WARNING ASSESSMENT: CHINA-EAST ASIA PACIFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 23, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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23 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
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THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM
ationa me igence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
SUBJECT Warning Assessment: China-East Asia Pacific
The following items were discussed by the Community
Representatives at the 19 May Warning meeting.
China
1. Analysts discussed the apparent contradictions between the
recent speech of Hua Guofeng which contained criticism of material
incentives, and a Peoples Daily article the following day defending
such incentives in strongest terms. While Hua's speech could have
represented a serious division among the leadership, most analysts
considered it to be more of a personal position of Hua himself,
who seems to be fighting a losing battle to stay in power. Deng
Xiaoping's reported decision to step down in August probably meant that
he would be taking Hua with him, too, and Hua is "going out with a
whimper." The question of incentives would be addressed at the
forthcoming NPC session according to Vice Premier Zhao Ziyang, but
there was no reason to believe that present policy lines would be
reversed even though there were clearly those at lower levels who
opposed material rewards for production increases.
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DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW bN MAY 2000
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2. On Chinese foreign policy, analysts believe that the
Chinese are presently quite concerned over their relations with
the ASEAN countries, particularly the tendency among some of these
countries -- Indonesia and Malaysia -- to seek out a negotiated
settlement of the Kampuchean situation. This may be why Deng
Xiaoping spoke of accepting a-phased Vietnam withdrawal from
Kampuchea to a German reporter. There was no question but that
China is now in a more difficult situation then it was a ear
ago with respect to Vietnam and Kampuchea (see below). I
Indochina
3. Analysts did not believe that Vietnam intended to make
any serious concessions with respect to Thai and the other ASEAN
countries on troop withdrawal from Vietnam -- the reported VN
willingness to withdraw some troops was regarded as a token
gesture and possibly could be related to the practice that Hanoi
followed in last year's rainy season in withdrawing some units
back to Vietnam for refitting. Vietnam Foreign Minister Thach's
visit to Kuala Lumpur showed no real flexibility despite some
reference to some troop withdrawals under "certain conditions."
However, the Vietnamese apparently perceived the existence of
differences among the ASEAN nations on negotiations and were
trying to exploit these differences.
4. The purge of the Lao Dong party currently conducted by
the Vietnamese was not regarded as being particularly serious; the
Vietnamese were evidently attempting to weed out cadres who were
"good at war but no good at managing the economy." The corrupt
and inefficient were also targeted for elimination. Nevertheless,
the purge (which had begun in January) could pickup steam later
this year as high-ranking party members became involved. It was
noted that party members of Chinese ethnic background were being
removed as well. =
5. Analysts commented upon the apparent consolidation of Soviet
military presence in Vietnam at Cam Ranh Bay. It appeared that air
activities formerly conducted from Da Nang were being moved to Cam
Ranh, where Soviet ground controllers as well as aviation fuel
storage facilities were being located. A continuing Soviet naval
presence at Cam Ranh Bay was reported upon.
6. Within Kampuchea, analysts commented that the DK forces
under Pol Pot had evidently developed plans for military operations
during the rainy season, but no real action had yet occurred.
However, the rainy season had not yet fully arrived. The DK forces
were evidently drawing food supply from UN stocks at the Thai border.
Arms and equipment from Chinese sources appeared adequate. =
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functioned required active Vietnamese support.
7. Analysts observed that the Vietnamese were trying hard
to provide a facade of a Kampuchean governmental structure under
Heng Samrin, but were still not having much success. Village
committees had been set up in some areas of Kampuchea but lacked
real authority and the only local governmental operations which
the west, i.e., the Thai border area and not from the east.
8. On the food situation in Kampuchea reports of starvation
in Battambang and even some of the eastern provinces adjacent to
Vietnam were coming in, and the situation was regarded as likely
to get worse. The Vietnamese were making some food stocks available
to the populace in order to draw people to support the Heng Samrin
regime, but while Vietnamese and Heng Samrin government officials
received 30 kilos of rice per month, only three kilos of rice per
person were going to the Kampucheans. Seed rice was coming from
9. Analysts noted that increased quantities of Vietnamese
supplies were being sent to Northern Laos, but no serious Chinese
provocations in this region had occurred. The types of supplies
being sent there could not be identified. II
Thailand
10. Analysts expressed the view that Prem's government was
doing about as well as could be expected -- the economy was still
in serious trouble and inflation was increasing -- but there was
no threat for the time being to political stability nor to the Prem
government itself. People were giving him the benefit of the doubt.
However, Prem would need to come to grips soon with the economic
problems facing the country. Analysts called attention to the
1 October date for making annual military promotions, and speculated
that Prem could encounter some problems around this time. Although
he had been identified with ISOC (Internal Security Operations Command),
former colleagues in the ISOC had not been taken into the government
by him and were dissatisfied. There were also elements of the ISOC
who would like to move further away from the Chinese who traditionally
had been identified with support for the Communist-led insurgency.F-
South Korea
11. Analysts were not surprised by the declaration of martial
law in South Korea given the failure of the government's restrained
approach to student demonstrations. One analyst characterized General
Chun Doo Hwan as having a seige mentality which made his strong
reaction to the student's ultimatum and 22 May deadline predictable.
It was generally agreed that Chun enjoyed strong support within the
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military for tougher action against the demonstrators and the
establishment of martial law. C
which has come to light since
our meeting, appears to back up that judgment. There is probably
a.good deal less support among military officers for Chun's
capitalizing on martial law to neutralize -- in some cases wipe
out -- his political opposition.
North Korea
12. North Korean I&W anomalies were noted, but they were
thought not to be significant, even in combination in suggesting
the North was preparing for an attack.
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DCI
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DDCI
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ER
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D/NFAC
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DD/NFAC
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AS/NFAC
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NIO/W
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NIO/Ch-EAP File
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NI0/Ch-EAP Chrono
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NFAC Registry
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NSC Coordinator
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SRP
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N IO/NESA
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NI0/GPF
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NI0 /PE
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NIO/SP
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NIO/USSR-EE
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NI0/LA
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NI0/WE
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SA/NP
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D/OCO
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DD/OCO
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D/OCR
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D/OER
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D/OPA
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D/OSR
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D/OGCR
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D/OIA
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D/OSWR
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NFAC/RES
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OER/DC
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OPA/EA
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C/DDO/EA
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ulAf LYD
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OPA/EA/CH
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OSR/EAP
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OER/IJP
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State (Drexler)
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Air Force (Astor)
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Army (Churchill)
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Navy (Cyboron)
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 Approved For R
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
0
23 May 1980
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment for China-
East Asia Pacific
Attached is the assessment prepared on the
basis of the Community views expressed at the
19 May warning meeting. This memorandum has
not been coordinated with the participants but
is being circulated among them.
You or your representative are cordially
invited to attend the next warning meeting for
China-East Asia Pacific in Room 7 E 62, CIA
iEna&quarters, at 1400 on Wednesday, 18 June.
Please provide the name of your representative
25X
by COB 17 June.
Distribution
State - Mr. Robert Drexler
Navy - Cdr. Robert Cyboron
DIA
Air Force - Maj. Wally Astor
Army - Col. Jack Churchill
Treasury - Mr. Arthur Long
SEW
NSA