CHRONO (10 SEPTEMBER THRU 31 OCTOBER 1979)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000200200001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 89
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1979
• Content Type: LIST

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4110
CHRONO
TAB
(10 September thru
Memo to Nick Platt
Subject: NIE-IIM
Pacific (NFAC 4853-79)
31 October 1979)
1
2
3
(NSC) from
dated 12 September
Production Schedule - East Asia and the
Note to Oksenberg
Re: Speech delivered
(NSC) from dated 18 September
by Chai Zemin
4
5
6
7
Memo (See Distribution)
Subject: Korean Pre
Note to D 0 R from
from Lehman'
-H Hour Scenario
dated 24 September
Study (NFAC 5111-79)
ated 25 September
26 September
China (NFAC 5187-79)
Re: Resume
Warning Memo from dated
Subject: WarningAssessment:
8
9 Memo to NIO/W from dated 17 October
Subject: Draft Study of the NIO System
10 Ltr tol
Subjece.
11
12
13
dated 19 October
luauk you
14 Ltr to Amb. Woodcock from
Subject: Thank you
dated 22 October
15 Memo to NIO/W from 1, dated 23 October
Subject: Reform of the NIO System
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CHRONO 10 Sept thru 31 Oct 79
TAB
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25
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26
27
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30
Memo to C/NFAC Admin from
Subject: Research Project
flated 24 October
KNFAC 5748-79)
Memo to NITO, frorni dated 25 October
Subject: Nuclear Proliferation Collection Study: North
Korea (NFAC 5783-79)
Memo to DCI from dated 25 October 1979
Subject: Monthly Warning Meeting, October 1979 (NFAC 5783-79)
Warning Memo from' 1 dated 25 October
Subject: Warning Assessment: China (NFAC 5784-79)
Ltr to
Subject: Thank you
Ltr to
from
Subject: Thank you
Memo to DCI from!
dated 26 October
dated 26 October
fated 26 October
Memo to DD/NFA from
dateti 90 n,f-^1.^-
Memo to DD/NFAC from
Subject:
Note to NI0s-ODs-SRP-SA/P from
Subject: NIO/Ch-EAP Production korecast
Elj dated 29 October
dated 29 October
Rpts for Presidential Briefing. dated 11 October
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or
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National Intelligence Officers
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110 25
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Nick Platt, NSC/EA
FROM
SUBJECT
NF.*- 93-
12 September 1979
NIO/China-East Asia
paciric
: NIE-IIM Production Schedule - East Asia and
the Pacific
1. Following on our conversation of September 11,
I am sending you a copy of the production schedule for East
Asia and the Pacific through the second quarter of 1980.
2. I would be pleased to receive any comments or
suggestions you may have regarding the schedule.
Attachment:
Production Schedule
SECRET,
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25
25
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D Eill VAT i 't) E L bY Signer
EJ C EC L !NV; ON 12Sept ' 85
DERIVED FROM
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SECRET)
? 2
NFAC 4853-79
12 September 1979
SUBJECT: NIE-IIM Production Schedule - East Asia and
the Pacific
NIO/CH-EAP:
Attachment:
Production Schedule
jcn 12 Sept.79
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee Watt
w/att
1 - NIO/EAP Watt
1 - NFAC Reg. w/att
SECRET,
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NFAC NOTICE
NFACN
No. 10 September 1979
Announcement of Assignment to Key Position
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia Pacific
Effective immediately, ,
NIO/China,
will temporarily assume the additional responsibility of
NIO/East Asia Pacific, vice
Distribution:
Regular inhouse
+ DDO
ruce ar e,
Director
Nationa oreign Assessment Center
!so o -o o - II I A?I; :II 11111 II 1.111
2
2
1
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? SECRET
National Intelligence Officers
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
NFAC 4854-79
12 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr., D/NFAC
FROM
INIO/CH-EAP
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
Recommendations onl
Policy NIE
D/NFAC Note to NIO/CH-EAP,
10
September
1979
1. I attach a revised concept paper which I believe
goes some way toward incorporating the advice of the SRP
as well as my own views on the construct of the paper.
Paragraph 2 of the revised version makes clear the intended
direction of the NIE and clarifies central issues to be
addressed in the paper.
I I
2. The SRP is hesitant to discuss the revised concept
paper with me until after you have had a chance to react to
it. I share your concern that a good paper is more important
than the completion date, and we have decided to cancel the
meeting with interagency representatives scheduled for
Friday.
I I
3. You also asked my views on whether the paper needed to
be done as an NIE rather than an IIM. I believe the subject
is of interest to policymakers at a sufficiently high level
that it deserves NFIB review which is afforded an NIE.
Attachment:
Concept Paper
25X1
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S Fin",ff
SECRET
EXT BY ND Y FIG BY
P7ACOM
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sECRET
SUBJECT: Recommendations on
Attachment:
Concept Paper
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee Watt
,1 - NIO/CH-EAP w/att
1 - NIO/EAP Watt
1 - NFAC Reg. Watt
NFAC 4854-79
12 September 1979
SECRET
Policy NIE 25X1
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,
THE DIRIPOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
18 September 1979
Michel Oksenberg
National Security Council
Dear Mike,
Herewith is the speech delivered by
Chai Zemin before the annual meeting of the
National Committee on US-Chinese Relations
In New York on 17 September. As I mentioned
to you, I found noteworthy the references to
hegemonism, which must reflect policy guidance
Chai recently received in Beijing. Also of
interest is the reference to the situation
requiring us to view and approach Sino-US
relations with a politico-strategic perspective.
Regard
or China-EAP
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THE DIRECTOL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ono! Intelligence Officers 18 September 1979
Dear Dick,
Herewith is the speech delivered by
Chai Zemin before the annual meeting of the
National Committee on US-Chinese Relations
in New York on 17 September. As I mentioned
to you, I found noteworthy the references to
hegemonism, which must reflect policy guidance
Chai recently received in Beijing. Also of
interest is the reference to the situation
requiring us to view and approach Sino-US
relations with a politico-strategic perspective.
Re ards
Mr. Richard Solomon
or China-EAP
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Mr. Chairman Yost, _
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It gives me and my colleagues great pleasure to attend
today's luncheon upon invitation ,nd to meet many of our
American friends on the occasion of the annual meeting of
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.
Your current annual meeting is being held at a time
when Sino-U.S. relations have entered a new phase after the
establisint of diplomatic relations between our two
countries.- As I see it, this new development will add to
the significance of this annual meeting. -
Over-the-yearsi-the-National-Committee-on-UvS--:-Chima
Relations has done a lot of work to promote Sino-U.S. cultural
exchanges and friendly contacts, thus contributing to the
normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. I will give you only
one example to illustrate this point: It was the National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations that played host to the
Chinese Table Tennis Team, which visited the United States
in 1971 as a pioneer of the Chinese people for opening
Sino-U.S. relations. That important decision known as
the "Ping-Pong Diplomacy" was made by the late Chairman
Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. The immediate positive
Si
response and warm Aupport to that decision given by the
National Committee on U.S.-China RelatiOns and American
friends of all walks of life made it possible for.the
little ping-pong ball finally to open the door to friendly
contacts between the Chinese and American peoples. As the
Chinese -saying goes,"everything's hard at the beginning."
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That good beginning paved the way for broader exchanges between
our two peoples at a later stage.
Shortly after that visit, the epoch-making Shanghai
Communique was issued thanks to the outstanding farsightedness
of the leaders of both countries, a document which charted the
orientation for developing the relations between our two
countries. In keeping with the spirit of the Shanghai
Communique and in cooperation with relevant Chinese organizations,
the National Committee organized extensive people-to-people
exchange programmes for sportsmen, journalists, women representativ
research fellows of international study, educationists, local
administrative leaders, performing arts groups and travel
agency workers, etc. These programmes have enhanced the
mutual understanding between our two peoples and promoted their
friandship. No doubt, these meaningful exchange of visits
quickened the pace of normalization of relations, thus bringing
about the establishment of diplomatic relationsbetween our
two countries on January 1 this year. I wish to take this
opportunity to extend our sincere congratulations and profound
thanks to you for the excellent work the National Committee
has done in promoting the friendly relations between China and
the United States.
