY 86
Derived from Multiple
All Portions SECRET.
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THE DIREC? OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
21 May 1980
Attached are the Talking Points,
State paper and other related materials
for the PRC meeting on the Situation
in South Korea scheduled for 22 May
at 1600 hours.
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S=AC 3735-80
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
21 May 19 80
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
25X1
National Intelligence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
SUBJECT PRC Meeting on the Situation in South Korea
1. Action Requested: Review talking points and related materials
covering matters to be discussed at the PRC meeting scheduled for
22 May at 1600 hours.
2. Background: The meeting, which will be chaired by State,
has been convened to discuss:
o ~v'hat are realistic objectives for us to pursue in
relation to the current ROK political situation?
e How can we best use our leverage?
General Jones will brief on the military situation and the North Korean
threat, and you are scheduled to brief on current developments in
South Korea. As you know, the serious confrontation between the South
Korean military leadership and student demonstrations which we
anticipated in our Alert Memorandum of 9 May (Tab D) has in fact taken
place, and has led to the arrest by the military authorities of student
leaders and prominent politicians who allegedly supported them, the
imposition of complete martial law, the closure of the National Assembly,
the mass resignation of all opposition National Assemblymen, and the
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON MAY 86
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resignation of the Cabinet to leave President Choi as the only
civilian official presently functioning in the South Korean govern-
ment. The southern cities of Kwangju -- Kim Dae Chung's home area --
has suffered a massive insurrection that has been raging out of
control for over three days. The military crackdown has at the minimum
suspended indefinitely the process of political liberalization which
had been under way following the assassination of President Park last
October. A major breakdown of governmental and military control
over the country could also take place if rioting spreads.
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11.
Your briefing book is arranged as follows:
Tab A
--
Your Talking Points
Tab B
--
State Paper on Policy Review in Korea
Tab C
--
Current Sitreps
Tab D
--
Our Alert Memorandum of 9 May
Tab E
--
South Korea: Chronology
Tab F
--
Intelligence Memorandum on South Korean
Students: The Potential for Unrest
Tab G
--
Intelligence Memorandum on Political
Reconstruction in South Korea: A Difficult
Road
Tab H
--
SNIE on North Korean Reactions to Instability
in the South
25
All Portions of this
Document are SECRET.
Distribution
DCI
DDCI Handcarried tol 2lMay80
NSC/CS
ER
DD/NFA
DD/NFAC, w/o atts 5
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
23 May 1980
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of qentral Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Direr4or,for National Foreign Assessme
na-l--I.ntelligence Council 4
National Intelligen'Office r for
China-East Asia Pacific
SUBJECT Kos ream-situation Reporting by General Wickham
in Defense Channels
1. You will recall that at the 22 May PRC meeting, SECDEF
and General Jones made frequent references to messages that had
been received from General Wickham in Korea. These messages are
not being made available to CIA and we are therefore deprived of
a significant source of information and considered judgment
regarding developments in South Korea.
2. I believe it would be helpful in this situation that
you talk with Secretary Brown, General Jones or General 'Tighe
and ask them to release messages from General Wickham to us.
We would of course keep them closely held.
-')7-str.?bution-
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/_iFA
1 - nn/:1FAC
1 - Action Staff
1 C/'1IC
1 - NNIO/Ch-EAP Chrono
1 - _1I0/Ch-EAP File
1 - NFAC Registry
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
23 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
National Intelligence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
SUBJECT Warning Assessment: China-East Asia Pacific
The following items were discussed by the Community
Representatives at the 19 May Warning meeting.
China
1. Analysts discussed the apparent contradictions between the
recent speech of Hua Guofeng which contained criticism of material
incentives, and a Peoples Daily article the following day defending
such incentives in strongest terms. While Hua's speech could have
represented a. serious division among the leadership, most analysts
considered it to be more of a personal position of Hua himself,
who seems to be fighting a losing battle to stay in power. Deng
Xiaoping's reported decision to step down in August probably meant that
he would be taking Hua with him, too, and Hua is "going out with a
whimper." The question of incentives would be addressed at the
forthcoming NPC session according to Vice Premier Zhao Ziyang, but
there was no reason to believe that present policy lines would be
reversed even though there were clearly those at lower levels who
opposed material rewards for production increases.
