WARNING ASSESSMENT: CHINA-EAST ASIA PACIFIC (S)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 29, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
29 April 1980
MEMORATDUM FOR:
THROUGH
FROM
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for National Intelligence
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
National Intelligence Officer for
China-East Asia Pacific
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China-East Asia Pacific
II
The following items were discussed by the Community Repre-
sentatives at the 23 April Warning Meeting. II
South Korea
2. Military strongman General Chon Tu-hwan's appointment as
Acting Director of the KCIA was seen as the next in a series of steps
Chon has taken to increase his control and power in the complex set
of relationships that currently describe the R-OK government. In
his frequent disclaimers of political ambition, Chon has encouraged
us to watch what he does; this most recent exhibit, therefore, is
all the more unreassuring. While our suspicions about Chon's
aspirations cannot be confirmed at this point, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to see him losing interest in the competition
for political power in a post-Pak government. Analysts anticipated
increased public awareness of Chon's role in the transition to
political reform and a new government now that he has assured the
KCIA post. Labor and the students are certain to become more
sensitive to indications of efforts by Chon to control the process
and/or promote himself to the Presidency. 0
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Southeast Asia
3. Thailand -- Analysts noted signs of disunity and indecision
in the new Prem government, but generally concluded it was too early
to conclude that these symptoms would lead to an early demise of
Prem. There was considerable discussion of indications that
Bangkok -- as well as Malaysia and Indonesia -- were rethinking
their options with regard to continuation of support for Pol Pot,
refusal to compromise with Vietnam, and close cooperation with China.
There was general agreement that the Malaysian and Indonesians were
hoping for a compromise with Hanoi, but analysts differed as to
whether there was any real likelihood of a change in Thai policy.
All agreed that the key to movement would be real policy changes on
the part of the Vietnamese (making it possible for others to
compromise), and it was generally concluded that Hanoi, while perhaps
making some cosmetic gestures, was likely to remain wedded to current
policy for some time to come. ~:]
5. Internal Developments -- Analysts touched briefly on the
recent NPC standing committee session, noting that it had carried
through on matters foreshadowed by the Fifth Central Committee Plenum.
They were generally relaxed about the internal political situation,
noting that the policy line favored by-Deng'-Xiaoping appeared all the
more firmly established.
6. Sino-Soviet Developments -- Participants in the meeting also
saw little evidence of change in this sphere. They generally discounted
faint signs of Soviet reasonableness" as protective measures prior
to Vice Premier Geng Biao's visit the US. They also saw little signs
of change on the Chinese side .II
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7. Sino-Vietnamese Developments -- Analysts had little new
to discuss.on this topic. They noted that China had ceased to
document regularly complaints of border clashes with the Vietnamese,
but saw little real significance in this trend. They noted that
there had been virtually no significant change in the forces
deployed on either side of the border. EJ
29 April 1980
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Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ER
4 - D/NFAC
5 - DD/NFAC
6 - AS/NFAC
7-NIO/W
8 - NIO/Ch-EAP File
9 - NIO/Ch-EAP Chrono
10 - NFAC Registry
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