The Chinese people are a peace-loving people determined
to work for the defence of world peace and international
security together with all other peace-loving countries and
peoples. What is more, we earnestly want a peaceful international
environment in order to focus our efforts on realizing the
four modernizations, so as to lift China out of economic backwardne
On the other hand, we cannot but note that the world today is
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by no means tranquil. Forces seeking military superiority and
world hegemony are constantly stepping up their offensives and
creating turmoils everywhere through direct or indirect means,
Under these circumstances, it has become a most important task
wor14
of our times to oppose hegemonism and defend wpisyld peace.
There exist traditional friendly contacts between the
Chinese and American peoples. The situation today requires us
to view and approach Sino-U.S. relations with a politico-strategic
perspective. In so doing, we will find a common basis for
strengthening the cooperation between our two countries, both
in the general aspect and in our bilateral relations. This basis
wili-be a relliaM and durable one, and ndt a transient expediencyc-
Whoever loses sight of this point or have doubt about it will
fall behind the historical trend.
Of course, in view of our different social systems
and a number of outstanding issues awaiting solution in the ,
relations between our two countries, there may emerge some
differences between our two countries. This is nothing strange.
The important thing is not allow, these differences _to, affect
our cooperation; instead, we should develop our relations on
the basis of mutual adherence to the internationally recognized
principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit.
Since normalization, Sino-U.S. relations have made fairly
rapid progress in the political, economic, trade, cultural,
scientific and technological fields. Our two countries have
since then signed many bilateral agreements, and contacts
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at governmental level or between peoples have also become more
and more frequent. This is in the interest of the Chinese
people and the American people as well. The development of
the friendly cooperation between China and the United States.
is no doubt of vital importance to defending peace and stability
i/he Asia-Pacific region and i94he world at large.
I have just returned from China.- At home, I saw for myself
a political situation of unity and stability, the promotion and
strengthening of socialist democracy and legal systems as
well as vigorous developments on all fronts of our national
economy under the impact of the policies formulated at the
second sessicTL the Fifth National People's Congress,
Starting from this year, we will use about three years to readjust,
restructure, consolidate and improve our national economy
and lead our national economy onto a course of sustained
and proportionate fast development, so as to accelerate
China's four modernizations. During the next three years
and in a fairly long period to come, while relying mainly
on our own efforts, we will study and introduce advanced
foreign technology and equipment suitable for our needs
independepent basis. We will actively develop trade and
mutually beneficial economic cooperation with various countries
and adopt reasona and customary methods now used abroad
in accepting foreign inveTents and guarAnteeing their
legitimate profits. We have already formulated some laws
and regulations to this effect and will formulate additional
ones inthe future.
China is a developing country with an area of 9.6 million
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square kilometres and a population of 900 million. With the
steady development of China's national construction, it is beyond
all doubt that there will be broad prospects for economic
cooperation and scientific and cultural exchange between our
two countries. I would like to quote the two lines from a
poem dating back to the Tang Dynasty which Vice President
Mondale used in his speech at Beijing University: We widen
our view 300 miles by ascending one flight of stairs. Only
when we stand on a higher plane, can we see far ahead. Let us
be far-sighted and keep in mind the magnificent prospects for
the friendly cooperation between our two-great countries over
a relatively long historical period.
Shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and the United States, Vice-Premier Deng paid a
visit to your country. The Vice-Premier and President Carter
reaffirmed the principles embodied in the joint communique
on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and
the United States and pushed the relations between the two countrie
to a new high. Recently, Vice President Mondale paid a successful
,a4a/
visit to China ,laid a new groundwork for the further
development of our relations. I personally had the privilege
of being a member of Vice-Premier Deng's party during
his visit to your country and of taking part i osting
the visit of Vice President Mondale to China. As a witness
to the latest development of Sino-U.S. relations, I am full
of fine expectations of the broad vistas for developing mutually
beneficial cooperation and friendly contacts between our two
coluntries and peoples. Much remains to/done by us. In the
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coming new era, the workload of the National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, I am afraid, will not decrease but rather
increase. I sincerely wish you an even bigger role in and
a still greater contribution to promoting the friendship between
our two peoples and strengthening the relations between
our two countries.
Thank you.
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CONFIDENTIAL 0 NFAC #5111-79
?
National Intelligence Officers
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2050$
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM
SUBJECT
24 September 1979
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP
: Korean Pre-H Hour Scenario Study
Work is starting on a reanalysis of possible pre-attack scenarios
on the Korean peninsula. It will incorporate recent order-of-battle
assessments and serve as a cornerstone for the forthcoming NIE. We
consider this work to be of the utmost importance and solicit maximum
participation by your agency.
Richard Lehman
NIO for Warning NIO for China-EAP
Distribution:
D/ NSA
D/INR/State
DD/NFA
D/DIA
Army ACSI
DNI
Air Force ACSI
D/Intel/USMC
- Signers
24 Sep 85
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CONFIDENTIAL
?
SUBJECT: Korean Pre-H Hour Scenario Study (NFAC #51I1-79)
Distribution:
2 - MIO/CH
2 - 1410/Warning .
25X1 1 - IA/NIO/EAP
1 - NFAC Registry
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CONFIDENTIA
THE DIOTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 25 September 1979
NOTE FOR: Director, Office of Central
Reference
FROM
NIO for China?EAP
The attached resume from
maybe of interest to you. If not, please
return.
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pprove or
National Intelligence Officers
ease
11 /1 24 IA-183
SECRET
00100R00020020000,,?
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
26 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for China
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China
1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of
Community views expressed at the warning meeting held on
17 September. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the
participants but is being circulated among them.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on Wednesday,
10 October at 1400 hours in room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters.
Please provide the name of your representative to
25X1 'prior to COB Tuesday, 9 October 1979.
25X1
All portions of the memorandum are SECRET.
At
As Stated
Distribution
State
NSA
Army
Air Force
Navy
DIA
SWS
- Mr. Robert Drexler
- Col. Jack B. Churchill
- Major Wally Astor
Lt/Cdr. Albert Aldo
25X1
- 11?. Douglas J. MacEachen
SECRET
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SECRET/
National Intelligence Officers
?
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
17 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
25X1 FROM
SUBJECT
25X1
: Draft Study of the NIO System
1. Since I won't be at your meeting on Thursday, I have availed
myself of your invitation to put my thoughts about your draft staff
study on paper. I am talking here about tactics, not direction or
destination (except in the area of integrated research programs).
2. It is my view that the changes in the NIO relationship with
NFAC are too explicitly spelled out to support your bureaucratically
necessary disclaimer that no radical changes are in train. I think
you are right that NIO withdrawal from NFAC affairs will be slower
and in the short run less complete than the D/NFAC perhaps now envisions.
If so, the categorical prohibitions in your draft study will cause
jurisdictional fights to become greater rather than lesser. Everyone
recognizes where things are going: Why not let nature take its course?
3. NIOs were given responsibility for interoffice production
precisely because such papers were not being written under Office
Director auspices. It may be that you don't think interoffice papers
are worth doing. But if they are (and I happen to think they are),
then they will only appear if responsibility for them is lodged with
someone who has the substantive expertise to see them through.
4. Let me reiterate again my views on a useful NIO relationship
to NFAC-wide research programs in the China and USSR areas, where very
large numbers of analysts in virtually all NFAC production offices
are engaged in working on a single country. There is a real role to
be played by the D/NFAC's senior substantive expert in developing and
coordinating an integrated research program in these areas. I append
my effort several years ago as one example of an integrated approach
to this issue. As I told you, it got good reviews at the time.