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON MAY 2000
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2. On Chinese foreign policy, analysts believe that the
Chinese are presently quite concerned over their relations with
the ASEAN countries, particularly the tendency among some of these
countries -- Indonesia and Malaysia -- to seek out a negotiated
settlement of the Kampuchean situation. This may be why Deng
Xiaoping spoke of accepting a phased Vietnam withdrawal from
Kampuchea to a German reporter. There was no question but that
China is now in a more difficult situation then it was a year
ago with respect to Vietnam and Kampuchea (see below)
Indochina
3. Analysts did not believe that Vietnam intended to make
any serious concessions with respect to Thai and the other ASEAN
countries on troop withdrawal from Vietnam -- the reported VN
willingness to withdraw some troops was regarded as a token
gesture and possibly could be related to the practice that Hanoi
followed in last year's rainy season in withdrawing some units
back to Vietnam for refitting. Vietnam Foreign Minister Thach's
visit to Kuala Lumpur showed no real flexibility despite some
reference to some troop withdrawals under "certain conditions."
However, the Vietnamese apparently perceived the existence of
differences among the ASEAN nations on ne otiations and were
trying to exploit these differences.
4. The purge of the Lao Dong party currently conducted by
the Vietnamese was not regarded as being particularly serious; the
Vietnamese were evidently attempting to weed out cadres who were
"good at war but no good at managing the economy." The corrupt
and inefficient were also targeted for elimination. Nevertheless,
the purge (which had begun in January) could pickup steam later
this year as high-ranking party members became involved. It was
noted that party members of Chinese ethnic background were being
6. Within Kampuchea, analysts commented that the DK forces
under Pol Pot had evidently developed plans for military operations
during the rainy season, but no real action had yet occurred.
However, the rainy season had not yet fully arrived. The DK forces
were evidently drawing food supply from UN stocks at the Thai border.
Arms and equipment from Chinese sources appeared adequate.
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7. Analysts observed that the Vietnamese were trying hard
to provide a facade of a Kampuchean governmental structure under
Heng Samrin, but were still not having much success. Village
committees had been set up in some areas of Kampuchea but lacked
real authority and the only local governmental operations which
functioned required active Vietnamese support.
South Korea
11. Analysts were not surprised by the declaration of martial
law in South Korea given the failure of the government's restrained
approach to student demonstrations. One analyst characterized General
Chun Doo Hwan as having a seige mentality which made his strong
reaction to the student's ultimatum and 22 May deadline predictable.
It was generally agreed that Chun enjoyed strong support within the
23 May 1980
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military for tougher action against the demonstrators and the
establishment of martial law. Indeed, a Defense Security Command
Survey of senior military officers, which has come to light since
our meeting, appears to back up that judgment. There is probably
a good deal less support among military officers for Chun's
capitalizing on martial law to neutralizes in some cases wipe
North Korea
12. North Korean I&W anomalies were noted, but they were
thought not to be significant, even in combination in suggesting
the North was preparing for an attack.
4 23 May 1980
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Copy
1
- DCI
2
- DDCI
3
- ER
4
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5
- DD/NFAC
6
- AS/NFAC
7
- NIO/W
8
- NIO/Ch-EAP
File
9
- NIO/Ch-EAP
Chrono
10 - NFAC Registr"
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REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING
1. Title of Presentation & Nature of Meeting:
Board Meeting of National Council for US-China Trade
Recent political and economic developments in China
2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:
NCUST
3. Location:
Metropolitan Club, Washington, D. C.
4. Time:
7:30 p.m., 3 June 1980
25X1
25X1
S. Name and Position of NIC Requester:
6. Identified as CIA? YES Agency-sponsored? No
7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx):
None
8.`Ti/Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)
9. Other Pertinent Information:
I addressed this group under similar circumstances last year.
