WARNING ASSESSMENT FOR EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 24, 1980
• Content Type: NOTES

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment for East Asia
Attached is the assessment prepared on the
basis of the Community views expressed at the
18 June warning meeting. This memorandum had
not been coordinated with the participants but
is being circulated among them.
You or your representative are cordially
invited to attend the next warning meeting for
East Asia in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters, at
1400 on Wednesday, 23 July. Please provide the
name of your representative t
y COB 22 July.
Distribution
State - Mr. Robert Drexler
Navy - Cdr. Robert Cyboron
DIA
Air Force - Maj. Wally Astor
Army - Col. Jack Churchill
Treasury - Mr. Arthur Long
SWS -
NSA -
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning 1" -C
FROM
National intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: East Asia
The following items were discussed by the Community
Representatives at the 18 June Warning Meeting.
2. Korea -- In the ROK, General Chon Doo Huan's recent activities
suggested to analysts that he is using the textbook written by Park
Chong Hee to move toward seizing power and establishing one-man rule.
It was also observed, however, that if Chon hopes to succeed within
the time-frame now being considered for constitutional reform and
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elections (a completion of the new constitional draft by October, a
referendum by the end of the year, and elections possibly by next
June) the only way he can do so would be through massive rigging of
the polls. Chon's problem is his unpopularity combined with the
battered state of the two political parties -- the DRP is decimated
and although the NDP, while still in being, is weakened -- which
might require him to organize a new party. It was speculated that
if Kim Yong San ran against Chon, Kim would win.
3. Analysts added that if Chon does attempt to rig the election,
he would face the question of public reaction. There is also the
question of how the public will accept a new constitution containing
elements of the old Yushin constitution, e.g., strong one-man rule and
government control of the National Assembly. Cl
4. Analysts agreed that for the moment, at least, the country is
quiet. Student activitists had been arrested or frightened into
passivity and the Kwangju riots have not caused people outside the
Cholla provinces to react. Nevertheless, the government will need to
allow a number of schools to open soon and other unknown factors could
go to work and create problems. There is a possibility of
assassination and terrorist activities generated by Kwangju students.
The government is watching the schools, and there is a brigade of
special forces assigned to the campuses. =
5. Analysts termed the economic situation less than good, but
commented also that economic activity was beginning to pick up again.
The visit of Ex-Im Bank President Moore had helped in this regard by
restoring a measure of economic confidence. Commercial banks are
following a wait and see policy with respect to further investments,
but have lots of money available and are conscious of the need to
protect investments already made. The unemployment figure stands at
five percent, but there have been no further labor demonstrations;
workers appear to understand that if they demand too much they will be
worse off. D
6. With the security situation quiet, US-ROK relations are
satisfactory. The Combined Forces Command is functioning, and ROK
troops used to suppress the Kwangju riots are back to normal positions.
US-ROK military cooperation has resumed. General Wickham's deputy in
the CFC has been appointed to the Special Committee National Security
Matters (the new military dominated control mechanism) but may be
removed. II
7. In the North, analysts had not perceived any unusual military
indicators. Troops were engaged in normal activities for this time
of year, including agriculture. However, during May 280,000 people in
Chongjin had been blood-typed, which suggested that the same thing
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prepared for war.
had occurred elsewhere. This could be read as an indication that
the North Koreans were getting their civilian population better
8. China -- Following up last month's discussion, analysts
called attention to possible frictions at the top on economic issues,
as indicated by a spate of Peoples Daily editorials. For example,
criticisms had been leveled at unnamed people who had favored a
faster pace of modernization -- an issue on which Hua Guofeng is
vulnerable, in addition to his vulnerability on the question of
material incentives. Nevertheless, the tone of such editorials was
neither sharp nor accusative.
9. Analysts assume that Deng Xiaoping would indeed resign from
his governmental position in August, taking Li Xiannian, Yeh Jianying,
and perhaps Hua Guofeng with him. Hua would thus be left with only
the Party Chairmanship. It appeared from editorials and other evidence
that the top leaders were presently thrashing out issues before the
major meetings scheduled for later this year. Analysts referred to
the differences between Hua Guofeng's and Zhao Ziyang's definitions of
Zhao's duties as Vice Premier, which suggested that Hua might try to
hang on to the Premiership. II
on Kampuchea and Pol Pot.
10. On the subject of Sino-US relations, analysts felt that the
Chinese are quiet satisfied with the present state of affairs. The
4 June Holbrooke speech and Geng Biao's visit to the US had generated
favorable Chinese comments, along with statements affirming coincidence
of strategic views between the two countries. On the Geng Biao visit
itself, the Peoples Daily commentary spoke first of all about this
coincidence of views, and accorded less importance to US arms sales.