5. Individual production offices are already being encouraged
to set up their own lines of communications to the NSC, State and
so forth. No specific dispensation is necessary. The injunction
SECRET'
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that the offices keep the NIOs informed of what they are doing is,
moreover, unenforceable. NIOs are not being informed of activities
in this area as things stand now. Your new regulations make it
impossible even to pretend that the NIOs are in fact the DCI's
substantive advisor and surrogate in his field or area of expertise.
6. This is even more true if the NIOs are merely to "advise"
on the preparation of briefing books, Presidential briefings, etc.
How are the NIOs to accompany the DCI to SCCs, PRCs, and so forth
(much less occasionally substitute for him) if they are not actively
engaged in preparing for such meetings? This is not to say that
NIOs need do the initial drafting; merely that they should shape
the product before it goes to the DCI. You may, of course, wish
deliberately to give the impression that you are creating a giant
Senior Review Board, but if you don't then here as elsewhere greater
ambiguity is in order.
7. I appreciate your idea of brining together a "critical mass,"
but if you are going to be able to do this you will have to make the
new NIO setup attractive enough to bring in the kind of people who will
make the system work. It is one thing to cut off a leg and a couple
of fingers, it is another to engage in a public emasculation. A
"critical mass" implies a chain reaction. What you don't want is
another embarassing accident leaving in its wake the problem of having
to dispose of all those gallons of radioactive water. We have had
enough Three Mile Islands around here since 1973.
aECRE
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19 October 1979
I returned to Washington on the 17th, suffering only somewhat
from jetlag. Now that I have gone through the accumulated traffic
of two weeks, I want to express my deepest thanks and appreciation
for all the help that you gave me during my stay
I will be looking forward to seeing you in Washington during
your consultations next month. Hopefully, you will be able to
spend some time giving me and others the opportunity to hear your
thoughts on recent developments
I know that these would be most helpful and
preceptive.
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(NIWCH-EAP)
A/NJ-Wk.:kJ-EA') chrono (JEE)
SECRET
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National Intelligence Officers
SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
NFAC 5683-79
22 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Rae Huffstutler, Director, OSR
25X1 FROM
SUBJECT
25X1
1.
25X1
National Intelligence OfJicer/China,
East Asia Pacific
Policy
In that regard the drafting officer and my assistant
met Informally with of your office to sketch out
arguments that might be addressed in that segment of the paper.
It is my understanding that much of the research may be "on
the shelf." The major tasks are:
Composition of a terms of reference for a
4-5 page annex to the estimate;
A draft of that annex; and
Extrapolation of judgments contained in the
annex for inclusion in the draft itself.
25X1 We would likertaimplete this portion of the estimate by
1 November.
25X1 2. I request you make? available to participate in this
project to function as the annex drafting officer.
25X1
25X1
Distribution:
Orig-Addressee
SIGNED
Signer
220ct.85
mpAr Rpa
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC 5684-79
22 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Karl H. Weber
Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence
25X1 FROM
25X1 SUBJECT
25X1 1.
25X1
25X1
National Intelligence Officer/China,
East Asia Pacific
Defense Policy
!In that regard the draft nq officer and my assistant
met informally with
of your office to sketch out arguments that might be addressed in
that segment of the paper. It is my understanding that much of
the research may be "on the shelf." The major tasks are:
Composition of a terms of reference for a
4-5 page annex to the estimate;
A draft of that annex; and
Extrapolation of judgments contained in the
annex for inclusion in the draft itself.
We would like to complete this portion of the estimate by
1 November.
2. I request you make these individuals available to
participate in this project.
Distribution:
Orig - Aaarssp,m
25X1 NIO/CH-EAP)
- A/NIO/CH-EAP Chrono (jEE)
1 - NFAC Req.
1 -
25X1
SIGNED.
C' Signer
VC.0 :7
4: CIA-RDP83600100R000200200001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1 1. 1
[ 1 in tnat regard the drafting otticer and my assistant
25X1 met informally with of your office to sketch out
arguments that might be addressed in that segment of the paper.
It is my understanding that much of the research may be "on
the shelf." The major tasks are:
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SECRET
National Intelligence Officers
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
NFAC 5685-79
22 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Evan Hineman
Director, Office of Weapons
Intelligence
FROM
veaLtunai inteiiigence tit
East Asia Pacific
icer/China,
SUBJECT
Defense
Policy
25X1
25X1 2. I requrI_yru make
25X1 this project.
Composition of a terms of reference for a
4-5 page annex to the estimate;
A draft of that annex; and
Extrapolation of judgments contained in the
annex for inclusion in the draft itself.
We would like to complete this portion of the estimate by
1 November.
25X1
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - (NIO/CH-EAP)
1 - a/Nio/LH-EAP (JEE)
1 - NFAC Reg.
1 - NIE 41-1-79
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available to participate in
SIGNED
c_.
/3
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? ?
National Intelligence Officers
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
23 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard. Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : I
2 5X1ational Intelligence Officer for
China-EAP
SUBJECT Reform of the NIO System
1. My major concern with respect to your study on reform of
the NIO system is the relationship between the NIOs and NFAC,
specifically on the score of the need for the NIO not only to be
kept au courant regarding NFAC policy papers but assured the right
to coordinate such papers. Otherwise, NIO's role as the DCI's
advisor and surrogate on policy would be vitiated. Judging by
your comments at the NIO meeting of 23 October, however, this point
may already have been resolved.
2. As a practical matter, I also question the advisibility
of arbitarily limiting NIOs to one assistant. I believe I understand
the purpose for this limitation: reducing the NIO "presence" among
NFAC analysts and hence reducing the amount of irritation on the
Office Director's part concerning utilization of his analytical
strength. Also, I assume that you anticipate the need for NIO-NFAC
interaction will be reduced as the NIC's own analytic and drafting
capability increases. Nevertheless, this separate NIC capability
does not now exist and is not likely to do so for quite some time;
thus, realistically speaking, continued NIO-NFAC interaction cannot
be avoided. Accordingly, in a large and varied area such as my own
I would feel that the presence of two assistants is essential if
the heavy, NIE workload is to be accomplished, not to mention maintenance
of coordination on other projects. To argue ad hominem, there is enough
going on in China and elsewhere in the East Asia-Pacific area to keep
25X1 both thoroughly busy.
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St
II
? I
16AbboibotNoMPTR
EW ON OCT 85
ALL PORTIONS CL SECRET
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410 SECRET
41P NFAC 5748-79
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
24 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, NFAC Admin
25X1 FROM
H31
??Al
25X1
25X1
National Intelligence Officer
for China-EAP
SUJECT Research Project
1. I would like to send 1 who is an Agency
consultant, I [o undertake a research project in connection
with a fqrthcoming IIM entitled "The Medium-Term Prospects for
The purpose of visit would be to look into
the attitudes of the key opinion groups (government officials,
military, businessmen, youth intellectuals. farmerq anA ...,-,4.
Importantly, I 1
regarding thdir current situation and future prospects' 1
in the coming five years or so. The impetus for thic
25X1 3. 3. From !standpoint, it would be most desirable
for him to be given a contract for a specific research project covering
the points I have outlined above, at a cost of about $6500. However,
for security purposes a less detailed description would be preferable,
e.g., something along the lines of "to conduct research into current
East Asian developments." 1 1research would be done at a
25X1 SECRET level. Alternatively, I presume that there would be no problem
in compensating' let the maximum rate permissible, plus
25X1 travel and per diem expenses. 1
25X1
ORIGINAL CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON 24 OCT 85
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40
4. I have discussed this project extensivel wi
and he would like to spend about three weeks
25 November.
All portions of the document
are classified SECRET.
