ALERT MEMORANDUM ON CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 14, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC -
14 February 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
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National Inte igence Officer for China
SUBJECT Alert Memorandum on China-Vietnam-USSR
1. Action Requested: DCI signature on the attached
memorandum forwarding he NSC an Alert Memorandum on
China-Vietnam-USSR.
2. Background: The Chinese buildup along the Viet-
namese border has grown unabated since our last Alert
Memorandum of 19 January. We think that in military terms
the Chinese are ready to go, and that their push, if it
occurs, would be larger than we thought in mid-January.
The political signals are mixed, but we think there is~
about a 60 percent chance that the Chinese will act.
3. This Alert Memorandum has been coordinated with
DIA, INR, and NSA.
Attachment
NI IAM 79-10004
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Washington. D. C 20505
ALERT MEMORANDUM
14 February 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT Alert Memorandum -- China-Vietnam-USSR
The Chinese buildup along the Vietnamese border has
grown unabated since our last Alert Memorandum of 19
January. We think that in military terms the Chinese are
ready to go, and that their push, if it occurs, would be
larger than we thought in mid-January. The political
signals are mixed, but we think there is about a 60 per-
Attachment
NI IAM 79-10004
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f SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
14 February 1979
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
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Since our alert memorandum of 19 January,
the Chinese military buildup along the Vietnamese
border has continued to escalate. In contrast
At leas
zuu,uuu men are pro a y 2n. = e or er area, and
elements of two additional armies may be moving
from central and eastern China to the military
region adjacent to northeast Vietnam. There are
more than 600 combat aircraft at bases close to
Vietnam, with others in close reserve. China
_'J
We Zack precise evidence on Chinese
s oc pz es, ut trains have evidently moved large
quantities of supplies- and munitions toward the
border. We continue to believe that from a mili-
tary viewpoint the Chinese could attack at any time.
Moreover, with the return of Vice Premier (and Chief
of Staff) Deng Xiaoping to China, some political
restraints deriving from his presence in th United
States and Japan have now been removed, II
There remain political, economic and military argu-
ments against an attack. The Chinese must consider US and
Japanese advice to exercise restraint, possible Soviet
reaction, the demonstrated ability of the Pol Pot forces
*The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued
by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the
Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that
senior poZicymakers are aware of the serious implications
for US interests of impending potential developments. It
is not a prediction that these developments will occur.
This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level
by CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR.
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to bleed Vietnam in Kampuchea without direct Chinese
intervention, as well as the impact of major fighting
on Beijing's cherished modernization campaign. More-
over, Chinese forces have not engaged in extended
combat since 1953, and may not be fully efficient. In
the past week, a number of Chinese officials have ad-
duced some of these factors as reasons for China not
to strike against Vietnam, and some of these officials
appeared to be speaking on foreign ministry guidance.
Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping himself has repeatedly
stated in public and in private that Vietnam must be
"taught a lesson," and this theme was echoed in a
Chinese response to a US demarche in Beijing on 10
February which cautioned against Chinese military
action. We do not have direct - e
decision to move,
On bal eve there is about a 60
percen c ance that the Chinese will in fact attack
in response to real or contrived provocation. 0
The size of the buildup on the border suggests
if the Chinese attack it would be on a scope larger
than we had originally thought likely--a brief and
shallow incursion. The Chinese have a wide range of
options open to them, beginning with a limited cross-
border attack designed to inflict heavy casualties on
Vietnamese border defense forces. One likely option
would be to rout the border forces and drive far enough
into Vietnam to threaten but not actually attack Hanoi,
with a view to withdrawal after several weeks. We cannot
exclude an attack on the capital itself, but we think
this unlikely for both political and military reasons
(the Chinese probably could not achieve air superiority
in the vicinity of Hanoi). II
A major index of the seriousness with which the
Chinese appear to be considering an attack on Vietnam
is their defensive measures near the Soviet border.
war. More significant are Chinese actions in the vul-
nerable northwest province of Xinjiang, where defensive
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trenching and an apparent large-scale civilian evac-
uation is under wa in
viet attack.
perhaps a million civilians would be evacuated--a mas-
sive, complicated and extremely expensive undertaking.
The Soviets in turn have stepped up their recon-
naissance deployed in the South
China Sea DUL. ave.no undertaken any detectable military
moves of their own. They maintain sufficient forces in
the border area, however, to undertake a co able
number of moves with little or no warning.
We continue to believe that the eventual Soviet
choice in reacting to any Chinese attack on Vietnam
will be contingent on the extent and severity of the
Chinese action and its political effects. In response
to relatively small-scale and shallow Chinese attacks,
the Soviets are likely to restrict their active response
to Vietnam proper, consulting under the Treaty, making
conspicuous deliveries of military assistance, and
probably issuing strong warnings. Against Chinese
attacks in the middle range--which went so far as to
begin to threaten Hanoi--the Soviets would increase
their aid in Vietnam but might in addition mount
military demonstrations on the Sino-Soviet border,
seize islands in the border rivers, or even make quick
small raids across the frontier, all of which they
A severe dilemma would confront them in the event
of a massive, direct Chinese attack on Hanoi, the
least likely Chinese option. Against such a contingency,
the above Soviet measures would not relieve the postulated
threat to Vietnam, and would be perceived by world
opinion as a Soviet failure of nerve. Even in these
extreme circumstances, the Soviets would wish to
avoid large-scale cross-border ground operations to any
substantial depth that would risk enmeshing the USSR in
protracting fighting i hina, and might instead
consider air attacks. I
In any event, the Soviets continue to be careful
not to commit themselves in advance to any particular
course of action. An authoritative Pravda article
of 10 February on the Chinese buildup was notable for
its failure to mention the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty or
to allude to the possibility of a Soviet response if
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