EAST ASIA WARNING MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 17, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
17 July 1980
MEMORAidDUM FOR: See Distribution
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT East Asia Warning Meeting
1. Following is the agenda for the East Asia Warning Meeting,
scheduled for Wednesday, 23 July at 1400 hours in Room 7 E 62,
CIA Headquarters.
China
-- Preparations for NPC: what is Hua Guofeng`s staying power?
-- Reaction to Indian recognition of Heng Samrin -- will
rapproachement live?
-- "Second lesson" prospects in wake of Thai border
incursions.
Southeast Asia
-- What is purpose of "summit meeting" in Laos?
-- The Soviet Vietnamese connection after the meeting in
Moscow
-- Will there be more attacks along the Thai border?
-- How serious the Lao-Thai border closing?
-- Long-term Thai reaction to the Vietnamese incursion?
-- How well is Prem doing?
DERIVATI.-'::. CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW 0': JULY 1986
Derived from 2lultiple
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South Korea
-- Public reaction to the purification campaign, new
issue of military promotion and the appointment of
General Yoo as the new KCIA chief.
North Korea
-- Possibility succession issue might be resolved at the
Party Congress.
Indonesia
-- How serious are the current strains in US.-Indonesian
relations?
2
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2 July 1950
PNIC Warnin-- Agenda: Potential Wa-nine Developments over the next 90 days.
I. Vietna Thail3rd-China:
A. Do the Vietnamese incursions into T an' on 23-~~ s'
h-fY a
change in Hanoi's policy or were they simply a sho - ction to the
Thai decision to begin repatriating Khmer
1. Can a case be made that the Vietnamese misjudged Thai intentions
and had not expected the Prem government to begin repatriation? Did Hanoi
share Beijing's judgment this spring that Preen wished to stop Chinese assistance
to Pol Pot's forces through Thailand? Foreign Minister Thach's suggestion
during his visit to Bangkok in May that Hanoi and Bangkok let the Kampuchea
question rest for 3 or 4 months implied that the Vietnamese were confident
that they would be able to bring about a gradual Thai disengagement from
collaborating with China on Kampuchea. But following his talks with Thach,
Prem reportedly concluded that Beijing was correct regarding the necessity of
applying military pressure on Vietnam to force a withdrawal of its forces from
Kampuchea.
B. If Hanoi has in fact concluded that Prem has abandoned his initial
intent to back away from a collision course with Vietnam, the Vietnamese may
be contemplating a significant shift toward confrontation tactics in dealing
with Thailand. le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap are said to be in
Moscow for consultations on policy toward Kampuchea and Thailand.
1. Foreign Minister Thach stated on 26 June that Vietnamese forces
would now move against Pol Pot's forces south of Aranyaprathet in an attempt
to stop the repatriation of these guerrillas.
2. Does Hanoi intend to maintain military pressure with the object of
forcing the Thai tQ halt repatriation and end their resupply of DK forces?
.Will. the Vietnamese withhold further cross-border operations for several weeks
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in order to gauge Bangkok's response to the initial incursions? According to
press reports, Thai authorities, citing border tensions, announced a sus'
pension
of repatriation on 27 June. On 30 June, Foreign Minister Sitthi postponed
indefinitely his planned trip to China.
C. China's response: Following Thach's visit to Bangkok, the Chinese
claimed to be increasingly confident that the Thai would not yield to Vietnamese
pressure to prevent Chinese supplies from reaching Pol Pot's forces.
Chinese Foreign Ministry warned the Vietnamese on.25 June that they would fac25
grave danger" if they "persist in military adventures,"
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1. The ITM of 26 June judged that, "If attacks into Thailand continue
or escalate, Beijing may feel compelled to increase its military activity along
the Sino-Vietnamese border."
2. Deng Xiaoping, the prime mover in China's attack on Vietnam in
February 1979, told a Thai cabinet minister on 26 May that a second and perhaps
stronger military strike into Vietnam remained a serious option.
D. The Chinese have an obvious interest in stiffening Thai resistance to'
Vietnamese pressures, but if their public and private waThings fail to deter
further Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, and if the Thai back away from
confrontation with Vietnam, Beijing will have to confront some hard decisions.