Distribution:
1 - C/NFAC/Admin
1 - CAR
NIO/China-EAP Chrono
1 -
1 - egistry
ommensing
2
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25X1
25X1
25X1
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SECRET
?
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
NFAC 5788-79
25 October 1979
A/N10-CH/EAP
Nuclear Proliferation Collection Study:
North Korea
NITO/USSR-EE Memorandum, Same Subject,
Dated 27 September 1979
I support the objectives and analysis contained in the
collection study on nuclear proliferation: North Korea, and
agree with the collection focal points.
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
A/NIO/CH-EAP
1 - A/NIO/CH-EAP
1 - NFAC Reg.
SECRET
;IGNED
BY Signer
250ct. 81
DEtlIVEZ; FEC:A
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SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Notional Intelligence Officers
NFAC 5783-79
25 October 1979
.40204-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
25X1 FROM
SUBJECT
Director, National Foreign Assessment Cente
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
A/NIO/CH-EAP
Monthly Warning Meeting, October 1979
The following items are suggested for consideration:
1. Mbrth Asia
Korea. Analysts thought that last week's student
demonstrations and the opposition's en masse resignation from
the National Assembly the week before created the most difficult
political problem set the Park government has faced in over
five years. They noted, however, that the government's tough,
decisive response to opposition challenges - the move to expel
Kim Yong-sam from his post as opposition party leader as
illustration - has worked well for Park in the past. They also
shared the view that in several recent instances the government
has used greater restraint in responding to provocations by
the opposition than it did in the past. There was a consensus
25X1 that the greatest danger to Park lies in the emergence of an
attractive leader that the opposition could rally behind. Most
To bring the
26X1 situation back to normal, the government must neutralize Kim
and persuade the opposition party members to rejoin the National
25X1 Assembly. Of the two, the latter task appears the most
25X1 manageable.
? Signer
250ct. 83
El X-
SECRET/I I
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SECRET
-2-
2. Southeast Asia. Analysts expressed concern that
ASEAN's delicate consensus on security might be breaking down
over Indochina. With the future of Pol Pot and his forces
increasingly a question mark, the ASEAN states seem to be
reaching separate conclusions on what to do next. At present,
Singapore is leery of what it perceives as a drift by both
Malaysia and Indonesia toward a political solution with the
Vietnamese. Lee Kwan Yew would prefer a coalition in Kampuchea
headed by Sihanouk.
SECRET1
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
25 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
25X1 FROM
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for China
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China
g/f4 41,4z
1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of
Community views expressed at the warning meeting held on 10 October.
This memorandum has not been coordinated with the participants but
is being circulated among them.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on Monday,
19 November at 1400 hours in room 7 E 32, CIA Headquarters.
Please provide the name of your representative to
25X1 prior to COB Friday, 16 November 1979.
Attachment
As Stated
Distribution:
State
NSA
Air Force
Navy 4
DIA
SWS
Mr. Robert Drexler
- 'Col. Jack B. Churchill
25X1
Army
25X1
Major Wally Astor
- Lt/Cdr. Albprr Alan
- nr. Douglas J. MacEachen
All portions of this document
are classified SECRET.
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2
;'6
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
25 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
25X1 FROM
: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assess
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence
Officer for China
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: China
1. The Internal Situation
Analysts focused primarily on the possibility that a new
and relatively wide-ranging purge of officials accused of leftist
tendencies may be impending. There was some divergence of views as
to whether or not Deng Xiaoping (apparently the prime mover in this
effort) had the political strength to carry through, but most
analysts thought the odds on such a purge had definitely shortened.
The issue the meeting addressed was whether a purge of this nature
would lead to greater or lesser political instability in China in
(a) the short run and (b) the longer run. A strong concensus
developed that such a purge was useful perhaps even necessary if
current policies were to be sustained over the longer run, but that
the purge itself was likely to be a source of instability, fueling
new resentments. A further consensus also emerged that the odds
were good that tensions created by such a purge could and probably
would be contained. One analyst made a strong case for unity among
the leadership as the key factor in containing tensions; other
suggested the main problem lay at middle levels of the party. It
was generally concluded that a new purge would present some risk
but not an acute one, to US policy interests.
2: Sino-Soviet Affairs
After taking the temperature on this issue, most analysts
concluded that the thermometer remained about where it had been over
the past several months. Most signs remained negative, and the odds
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against significant improvement of relations between the two parties
were not good. Analysts noted that the preliminary sparring in
Moscow before formal talks got underway suggested that each side
was maneuvering for marginal, tactical advantage (with Vietnam in
both parties' mind), and that suspicions were high on each side.
It was also noted, however, that there had been signs of genuine
Chinese interest in some movement off dead center last spring. The
importance of Chinese domestic politics as a key variable in assessing
the chances of movement in the Sino-Soviet relationship was generally
acknowledged, and there was agreement that the indications that
Deng Xiaoping had strengthened his position in recent weeks made even
limited improvement in relations a good deal less likely.
3. The Indochina Situation
Analysts looked carefully once again at the indicators but
reiterated the conclusion that a major renewal of last winter's
fighting did not seem likely. There was agreement that the
Vietnamese were decidely concerned over the possibility of a Chinese
attack; strong evidence on the Chinese side, however, continued to
be lacking. There was general agreement that (a) it would not take
the Chinese as long to prepare for a second attack, but (b) we would
nevertheless see the tell-tale signs if preparations were underway.
These signs have not been visable. In the more nebulous area of
Chinese rhetoric and private warning, there was a consensus that the
decibel level had gone up -- briefly -- about two months ago, but
had definitely dropped back again. A number of analysts thought the
imminent destruction of the Pol Pot forces would trigger a Chinese
attack; others noted that the Chinese could define at will what
constituted the survivability of Pol Pot and that in any case an
attack along the Sino-Vietnamese or Sino-Lao border would not in itself
prevent the elimination of the Pol Pot forces if that were imminent.
Most analysts agreed that any Chinese attack (short of a direct threat
to Hanoi) would not accrue to Beijing the political gains that were
achieved through that winter's attack, and could easily erode the
gains already made. Several analysts noted that Beijing had been
reenforcing its border defense units (as distinct from main force
units) in response to the Vietnamese military buildup on the other
side of the border, and pointed out that recent information suggested
that these border units were better equipped and trained than had
previously been supposed. There was general agreement that this
information did not appreciably change the assessmention the likelihood
of a Chinese attack, however.
All portions of this document
are classified SECRET.
SECRET
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?
%
Aft SECRET,
THE DIRECTOR CW CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
200001-2
NFAC 5783-79
25 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
National Intelligence
Officer for Warning
25X1
FROM
A/NIO/CH-EAP
SUBJECT
Monthly Warning
Meeting, October 1979
The following items are suggested for consideration:
1. -north Asia
Korea. Analysts thought that last week's student
demonstrations and the opposition's en masse resignation from
the National Assembly the week before created the most difficult
political problem set the Park government has faced in over
five years. They noted, however, that the government's tough,
decisive response to opposition challenges - the move to expel
Kim Yong-sam from his post as opposition party leader as
illustration - has worked well for Park in the past. They also
shared the view that in several recent instances the government
has used greater restraint in responding to provocations by
the opposition than it did in the past. There was a consensus
that the greatest danger to Park lies in the emergence of an
attractive leader that the opposition could rally behind. Most
25X1 i I To bring the
situation back to normal, the government must neutralize Kim
and persuade the opposition party members to rejoin the National
Assembly. Of the two, the latter task appears the most
25X1 manageable.
25X1
SECRET,
.., Signer
x.t , 250ct.83
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25X1
25X1
25X1
?
