WARNING ASSESSMENT: EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: December 18, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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NFAC 8200-80
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR:. Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
FROM
SUBJECT
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
Warning Assessment: East Asia
The following items were discussed by the Community Repre-
sentatives at the 16 December Warning Meeting. (U)
China
1. Discussion centered on current domestic events in China,
with particular reference to the moves to dispose Hua Guofeng. The
issue is whether or not the effort to topple him was slated to come at
this time, and if not, whether it was precipitated by events not fully
expected by Deng Xiaoping and company. The hypothetical case that
such events (disputes arising out of the trial or the new assessment of
Mao, growing economic problems, pressures from the military establishment,
-Deng's various vulnerabilities on specific issues) in fact threw the
timetable out the window was
examined in considerable detail, since the question of instability in
China bears directly on durability and fabric of Sino-US relations. (C)
2. Most analysts participating in this discussion felt that the
well-established trends and balances of Chinese politics had not changed
markedly in the last few weeks. Most also believed that it was too
early to judge that recent economic troubles had forced the leadership
to abandon major portions of their Four Modernizations programs. All
agreed, however, that if certain recent reportings, which indicated an
indefinite postponement of the 12th Party Congress, a high level of
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON DEC 86
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political apprehension in Beijing, and rumors of sharp political
infighting, were confirmed, opinions on this subject would have to
be reassessed. There was also agreement that if the current backing
away from economic experimentation continued Deng's political position
could be damaged. (C)
3. In'-the light of subsequent information indicating high-level.
meetings were underway in Beijing, an informal meeting of some NFAC
analysts with officers from State Department's China desk further
reviewed the issue the following day. The consensus of this meeting
was that the campaign against Hua Guofeng had indeed speeded up, and
that this change in tempo probably resulted from a confluence of
factors not fully expected by Deng and his allies, and that Deng's
vulnerabilities on a range of issues made it imperative for him to
protect himself by moving decisively against a range of opponents.
There was general agreement also that perhaps half the current
Politburo was in hot political water and could be subject to purge.
An event of this magnitude, of course, would give the impression that
the Chinese political scene remained unstable; the international effect
of this impression, particularly in Western Europe, Japan and the US,
could not easily be calculated. (S)
Sino-Vietnamese Border
4. The situation along the Sino-Vietnamese border remains tense,
with both sides conducting periodic, limited cross border operations.
Vietnam has, possibly for the first time, conducted large scale scenario'
exercises in the area. This may be an indication of the increase of
Soviet influence on Vietnamese training and tactics.
reporting of some increased infiltration from China into Laos in recent
weeks cannot be confirmed but may reflect the return of refugees
trained by the PRC over the past several months. (S)
Indochina
5. There:.,-has been a. slight augmentation of Vietnamese forces in
the Thai/Kampuchean border area in the past month but most movement
of troops can be associated with rotation of personnel. The Vietnamese
military posture in the border areas remains essentially defensive
despite the advent of the dry season which offers Hanoi's troops
greater flexibility for larger scale operations. In contrast, DK forces
have been surprisingly active and have been reported operating con-
sistently in larger units -- up to 200 personnel. Some DK units are
now reported armed with 107 and 82 mm mortars and possibly even heavier
weapons. Reports of DK activity in central Kampuchea have increased in
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the past month suggesting some expansion in DK operation. More
aggressive behavior by the DK may in part reflect prodding from the
Chinese to adopt a higher profile. Nonetheless, with expanded
operations, the DK also risks heavier casualties when the extent of
its recruitment base remains limited. (S)
..6. Vietnamese forces can easily adopt more aggressive tactics
and the prospect of substantial 'raid into Thailand remains. The
limited raids undertaken to date have, however, been in areas away
from large refugee concentrations or only of particular sensitivity
to the Thai. (S)
South Korea
7. there are now divergent views
within the senior ROK military on how to handle the Kim Tae-chung
issue. A few senior officers close to President Chun now apparently
believe that it would be best if a way were found to deal with Kim,
short of execution. Others in the military close to the President
apparently continue to believe that the best course is to proceed quickly
with the execution. There is little question that President Chun has
had both views set before him but there is no evidence.that he had made
up his mind on how to resolve the issue. Nonetheless, pressure from
the US and Japan to avoid execution is having some impact as Chun
formulates his policy. Chun's sending of a close personal associate
-Lt/Gen Chong Ho-yong to the US this week reflected his determination to
continue to gauge the US feeling on the Kim case. (S)
Indonesia
9. Recent anti-Chinese riots in a large number of cities and
towns in central Java may have been sparked principally by a
comination of persistent ethnic tension and youth unemployment.
There is no evidence that the outbreak was politically motivated, was
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manipulated for political purposes or that the regime believes it
reflected a serious threat to internal stability. While any unrest
of this sort is of concern, there has been no attempt to assign blame
or to seek a scapegoat -- factors that further suggest that the
regime does not regard the outbreak as symptomatic of serious internal
unrest. (C)
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