The Chinese military attache in Bangkok has said that China does not expect
Vietnam to launch additional attacks against the Thai on a scale that the.Thai
military cannot handle on their own. INR on 1 July noted that the Chinese
would be faced with a dilemma if the Vietnamese should ignore Beijing's warnings,
and judged that if-the Chinese feel the need for military-psychological
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 S." Should consideration be given-to issuing an Alert Memorandum calling
attention to possible Chinese military. moves against Vietnam if Hanoi disregards
The-Two Koreas:
A. The central question for warning over the next three months focuses on
china's warnings?
un oo Hwan and his core.
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pressure, a ground or air exercise conducted so as to be clearly detectable to
the Vietnamese might serve China's purpose.
-~ guru" korea. might take in an.attempt to halt- the growing consolidation
and institutionalization of the authority of If Gen Ch D
_on 27 May almost certainly are viewed by the North Koreans as having demolished
their hopes for an early "revolutionary uprising," i.e., internal confusion and
divisions and violent demonstrations leading to the weakening of South Korea's
political and military posture vis-a-vis the North.
group in Seoul. Developments in the South since the military-.takeover of Kwangju.
simultaneous overland infiltration raised potentially serious questions about
North Korean intentions. The 14 D played down this incident by noting that
"North Korean infiltration missions normally are at their high point between March
and early fall." DIA, on the other hand, took a more serious view, stating that
C. The attempted seaborne infiltration on 20 June and indications of a
time for Judging trends in the South and.in US-ROK relations.
B. Although the North Koreans so far have been unwilling to terminate
the bilateral preparatory talks for a-meeting between the two prime ministers,
they insisted on delaying the next session until late August, presumably to gain
the infiltration attempts, coupled with more vitriolic propaganda attacks on-
South Korean leaders, suggest that the North may be moving toward ?a more
confrontational stance."
D. If Chun Doo Hwan and his supporters succeed in keeping the lid on
and make steady progress in consolidating their Dower in the next few months,
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 the North Koreans will either have to acquiesce in a fait accompli ending
their hope for a "revolutionary uprising" in the South or gamble on high.riskT
measures to reverse the trend..'
If Kim Il-song opts for bold-measures, he may first withdraw from the
Panmunjom preparatory.talks,'perhaps'before the next scheduled meeting in late
August. The North Koreans-have prepared the ground for a walkout by questioning
.the- credentials of__the.ROK delegates following the imposition
provoke a clash alongthe.DMZ which would be blamed on
true ..J.ascist clique" in Seoul;
.martial law in the South.
Apia-Somalia:
mid-July, with the participation of Cuban troops, have heightened Somali con-
order an attempt to assassinate Clum Doo Hwan and other
ROK military.leaders. (The abortive Blue House raid to
eliminate President Pak Chong-hui in January 1968 was
conceived as "the spark that would touch off the revoluticn.
A. -Ethiopian plans for a large military exercise near Dire Dawa in
victims that Ethiopia will stage an attack into northern Somalia before the
end of the year. A Somali faction headed by Defense Y *+;ster All Samantar
reportedly believes that the Ethiopian military buildup in the Ogaden has
created a critical need for an early agreement with the L'S for the use of
Somali military facilities in exchange for US military aid. In the absence of
such an agreement, Ali Samantar believes a large-scale. Ethiopian invasion would
be inevitable before the end of 1980. He doubts that President Siad Barrels
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-Sim -ma a order a - ste up '
y_..... pinfiltration atte%,s. with the mission
-of provoking violence. that could tae turned against . the Seoul 'regime:
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regime could repel such an attack or survive in' its present form.
The Ethiopians, for their part, seem to attach equal importance to
a u-omali agreement which would strengthen Somalia's ability to resist
Ethiopian pressures. The mid-May DDO report stated that an attack into northern
Somalia would be carried out before the Somalis can acquire foreign military.
support. At the end of May, Foreign Minister Feleke mentioned the US-Somali
negotiations in a talk with the US ambassador and emphasized that Ethiopia
buildup and the exercise in mid-July. could thus. be assessed: in- this content of
Ethiopian concern that-a US-Somali agreement would'present a long-term threat
to their position in the Ogaden and, more generally, in the Horn of Africa.