SECRET)
2
25X1
2. Southeast Asia. Analysts expressed concern that
ASEAN's delicate consensus on security might be breaking down
over Indochina. With the future of Pol Pot and his forces
increasingly a question mark, the ASEAN states seem to be
reaching separate conclusions on what to do next. At present,
Singapore is leery of what it perceives as a drift by both
Malaysia and Indonesia toward a political solution with the
Vietnamese. Lee Kwan Yew would prefer a coalition in Kampuchea
headed by Sihanouk.\
SECRET)
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Approved For Release 2005/0NS4tIA-RDP83B00160-R00020021
THE DIRPOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NOTE FOR:
29 October 1979
Each NIO
All Office Chiefs
Senior Review Panel
Special Assistant for Production
SUBJECT : NIO/Ch-EAP Production Forecast
Attached is a tentative schedule for
production of NIEs and IINs we have planned
for 1980. We have discussed these programs
with various offices and welcome additional
comments from them and others.
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?
2411ctober 1979
NIO for China and the Far East
NIE/IIM Production Forecast--November 1979-October 1980
A. Projects in Progress
1.
2. NIE: The Future of US-ROK Relations
Estimated completion date: December 1979
General concept: Assesses key political, economic, and
military developments in the near term,
with special emphasis on issues affecting
US interests in South Korea. Addresses
the prospects in South Korea for continued
rapid economic growth, developments on
human rights, continued political stability,
the modernization of Seoul's military
forces, diplomatic intiatives intended to
reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula,
and the implications of President Park's
assassination.
3. NIE: Indications and Warning on North Korea
Estimated completion date: December 1979
General concept: Reviews specific steps North Korea could
take in launching an attack against South
Korea and assesses US ability to detect
such steps, including current and future
warning systems and the contribution to
warning capability provided by US forces
in Korea.
4. NIE: The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations
Estimated completion date: First Quarter 1980
SECRET
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25X6
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?
B. Projects Planned and Approved, but not yet in Progress
1.
2.
2
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C. Proposed New Projects
1. IIM: ASEAN's Durability as an Effective Regional Organization
Estimated completion date: Third Quarter 1980
General concept: Since its inception in 1967 ASEAN has
grown in importance to its five member
states, particularly since 1975, and has
brought them into a closer economic and
political relationship (and even an
increased degree of informal military
cooperation). However, strains in this
relationship are becoming apparent as
each nation reacts in its own individual
way to the circumstances and implications
of Vietnam's attack on Kampuchea. This
study will assess the prospects for ASEAN
as a durable regional organization within
which the five member states will continue
to coordinate on major aspects of foreign
policy.
2. IIM: Pacific Interdependence Trends and Prospects
Estimated completion date: Second Quarter 1980
3
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General concept: Countries in the Pacific Basin broadly
defined share no history of regional
consciousness. But over the past decade
the market economies of North America and
East Asia have linked together to show some
of the characteristics of a regional
economy. The paper sets out to: 1) examine
the intensity, scope, direction and benefits
of economic interaction among these
countries; 2) analyze how political and
military relationships - real and potential -
both within the community and with major
powers outside enhance or inhibit the
economic linkages; and 3) assess the
implications of these relationships and
trends for the US and its posture in the
region.
4
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CHINA: GREAT EXPECTATIONS
moo 9920 o co -2
1. China's new realistic, moderate political and economic
policies, which concentrate on rapid economic modernization
seem well-established.
Mao Zedong's highly disruptive utopian programs of the
past 30 years, notably the "Great Leap Forward" and the
Cultural Revolution, have been repudiated at the highest
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) levels. (See speech by
Yeh Jianying, 2d ranking CCP leader, commemorating the
30th anniversary of the PRC.)
-- Steps already underway to implement internal measures
providing for legal protection of individual rights,
increased democracy, greatly expanded material incentives,
and much more scope for initiative and independent judgment
in management of affairs. Externally, China is turning to
outside world, mainly the West and Japan, to provide critical
technology and equipment for modernization.
-- Center of gravity of the top CCP leadership appears united
on China's present course of breaking with the past (even
if this means at minimum implicit criticism of Mao) and
concentrating efforts on successfully carrying out the "four
modernications." Deng Xiaoping undoubtedly initiated this
course, but CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng (a Mao hold-over) is
going along.
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2. As a result, Chinese people in general beginning to look
ahead with sense of great expectation.
Within upper CCP echelons there is high degree of confidence
that China's new policies will pay off -- provided Western
countries and Japan do their part in exporting to China
the technology which it needs to modernize.
Among the people, a sense of relief is apparent over
scrapping of Maoism, combined with optimism about the future.
This noticeable in increased individualism in dress, absence
of tension in inter-personal relations, and willingness to
challenge established authority, e.g., "democracy wall."
The people obviously are hopeful about their prospects.
3. Problems of course remain:
-- Some senior CCP leaders are-probably unhappy over extent
to which Mao Zedong's legacy is being cast aside, since
Mao and CCP's revolutionary success have hitherto been
considered inseparable -- to question one is to question the
other.
Intermediate-level cadres (leaders) are still not going along
with the new approach, either out of fear of exposing them-
selves to possible reprisals if policy should somehow reverse,
or because they fear they cannot measure up and will lose
their positions.
2
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China's still-depressed economy cannot provide good jobs
for everyone, and there is considerable urban unemployment,
especially among youth, with consequent discontent.
Continued pulling and hauling between CCP leaders interested
in public order and discipline, and individuals anxious for
more democracy and human rights, can be expected.
However, these problems can probably be handled, and China
is a far happier, livelier country now than it has been
for years.
3
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Excerpt of Ye JianvinR. speech crttictztng the "Great Leap Forward"
But amidst these immense victories we had become imprudent. In 1957 while it was neces-
sary to counter the attack of a handful of bourgeois rightists, the mistake was made of
broadening the scope or the struggle. In 1953 we departed from the principles of carrying
out thoroughgoing investigation and study and of testing all innovations before popu-
larizing them in the violation of objective laws in cur economic work. We nada the mis?
takes of giving arbitrary directions, being boastful and stirring up a "communist wind".
In 1959, in inner-party struggle we ineptly carried out the struggle against so -called
right opportunism. These "leftist" errors plus the three years of natural calamities
and the scrapping of contracts and withdrawal of specialists by the Government of the
Soviet Union brought. about the serious economic reverses of the late fifties and early
sixties. The Central Committee of the party and Conrade?Mao Zedong quickly perceived
these errors in our rural and. economic work and began to lead us in rectifying then.
To this end, he put forward a series of guiding ideas such as the need to oppose, ?
egalitarianism, stress commodity production, respect the law of value, strike an overa-
all balance, draw up the national economic plan with agriculture first, Light industry -
second and heavy industry third, exert genuine and not sham efforts and go in for
investigation and study in a big way. He also took charge of drawing up the "Oo Articles"
for the work of the peoplefs communes. The party Central Committee and the State Council
took decisive action to establish the correct guideline of "readjustment, consolidation,
filling out and raising standards" for the national economy and laid down a succession
of correct policies, rules and measures regarding work in other spheres. Early in 1962
an enlarged central work conference attended by 7,000 people was convened, at which
criticism and self-criticism was 'unfolded and both positive and negative experience was
summed up.. Comrade Mao Zedong criticized himself in his speech at the conference and
emphasized the necessity of perfecting the system of democratic centralism in the party
and deepening our understanding of the laws of socialist construction.
