EAST ASIA WARNING ASSSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 22, 1981
• Content Type: MF

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NFAC 3830-81
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM
Acting NIO for East Asia
SUBJECT East Asia Warning Assessment (U)
The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives
at the 17 June warning meeting. (U)
Thai-Kampuchea Border
1. The recently announced Thai policy to cross border repatriate
Khmer refugees, coupled with bellicose Vietnamese statements, has raised
the possibility of new Vietnamese military action along the border. To
date, however, most activity has been confined to the propaganda realm.
The Thai announcement was in large measure designed to focus US attention
on the refugee problem; only limited repatriation has taken place or is
planned at this stage. Hanoi's reaction has been a noisy propaganda
campaign exaggerated in part by the distortion of comments by Vice Foreign
Minister Giang on the possibility of military action similar to the
incursion last June. (C)
2. The Vietnamese in recent weeks have, however, made some limited
tactical moves designed to control some of the border area, possibly in
anticipation of an expanded flow of refugees returning to Kampuchea. PAVN
forces retain the capability to mount military operations across the border
with little or no warning. There are, however, no signs of preparations
for any significant military action. In fact, activity by Vietnamese units
along the border has recently declined. (S)
SECRET
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3. With the exception of the incident last June the Vietnamese
have carefully eschewed actions in the border area that would spark concern
in Thailand, draw stronger US support for the Thai and increase inter-
national criticism of the SRV. Hanoi seems likely to persist in this policy
unless it sees its interests in the border area being substantially weakened.
Even then, small scale military probes against Khmer border enclaves seem
much more likely than any significant military action directed against Thai
forces or territory. (S)
Soviets in Indochina
4. There is a growing body of evidence indicating friction between
the Vietnamese and the Soviets in many areas of their relationship. As Hanoi
has become more dependent on Moscow and the Soviets have become more
intimately involved in Vietnamese military and economic programs, this
irritation has grown. The Soviets are clearly disturbed by the level of
waste, corruption and inefficiency they encounter in Vietnam while the
Vietnamese are chaffing at the demands for a larger voice in economic
planning and the utilization of Soviet assistance. At the same time, the
Soviets are using their military and economic assistance to forge links --
independent from the Vietnamese -- with the Government in Laos and the Heng
Samrin regime in Phnom Penh. (C)
5. Though adding a distinct element of tension to the relationship,
this situation is not likely to lead to any Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam
or to have:much impact on Hanoi's capability or willingness to persist in
its Indochina policy in the near term. Hanoi must accept the Soviet behavior
as the price for essential Soviet military and economic support, particularly
so long as China continues to pose a direct threat to Vietnamese national
and regional interests. While concerned about Moscow's dealings with its
Indochinese neighbors, Hanoi must also calculate that its military presence
in Laos and Kampuchea together with its dominant economic role there make it
unlikely that Moscow will be able to progress very far in the development
of independent ties that run counter to Vietnamese interests. (C)
Philippines: Domestic Outlook
6. The landslide election of President Marcos on 16 June was a foregone
conclusion. Not so predictable was the coalescence of a broad range of
opposition elements -- both conservative and radical -- in the movement to
boycott and otherwise discredit the election. In a sense, the election offered
a catalyst for forging a type of unity among the disparate opposition groups
that has not occurred in the past. How long this convergence of views is
likely to last is unpredictable, though with the election as a focal point now
passed, it may prove difficult to sustain a common view. At a minimum, Marcos
can also be counted on to move quickly to counter this development by persisting
in his efforts to co-opt or isolate elements of the opposition. (C)
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China
7. Deng Xiaoping will be entering the 6th Central Committee Plenum
in a somewhat weaker position than the one he held late last year -- the
original date for the much-postponed plenum. Nevertheless, he will get the
most important of the personnel changes he has been pressing for: the
replacement of Hua Guofeng as party chairman by Deng's protege Hu Yaobang.
There is less certainty regarding other important posts. Hu may be replaced
as party general secretary by a man with closer ties to Hua than to Deng,
and Hu will probably be denied the chairmanship of the important military
affairs committee because of army opposition; Deng may continue to function
in this last job (although this is "unconstitutional"). A fairly benign
assessment of Mao's role in party history will be approved, thus further
propitiating party conservatives. Analysts did not expect any new departures
in economic policy. Foreign policy will be a subject of debate; in this
area Deng's hand has been strengthened by Secretary Haig's successful visit
to China (this success may have been somewhat vitiated, however, by the
President's remarks at his recent press conference). A fuller reading of
the leadership power balance must await the personnel actions taken at the
plenum. (S)
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