WARNING ASSESSMENT; EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060040-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: September 19, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
19 September 1980
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: East Asia
The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives
at the 17 September Warning Meeting.
to complete a similar schedule.
Korea
1. Analysts generally agreed that the imposition of the death
sentence on Kim Tae-chung poses a serious dilemma for President Chon
Tu-hwan and has important implications for the stability of his
government. If Chon is prepared to
ultimately commute the sentence after a period of judicial review, he
still must cope with international reaction to the sentencing. In
making a decision on the case Chon must also take into account that
some of his strongest military supporters are opposed to commutation
while others in the senior military and political ranks feel strongly
that it was in Korea's long-term interest, particularly with regard
to the US, to keep Kim alive. Chon will be making his decision at the
same time he is attempting to consolidate his political power, reduce
or redirect the military's role in the running of the country, and move
the nation forward on an ambitious political schedule which includes
a Constitutional referendum next month and ultimately elections next
year. Analysts pointed out that it took Pak Chong-hui almost two years
National Intelligence Officer for Warnin g
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2. It is generally believed that Chon will not face an upsurge
in popular dissatisfaction as a result of the verdict in the
Kim Tae-chung case. Kim's position in Korean society had weakened
considerably even before the riots in mid-May and the regime has
skillfully exploited his alleged connections with subversive elements.
While some students at the recently reopened universities might be
inclined to support Kim the still tight security will keep them under
control. tion politicians are not inclined to take up Kim's
cause.
3. Chon could face significant difficulties as a result of
heightened US or Japanese reaction. Tokyo has made it clear that it
will take strong measures if the verdict in the case deals explicitly
with Kim's activities in Japan prior to 1973. Tokyo will view inclusion
of such data as a direct violation of the political settlement of the
Kim Tae-ching kidnapping. Otherwise, the Japanese will take their lead
from the US in the matter.
4. US reaction will be Chon's central foreign policy concern. He
is well aware of the US position on the issue and undoubtedly anticipates
strong public statements. US actions in the economic or military sphere
may not be anticipated and indeed would, from the Korean perspective, be
viewed as a significant demonstration of reduced US support for Chon's
government and could have an adverse impact on his domestic political
support.
5. Reaction in the North: Pyongyang's reaction to developments in
the South continues to be concentrated in the diplomatic and propaganda
arenas.
Pyongyang has resumed harsh criticism o the
ROK in broadcasts along the DMZ and in its media. It has also played up
contacts with visiting US and Japan delegations and most recently offered
6. The coalescence of opposition political forces in the Philippines
and the rash of recent bombings in the Manila area have heightened concerns
about overall security situation and potential challenges to the Marcos 25X1
Government. Evidence is lacking, however, to suggest that the recent
surge of bombings represents an organized terrorist effort with clear
a proposal for a peace treaty with the US designed to encourage division
between the US and the ROK. Overall the North Korean reaction has been
low keyed owing in part perhaps to increasing concentration on the Party
Congress scheduled to open next month.
Philippines
li i al b'ectives.
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analysts generally believe that the situation may represent only a
snowballing of uncoordinated activity developing in part in anticipation
of the anniversary of martial law on 21 September. Marcos has greatly
heightened security and the general populace seems to support such
security measures. If they do not prove effective and the pattern of
random violence spreads and intensifies the situation will require a
much more serious evaluation. In turn, much more information on the
nature and scope of the terrorist/oppositionist activity will be needed.
China
7. Analysts generally concluded that the changes brought about by
the National Peoples Congress augered well for stability in China's
domestic affairs and for general consistency in Beijing's foreign policy.
Particular note was made of the evidence stemming from the Congress of
the persistent strains between the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party
and the pragmatic recognition that problems in resource allocation are
real and must be dealt with. This was not viewed as a destablizing
factor but rather an evolutionary aspect of China's modernization. The
failure to name a new defense minister was noted as suggesting continued
difficulties in completing the realignment of the leadership.
China-Vietnam
8. Recent statements by the Chinese suggesting a willingness to
negotiate the Kampuchean situation without Vietnamese withdrawal as a
prerequisite were seen largely as tactical moves and set in a context
that would, in any case, be unacceptable to Hanoi. Analysts did take
note, however, of what appears to be increased Chinese disaffection with
the DK, and an inclination to explore the broadening of the political
base opposed to the Heng Samrin Government. Beijing was not prepared
to make any significant moves away from the DK in the near term. There
was however a general feeling expressed that the Chinese may well begin
to seek broader options after the UN vote in recognition of the declining
international support of the DK. There was no indication that Beijing's
military posture along the border with Vietnam had altered significantly
in recent weeks or that the threat of hostilities along the border had
increased.
Kampuchea
9. Vietnam has increased its forces along the border with Thailand
over the past several weeks by as much as two divisions. 25X1
E-- I Military activity
has, however, been relatively low partly because o the apparent
Vietnamese desire to avoid any action that could complicate their efforts at
the UN on.the Kampuchean seating issue. The augmentation on the border
is seen as intended to influence Thai political attitudes as well as to
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heighten control of infiltration routes. The Vietnamese may also be
attempting to preempt any attempt by the DK forces to initiate
significant military activity. The Vietnamese remain in a strong position
to carry out military operations inside Thailand.
10. DK forces appear to be consolidating along the northern border
with Thailand in Preah Vihear province. Significant quantities of food
and ammunition have been reported transiting the border in this area
suggesting either that the DK are planning significant operations in this
region which does not have a strong Vietnamese presence or simply that they
are seeking a safe base. The DK have had some success in carrying out
limited mil' in the interior including in the vicinity of
Phnom Penh.
11. There has been no significant change in the military situation
in Laos. Chinese propaganda statements suggesting greater involvement
in the area have not as yet been borne out by any action.
Indonesia
13. Recent moves by the US to increase the priority given Indonesia
were regarded as very positive but analysts were skeptical as to whether
the anticipated efforts would be sufficient to overcome the Indonesian
Government's concern about the state of its ties with Washington. All
agreed that close monitorin of the reaction to the US effort will be of
considerable importance. I
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THE DIRECTCF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
FROM : IMU tor East Asia
22 September 1980
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment for East Asia
Attached is the assessment prepared on the
basis of the Community views expressed at the
17 September warning meeting. This memorandum
has not been coordinated with the participants
but is being circulated among them.
You or your representative are cordially
invited to attend the next warning meeting for
East Asia in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters,
at 1400 on Wednesday, 22 October. Please provide
the name of your representative to
by COB 21 October.
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Distribution
State - Wever Gim
Air Force - Charles Meyer
Army - Norman Wells
Navy - Dominik Nargele
DIA -1 1
Treasury - Arthur Long
SWS -
NSC - Donald Gregg &
Roger Sullivan
USMC - Mark Silver
NSA -
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