WARNING ASSESSMENT FOR EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060042-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: August 27, 1980
• Content Type: NOTES

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
27 August 1980
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment for East Asia
Attached is the assessment prepared on the
basis of the Community views expressed at the
20 August warning meeting. This memorandum
ha6 not been coordinated with the participants
but is being circulated among them.
You or your representative are cordially
invited to attend the next warning meeting for
East Asia in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters,
at 1400 on Wednesday, 17 September. Please
provide the name of your representative to
by COB 16 September.
Distribution
State - Wever Gim
Navy - Dominik Nargele
DIA -
Air Force - Charles A. Meyer
Army - Jack Churchill
Treasury - Arthur Long
SWS -
NSA -F
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Roger Sullivan
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
26 August 1980
Copy .111-4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
:
FROM
National intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: East Asia
The following items were discussed by the Community Repre-
sentatives at the 20 August Warning Meeting.
China
1. According to analysts, it was now confirmed that the five
top Party leaders would resign their Government posts at the upcoming
National Peoples Congress session. In addition, reports had been
received that a number of senior economic planners would resign,
indicating a major shakeup in economic policy is under way. Analysts
had noted apparent efforts by Hua Guofeng to assert influence within the
military (Hua as Party Chairman would retain his chairmanship of the
Military Affairs Commission) but noted that Hua's influence would be
limited due to the recent appointment of Deng Xiaoping supporters to
senior military positions. Analysts discounted rumors to a "coup d'etat"
effort in China involving personalities such as Fang Ti and Xu Shi you.
2. In commenting on Chinese reactions to Ronald Reagan's statements
regarding the Taiwan question, analysts believed that the hard Chinese
line concerning official US relations with Taiwan was based on principle,
and that they would not back down.
3. On Sino-Soviet relations, attention was called to an authoritative
speech by a Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to
the effect that the Soviets were no longer to be considered revisionists.
This was the stand on which a journal in Heilungjiang had been closed
earlier this year. However, no one believed that improved Sino-Soviet
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON AUG 00
Derived from Multiple
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relations could be anticipated despite this higher-level view of the
USSR --.China's differences with the Soviets had many other deep-seated
4. No cha en noted in the respective forces along the Sino-
Soviet border. the Assistant Chinese Military Attache in Washington,
had told DoD of icia s t e Chinese were aware that quantitative and qualitative
Soviet force improvements were being made, but not yet of a level requiring
a Chinese response.
5. had also mentioned that the Chinese had "hit" the Vietnamese
hard somarly August. This evidently coincided with a period of
increased anti-Chinese propaganda between 3 and 10 August. Analysts doubted,
however, that a "second lesson" was in store, or that China intended to launch
anything more than low-level attacks against the Vietnamese. They noted, though,
that China evidently was attempting through arms aid to anti-Vietnamese
Montagnard groups to create more trouble for Hanoi behind its lines. 25X1
Korea
6. No signs of opposition had been noted to General Chun Du Hwan's
ascendency and Chun now appeared firmly entrenched. It was speculated that
the first sign of popular reaction against him, if any, would be at the
time of the referendum on the new constitution in October. In view of the
shortage of lead time Chun had possibly decided to rely on the DRP as his
vehicle to attain the Presidency in 1981, which could involve soliciting
Kim Chong Pil's cooperation. I I
7. It was suggested that the ROK Generals were watching the US closely
to see our reaction to Chon's moves, but would do what they thought was
necessary regardless. Joint military planning such as the SCM was in limbo
but could be icked up on a reduced scale as circumstances appeared to
warrant. II
8. The ROK's economic situation was described as being in a downturn
and likely to stay that way. Problems could be anticipated if the authorities
attempted to cut beck recently-won workers' salaries to make Korean exports
more competitive.
9. On North Korea, analysts spoke of main features emerging from
Congressman Solarz's conversation with Kim I1 Sung: Kim's stress on
reunification, similar stress on US troop withdrawal, and willingness to lie
in claiming a Northern troop strength of 375,000 men. Despite the blatancy
of Kim's claims on troop strength, the newsmen accompanying Solarz had picked
this figure up and had given it wide play.
10. North Korean order of battle along the DMZ remained unchanged.
Attention was called to the fact that an exact copy of a section of the ROK's
"Great Wall" anti-tank barrier along the DMZ ha been duplicated at the North
Korean ranger training center nearby.
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Indonesia
12. Analysts regarded the current differences between the US and
Indonesia as very serious. It was pointed out that several years ago a
US-Indonesian Binational Conference had been set up to meet twice yearly
on ways to avoid just such differences, but had for some time failed to
convene. We had also poured cold water on a feeler to
visit the US to discuss an improvement in relations. The Indonesians were
now behaving in a very nationalistic way. Suharto was controlling the
situation so far, but it could get much worse if opposition elements seized
upon it to embarrass the government.
Philippines
13. Deterioration of security in the Philippines was not viewed as an
issue which was imminent; analysts believed, however, that it should be
flagged as something requiring attention. Aquino had made an emotional
anti-Marcos speech at the National Press Club and would probably do the
same before the Asia Society, but it seemed doubtful that he could really
lead the anti-Marcos elements. But the spread between rich and poor was
increasing, and the question which needed to be faced at some point was
"
after Marcos, what?"
Indochina
14. Since 23 June the Thai had reduced their forces along the Kampuchean
border and pulled well back, apparently to reduce the chances of a further
clash. The Vietnamese on the other hand had increased their forces and now
had nine
1E 1 3W
some analysts believed it likely that the VN forces would attack DK
concentrations if good intelligence could be obtained regardless of political
consequences. Other analysts felt that the impending UN vote on Kampuchean
seating might inhibit the Vietnamese. 25X1
15. No L' ' .a: ks had yet occurred, but DK guerrilla operations had
forced the Vietnamese to string out their troops along roads and railroads.
I possible DK effort to make a show of attacking Phnom Penh,
our uk caps i ies os yet did not appear sufficient for such an objective.
Although the DK forces appeared well armed, no new Chinese ship arrivals had occurred.
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16. In Laos the LPDR appeared to be acutely concerned about a possible
threat along the Thai-Lao border from rebel units based in Thailand. These
units were better organized than was the case a year ago. The situation
along the Lao-Chinese border appeared comparatively quiet.
17. Addressing reports that Soviet shipments to VN had been reduced,
analysts pointed out that the Soviet aid flow was cyclical in nature and 25X1
could, in fact, be down somewhat at the present time. In addition, VN
had already received considerable Soviet military assistance and might now
be in process of absorbing the aid already on hand.
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13 August 1930
Following is the East Asia Warning Meeting Agenda. The meeting
is scheduled for 1400 hours on 20 August in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters.
South Korea
-- Effect of General Chun's anticipated takeover as Chief in South Korea.
-- Popular reactions, if any, expected from Kim Dae Jong trial.
North Korea
-- Status of Kim Chong-I1 and the succession question -- close to
resolution?
-- Results of the Solarz visit -- a mellowing in the North?
Indonesia
-- Is the Indonesian loss of confidence in and dissatisfaction With the
US reported out of Jakarta for real?
Philippines
-- Aquino, Marcos, and the security situation.
China
-- What policy and personnel developments can we expect from the upcoming
NPC session?
-- Update on the military balance along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese
borders.
Indochina
-- Situation in Kampuchean and along the Thai border. Thai-Laos relations
Soviet logistical support to Vietnam.
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