C. From the warning standpoint, the near-term risk of a sharp military
escalation may center more on Somali reactions to the Ethiopian exercise and
attempts to keep Ethiopian forces away from the border than on the longer-term
prospect of an Ethiopian attack into northern Somalia.
IV. Cuba: -Castro's Next Move:
A. Is Castro. preparing new initiatives on the refugees-negotiations
complex of issues before the US elections? The regime remains formally
committed to using the refugees-particularly the 360 who remain in the US
Interests Section-to draw the US into talks on "basic problems" of the trade
embargo, Guantanamo, and reconnaissance overflights. NID articles have suggested
that Castro might (1) revive the Florida boat-lift by prortsing to release
relatives of Cubans. in the US; (2) encourage refugees to enter-the Guantanamo base.
B. The Soviet dimension: hypothetical scenario:
Might Castro seek Soviet approval of a negotiating package that would
include a guarded and vague Soviet offer to consider withdrawing the combat
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 -brigade from Cuba if the US agrees to Castro's terms for "normalizingg US-Cuban.
relations? It might be recalled that the circumstances that prompted the Soviet
decision `to have the brigade conduct conspicuous.. field maneuvers last August
ve never been fully explained. This episode may still have an important-.bearing
on future Soviet-CuDan initiatives. The decision was made in the knowledge that
field maneuvers presumably was related in part to Cuban objectives at- the
ublic controversy over the Soviet military presence was developing in the US.
Senator Stone's initial . public. statement was made on-.15 July) ,-.The timing of
ionaligtied=:Summit in Havana 3n September.:
einusual attention: to .the"US military presence on Cuban- territory as a -permanen
hreat to that country? s- sovereigityMoscow radio said the Cubans "have made
ta.aa1-, L zia-F, r6501U ion 01 t
Soviet media drew an implicit parallel between Guantanamo and the -Soviet. brigade.
In his first public re w ion to US statements regarding the Soviet brigade, Castro
on 28 September demanded that the Guantanamo base be "dismantled': He argued
that "Carter's moral duty is to withdraw the troops and remove'the naval base
from Guantanaa-lo because its existence is illegal and-immoral."
C. If the Soviet leaders should authorize Castro to put forward a..
package which linked, explicitly or implicitly,. Guantanamo with the combat brigade,
they presumably would do so on the assumption that the US administration--given
--tine exigencies or the election carp ail
Soviets probably would calculate that this outcome would damage the credibility
of Washington's case for remaining in Guantanamo and strengthen Moscow's case
for maintaining the brigade in Cuba.
D. :.The "logic" of this scenario suggests that Castro would time the
package- initiative for t greatest impact on the US election campaign.-perhaps
.in late summer following the nominating conventions.
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 --Afghanistan: (1) Proposals designed to broaden Kabul's 14 May-
A. U=SR: possible post-Olympics initiatives:
-TNF' modernization:. A new negotiating initiative that would
formula for a "settlement," including a demand that the eventual withdrawal of
Soviet forces be accompanied by the-."neutralization" of the. Indian ocean and
the Persian Gulf, i.e., withdrawal of both US and Soviet naval units from these
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waters.
additional Soviet forces into Afghanistan before the end of the year.
objectives in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia and jUstified.the introduction of...
settlement- plan on: the calculation that it would be-unacceptable to the-US Th
zoviets would then contend that US rejection confirms their charges aboutUS
build on Schmidt's co-kept of a freeze and drop or fuzz Moscow's predonditian
that NATO must cancel or postpone implementation of the December deployment
decision before negotiations can take place. Any Soviet TNP initiative would
be aimed squarely at the US failure to ratify SALT II and be designed to exploit
:tr_e vulnerabilities represented by the SALT III proviso in the December deployment
.Denesnti s faction is already positioning itself to block any efforts by
decision.-
g
Bani-Sadr and Ghotbazadeh to use the Shah's demise for another atterrrt to break
-the impasse an the hostages.
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le ...
B. Iran: Effects of the Shah's death on the internat. power str,,
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