There were, however, the "usual differences between the US and China
11. As an indicator of the current state of Sino-US relations,
analysts commented on the large number of people traveling from each
country to the other. This had also occurred, it was pointed out, in
the case of France, when in the early days of Sino-French relations
similar flow of visits had occurred. The present volume of US-PRC
travel nevertheless was much greater. F
12. One analyst remarked upon the key role which Hong Kong is
assuming in Chinese policy. The Chinese are putting their representatives
into Hong Kong business and commercial concerns in significant numbers,
probably to train their people in business practices but also suggesting
that Hong Kong has a long-term part to play in China's economic develop-
ment. F I
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13. Commenting upon the Chinese refusal to respond to Soviet
feelers on improving Sino-Soviet relations, analysts judged that
Beijing's present policies, including expanded relations with the US,
are more valuable to the Chinese then achieving some easing of tensions,
with the Soviets along the border. There was agreement that a failure
to continue to realize such benefits could generate some pressures for
a change, although there was no sign of this now. There was some
speculation that if the Soviets revealed that their bid had been
rejected, a considerable degree of ferment could be generated within
the Chinese Foreign Ministry and PLA. Apropos of possible potential
problems in US-Communist relations, attention was called to the
Peoples Daily editorial critizing Governor Reagan's China policy. F
14. No particular change in the Soviet OB along the Chinese
border had been observed, except for the addition of a new Backfire
regiment. The Soviets had also undertaken a succession of command post
exercises with the Transbaikal and Far Eastern military districts
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15. Philippines -- Reference was made to the reported manifesto
of anti-Marcos activities provided to the Department of State by
Senator Aquino, which called for a united front including the
Communists against Marcos as well as armed demonstrations. Analysts
recalled that a similar manifesto had occurred during elections some
two years ago and this added nothing new. It was agreed that the
Philippine situation merited close watching, however. ^ 25X1
16. Indochina -- Analysts addressed the security situation in
Kampuchea, noting that the Vietnamese and Heng Semrin forces were
having difficulties in maintaining control over the roads, although
the level of DK attacks had not reached a point requiring special
attention. Eastern Kampuchea was said to be fairly secure, but
communications elsewhere were being hit; e.g., Route 4 struck one
time, and a press report of an attack on a train NW of Phnom Penh
confirmed. Not all these attacks were attributable to the DK; some
were caused by elements which were essentially bandits. Heavy rains
were now occurring, and Route 6 was under water. WN casualties were
evidently fairly low, and Vietnamese troops were undertaking operations
of their own. On the other hand, whole units of Heng Samrin troops
had been deserting.
17. The DK forces were described as being well supplied with small
arms and mines, with the expectation of receiving 1600 additional tons
of arms aid by the end of the summer. Hence they were well able to do
what they would do -- intensify operations against the Vietnamese.
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So far, though, this intensification had not occurred. There was no
disagreement over the thesis that the DK forces would be in a more
difficult position in the next dry season if they failed to take
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action now.
18. Considerable discussion ensued over the size of the DK forces,
with one view maintaining that the total was around 50,000 but with
the upper limit of combat or main force units being 30-35,000 with the
rest consisting of transport troops, militia, etc. Questioned closely
on the methodology for putting forth this view, the analyst concerned
outlined the steps through which his judgment was reached. SIGINT
was the basic tool. The possibility was raised that force levels in
DK communications were purposely inflated as a propaganda device, to
which the analyst responded that DK activity reports had been collated
with PAVN reports as well as with Thai intelligence estimates of DK
troops strengths and all roughly tallied. The NSA representative added
that the DK units had been attempting to preserve communications security
and that there was no reason to question the DK communications. All
agreed that the best anyone could come up with on DK strength was an
educated guess. Inter alia it was observed that the DK were presently
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using couriers to supplement radio communications.
10 n? rhp nn1;rira1 side- it was reported that the!
There was a possibility from this and some other similar in i.ca ions
of more Chinese aid going to the K'PLF or the Khmer Serai. The Thai
had been trying to bring together Son Sann and Khieu Samphan. The
Heng Samrin units which had deserted had gone over Son Sann,not to the
DK, and the Son Sann also claimed penetration into every part of
Kampuchea.
20. Attention was also called to signs of possible increased Chinese
attention to Northern Laos as an area for stepped-up anti-Vietnamese
activity, as indicated by an unusual number of air flights between Hainan,
where the Lao refugees accepted by China from camps in Thailand had been
relocated, to areas along the Chinese border with Laos. Conceivably
the Chin raining some of these refugees for guerrilla operations
in Laos.
21. Analysts speculated on the motivations and significance of the
purported decision of the Thai to ask the Chinese to stop supplying
the DK forces through Thailand. In this regard, Air Marshal Sitthi was
quoted as saying that what the DK needed was food, not arms, for rainy
season operations. It was conceivable therefore that the DK in fact
already had all the arms necessary for the current level of attacks.
Mention was made of an island off Trad province in the Gulf of Thailand
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which was being used as a covert support base, and there was some
speculation that logistical support efforts might be concentrated there
in a more secure environment. There had been agreement between the
Chinese and Thai to "cool it" on the score of military aid to the DK
during the Thach visit to Thailand, and the Thai and Chinese might now
be playing some kind of a shadow game.
22. On the subject of the forthcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers
Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, analysts assumed that the main question which
Secretary Muskie would be asked was how the US would vote in the next
UN General Assembly on Kampuchean representation. Besides this, there
was an underlying question on the score of US-Chinese relations and
what they entailed for Southeast Asia. The Indonesians and Malaysians
were not persuaded that the developing relationships between the US
and China were not being undertaken at their expense.
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23. Analysts suggested that the Thai might run into problems
connected with the new effort to repatriate Kampuchean refugees from
the camps located in Thailand. Nobody much was anxious to return --
only 500 to 600 people had agreed to go -- and the Vietnamese were
also objecting. There was a chance that the Vietnamese might try to
scare some of the repatriates back into Thailand. I
communicators remained at Danang. There was no indication to suggest
that the Soviets were in any way cutting back on their aid to Vietnam.
24. The Soviet presence in Vietnam was touched upon briefly. It
appeared that the Soviets were concentrating this presence at Cam Ranh
Bay by moving their air activities there from Danang. However, Soviet
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25. Thailand -- The performance of Prime Minister Prem since he
assumed office was summed up as not being too good. So far Prem had
escaped serious criticism, but a critical point could come in about three 25X1
months more unless he faced up to some of Thailand's pressing problems.
This point in time would coincide with the date of announcing new
military promotions, which could also cause additional trouble for Prem. F-1
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