APPROVE:
Z7 I G6
(Chairman, National Intelligence Council (Date)
25X1
25X1
41
Coor inat r for Academic Relations)
(Director of Security)
(ate
30 D e
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
REQUEST TO SPEAK IN A PUBLIC MEETING
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
NIC Admin Officer
CAR Room 7G25
D/OSOEAB Room 4E33 IIsr~g IO
NI O/ CII-EAP
kL
AQ20013000n SECRET
27"lay 1980
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
FORM USE PREVIOUS //~ Tld Fok~ Q~~~,,100R
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a ~~~bM~d6:
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is T 08 May 1980
Korea, the US, and Western Europe/Japan
I. Recent events in ROK -- student riots, martial law, Kwangju bloodshed, trend
away from political liberation and toward a possible military
dictatorship -- add yet another significant area of tension
to troubled world scene. US unavoidably drawn in due to our
military presence in ROK, 35-year history of close relationship
with successive ROK governments, commitment to defense against
North Korean attack.
II. Western (including Japanese) concern and relationship derives
from several considerations
-- Security, i.e., possibility of hostilities if NK attempts
to exploit current disarray in the South by launching a
military attack. (Due to proximity, Japan particularly
concerned, and Ohira expressed such fears to visiting PRC
Premier Hua Guofeng on first day of Hua's visit. Hua
said NK would not attack.)
-- Related issue is that EC and Japan have very large invest-
ments in ROK, which they stand to lose outright if the North
attacks. We also have a very heavy economic stake. Break-
down is as follows:
South Korea: Foreign Capital Inflows by Country
(Nil US $)
1976
1977
1978
1979
Cumulative 1959
thru latest year
Total
842
1260
1930
NA
7745
US
231
260
310
NA
2123
Japan
51
348
585
NA
1758
EC
343
407
607
NA
2320
Public Loans
Total
711
608
818
NA
4763
US
191
126
176
NA
1451
Japan
55
76
98
NA
818
EC
65
47
70
NA
396
Equity Investment
Total
85
103
101
126
999
US
28
12
15
29
191
Japan
49
53
45
55
586
Other
8
38
41
42
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-- Even if NK exercises restraint, continued political unrest
in ROK deriving from resistance by student groups,
intellectuals, the Church, etc. to martial law, moves by
General Chun Tu Hwan to establish military dictatorship
and one-man rule, could undercut ROK's "economic miracle"
and discourage further foreign loans, investments.
? ROK already facing serious economic difficulties prior
to present crisis: GNP growth only 3-4% p.a. (vice 1971-79
average of 9.9%); inflation running at 25%. Wage
increases granted as result of wave of strikes last April
could push inflation to 30%.
-- As a result, foreign banking consortia are now seriously
considering holding back on further development loans.
But absence of such loans could further exacerbate ROK
economic strains and add to political tensions. (Labor
groups have not joined with students in present situation,
but might if economic conditions worsen.)
III. Western Europe and Japan will inevitably look to US to assist
in maintaining ROK's political stability and economic progress.
-- Most importantly, our military responses to the potential
NK threat will be carefully scrutinized as to adequacy.
-- We will be expected to apply leverage on General Chun and
his military colleagues to exercise moderation; restore unity,
and not stand in way of political liberalization.
-- We will also be expected to do what we can to safeguard the
economic stake which WE and Japan have in ROK.
? Our own bankers will also be watching us closely for
signs that we are playing a positive role with respect
to ROK economic developments. If we falter, they will
cut back.
-- Our problem is, however, that given our defense commitment
to the ROK our leverage over General Chun and his colleagues
is not great. Our friends. and allies may not understand. this.
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FROM: I
30 May 19 80
Attached is the summary of events from
the 22 May PRC meeting on the situation in
South Korea.
cc: DDCI
DD/NFA
C/NIC
C/DDO/EA
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4
THE DIRECTIP OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
28 May 1980
SUBJECT: FOCUS Philippines
Attached is the draft of the FOCUS
Philippines. Please contact
by COB 6 June with your comments
or concurrence.
Attachment
As Stated
for East sia
DIA
NSA
DIA
Fre Ashley, State
Arthur Long, Treasury
Hubert F. Matson, Army
John H. Porasky, Air Force
Lee Piartin, DOE
DDO/EPDS/FREG
C/RES
NITO/HTO
C/'TIC
%TIO/EA
C/DDO/EA
OPA/EAP
OER/ IJP
EO/OSWR
OCR/FE/PAC
D/OGCR
FBIS
OCR/Acquisition Branch
?TFAC Registry
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