Excerpt of Te Hanying speech crtt.tqtzing_the Cultural Revolutiza_
In the tett years of the Cultural Revolution which began in 1966, cur country went
through a fierce struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. The Cultural
Revolution was launched with the aim of preventing and combating revisionism. "Par a
proletarian party in power, it is. of course necessary to be constantly on guard a;ainst
going down the revisionist road. characterized by oppression of the peonle at home and
pursuit of hegemony abroad. But the point is that, at the time when the Cultural
Revolution was launched, the estimate made of the situation within the party and the
country ran counter to reality, no accurate definition Was given of revisionism, and an
erroneous policy and method of struggle were adopted, deviating from the principle of
-democratic centralism, Driven by counter-revolutionary motives, Lin Bisa, the gang
of four and other conspirators and careerists exploited these errors, pushed things
to the extreme and formulated and pursued an ultra-left line. They engaged in
"overthrowing everything and launching an all-out civil war", usurping the party
leadership and staging a coup to seize Dower. They attempted to uniermihe the
foundation of our socialist system, subvert the dictatorship of the preletarit,
destroy the leadership of the party, adulterate Narxism-Leninzsr.-!n: Tho?rt
and plunge our country once again into the division and chaos abhorred 'ey the peotoe,
into blood-baths and terror. The havoc which the counter-revolutionary rang wrought
for ten long years spelt calamity for our people and constituted the .7_-,st severe
reversal to our socialist cause since the founding of the People's Republic. Their
conspiratorial activities were entirely different in nature from the e're=.s committed
by our party. They were the most vicious enemies of the entire eesple, and it was
impossible to settle their case through inner-party struggle.
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25X1 TOP SECRET
211Iptober 1979
25X1
Chinese Military Situation
I. Modernization of China's armed forces will be realized only
over the long term.
-- China does not have the technical or economic resources
to buy, utilize, or produce large numbers of advanced
weapons.
-- There will be incremental improvements as the Chinese
improve their training and tactics and deploy small
numbers of improved weapons to their forces.
-- The Chinese continue to view the Soviets as their primary
threat and any new weapons will be deployed first along
the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese borders.
- China has placed its highest priority on obtaining
antitank and air defense weapons?
China's experience in Vietnam has helped focus the
attention of military leaders on areas that will receive
priority in the military modernization program.
25X1
-
The Army's performance was credible, accomplishing most
of China's military objectives,
II.
While
China continues to maintain substantial forces
25X1
opposite Vietnam, the leadership
now seems less inclined to initiate a "second lesson."
-- Vietnam's
forces opposite its border with China are much
stronger
than they were in February
25X1
and China's losses in any new invasion would
be
much heavier.
25X1
TOP SECRET
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-- The Chinese profess to believe that the Pol Pot forces can
continue their resistance against Vietnamese forces in
Kampuchea, and Beijing is not presently linking a "second
lesson" against Vietnam with the outcome of the resistance
in Kampuchea.
China retains the option of military action, however, and
the possibility of a limited attack against one or two
specific targets in Vietnam, an attack through Laos, or a
full-scale invasion remains. This would be particularly
true if Beijing concluded that all organized anti-Vietnamese
resistance would otherwise collapse.
2
25X1 TOP SECRET
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Used for Presidential Briefing on
31 October 1979
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THE DIROOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 22 October 1979
NOTE FOR: See Distribution
FROM : NIO/China-EAP
Both
have recently returned from trips
They will brief on their trips on Friday,
26 October from 1500 to 1700 in Room 7 E 62.
If you would like to attend, please
contact by COB 25 October.
Distribution
DD/NFA
D/NFAC
NIOs
Office Directors
NSC/CS
ES/PB
SRP
C/RES
C/AS
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China's Foreign Trade in the-Pres.ent Era
I believe that it is not only appropriate but imperative for
this conference to begin with a survey of the economic and political
climate in China for foreign trade. The questions we would hope to
answer would be, first, are political and economic conditions in
China such as to favor an expansion of China's foreign trade, and if
so, are they likely to endure? Otherwise, this whole conference
becomes simply an academic exercise.
In response, let me say at the outset that a change of major
proportions unquestionably is taking place in China and is bringing
about a sweeping -- and, to those of us who have been watching
developments in China for the past several decades -- a startlingly
different approach to the whole cause of national development.
According to Premier Hua Guofeng, in his report on the work of the
government delivered at the 2nd Session of the 5th National Peoples
Congress last June,
...the State Council has since the beginning of 1979,
shifted the work of the whole nation to socialist
modernization. This is a historic turning point."
In practical terms, what Hua Guofeng's words mean is that China's
political and economic efforts should be directed, first and foremost,
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to the goal of accomplishing the so-called "four modernizations,"
that is, the modernization of agriculture, industry, national
defense, and science and technology.
This is not to deny that modernization has been an objective
of the PRC since its establishment on 1 October 1949, but for the
greater part of the PRC's existence this objective has been
accompanied -- and for many years actually eclipsed by -- efforts
to achieve socio-political goals as the overriding priority. You may
recall the slogans of "carrying the revolution through to the end" and
"putting politics in command," which tended to occupy pride of place
in Chinese philosophy and to outweigh or greatly color the economic
aspects of national development.
An extreme example of what, in my opinion, has been the basic
contradiction in China between the economic goal of modernization and
the political cause of "revolution," is the so-called "Great Leap
Forward" of 1958-61. On the one hand, China was exhorted to catch up
with the most developed countries of Western Europe (notably Britain)
in "fifteen years of a little less" using such expediencies as
backyard steel furnaces, deep plowing, and close planting; and on the
other hand, to push boldly toward the "victory of socialism." In this
latter respect, for a brief peiod in the early days of the Great Leap
Forward emphasis was placed on the principle "from each according to
his ability, to each according to his need," which in Marxist terms is
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supposed to be applied only when the day of pure communism has
arrived. This period also saw the massive establishment of
People' Communes with dormitory-style living and communal mess halls,
and the "five-fixed" principle of fixed payments for almost all
human needs. The upshot of the contradiction between economic
development and politics was a great internal upheaval in China,
which when combined with bad weather and the withdrawal of all Soviet
aid, resulted in near-famine conditions and a serious setback to
China's development plans. Another similar upheaval, of course,
took place during the Cultural Revolution, which is closer to us
in time and hence more familiar. I doubt that any further elaboration
is needed.
There was yet another concept which figured somewhat later in
China's internal policies: "zu li geng sheng," or national self-
reliance, which when carried to extremes (as, in fact, appeared to
have occasionally happened) meant that China should forbid or severely
limit the importation of foreign goods and technology for fear that
such imports would weaken the political fiber of the nation.
During the period that I was in Beijing a running battle was
conducted in the cultural media between proponents of conflicting
points of view on the "national self-reliance" issue, with those
objecting to imports arguing that China could, and should, go it
alone, and their opponents countering with the view that China
should not be put in the position of trailing behind the developed
countries of the West. The stronghold of "national self-reliance"
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during these years appeared to be in Shanghai, as evidenced by
articles in the Shanghai journal "Study and Criticism," and episodes
such as the Shanghai-made motion picture "Bright Fiery Furnance"
which criticized the importation of alloy steel for use by the
PLA Navy on the grounds that equally-strong steel could be made in
China. Those in Beijing responsible for orderly economic planning,
who appeared to remain in the ascendency, countered by quoting the
words of Mao Zedong: "yi gu wei xin yong; yi wai wei Zhong yong,"
or "use the old to serve the new; use the foreign to serve China."
(I should add that "national self-reliance" is still with us, but in
a greatly modified form which I will discuss later.)
Now, however, the period of contradictory political and
economic objectives appears to have passed. As indicated by the
words of Hua Guofeng which I have already quoted, China's overriding
goal is to carry out the four modernizations successfully, and all
other goals are to be subordinated to it. As for the slogan of
"putting politics in command," I noted with interest that one of the
works recently published in Beijing attributed to the recently-
rehabilitated Zhang Wentian (now deceased), dealt with this slogan
by saying that it was all right to put politics in command so long as
politics was derived from economics! No one should doubt for one
moment that politics remains a profound element in China's long-term
development program (hence the "socialist" in"socialist modernization")
but not in such a way as to get in the way of economics.
