EAST ASIA WARNING ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 27, 1981
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/01/12 CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060024-2
? SECRET ?
I I - ~ - /. ~ '-'P d .2~e - 14-164-CAL
22 APR 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning ,^ ..
FROM .
Acting NiU or East Asia
SUBJECT : East Asia Warning Assessment
oc?mvo R?
The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives at
the 22 April Warning Meeting. (U)
Thailand: Aftermath of the Attempted Coup
1. The outlook for the longevity of the Prem Government is not good,
even though Prem has emerged from the attempted coup in a temporarily somewhat
stronger political position. He has yet to use the opportunity presented by
the coup to demonstrate effective and decisive leadership. In the absence of
forceful action on his part -- changes in the Cabinet, more aggressive
management of pressing economic problems, a firm hand in dealing with the coup
plotters -- he is unlikely to sustain the support from the military he will
need to prolong his government. For the next several months, however the
military -- the likely source of any coup attempt -- will be supportive of
Prem as it seeks to get its own house in order. If Prem's lackluster
performance continues, pressures for change will build as the traditional
1 October date for rotations, promotions and retirements within the military
approaches. Before the date, however, Prem -- whatever his performance -- is
likely to face renewed criticism from the civilian politicians, particularly
once the National Assembly is reconvened. Should he prove unable to deal with
pressures from the politicians, there may be an acceleration in the
determination within the Army to establish a stronger Government without
Prem. (S)
CIA-RDP83130010 000300060024-2
 Approved For P40 ase 2006/1T
83B001 00V0300060024-2
and the
a with internal reserve with which some of the ASEAN states have viewed Thai policy developments po may
d may
combine to weaken the Thai (C) c
position.
Indochina: Thai-Kampuchean Border
3. The indicators evident last month which seemed to suggest increased
Vietnamese activity in the border area in retrospect now appear to have been
directly related only to the fleshing out and sustaining the Vietnamese
presence in the area. Activity has not picked up and with the advent of
early, heavy rains in the area substantial Vietnamese offensive activity is
not likely. (S)
4. Reviewing what has been a pattern of predicting limited offensives in
this area which fail to materialize, analysts agreed that too much attention
appeared to be focused on often ambiguous indicators. These tend to reenforce
analysts perception of what it would be logical for the Vietnamese to be
doing. In general, the pattern that seems to have emerged is one of
relatively limited Vietnamese activity, mostly of a defensive nature. It is
unlikely that this pattern stems simply from Vietnamese complacency, since in
the dry season just ending the Vietnamese forces have done relatively poorly,
the Kampuchean rebels relatively well -- at a time of year when the reverse
might be expected to be the case. (S)
Philippines: Outlook before the Presidential Election
5. Marcos is currently moving to co-opt the moderate opposition to
ensure he has an opponent in the forthcoming election. In the weeks before
the 16 June election there are likely to be some small, isolated anti-
government demonstrations, public posturing by politicians but no significant
threat of large scale violence or unrest. The return of Benito Aquino is not
apt to stir much unrest even if, as promised by Marcos, he is arrested. There
have been scattered reports suggesting that radical groups such as the
remnants of the 6 April movement may try to carry out acts of terrorism but
there is serious question as to their capability to do so and even their
viability in the wake of Government arrests.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/1 -
 Approved For Release 2006MZt2
,IA-RDP8
?
China-US Relations
6. On the strategic level, the PRC is comfortable if not pleased with
the Administration's strong commitment to defense and the tone of its policy
in dealing with the USSR. There are, nonetheless, abiding concerns in Beijing
about the direction of bi-lateral relations with the US in large measure
stemming from the Administration's handling of Taiwan policy before coming into
office. In the absence of any movement on the Taiwan issue in the current
context the situation improves from the PRC's perspective. Nonetheless,
Chinese officials have made a substantial effort to convey the view that
should the US provide military equipment to Taiwan -- particularly at an early
date and in substantial quantities -- there would be serious adverse
developments in the relationship. The Chinese position, while containing an
element of posturing, is nonetheless rooted in reality, and a vigorous
response can be anticipated particularly if such a move occurred in the near
term. (S)
Approved For Release 206601VI2 : CIA-RD083B00100R000300060024-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060024-2
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060024-2