FOOD FOR THOUGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 13, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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13 March 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officers
FROM : Assistant NIO for Warning
SUBJECT Food for Thought
Attached are some comments and questions which may be of use to
you in your monthly warning meetings next week.'
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I. USSIt-Pakistan-A f"hanistan
1. Has the possibility of Soviet military action against Afghan
insurgent camps in Pakistan increased or diminished in the past month?
-The NID of 6 March, noting that the Soviet offensive in Konarha
Province had forced more Afghan rebels to retreat across the border,
judged that this "will increase the chances for Soviet cross-border
incursions."
2. What effect will developments in Afghanistan during the past month
have on the Soviets' assessment of their prospects for pacifying the country
without resorting to harsh measures to intimidate Pakistan into terminating
its own and foreign assistance to the insurgents?
--Can a case be made that the Soviets have managed at least to slow
the pace of insurgent gains, if not to arrest or reverse them?
a. The offensive in Konarha Province.
b. Attempts to block major insurgent infiltration routes across
the Afghan-Pakistani border in the northeast.
3. Soviet perceptions of Pakistan's intentions
-Zia's "appeasement" tactics:
a. Private assurances that Pakistan is not pursuing an anti-Soviet policy
b. Pakistan's rejection of the US aid package
c. Agha Shahi's public expression of interest in improving Soviet-
Pakistani relations.
d. Pakistan's apparent intention to stop short of a complete break
in diplomatic relations with Kabul.
e. Zia's 6 March statement that he would allow international
inspection of border refugee camps.
Possible Soviet/Afghan diplomatic initiatives.
-As a follow up to 13rezhnev's 22 February call for guarantees by
the US and Afghanistan's neighbors of termination of "all forms of outside
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interference in Afghanistan," might Moscow announce an initiative aimed at
undercutting US efforts to persuade its allies to apply "tangible" measures
against the Soviet Union?
a. A proposal for an international conference to negotiate guarantees
against outside interference-on the assumption that the US would
oppose such a conferende but that the European allies, Pakistan, and
India would be favorably inclined.
b. Babrak's statement to an Indian journalist on 5 March that
Afghanistan would welcome an invitation to a "Geneva-type" conference
that would establish an "international police force" on the Afghan-
Pakistani border.
II.Iran.
Implications of the failure of the UN Commission.
-Do events of 6-10 March signify a definitive failure of Bani-Sad.r's
attempts to achieve a compromise solution by decoupling the hostage and
extradition issues?
a. If the Islamic Republic Party wins a majority in the Majlis, will
Bani-Sadr abandon his efforts to resolve the hostage crisis at least
temporarily? Might he react to an electoral defeat by resigning?
b. Did Khomeini's statements on 8 and 10 March mean that he has now
sided unequivocally with the position of the embassy militants and the
clerical right that extradition of the shah is the irreducible price for
freeing the hostages? Beheshti claimed on 12 March that a majority of
members of the Revolutionary Council share the view that extradition is
the essential condition for release of the hostages.
c. Was Khomeini's pre-election broadcast tantamount to an appeal for
returning an Islamic Republic Party majority to the Majlis?
d. 'How would the leftist parties and armed groups and the ethnic
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minorities react to clerical rightist domination of the Majlis? What is
the potential for violent backlash in the streets?
III. aria
Assad has taken two major initiatives-withdrawal from Beirut and a
crackdown on domestic opponents-which involve considerable risk of mis-
calculation and surprise.
a. If communal violence in northern Lebanon and the Beirut area
escalates, will it spread. to southern Lebanon? How would Haddad and the
Israelis react? Would the August 1979 ceasefire survive? Weizmann to
the US Ambassador on 14 February: "I may end up with no choice but moving in
again unless you can do something to control (the PLO). I will not be able to
sit by and. watch Haddad's people being killed without protecting him:"
b. Is Assad overreaching in repressing his opposition? Have the chances
increased that senior Alawite officers will move against him?
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V. Egypt-Libya
a. Aside from some diplomatic diversion, might Sadat try to deflect
attention from his problems with Israel by a military move against Libya?
Might Sadat seize upon another Libyan adventure in Tunisia as a pretext?
b. Qadhafi faces growing domestic dissidence and potential disloyalty
in the military. Have the chances increased that he will see another
attempt to bring down the Bourguiba regime as a means of easing his domestic
problems?
-The Tunisian military in early March had information that the Libyans
were planning to attack Qafsah and Bordj El Khadra, and that Tunisian rebels
armed and trained by Libya were moving toward the Tunisian border.
---According to a Western technician~:iii: Libya, Libyan CH-47 helicopters
since mid-February have been flying cargo into southern Tunisia, apparently
in preparation for offensive operations.
VI. Vietnam-Kampuchea--China-Thailand.
1. How will Hanoi assess Prem's succession to Kriangsak? Will the
Vietnamese view affect the nature and scope of their military operations along
the Kampuchean-Thai border between now and the rainy season?
a. Prem reportedly believes Thailand should back away from a collision
course with Vietnam and adopt a more neutral policy. Prem, moreover,
is said to desire an early end to the refugee problem.
b. Foreign Minister Sitthi advocates withdrawing from the "monkey business"
of supporting Pol Pot.
2. TheVietnamese would seem to have two options:
a. Attempt to exploit Prem's desire to disengage from cooperation
with China in aiding Pol Pot by sharpening military pressure and
threats of cross-border strikes.
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b. Avoid menacing actions in order to draw Prem into a dialogue to
test chances of a political. accommodation at the expense of China.
3. China's perceptions.
a. Chinese officials have expressed concern that Prem will be less
receptive to China's efforts to contain the Vietnamese and will opt
for negotiations with Hanoi.
b. If the Chinese come to believe they can no longer rely on Thai
collaboration, what alternatives might they adopt? Will a Thai
disengagement increase China's incentive to stage threatening military
demonstrations and incidents on the Vietnamese border?
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