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The new situation has brought with it additional important
changes, affecting, in fact, the basic nature of the political
course which China will pursue. Very significantly, class struggle
on the nationwide, turbulent scale of the past years is to cease,
although individual "class enemies" may still be attacked. Instead
of stress on class struggle, the mephasis is now on unity among all
classes and all elements of the population so that socialist
modernization can be carried out. In consequence, older cadres
attacked during the Cultural Revolution and "Gang of Four" eras
have been rehabilitated and many people formerly categorized as
class enemies have had their status changed.
An additional major point is the attention now being directed
toward democracy in China on the grounds that "without democracy,
there can be no modernization." To be sure, China's democracy
today is not to be compared with what is familiar to us in the
outside world since it must be carried out within the "Four Upholds,"
or upholding socialism, leadership of the Party, democratic
centralism, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. But for the
average Chinese, the new emphasis on democracy must represent a
significant change from the days of even the recent past, and
allows them much more latitude for political expression than ever before.
Finally, the new situation is China has brought with it a
restoration and strengthening of the rule of law. The Supreme Court,
procuratorship, and system of Peoples Courts at all levels has been
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returned, and the Chinese people are now being told that no one is
above the law, even those at the highest levels of Party and
Government. Again, a dramatic change from the very recent past,
in which laws to protect individual rights did not exist and people
were brought to trial before administrative rather than judicial
bodies.
The second session of the 5th National Peoples Congress last
June/July provided the occasion for dramatizing on a National
scale the new developments in China and providing a legal basis
for establishing and implementing the principles which I have
discussed. But as in the case of all NPC sessions, the basic
decisions had already been made. I consider that the watershed was
the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress which took place last
December. In this session, besides settling on the establishment
of socialist modernization as the primary goal and emphasizing
demoncracy and the rule of law, there were additional crucial
issues addressed which deserve our attention:
-- The slogans of "emancipation of,thinking" and "seeking
truth. fromfacts" were establi-shed as new ideological
guidelines. These slogans, which are attributed to
Deng Xiaoping and were also used by Hua Guofeng in his
NPC work report, represent a determination to approach
new situations in a realistic and flexible way. They
tell the Chinese people not to be bound by past ideological
positions even if these positions were set by Mao Zedong.
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It is now acknowledged that even Mao could make mistakes,
and also noted that Mao advocated adjusting policy to
suit objective circumstances.
-- Material incentives both for the rural peasants and for
the urban workers were both acknowledged as necessary
and greatly expanded. The communique of the plenary
session pointed out that "it is imperative to improve the
livelihood of the people in town and country step by step
on the basis of the growth of production. The bureaucratic
attitude of paying no attention at all to urgent problems
in the people's livelihood must be resulutely opposed."
Thus, in the rural areas, higher prices will be paid for
produce, and private plots, sideline occupations, and
rural free markets legitimized; in the cities a high
percentage of the workers have received pay raises.
-- A call was made for separation of the Party mechanism from
the realms of economic management 'and the Government
apparatus. Now, managers and government officials are to
be much more free than heretofore to make decisions without
the constraints of Party vetoes. The result is supposed to
be greatly enhanced initiative and efficiency. Once more,
the purpose is to support the goals of socialist
modernization. An illustration of the new freedom is the
authority granted to officials in Guangdong and Fujian provinces
to engage in foreign trade relations without recourse to
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Of course, I cannot speak for what is going on in the minds of
the leaders in Beijing today. Nevertheless, I would like to venture
this thought:
Those of us who are familiar with the East Asian scene are
very much aware of the qualities of imagination, initiative and energy
which are to be found among the Chinese people in places such as
Singapore, Hong Kong, and yes, Taiwan -- to name but a few. There is
a real spark among these people, which can be seen by anyone who
cares to wander around the major arteries and back streets almost at
any time of the day and night, where economic and commercial activity
is incessant. This same spark, though, has not been visible in
China in recent years, even though it might still be burning below
the surface.
My personal recollections of China during the period of 1973 to
1975 are of a relatively apathetic population, where farmers and workers
with rare exceptions seemed to be doing just enough to get along --
with resultant adverse effects on production. In the big cities of
Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, and the like, the streets were virtually
clear of people by eight or nine at night, unlike the bustling scenes
in those cities outside China which I have mentioned. I am convinced
that the leaders in Beijing today are aware of this contrast, and
are trying to reignite the spark, or bring it out of hiding, by
providing the Chinese people with the requisite degree of political,
material, psychological and incentive needed to stimulate a great
upsurge in economic activity and productivity.
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Now, what do the changing circumstances in China, especially
the emphasis on the "four modernizations," mean in terms of foreign
trade? In this regard, let me again refer to the words of Hua Guofeng
in his NPC work report, which are worth quoting in full:
"(We should) continue to do a good job in importing technology,
make active use of funds from abroad and strive to expand
exports. Economic exchanges between countries and the import
of technology are indispensable major means by which countries
develop their economy and technology. It is all the more
necessary for developing countries to import advanced technology
in a planned way in order to catch up with those economically
developed. In order to accelerate the four modernizations,
while resolutely maintaining independence and self-reliance
as our main premise, we must work hard to learn all that is
worthwhile from foreign countries, selectively import advanced
technology of which we are urgently in need, and not wall
our country off from international exchanges. Both in the
three-year period of economic readjustment and in subsequent
years, we shall be taking energetic steps to develop foreign trade,
expand economic co-operation and technical exchange with foreign
countries and employ various appropriate means, current in
international practice, to absorb funds from abroad."
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There are several elements in Hua's statement which I would like
to underscore:
-- By imports, apart from needed foodgrains and primary
products such as rubber and hardwood in which China is
in short supply, Hua means essentially high-technology
items. Everything which China can make itself China
intends to make, and it will seek outside sources only
for those high-technology goods which it can not
currently produce itself. Obviously, the intention is
to become self-reliant even in these areas as soon as
possible. This is the new version of "national self-
reliance" which I mentioned above.
In order to pay for imports, China must export. China
will attempt to develop its own export industries,
particularly in the field of light industry. In my
judgment, it will probably establish the strongest
import relationships with those countries which can best
absorb China's exports.
-- China will import only to the extent that it is able to
pay for these imports, whether through direct payments,
deferred payments, or draw-down on lines of credit.
-- China will now, for the first time, accept some form of
economic aid, so long as it does not consider that the
aid terms might compromise its national independence.
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Quite clearly, the prospects are very good indeed for a growth
on the order of several magnitudes in China's foreign trade relations.
All I would add here is that the guidelines are very evident, and
that those wishing to trade with China should bear them in mind.
Perhaps those in this room might wish to consider the advantage to
them of engaging in "compensation trade," which means furnishing the
capital, equipment, and management to factories in China producing
goods for exports and taking part of the product as compensation,
or engaging in direct investment in China with some percentage of
the equity held by the Chinese Government. As I understand it,
the Chinese are strongly proposing arrangements along these lines,
and laws are now being drawn up to provide for such activities.
To show how impressively China's foreign trade has grown under
the new conditions, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Qiang stated in a
news interview in Beijing on 17 September that during the period
January through August 1979, in terms of US dollars Chinese exports
were up 39.8% and imports 66.3% over the corresponding period in
1978. In real terms, making allowances for inflation, the increases
would be 20% for China's exports and 35% for imports. The January-
August trade performance indicates that China will easily fulfill, and
probably surpass its 1979 foreign trade targets. A conservative
projection indicates that total trade turnover could reach US $29 billion
with a trade deficit of US $1.5 billion. A more optimistic projection
based on the January-August performance taken against the 1978 figures
indicates that total trade could reach the level of US $34 billion with
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a deficit of US $4 billion. Given good planning and, I suppose,
a little bit of luck, the expanding trend in Chinese trade should
continue. China's ability to pay should also remain unimpaired,
with the deficits funded through loans and credits.
This leaves only the question of whether the current situation
is likely to endure. There are undoubtedly many problems, and we have
already seen some readjustments in China's economic projections
between the latter part of 1978 and the first half of 1979 due to
economic and political difficulties. China is now undergoing a
three-year period of economic readjustment and consolidation, as
indicated by Hua Guofeng, in which priorities have been reorganized,
e.g., development of light industry has been put ahead of heavy
industry. We have numerous reports of unhappiness on the part of
elements within the population respecting their status and future
prospects. Demonstrations and wall posters have become commonplace,
pointing to various kinds of discontent. There are signs of pulling
and hauling in the upper echelon of the Chinese Communist Party
leadership, notably over the role in history to be accorded Mao
Zedong.
(Aspects of foreign policy may have been questioned as well,
judging by the rather defensive tone to the statement in the NPC
communique accepting Hua Guofeng's work report that "the session fully
endorses the Governments line and policy in foreign affairs and its
position and principles in handling China's relations with Vietnam,
the United States, and the Soviet Union.") Some remnants of the
"Gang of Four" are seemingly still in positions of authority.
12
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Nevertheless, I personally remain quite optimistic about China's
prospects. We might say that China's new ship of state, as created
by the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress and the second session
of the Fifth NPC, is undergoing a shakedown cruise with many unforeseen
problems inevitably arising. But I submit that a reversion to the old
system would be difficult indeed -- after all, this system was in
effect for many years and did not bring anywhere near the desired
results. Everyone in China from the top leadership on down knows
this. In fact, China today admittedly finds itself in many major
respects essentially where it was in 1957, the year before the Great
Leap Forward. While modifications in the new policy may ensue, and
China may blow hot or cold in various aspects of its foreign economic
and political relationships, there are relatively few options for it
to follow outside its present course and still retain its determination
to modernize while preserving its national identity and independence.
The one major problem which I would like to outline as a parting
thought concerns the responsiveness of the rank-and-file Party
membership to responsibilities assigned to it. The Party cadres must
now demonstrate much greater capacities for leadership, initiative,
and managerial and technological skill than ever before, but the
evidence suggests many are reluctant to assume these responsibilities.
Some are afraid that the political pendulum will again swing the other
way, leaving them exposed if they do what they are now told to do.
There are many others who entered the Party primarily on the basis of
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their political stand (over half the Party membership dates from
1966 or later) and feel that their jobs are now threatened; they
are therefore dragging their feet when it comes to implementing
reforms. A saying which I have heard is making the rounds in China
goes: "The two ends hot, the middle cold." This means that the top
leadership at the one extreme and the people at the other are
enthusiastic about the new situation, but that the cadres in the
middle are not. The particular problem of cadre responsiveness must
be solved if China is to move ahead as vigorously as its leaders
clearly wish.
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National Intelligence Officers
29 October 1979
NOTE FOR: Ambassador Handyside
FROM
NIO for China-EAP
Per our discussion, attached
are maps of the dam sites.
Ambassador Handyside
Senior Intelligence Officer for DOE
Room 7 C 034
Forrestal Building
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
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TAT
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STAT
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"NMJiJ Use 0
26 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant NIO/China and EAP
SUBJECT : Dam Sites on the Hongshui He
1. The two dam sites -- the Dateng Gorge Project and the
Tiansheng Bridge/Dam Site -- mentioned on October 19 by Jia Ke,
Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Electric
Power, as suitable for visit by separate teams of a high-level
U.S. hydropower delegation have probably not been previously
discussed openly by the Chinese. We cannot pinpoint the location
of the dam sites, though there is sufficient information to
indicate the general location of them.
2. The new Dateng Gorge Project is probably planned for
the Dateng Xia on the Qian Jiang in east-central Kwangsi. Qian
Jiang is one of the alternate regional names applied to the main
channel of the Hongshui. The Dateng Xia stretches along about
40 kilometers of the Qian Jiang just upstream from Guiping. The
river makes about eight bends through this gorge and some of
these could be suitable for the construction of a dam. The Dateng
Xia is reasonably accessible to a visiting group. Guiping is
served by a good road and an airfield. The upstream end of the
gorge can be reached via a road from the main railroad or from
Liuzhou, a principal transportation center about 100 kilometers
to the north.
3. The second dam site, the Tiansheng Bridge/Dam Site in
Guizhou, cannot be located precisely. It is probably located
where the Hongshui serves as the border between Guizhou and
Guangxi upstream from Tianle (25?00'N 107?101E). The river
here flows for almost 100 kilometers in a deep gorge along a
relatively straight course and probably has numerous potential
dam sites. Other dam sites exist upstream from the fork of the
Nanpan Jiang and Beipan Jiang branches of the Horshui
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4. Two hydro projects have previously been mentioned by the
Chinese on the Hongshui in the border region of the provinces.
The Longtai Project in Guangxi is a 200-meter-high dam about
16 kilometers upstream from Tianle with a power potential of
3,000 MW. The Chinese claim that this project could provide
power for the development and processing of nearby bauxite
deposits. The Longtai Project has always been identified by the
Chinese as being in Guangxi, although it is very close to the
Guizhou border. Less is known about the second dam, the Qiancheng,
except that it is projected for the upstream Hongshui. Work on the
55-meter-high 464-meter-long dam is expected to start in late 1979.
It is conceivable that the Tiansheng Bridge/Dam reference applies
to the Qiancheng site. Access to the Tiansheng site, which has to
be in southern Guizhou, will be more difficult than to the Dateng
Gorge Project. Travel to the dam site will probably be via a
sparse network of roads into a relatively remote section of Guizhou.
5. For additional informatiin or clarification, please contact
Attachments: as stated
II
Approv . FEE
- 2 -
Ny005
ast Psia Branch
Geography Division, OGCR
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?
? CONFIDri\IFIAL
25 October 1979
Hydroelectric Power on The Hongshui River
The Chinese are apparently planning to tap substantial
amounts of the hydroelectric potential of the Hongshui River.
According to the Chinese the Hongshui River has 8600 megawatts
(MW) of hydro potential in Guangxi Chuang Autonomous Region
alone. At least three large hydroelectric projects are
currently planned for the Hongshui, two in Guangxi and one
in bordering Guizhou.
The two hydroelectric facilities planned for Guanvci
Chuang Autonomous Region include Dahua located between Du'an
and Mashan counties, and Longtan near Guangxi's northern
border with Guizhou Province. Dahua, the first large-scale
effort to tap the Hongshui's hydro potential, is reportedly
a multipurpose project intended to facilitate water transport
as well as provide 400 MW of power. The Chinese report that
Dahua should begin initial power generation in 1980. The much
larger Longtan project of 3,000 MW is still on the drawing
boards and is one of the 8 major development projects for which
China has sought $5.5 billion in financing from Japan. The
800 MW Qianching hydroelectric facility is planned for the upper
reaches of the Hongshui River in Guizhou Province. Work is
scheduled to start on the project later this year. Table 1
summarizes these three planned projects.
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? CONFII ENTIAL.
We are unable to fully verify the two hydroelectric sites
included in the US hydroelectric delegation's itinerary. The
Dateng Gorge project listed in the itinerary appears to be a
wholly different location from the sites of the two hydro-
electric projects already confirmed by the Chinese along the
Hongshui River in Guangxi. According to our gazetteer, The
Dateng Gorge appears to be on the Qian Jiang River at least
60 kilometers downstream from the confluence of the Hongshui
and Liu Jiang Rivers. Given its probable location the Dateng
gorge project is clearly distinct from the other two Hongshui
River projects in Guangxi. The Tiansheng Bridge Dam site
listed in the US itinerary may correspond to the 800 MW Qianching
STAT hydroelectric facility.
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STAT
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